

Andren v. Behind"

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Great Patriotic War: Unknown Won

Andrey Smirnov

The collapse of 1941 - repression has nothing to do with it!

"@headless" and Stalin's Red Army?

Moscow

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A new book from the best-selling author of Blood Washed Falcons. Why did the Soviet Air Force fight worse than the Luftwaffe? A radical rethinking of the tragedy of 1941. Refutation of one of the main myths of the Great Patriotic War.

Until now, anti-Stalinist propaganda is trying to explain the crushing defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war by the mass repressions of 1937-1938, which allegedly "exterminated the Soviet military elite", "decapitated" and "knocked down" the armed forces, predetermining the catastrophe of 1941. Say, if that summer the troops were commanded not by mediocre Stalinist nominees and ignorant "cavalrymen", but by such "military professionals" as Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, the tragedy could have been avoided and the whole war would have gone in a completely different, much more favorable for the USSR scenario ...

A new book by a leading military historian leaves no stone unturned in these myths. Based not on propaganda clichés, but on genuine archival documents, comparing the level of combat training of the Red Army before and after the repressions, this study convincingly proves that the pre-war "purge" of the Red Army actually did not affect its combat readiness, which means that the causes of the tragedy : 1941, as well as failures on Hassan and during the Finnish war, should be sought not in the "Stalinist repressions", but in a completely different place. What exactly? Read this sensational book!

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Introduction

Formed in the early 1960s. the conviction that one of the most important reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941 was the military campaign carried out in 1937-1938. mass repression of its commanding staff, is one of those ideas about the twentieth century of our history, which are most

in the minds of both the masses and historians. However, this thesis still remains unproven. There is actually only one way of proof here; it is very simple and consists in the sequential execution of three research operations:

- a) studying the level of military training of the army on the eve of repressions;
- 6) studying the level of military training of the army after the repression
- c) comparison of both levels (with subsequent formulation of the conclusion).

But none of those who defend the thesis that repression is fatal has yet done this work! At best, a comparison of the level of training of the "pre-repression" and "post-repression" Red Army (i.e., a voluminous detailed study) was replaced by a several-line comparison of the "pre-repression" and "post-repression" percentages of commanders with a full-fledged military education and the percentage of people with a higher commanders with higher military education. But is this enough to prove it? Not even speaking about,

- that the figures given were incorrect!,

- that even a decrease in the level of education of the command staff could be the result not of repression, but of a threefold number

5

the slow growth of the army from 1937 to 1941 (which forced a reduction in the training time for commanders);

- that these are generally only two indicators out of many that characterize the training of the army.

The percentage of commanders with one or another military education is a rather formal indicator: it does not take into account the quality of education. But this is the last in the USSR of the 20-30s. suffered greatly from the low general educational level of cadets of military schools and students of military academies and from insufficient exactingness towards them (due to the desire to provide the army of the "proletarian state" with command cadres from workers and peasants at any cost) ... ,

Often, they even managed without such a comparison - and limited themselves, for example, to pointing out the extermination during the repressions of many prominent military scientists. But after all (as M.I. Meltyukhov rightly recalled), "troops are trained not according to the work of individual military leaders, even brilliant ones, but according to military regulations and instructions that no one has canceled"...? Or they got by with a message about the extermination or expulsion from the army of one or another number of persons of the highest and senior command staff. This last fact was presented as "the decapitation of the army", i.e. deprivation of its trained senior and senior commanders, and was usually submitted along with the remark that it takes many years to train a senior commander or an employee of the operational headquarters. But does the training of a senior or senior officer in the army begin only after the next such officer is out of action? Is it only after this that a person is enrolled in a military school, from whom, over the next "many years", a new division commander or corps chief of staff is trained? Were there not colonels in the Red Army (directly intended to fill in the coming years the positions of brigade commanders or divisional commanders), majors (directly intended to fill the posts of colonel in the coming years), etc., did green lieutenants go immediately after the brigade commanders? Of course, the premature occupation of successive positions by commanders can lead to a deterioration in the quality of senior command personnel - but such a conclusion can only be drawn on the basis of a detailed study and comparison.

6

changing the level of preparedness of the repressed and those who replaced them...

Unsubstantiated the thesis about the undermining of the Red Army by the repressions of 1937-1938. (as well as all the helplessness of attempts to prove it without a detailed comparison of the training of the "pre-" and "post-repression" Red Army) is clearly visible on the example of the published in the second half of the 90s. and being a kind of "classic of the genre" works of famous military historians V.A. Anfilov and O.F. Souvenirova. The author of the first one? does not spare emotions about the "collapse of the Red Army" (p. 63), but the conclusion with which he concludes on p. 75 listing a number of shortcomings in the combat training of the "post-repression" Red Army ("This is the deplorable state Voroshilov and his comrades under the "wise" leadership of Stalin brought the Red Army and the country's defense capability from 1937 to the spring of 1940"), looks artificially fastened. After all, V.A. Anfilov does not cover the "pre-repression" state of affairs in the aspects he criticizes. Meanwhile, for example, lessons in tactics in military schools (before March 16, 1937 - military schools) instead of the field "were conducted mainly in the classroom, on a box of sand" not only after (as Anfilov claims on p. 69), but also until 1937. Until now, in October 1936, the head of the Department of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army, army commissar of the 2nd rank, I.E. Slavin, "practical training in tactics" consisted mainly of training on a sandbox and group exercises in the classroom, while "there were very few exercises in the field." "Disorganized, and sometimes simply bad" "management of mobile formations and units" during maneuvers - explained by Anfilov on p. 65 "Frequent change of commanders of all levels in connection with mass repressions" was also common before the purge of the Red Army. Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 of November 3, 1936 explicitly stated that "issues of command and control" "within the mechanized unit" "remain unfinished". For example, the headquarters of the 5th mechanized corps during the maneuvers of the Moscow Military District in September 1936 demonstrated (as observers noted) "the lack of flexibility in commanding the corps and brigades on the part of the headquarters of the corps and the sketchiness of control methods in various combat environment "(M.N. Tukhachevsky right behind

7

KEY THAT "management is bad") and could not organize interaction between his brigades (and the commanders and headquarters of the brigades - between their battalions) b. Past the target beats and a reference to the conclusion of the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko, according to which, by December 1940, "operational training of senior officers" "did not reach the required height and needed to be further improved" (p. 70). After all, absolutely the same thing was noted in the letter of Timoshenko's predecessor K.E. Voroshilov to the commanders of the troops of military districts, armies, fleets and heads of military academies and central directorates of the Red Army of December 28, 1935: "The operational training of the high command, headquarters and services still has not reached the level required by modern conditions for combating probable strong adversaries...

Nothing is supported by the assessment of V.A. Anfilov repressed commanders as "the most experienced" and "the most talented" (p. 59, 117).

Labor O.F. Souvenirova? (We will give references to it according to the second edition?, which was published after the death of Oleg Fedotovich) is structured quite differently, but this researcher also builds a characterization of the consequences of repressions mainly on emotions, practically without giving serious arguments. He begins (p. 468) with references to the opinion of the foreign press in the late 1930s. (which, by definition, could not be familiar in detail with the army of a totalitarian state that classified everything and everything and was seized by spy mania) and foreign historians of the 60-70s. (who are also not an authority here, since they did not have the opportunity to rely on the materials of the Soviet archives when writing their works). Further on (pp. 470-483) information is provided on the number of senior commanders and colonels convicted for political reasons, and the already familiar conclusion is made about the "beheading of the army" (moreover, on p. only after the end of the mass repressions: "In two and a half years [1939 – June 1941 – A.S.] a lot can be done, but it is impossible to train not only the highest, but even the average high-quality command staff, neither theoretically nor practically")... But the most striking passage is placed by us. 492. Adding on

E. 486-491 information on the number of those convicted, information on the number of commanding and commanding officers dismissed from the army for political reasons, O.F. Suvenirov refers the reader to Table 15, the data of which, according to him, "clearly testify" that "no war in any army has opened so many vacancies (especially in the highest group) as arranged by the highest party-state leadership of the bloody "purge" of the Red Army in 1937-1938. However, we can see from the table that in the "pre-repression" year of 1936, the number of commanding officers of the ground forces and the Air Force of the Red Army (without political staff) who received a promotion was greater than in the year of the beginning of mass repressions - 1937 (29,535 vs. 26,021)! In the group of senior command personnel in 1936, almost the same number of people were promoted as in 1937 (567 vs. 585), and in the group of senior command personnel - 1.2 times more (8960 vs. 7602)! A few lines later, the researcher himself admits that new vacancies appeared "not only due to significant losses in command staff as a result of mass arrests and indiscriminate dismissals "for political reasons." Significantly more new vacancies [emphasis mine. - A.S.] arose as a result of a sharp increase in the number of personnel of the Red Army and, consequently, the formation of new military units, formations, associations and institutions. In other words, O.F. Suvenirov contradicts himself and crosses out in a few lines what he wrote the previous twenty-odd pages for! But further, on p. 493-494, he, as if nothing had happened, continues to insist that it was precisely the repressions that inflicted on the army, "especially on its highest command personnel", a "terrible half-death blow", that it was precisely because of the repressions that the Red Army the beginning of the Great Patriotic War was distinguished by "insufficient preparedness of the senior and especially the highest level" of the command staff. And again, instead of a specific study and comparison of the appearance of the "pre-repression" and "post-repression" senior and senior command personnel, there are only speculative arguments about the fact that if "to dismiss, or even destroy the commander of a regiment, division, corps, it was possible in those years almost simultaneously", then in order to "prepare it in accordance with the requirements of

temporary war, not even one decade was needed, but one and a half or two" (p. 494) ...

Us. 495-501 simply rehash everything that was discussed on p. 470-494 (with the addition of only another reference to the opinion of foreigners - this time A. Hitler and the German military attaché in the USSR E. Köstring. The fact that the former did not at all compare the "before-" and "post-repression" composition of the Red Army, but only noted the low level of the Soviet "general" "sent" to him, and the second could form an opinion about the Soviet command staff only by his extremely limited Moscow acquaintances (0, not taken into account ...).

Pages 501 to 512 are devoted to an attempt to substantiate the thesis of a "sharp decline" as a result of repressions of the "intellectual potential of the Red Army". First, there is a traditional enumeration of the names of repressed military scientists — as we have already noted, there is no rigid connection between whose activities and the military training of the army... Then information is given about the low professional level of "post-repression" teachers of military academies and their low exactingness to the listeners - however, they are not compared with the "pre-repression" ones (without which the cited facts still do not say anything) is not done. (Meanwhile, the fact that academy teachers "give higher grades", that "getting into the academy is easy, but "dropping out" for unsuitability is extremely difficult," was also written in the "pre-repression" 1934...!!) Further O.F. Suvenirov complains that after the repressions, "the academy was flooded with people who were completely immature because of their extremely low general education level" (p. 508), but again, comparison of this latter with the level of those who studied in the academies before the repressions is again not valid. - baby! (Meanwhile, as noted in 1932 by B.M. Feldman, then the head of Soviet military educational institutions, "the insufficient general educational level of students" was a "big obstacle" in the work of the academies and in 1924-1932. Feldman and July 2, 1934: "The main shortcomings in admission to military academies in 1933 and to the Military

Academy named after M.V. Frunze in 1934 were: insufficient preparedness of candidates in general education disciplines [...]" A K.E. Voroshilov also admitted on December 9, 1935,

10

that the academy accepts "unprepared people", that these PEOPLE "do not have time to digest what they are given", that "students of all academies howl that they are taught at such a pace that they do not have time to perceive, and therefore the forward movement is idling "...!2)

At the same time, on p. 511 Suvenirov again contradicts itself and again, in essence, crosses out everything that he wrote about on the previous (now more than forty) pages! Trying to substantiate the thesis about the general decrease in the professionalism of the Soviet command staff as a result of repressions, he quotes a prominent military writer from the Russian diaspora, Colonel A.A. Zaitsov, who noted that "the Achilles' heel of the Red Army is its command staff... He is not up to the mark of the demands that the war will make him." But after all, Zaitsov did not write this after 1937, but (as O.F. Suvenirov himself confirms) in the "pre-repression" 1931! What is the point of repression?

Allelations to the opinion of another major military writer of the Russian emigration, Colonel E.E. Messner, who declared in 1938 that as a result of repressions "the commanding staff of the Red Army sank in their intelligence to a level between European and Chinese" (p. 512), one can oppose the reference to the same A.A. Zaitsov, who wrote that "the command staff of the Red Army differs sharply from the officers of other modern armies" by its "very low average level of special and especially general education", wrote even before the repressions, in 1934¹³. At the same time, unlike Messner, who did not have any statistical material on the change in the general educational level of the command staff of the Red Army in 1937-1938, Zaitsov cited quite specific numerical data ... Of course, Zaitsov's opinion is also not the ultimate truth, but the essence The matter remains the same: what is needed is not a few references to the statements of contemporaries and facts that negatively characterize the "post-repression Red Army, but a detailed study and comparison of the "before" and "post-repression" state of this latter.

The same claim has to be made in connection with O.F. Suvenirova to show that the repressions undermined the authority and morale of the command staff, sowed in it

eleven

fear of being accused of sabotage for any mistake and, accordingly, they deprived the commander of the initiative that was so necessary (pp. 512-528). Again, the facts cited by the author relating to 1937-1941 are not compared with the "pre-repression" state of affairs, it is again a priori accepted that everything was wonderful and prosperous before the repressions. (Meanwhile, it is impossible not to pay attention here to the fact that A.A. Zaitsov, who, unlike other foreign experts of those years, had a sufficient amount of reliable information about the Red Army, made a similar conclusion back in the "pre-repression" 1934 "The complete dependence of the commanding staff on the organs of the Communist Party," wrote the Russian colonel at the time, "undermines their prestige and, which is especially bad, develops in them an instinct for adaptability and a desire to please the all-powerful political authorities. And how show independence or think freely in a country where even science has been introduced into the rigid channel of the "Marxist-Leninist method" and where dissent is tantamount to political unreliability and is mercilessly and immediately punished by the authorities? 1937-1938 - / A.S.] [...] Under these conditions, of course, it is not necessary to expect the manifestation of independence, civic courage and independence by the commanding staff "14.)

The same story with the attempt of O.F. Suvenirova to show (on pp. 528-539) that the repressions led to a decline in discipline (the level of which affects the course of combat training and, accordingly, the level of combat training. - / S.). True, here for the first time he gives a truly serious argument - the assertion of a "terrible fall in discipline" as a result of the "decomposition of the army" by repressions (p. 528), belonging to G.K. Zhukov (who in those years commanded corps,

army group and was an assistant to the commander of the military district and, therefore, possessed the relevant information on the scale of higher formations and associations). But this serious argument turns out to be the only one (and, accordingly, insufficient). Further, the facts are again given that characterize almost exclusively the “post-repression” army: the degree of prevalence of drunkenness in it, the rudeness of the commanders, the deser

12

shootings, emergencies, etc. As for the comparison with the “pre-repression” Red Army, it is carried out only on one indicator - the level of accidents in the Air Force (p. 534). However, its increase in 1937-1938. Compared to 1936, it was by no means necessarily to be explained (as O.F. Suvenirov writes on p. 533) by “an increase in gross violations of military discipline.” Decrease in 1937-1938. hours of flight time per flight accident could also be caused by other reasons — for example, the objective complexity of the then unfolding transition of bomber aircraft from single-engine R-5 biplanes to aircraft of a qualitatively different level — twin-engine high-speed bombers SB and DB-3 — or the deterioration production performance of aircraft supplied by the industry. As for the history of the “pre-repression” Red Army in connection with the question of the drunkenness of military personnel, the researcher does not at all give figures that would show a lower prevalence of this vice before 1937-1938. Moreover, the facts cited by him, relating to 1934-1936, confirm only that which does not in any way indicate the decay of the army by repressions - that (as Souvenirov himself is forced to admit) “drank in the army and navy before” (p. 528)!

If the works of V.A. Anfilov and O.F. Suvenirova are the crowning achievement of historians - supporters of the thesis about the “cutting down” of the Red Army by the repressions of 1937-1938. in the 90s, then the result of the development of this trend in domestic historiography in the first decade of the twentieth century. became a monograph by V.S. Milbach (dedicated, however, not to the entire Red Army, but to one of its largest groups - the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army - OKDVA - in June 1938 transformed into the KDF - Red Banner Far Eastern Front)! With each of her pages, she convinces that in the nine years that have passed since the appearance of the work of O.F. Suvenirova, the indicated direction has not advanced a millimeter in its research! We are again faced with the reluctance to apply the only effective research method in this case — to study in detail the level of combat training of not ONLY “POST-”, BUT ALSO “pre-repression” Red Army.

13

Army, compare both levels and only then draw a conclusion about the impact of repression on the state of the army. The level of combat training of the “pre-repression” OKDVA is not studied by the author; true us. 22-24 and 25-26 we find something similar to an attempt to characterize - but this is precisely “something similar to an attempt to characterize”; research (and even an attempt to research) it can not be called. Not to mention the fact that a total of only two and a half of the 215 (not counting appendices) pages of the text were given to information about the combat training of the OKDVA: in the “pre-repression” year of 1936, these are precisely separate, pulled on the principle “in the garden elderberry, and in Kiev uncle” information, individual facts, from which, moreover, absolutely illogical conclusions are drawn. At first, V.S. Milbach reports on the decision of the command of the OKDVA and its Primorsky Group to nevertheless carry out — despite the fact that the troops are busy with construction — autumn maneuvers and sees in this decision evidence that “in 1936, in the army, the tasks of improving combat training of units and formations, despite the enormous burden of tasks for the construction, quartering and provision of troops. But is it really a solution to fulfilling the tasks of “improving combat skills”? And we are not told anything about the results of the maneuvers ... Then the researcher mentions the staff and military exercises held in March to conduct maneuvers is tantamount to successful 1936, their goals and the composition of the troops participating in them, and concludes that the OKDVA command “paid attention to new forms and methods of training troops and headquarters. But after all, the methods of combat training are not an end in themselves, but only a means to achieve the goal (ensuring high combat training of troops)! And again, almost nothing is reported about the results of the exercises.

(The only mentioned fact - the failure of the attempt of the tanks and batteries attached to the 94th Rifle Regiment to pass with the regiment through the mountains and taiga - does not work at all for the thesis of V.S. Milbach about the good training of the Far East on the eve of repressions ...). Further, the message of the chief of staff of the OKDVA on the successful conduct of a specific staff exercise is cited and consists in the fact that the chief of staff "positively assessed" the "conducted summer

14

teachings." It is absolutely incomprehensible to us how one staff exercise turned into several headquarters and military exercises... year of the number of air crashes and the presence in the then OKDVA of "facts of disorganization and violation of discipline" (one of which is given). But these four facts and two conclusions (the second of which, although true, seems to be practically unproven by the author) in themselves still do not say anything and certainly do not unequivocally testify in favor of the thesis about the high combat capability of the "pre-repression" OKDVA.

And that's it! Instead of a detailed study of the level of training of commanders, headquarters, a single soldier and units, and the level of combat readiness of troops, there are less than a dozen helplessly pulled facts from the life of the army and about the same number of unsubstantiated conclusions. Instead of appealing at least to the order of the commander of OKDVA V.K. Blucher No. 00337 dated November 14, 1936 (which directly states that "by the end of 1936 OKDVA had unsatisfactorily solved both tasks: combat training and construction", which the commission of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Ya.B. Gamarnik stated "with - absolutely insufficient successes in the combat training of army troops in 1936 and a decrease in the combat readiness of military units and formations of the army as a result of a huge allocation of personnel for construction"! 6) - such a traditional argument of those mourning the "headless army" in January 1937, a number of commanders received orders for success in the combat training of their units and formations. The argument is simply ridiculous: is it really possible for a historian of the beginning of the 20th century? It is not known that orders in the USSR were often given not at all on merit, but according to the order, depending on personal preferences, etc.? Among those who became order bearers V.S. Milbach was also named the commander of the 62nd Infantry Regiment, Colonel I.V. Zaikin; Therefore, how "successfully" he prepared his unit is evidenced by his own confessions at the regimental party meeting on May 9, 1937: in the regiment they have not yet achieved "that the commander was proactive and able to correctly solve [tactical. - A.S.] tasks", commanders "have not yet learned how to manage units",

15

"Fire training is very insufficient, i.e. completely unsatisfactory", "moreover, the method of fire training does not allow to achieve better results", "the fire training of artillery is also unsatisfactory", "weapons quickly deteriorate, and a lot of weapons are constantly being repaired, those. savings are insufficient", training in grenade throwing is "very poorly organized", physical training is poorly organized, "we don't even know how to disguise ourselves, not only a fighter, but entire units are not disguised"...!7

Since the level of combat training of the OKDVA on the eve of the purge of the Red Army, V.S. Milbach has not been studied, all his statements about the deterioration of certain aspects of this learning as a result of repression (contained in Chapter 8 of his work) remain unfounded. Logical constructions are like that, "taking into account the significant losses among those who were supposed to organize reconnaissance [...] and directly among the intelligence officers", "it can be argued that the level of organization of intelligence and the conduct of intelligence activities to significantly decreased in the autumn of 1938" (p. 189-190) or that the understaffing of command personnel, which increased due to repressions, "naturally", "had a negative impact" on the combat capability of the troops (p. 175) - they are not drawn to the role of arguments. Theoretically, all this is natural, but when studying the history of the pre-war USSR and its army, theory does not always help: we must not forget that both this state and this army were "experimental" fruits of an experiment in building a society that history had not yet known. Theoretically, an officer of artillery or engineering troops in the twentieth century. a person who has not graduated from any

class of a general education school - and among those admitted to the engineering and artillery schools of the Red Army in 1929, there were 8.3% and 16.5%, respectively (after all, "in class terms (workers, farm laborers, poor people)" this group of people for peasant "army" was valuable ") ...! 8

In general, trying to substantiate the thesis about the deterioration of combat training of the OKDVA / KDF as a result of mass repressions of 1937-1938, V.S. Milbach, instead of scientific arguments, was able to offer only:

— suffering from the lack of elementary logic, a quasi-analysis of several facts presented to no avail; |

16

— abstract-logical constructions; - propaganda clichés and unsubstantiated , - many others allegations.

· - The appearance in 2007 of such a book should be regarded as a complete collapse of that trend in historiography, which for half a century has been defending the thesis about the deterioration of the Red Army's training as a result of the repressions of 1937-1939. It was still possible to understand when V.S. Milbach, Polish researcher J. Voikovyak!9. After all, he nevertheless limited his task to the study of the actual purge of the Far Eastern command staff. But when even after seven years the historian cannot bring any serious scientific arguments, who directly set out to find out the degree of influence of repressions in OKDVA / KDF on its combat capability; when, trying to prove his point of view, he proves only his unwillingness to reckon with the basics of the methodology of historical research and elementary logic, this is a dead end and collapse.

Such an assessment is all the more appropriate because there are serious grounds to suspect the historians of the trend we are criticizing of deliberately forgetting the goals of historical science, of deliberately distorting the truth. So, when reading a book by V.S. Milbach, one gets the strong impression that this author, who is quite competent in military matters, deliberately avoids a detailed study of the level of training of the "pre-repression" OKDVA and compares it with the "post-repression" level, deliberately operates with insignificant indirect arguments and does not try to find direct (although in the Russian State Military Archives alone, in the funds of the OKDVA administration and the administration of its Primorsky Group, there are dozens of cases with a volume of thousands of sheets in open storage, covering in detail the combat training of the "pre-repression" OKDVA and its results). One gets the impression that the researcher knows: a detailed study of the state of "pre-repression" OKDVA will lead him to completely different conclusions! After all (as shown in a number of our works?), before the repressions, the Special Far East was no better prepared than the KDF in 1938.

17

(when, as, in general, V.S. Milbach convincingly shows, the military training of the Far East was indeed very low). And many of the repressed top commanders of the Far East — unsubstantiatedly declared by Milbach to be "the best" "representatives of the Soviet people" (p. 161), carriers of valuable "knowledge and experience" (p. 216) — of proper combat training and combat readiness of their formations did not provide. In fact, V.S. Milbach! In the only case when he nevertheless decided to look closely at the documents detailing and specifically elucidating the level of combat training of the "pre-repression" OKDVA - three of the reports of employees of special departments dating back to the spring of 1937 - he could not help but admit that The "shortcomings in combat training" outlined in these "pre-repression" sources were precisely those that "manifested" after the peak of mass repressions, in the battles near Lake Khasan (p. 206)...

We dare to assume, therefore, that the rejection of a serious argumentation of their statements (which involves a detailed study of the level of education of the "pre-repression" Red Army and its comparison with the "post-repression" level) is caused by the desire to affirm the truth, which is presumed to be the only true one, at all costs. In fact, while just indicating the goals of his research, V.S. Milbach already knows what conclusions he must come to! "The study of the influence of political repressions on the components of the combat capability of the troops," he writes, "will make it possible to better understand the reasons for the high losses of the Red Army in the military conflicts of 1938-1940" (pp. 3-4). In other words, the historian accepts in advance that the repressions had an impact on the combat capability of the Red Army, that this influence was negative, and sets his task only to illustrate this statement, which is declared a priori to be true. The passage on p. 171: "It is necessary to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the state of combat capability of the troops of the Far Eastern Army (Front) after the political purge of 1937-1938. through a detailed analysis of the impact of political repressions on the components of the combat capability of the OKDVA (KDF) troops." Is it more illogical to do the opposite - to assess the impact of repression on combat capability by analyzing

18

state of combat readiness OKDVA (KDF) after cleaning? Perhaps this analysis will show that the repressions had no effect here at all? ..

This, it seems, is a sincere conviction that a study that touches on the topic "The Red Army and the repressions of 1937-1938" can and should be completed only with the conclusion that the army is "mowed down" by repressions, a conviction that makes even such competent researchers like O.F. Suvenirov and V.S. Milbach, not noticing his slipping into outright unprofessionalism, is, apparently, the result of many years of propaganda of the thesis about "cutting down". Apparently, we passed on one of those cases when, from constant repetition, a certain thesis begins to be perceived as an indisputable truth, which a more or less educated person simply cannot deny. (It is also possible, of course, that the researchers' conclusions may be influenced by their political preferences or the political situation.)

In the conviction that historians - supporters of the thesis of "cutting down" the army by repressions deliberately resort to fraud, we are strengthened by another domestic work of recent years, written by V.O. Daines, a representative of the same old school of Soviet military historians as V.A. Anfilov, and O.F. Souvenirs. In order to convince the reader of the high level of education of the Red Army on the eve of mass repressions, this author resorts to selective quoting of the source - the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. issued on the same day by order No. 010621). Fishing out only reports of successes in combat training, he ignores indications of flaws in combat training (and there were many of them in the order!). And wanting to substantiate the thesis about the worsening of the Red Army's training due to the start of mass repressions, Daines cites disappointing confessions from the report of the Leningrad Military District on the results of combat training for the 1936/37 academic year, without comparing them with reports from sources of the "pre-repression" period...22

In the last decade, works began to appear that refute or cast doubt on the thesis about the deterioration of combat training and combat capability of the Red Army in

19

the result of mass repression. The pioneer here was G.I. Gerasimov, with figures in his hands, refuted the notions of a decrease in the level of military education of the command staff of the Red Army after 1937-1938. (and revealed, in particular, that the percentage of those who graduated from military academies even increased after the purge)!? OKDVA) was no higher than after the peak of repression (in the battles on Khasan and in the Soviet-Finnish war). To exactly the same conclusion - that "the exterminated cadres were just as competent, or, more precisely, incompetent, as those who remained at large," came

and those who studied the level of combat training of the Soviet submarine fleet before and after 1937-1938. M.E. Morozov and K.L. Kulagin²⁵. (True, they clarify that the "blow on the political and moral state of the army" caused by the repressions "finished off the personnel training system, ruined combat training and discipline"²⁶, but this statement is based only on naval material and generally requires in our opinion, a more solid argument than the one given by the researchers.)

One way or another, the problem of determining the degree of influence of the mass repressions of 1937-1938. the level of combat training of the Red Army cannot be considered resolved. The works of the last decade have shown the insignificance or complete absence of such an influence only in general terms, without covering (due to the limitation of the tasks of researchers by certain aspects of the problem or due to the limited volume of publications) a number of aspects. A much more detailed study is needed, which we offer now to the reader. In it, we will compare in detail, using a system of clearly defined criteria, the level of combat training of the Red Army in the period between the beginning of mass repressions and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War (i.e., in the second half of 1937 - the first half (until June 22) 1941) with the level of combat training of the "pre-repression" Red Army. At the same time, we will consider 1935, 1936 and the first half of 1937 as the "pre-repression" period (the 35th was the year of the famous Kyiv maneuvers, which are usually assessed as

20

the achievement by the pre-war Red Army of the pinnacle of its power²⁷, but the real mass repressions in the Red Army began in the second half of June - early July of the 37th).

As for the evaluation criteria, the characteristics of the level of combat training of the army will be formed from the characteristics of the level of training:

a) commanders and staffs and

6) the actual troops (i.e. a single fighter and subunits — squads, platoons, companies, batteries, rifle battalions and artillery battalions).

We will judge the level of training of the commanders and headquarters of rifle and tank formations (which were actually combined arms, that is, uniting parts of several branches of the armed forces), rifle and tank units and the infantry and tank units that formed the basis of these formations and units, we will judge by the degree of their skill:

a) make optimal decisions in combat and operation conditions of the 1930s and 1940s. — distinguished by the widespread use of armored vehicles, aviation, radio communications and, consequently, dynamism, tension, rapid changes in the situation, rife with crisis situations (in other words, we are talking about the ability to apply a bold maneuver, quickly and adequately respond to frequent changes in the situation take the initiative — on the level of operational-tactical thinking that meets the requirements of the "war of engines"; in what follows we will use an abbreviated formulation of this criterion — operational-tactical thinking);

6) to organize interaction in battle (operation) of various types of troops (hereinafter - interaction);

c) organize all types of support for combat operations - rear, engineering, reconnaissance (hereinafter referred to as support for combat operations);

d) to carry out continuous command and control of troops during a battle (operation) - i.e. master command skills, staff work techniques, skillfully organize communications (hereinafter referred to as command and control).

An assessment of the level of professionalism of commanders and headquarters of artillery, engineering troops and signal troops will be made up of assessments of their level:

21

a) tactical training and

6) special training (small-artillery and technical for artillerymen and technical for engineering troops and signalmen).

Assessing the level of combat training of troops, we will consider the level:

— for infantrymen — tactical (including here the elements of engineering, inextricably linked with the actions of a fighter in battle), fire and physical training;

- for tankers - tactical, fire and technical training;

- for artillerymen, sappers and signalmen - special training.

Since our study is the first experience of a detailed study of the degree of influence of the purge of 1937-1938. to the level of training of the Red Army, we will allow ourselves to somewhat simplify our task.

First, to study the "post-repression" level, we will mainly use published sources and factual material introduced into scientific circulation by researchers. After all, taking into account the fact that the "pre-repression" period covers 2.5 years, and the "post-repression" - as many as 4, and the fact that from 1937 to 1941 the number of formations in the Red Army increased by 2-3 times, "raising" the archival material we need for the "post-repression" period will drag out the study for many years. At the same time, a lot of sources and studies shedding light on the combat skills of the Red Army in late 1937 and early 1941 have already been published. The selection of factual material they form not only covers practically all aspects of the army's combat training, but is also quite representative: the published documents and information characterize the most diverse units and formations of the most diverse military districts, armies and fronts, and some of the Red Army as a whole. . So, among the published sources:

- and orders of the people's commissar of defense, summing up the results of combat training for a given year, the results of inspections of the combat training of units and formations of a number of military districts and military branches, and the results of military conflicts of 1938-1940;28

- and materials of meetings of the Military Council under the People's Commissar

22

defense in November 1938 and other high-level army meetings; 29

- and orders of the higher, front and army command of the period of the Soviet-Finnish war (allowing to reveal the pros and cons of the training of commanders, staffs and troops); thirty

- and reports prepared at the headquarters of the armies and the General Staff of the Red Army, analyzing the level of combat skills of commanders, staffs and troops who participated in the battles near Lake Khasan and in the Soviet-Finnish war.

Significant factual material covering the training of the Soviet troops who fought at Khasan, Khalkhin Gol and in the Finnish campaign is contained in the works of P.A. Aptekarya, V.O. Daines, V.G. Krasnova, B.V. Sokolov and other researchers?.

The study of the level of training of the "pre-repression" Red Army, we will base on archival materials.

Secondly, since a detailed study of the level of combat training of the entire "pre-repression" Red Army is also an extremely time-consuming task, we will limit ourselves to attracting material from the three most powerful groupings of this army - the Kiev (KVO) and Belorussian (BVO) military districts. and equated to the military district of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. This material will give an idea of the entire "pre-repression" Red Army: after all, from 43 to 47% of Soviet rifle divisions and from 50 to 60% of mechanized and heavy tank brigades were deployed in the KVO, BVO and OKDVA. At the same time, the fact of the participation of OKDVA troops in the border conflicts of 1936 - the first half of 1937 will make comparison with the "post-repression" Red Army, which participated in a number of military conflicts, more significant. The fact that the "pre-repression" CVO and BVO were headed by I.E. Yakir and I.P. Uborevich, considered, along with M.N. Tukhachevsky, the most prominent of the repressed military leaders, and the "pre-repression" OKDVA was also headed by V.K. Blucher.

23

True, documents covering the combat training of the "pre-repression" KVO and BVO have been preserved in a relatively limited number. In those funds of the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), where the bulk of them should have been deposited - in the funds of the departments of the KVO and BVO - there are only sets of secret and top secret orders on the KVO for 1935 and 1936, a selection of orders and directives of the political department of the KVO for the same years and documents covering the preparation of the Kiev maneuvers of 1935 and the course and results of the Shepetov maneuvers of 1936. At the same time, the orders for the CMD do not differ in close attention to the issues of combat training and its results, and the control fund of the BVO does not contain any documents covering the course of combat training and combat training of the troops of the district! However, the funds of units and formations of the KVO and BVO, as well as the fund of the Political Directorate of the Red Army (PU RKKA) help out. Available in them:

- sets of orders for two out of 11 rifle corps of the KVO and BVO for 1937, for one of 29 rifle divisions for 1936 and for one of 72 and 90 rifle regiments, respectively, for 1935 and 1937- Y, and also

- Collections of orders, political reports of the heads of political departments of formations and protocols of party or Komsomol meetings and conferences for about a dozen more units and formations for 1935, 1936 and 1937,

together form a random sample. Accordingly, the results of the analysis of this sample can be confidently extrapolated to a particular district as a whole. We emphasize that the sources from this sample are extremely informative and highly reliable. Thus, in orders for units and formations, the results of checks on the progress of the combat training of these units and formations by their command or representatives of a higher headquarters are summed up, and these checks were carried out with the utmost care and according to a methodology that betrays experts in combat training. And since information about the results of inspections was intended not for superiors, but for subordinates, it was by no means "varnished" in orders. Political reports sent to higher political bodies (to collect material for which

24

sometimes commanders and other specialists were involved) also contained information on the progress and results of combat training, and if they embellished the true state of affairs, then not much. After all, even though the political workers were directly responsible for combat training and its results, their status of "supervising" the command and technical staff put them in the position of a somewhat detached observer, if not an outsider...

preparation at party and Komsomol meetings and conferences was not only exceptionally business-like, but also incredibly frank, and the value of these sources simply defies description (the same must be said about various army meetings, the protocols of some of which have been preserved in the PU fund). Red Army).

In addition, in the fund of the Combat Training Directorate of the Red Army (UBP RKKA), a number of acts, reports and other materials of inspections of the combat training of units and formations of the "pre-repression" KVO and BVO of employees of the central departments of the Red Army - combat training and Armored (materials of this latter are also found in the fund of the PU RKKA). These sources are distinguished by the same merits as the materials of "intradistrict" inspections (see above), and the materials of inspections of the state of military formations by employees of the Red Army PD (a small number of which have been preserved in the fund of this department) have the same merits as and political messages. The UBP RKKA Fund also provides us with the most valuable sources for studying such demonstrative tests of the combat skills of the troops of the "pre-repression" RKKA, as the Belorussian and Polesye maneuvers held in 1936 and large tactical exercises near Polotsk (these are exceptionally bright and informative reports and notes by the head of the UBP RKKA A.I. Sedyakin and a detailed report by his deputy M.N. Gerasimov). Such sources preserved in the fund of the PU of the Red Army, such as the reports of the KVO on the results of the combat training of its troops for 1935 and 1936, a similar report of the BVO for 1937 and a draft report of the political department of the BVO for 1935th. Of course, the compilers of such reports

25

trying to put their district before Moscow in the best light, they tried to exaggerate their achievements and gloss over their shortcomings. But if such a report nevertheless mentions any flaws, then there is no doubt that these latter really took place (and most likely on a much larger scale) ... In general, the task of studying the combat training of "pre-repression" The KVO and the BVO can be considered quite well endowed with sources.

This can all the more be said about the task of studying the combat training of the "pre-repression" OKDVA. The funds of the departments of this army and its Primorsky group are simply replete with documents covering this training - characterizing both the association as a whole, and almost each of its connections, which came out from the pen of the Far East themselves, and Moscow inspectors, presented and reports for higher authorities, and reports "for internal use", and orders, and acts of inspections, and analytical reports, and reports on battles, and protocols of party conferences, and reports of special officers ... Orders in parts serve as a valuable addition to them and connections and protocols of party meetings, preserved in the funds of a number of units and formations of OKDVA.

We will be able to verify the legitimacy of the distribution of the conclusions in the three districts to the entire Red Army by using the transcripts of the meetings of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense (which summed up the results of the academic year in the troops and were distinguished by a combination of bureaucratically optimistic reports about "achievements" - in which, however, the "cry of souls" - with quite business-like speeches), analytical reports and directives of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense M.N. Tukhachevsky and the head of the 2nd department of the Red Army Headquarters (since September 22, 1935 - the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army, as April 9, 1936 - UBP RKKA) A.I. Sedyakin and orders, directives and directive letters from Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov and chief. nickname of the Headquarters of the Red Army (since September 22, 1935 - the General Staff of the Red Army) A.I. Egorov, compiled by specialists from the 2nd Department of the Red Army Headquarters /? 2nd Department of the Red Army General Staff / UBP Red Army.

A more detailed description of specific sources (or specific types of sources or source housing)

26

'nicknames, allowing you to find out this or that specific question) will be given by us in the process research.

And, finally, let's simplify our task in one more respect: let's leave it outside the scope of the study of the Air Force and confine ourselves to studying the combat training of the ground forces, and in these latter we will not consider the training of the cavalry (with the exception of the tank units that were part of it) : the combat value of the saber units that formed the core of this type of troops in the conditions of the European theater of operations - in which the Great Patriotic War took place - in the 30-40s. it was already small.

Before proceeding directly to the study, we clarify a number of terminological issues. Unlike many domestic historians, we consider it impossible to call the commanding and commanding staff of the Red Army in the 30s - early 40s. officers (officers, officer corps, officer corps) and because he began to be called "officer staff" only from July 1943, and because the name "officer" for most Soviet commanders of those years fit like a saddle cow³. From October 1924 to September 1935, the Soviet "officers" were called "commanding staff", and on September 26, 1935 to July 1943 - "command and command" (in many documents and oral speeches of the late 30s they continued to use the old term "command staff"). At the same time, commanders of subdivisions, units, formations, as well as persons who occupied positions both in units and in institutions of the Red Army, for the performance of which duties required command experience and appropriate military training³, were referred to the command staff. Since September 26, 1935, military-political, military-technical, military-economic and administrative, military-medical, military-veterinary and military-legal staff began to be attributed to the commanding staff. We will call the Soviet "officers" of the 30s - early 40s. - both in relation to the period from September 26, 1935 to July 1943, and in relation to the period up to September 26, 1935 - command staff (command and command personnel, commanders and chiefs). If we are talking only © command or only about the boss (in the meaning,

27

existing after September 26, 1935) composition, we will use the terms "command staff" (command staff, commanders) and "command staff" (commanding staff), respectively. Recall that the commanders of platoons, companies and batteries (and after the introduction of personal military ranks on September 22, 1935 - lieutenants and senior lieutenants) belonged to the middle command staff, commanders of battalions, divisions and regiments (and then captains, majors and regiments nicknames) + to the senior, and the commanders of formations (and then those who had the personal rank of brigade commander, divisional commander, commander, army commander of the 2nd or G-th rank and Marshal of the Soviet Union or from May 1940 to the general) - to the highest .

That category of servicemen, which in pre-revolutionary Russia was called non-commissioned officers, and from July 1943 is called sergeants (sergeants) in our country, in 1924-September 1935 was called "junior command staff", ac 26 September 1935 to July 1943 - "junior command and command staff." We will call it (both in relation to the period up to September 26, 1935, and in relation to the period from September 26, 1935 to July 1943) junior command personnel (junior command personnel, junior commanders) and only in individual cases - junior commanders: the overwhelming majority of servicemen of this category, who came into our field of vision, occupied precisely command positions - squad leader and assistant platoon commander.

And, finally, let us recall a circumstance that is now ignored by almost all Russian researchers: at the end of 1939, the word "Workers' and Peasants'" disappeared from the official name of the Red Army, and from the end of 1939 to March 1946 (when was replaced by "Soviet" and the word "Red"), this army was simply called the Red. Accordingly, the abbreviation "RKKA" cannot be used to designate the Red Army of this period. (From the spring of 1940, the abbreviation "KA" came into use, but its scope was very limited, and we will not use it.)

NOTES

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29 See: Smirnov A.A. Not ready for battle. Army of Marshal Blucher on the eve of 1937 // Motherland. 2000. No. 9. S. 74-78; He is. On the impact of the purge of the Red Army in 1937-1938: on the actions of Soviet troops in the battles near Lake Khasan // Russian collection. Studies in the history of Russia. T. M1. M., 2009. S. 217-254; He is. Milbach V.S. Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (Red Banner Far Eastern Front). Political repressions of the command staff, 1937-1938. SPb., 2007. [Review] // Russian collection. T. \1. pp. 325-340.

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22 See: Daines W. Decree. op. pp. 64, 66.

23 See: Gerasimov G.I. Decree. op. pp. 46-49.

24 See: Smirnov A.A. Great maneuvers // Motherland. 2000. No. 4. S. 86-93; He is. Not ready for battle. Marshal Blucher's army on the eve of 1937 // Motherland. 2000. No. 9. S. 74-78; He is. "Dissolute" army: on the issue of breaking the Russian military tradition after 1917 // Russian collection. Research on the history of Russia in the XX-XX centuries. T. 1. M., 2004. S. 228-236; He is. Celebration of show. Kyiv and Belorussian maneuvers of 1935-1936 // Rodina. 2006. No. 12. S. 88-96; He is. On the impact of the purge of the Red Army in 1937-1938. on the actions of Soviet troops in the battles near Lake Khasan // Russian collection. Studies in the history of Russia. T. \1. M., 2009. S. 217-254; He is. Milbach V.S. Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (Red Banner Far Eastern Front). Political repressions of the commanding staff, 1937-1938 vol. St. Petersburg, 2007. [Review] // Russian collection. T. M. S. 325--340.

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Chapter 1 AT THE BEGINNING OF MASS REPRESSIONS

(second half of 1937)

To study the level of training of the Red Army during this period, we first of all have reports of self-reports by the commanders of the military districts and heads of the central departments of the Red Army at meetings of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense (hereinafter - the Military Council) November 21-27, 1937 and reports on the results of combat training in 1937 of the BVO, OKDVA, military branches of the OKDVA and the 18th and 20th rifle corps of the OKDVA (hereinafter - annual reports or reports for such and such a year). Recall that when analyzing such sources, we will proceed from the fact that all the shortcomings noted in them actually existed (perhaps even on a large scale), and information about achievements requires verification. For this latter, it is possible to use the materials of inspections of a number of subdivisions, units and formations of the Kyiv, Belorussian, Moscow (MVO) and Leningrad (LVO) military districts.

1. COMMANDERS AND HQS A. Combined arms, infantry and tank

Operational-tactical thinking. The sources we discovered do not contain a general characteristic of its level in the second half of the 37th. In the annual report of the OKDVA compiled in October 1937 (signed by Colonel V. Nesterov, temporarily correcting the post of the head of the 2nd department of the army headquarters), it was stated that the overwhelming

31

Most commanders from the Far East quickly and correctly understand the situation and make decisions, but the decisions themselves "very often show through schematism. They fight according to regulations, and not according to the situation [recall that in the battle of the 30s, rich in various techniques. the situation changed so often that no regulations could foresee all situations. — A.S.]". So necessary in a dynamically developing battle is the initiative of the "intact? about a number" of OKDVA commanders, according to the report, was "low", and the squad commanders completely demonstrated "low initiative" behavior. And no wonder: the commanders, the report admitted, do not have "a broad tactical outlook that facilitates understanding of the essence of modern, complex, general military combat"¹.

And in the BVO, according to its annual report (signed by the new commander of the troops of the district, commander of the 1st rank I.P. Belov on October 15, 1937), the "common weak point" of commanders and staffs was "slow decision-making"². It is clear that such a command staff was not capable of initiative actions, and the only materials of inspections of BVO units that have survived from the second half of the 37th are in full agreement with this conclusion. On August 18–29, 1937, after checking the combat training of units of the 37th Rifle Division and the 156th Rifle Regiment of the 52nd Rifle Division, the commander of the 23rd Rifle Corps, Divisional Commander K.P. Podlas, the commanders of his headquarters and representatives of the RKKA Combat Training Directorate (UBP RKKA) were convinced that platoon commanders get lost and do not show initiative when the situation changes ... The depravity of the operational thinking of the commander of one of the two armies that acted on the BVO maneuvers that took place on September 21-24, 1937 in the Bobruisk-Gomel region. Organizing the rout of the "blue" grouping that was advancing to launch a counterattack, the commander of the "red" did not use the opportunity to hit the enemy in parts, did not create a shock fist and brought his troops into battle in parts. As a result, his actions were not decisively successful.

The commanders of the LVO often simply lacked operational-tactical thinking! At the September district maneuvers, noted on November 21, 1937 at the Military Owl

32

those commander of the district troops commander of the 2nd rank P.E. Dybenko, it turned out that "in most cases the commander does not have a plan", that the commander "does not raise the question of what he wants" ... In addition, Dybenko pointed out, "now there are many commanders [as in the text. — 4.S.] sometimes does not know how to make a quick and correct analysis of the situation"³. And consequently, even in the presence

desire to make a decision, this last one could turn out to be not only belated (as in OKDVA or BVO), but also wrong ...

In the Siberian Military District (SibVO), commanders, just like in Leningrad, sometimes did not know how to make decisions at all. <[...] In a number of cases, - said at the same council on November 22, commander M.A. Antonyuk - good {? — A.S.] commanders act only on orders, often without even knowing what and how to do [...]". But in the Kharkiv District (KhVO), decisions even for a meeting battle - which required speed and initiative like no other - were taken by the majority of commanders quickly and correctly? This statement, made at the same meeting by the commander of the 2nd rank S.K. Timoshenko, apparently, one should believe: Semyon Konstantinovich appeared at the head of the KhVO only in September 1937, and there was still no point in inventing successes that did not actually exist there. Such inventions at that moment would have added laurels not to him, but to his predecessor, commander of the 2nd rank I.N. Oak...

The commanders of the troops of the Kiev, Moscow, Volga (PriVO), North Caucasian (SKVO), Transcaucasian (ZakVO), Ural (UrVO) and Transbaikal (ZabvVO) military districts did not touch upon the issue of interest to us now No. in their speeches at the Military Council. But it is indicative that, characterizing the three best MVO rifle battalions at the end of the academic year, their direct superiors are directly interested in showing the goods with their faces! — a good level of tactical thinking of the command staff could be noted only in one. Quick and tactically competent decisions of the battalion commander and middle commanders, "bold and initiative decisions" of the junior command staff - all this was then (and even then, if we are not dealing with postscripts) only

2-2255 33

in the 2nd battalion of the 146th rifle regiment of the 49th rifle division, and this is among the best battalions ...

And in the Central Asian Military District (SAVO), if you believe what he said on November 21, 1937 at the Military Council of his command troops commander A.D. Loktionov, a significant part of the command staff - and above all the senior and highest! — has not assimilated the requirements of modern warfare, even theoretically. "The backwardness of the command staff in the field of operational training is obvious," Loktionov argued, referring to the commanders and headquarters of divisions and regimental commanders (who, in particular, did not show a desire for bold maneuver and energy when delivering counterattacks). And the staff commanders, he pointed out further, do not even know how to "deeply analyze the situation and draw the right conclusions"...

Behind all this - slowness, lack of initiative, lack of audacity and decisiveness in actions - a lack of understanding of the "essence of modern, complex, combined arms combat" and general weak tactical literacy were also manifested in the inattention of commanders to monitoring the joints with neighboring units or formations, noted on November 27, 1937 at the Military Council of K.E. Voroshilov. Joints of units and formations represent a weak link in the combat formation of troops: it is more difficult for commanders of neighboring subunits (or units) to organize interaction with each other, since this can be caused by orders (or lack of orders) of the higher command - each of them has it own. But, without showing initiative and audacity, without seeking to find weak spots in the enemy, Soviet commanders at all levels inevitably ceased (or perhaps did not begin) to expect the same from the enemy... The Commissar spoke under the impression of what he saw them the September maneuvers of the Moscow Military District and the BVO, but other districts also sinned by inattention to the joints. After all, it is recognized even by one of the annual reports of the troops known to us - the report of the 20th rifle corps of the OKDVA (dated October 15, 1937). About "protecting the joints and flanks [another weak spot in the battle order! — A.S.]", it read, "continue to forget and wait for instructions"...8

Misunderstanding of the "essence of modern, complex, combined arms combat" was also manifested in the lack of

moat and headquarters of the desire to interact with neighbors. "Not only a division with a division, a corps with a corps," noted K.E. Voroshilov at the same meeting of the Military Council on November 27, 1937, - but even the regiments of the same division and even the battalions in the same regiment are not connected with each other, in a combat situation they not only do not contact [as in the document. — A.S.], but quite often they don't know what's going on nearby in the neighboring unit"³... Misunderstanding of the "essence of modern, complex, combined arms combat" was also manifested in the "inability" of the headquarters of OKDVA regiments and divisions "plan the battle to its full depth"! — actually neutralizing the presence of mobile forces (tank units and units) and long-range artillery at their disposal.

All the above-mentioned shortcomings in the operational-tactical thinking of the command staff of the Red Army in the second half of 1937 can be reduced to four main ones:

— misunderstanding of the peculiarities of the modern "motor war" (or even the fundamentals of tactics and operational art in general);

- inability to make decisions quickly;

- the desire to make decisions, guided not by the current situation, but by a typical scheme, template, and

- lack of initiative. -

But did these flaws appear only after the start of mass repressions? At the end of 1937, only the SAVO commanders complained about the unwillingness of the commanders of divisions and regiments to resort to a bold maneuver (i.e., to use the opportunities provided by new, mobile branches of the military) - and in the spring of "pre-repression" 1935, it was spread and among the commanders of the formations of the BVO - the district, where, as emphasized on September 11, 1936, K.E. Voroshilov, the commanders were "the most qualified, better trained in the Red Army"! The commander of the 27th Rifle Division K.P. Podlas and the commanders of his 79th and 80th rifle regiments had a desire "to accomplish the assigned task by a bold maneuver" - but a one-sided war game, held on the 20th of March in Bobruisk with the commanders of formations, deployed

deployed in the south of Belarus (5th Rifle Corps, 4th and 8th Rifle and 4th Cavalry Divisions and 3rd and 4th Mechanized Brigades), showed a completely different story. The tasks facing the participants in the game were very similar to those faced by their colleagues in June 1941 (by the way, one of the players, the commander of the 4th mechanized brigade D.G. Pavlov, also met the war in Belarus, on post of commander of the Western Front). Being placed "in conditions of scanty information about the general situation, a break in communications and high activity of the enemy, with a delay in the deployment of a significant part" of their troops, "with the threat [...] of envelopment on one of the flanks", the players had to "show resourcefulness, speed both in assessing the situation and in making decisions, courage, flexibility in maneuver. However, instead of "courage and flexibility", the head of the 2nd department of the Headquarters of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin saw "insufficient originality and courage in a tactical maneuver"!?

Even at the end of 1935, the commanders of the regiments of the LVO were the same, "quite often" did not use (as B.M. Shaposhnikov admitted on December 8, 1935 at the Military Council) "the opportunities that are available in military units in the sense of mobility, flexibility, maneuverability"³. In the only rifle division from which documents have been preserved containing an analysis of "pre-repression" tactical briefings with senior command staff (40th from the OKDVA), one of the three commanders of rifle regiments did not seek to cover the enemy in January 1936 either. And in the BVO that year, "extremely cautious" were the decisions of the chiefs of staff of the regiments of the first division, checked on this subject by specialists from the Red Army UBP (43rd Rifle)! 4, and the commander of one of the two mechanized brigades,

operating at large tactical exercises near Polotsk on October 2--4, 1936 (16th). Instead of trying to reach the "enemy" in the flanks of the rear, Colonel S.N. Amosov (a well-known, by the way, military theorist, author of works on the combat use of tank troops!) acted indecisively... Isn't this phenomenon too common in 1936? However, why ask this question if, according to the directive letter from the head

36

ka of the General Staff of the Red Army Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Yegorov by the commander of the military districts on June 27, 1937, "the skills to make and implement bold decisions" were not developed among the command staff of the "pre-repression" Red Army even in the spring of 1937!¹⁵

The inability of the headquarters of divisions and regiments to plan a battle to its full depth, noted in the fall of 1937 in the OKDVA - also indicating a lack of understanding of the opportunities provided by the new types of troops - in the advanced (!) BVO was also encountered in March 1935. It was then demonstrated even by such supporters of a bold maneuver, such as the above-mentioned division commanders - 27 and regiment commanders - 79 and - 80. In pursuit of the speed of issuing a combat order, they made decisions without hesitation that covered ... only the immediate task of a division or regiment. Having completed it, but having no idea of the next task, their subordinates could not take the initiative and develop success...

Inattention to the protection of flanks and junctions is especially disastrous in a dynamic, maneuverable battle of the 30s. - in the 20th rifle corps OKDVA also did not start in the fall of the 37th, they just "continued" to allow it!

The inability to create a shock fist and beat the enemy in parts, which was shown in September 1937 at the maneuvers of the BVO by the commander of the "Reds", indicating a lack of understanding of the basic principles of military art, was recognized as typical for the highest command staff of the Red Army by the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10 1936. "On the results of operational training for 1936 and on tasks for 1937." Instead of concentrating forces on the direction of the main attack, it was pointed out, the commanders of the operational level show "the desire to be "strong" everywhere (dispersing their efforts as a result)¹⁶.

In the same way, even before the purge of the Red Army, the noted K.E. Voroshilov during the September maneuvers of 1937, the unwillingness of the commanders of subunits, units and formations to interact with each other. "As a rule, there is no connection of interaction (connection between formations) in the course of a battle and especially an operation [...] this intolerable situation often does not touch anyone, this is treated as something ordinary [...]", - all this we can read in the same Directive No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936!¹⁷.

37

The "slow adoption" of decisions by the commanders in the BVO - as follows from the annual report of this district of October 15, 1937 - did not become its "weak point" precisely in the 37th, but only "continued" to "remain" as such! And indeed, it was also typical for the BVO in March 1935 (when both commanders of rifle divisions tested by A.I. Sedyakin at the military game turned out to be "slow" in making a decision - and division commander 4 GS. Isserson, and division commander V.Ya. Kolpakchi), and back in the first half of 1937 (in the 23rd rifle corps, the only one in the BVO for which documentation for this period was preserved, this was recorded then and the case: here is the "sluggish" and "uncertain" decision-making by the middle commanders of the 109th rifle regiment in January, and the insufficient "mobility" shown in May when solving tactical tasks by the commanders of the 1111th and 156th rifle regiments, and "slow decision-making" by the senior and top command staff of all parts of the corps at the training camp on June 1-3...)¹⁸.

In the autumn of 1937, only the BVO and (as can be understood from the November speech of P.E. Dybenko) complained about the slow decision-making by commanders in the LVO, and in the spring, before the purge of the Red Army began, this perk was also widespread in the OKDVA: the "slowness" of their commanders, his inability to "solve tactical tasks in a short

changing environments [sic in the document. — A.S.]” then recognized the command of the 40th Rifle Division, and the 59th, and the 62nd Rifle Regiment of the 21st... composition, “quickly navigate in the situation” was not able and the command staff of the 6th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District ... 19

The inability to make decisions according to the situation, the desire to act according to a template - characteristic of the fall of 1937 for the command staff of the OKDVA - was noted in this army in the summer and fall of 1935 (when the commanders of units and subunits of its Primorsky group were lost, faced with changes in the situation when moving the battlefield into the depths of the enemy’s defense) and in 1936 (when the commanders participating in the March maneuvers in Primorye made “few” “independent, strong-willed decisions, especially in critical moments of battle”²⁰, and the battalion commanders of the 1st and the middle commanders of the 66th Infantry Division did not change direction

38

attack even when their units stumbled upon a bunker spewing fire or fell under the flank FIRE of “whole groups” of heavy machine guns). The commander of the 9th rifle company of the 63rd rifle regiment of the 21st rifle division, Lieutenant Kuzin, who tried on July 5, 1937 to beat out the Japanese from the Vinokurka height they had captured (near Lake Khanka), also drove the company forward, despite the fire from the flanks (which in the end still forced the attackers to lie down, and then retreat to their original position)... only in the second half of 1937, but also in the first, and also in 1936. Thus, in the reports of the specialists of the Red Army UBP, we read about the “template and sketchiness” in the actions of the commanders of the 129th Infantry Regiment of the 43rd Infantry Division, checked in March 1936, and about the “insufficiently quick response to enemy actions” on the part of the commanders units of the 2nd Infantry Division and the 243rd Infantry Regiment of the 81st inspected in July. Even the compilers of the annual report of this division (dated October 1, 1936) could not but admit that in the 37th rifle unit the junior commanders acted “uncertainly” when the situation became more complicated, and th commander-23 K.P. Podlas saw that both the junior and middle command staff would organize the attack “without regard to the situation and terrain”, according to a pattern learned once and for all. And even in the first days of June 1937, Podlas had a chance to make sure that “in the event of surprises” in the 23rd Rifle Corps, both the highest and senior command staff are lost ...? 1

The “lack of intent” in the decisions taken in the autumn of 1937 by the commanders of the LVO, their inability to understand what they actually want to achieve is also evidence of an inability to act according to the situation, a desire in all cases to take the same , template decisions (even if they do not correspond to the situation so much that they give the impression that the commander has no idea at all). But the fact that in the decisions of his command staff “for the most part, there is still some kind of template,” the commander of the troops of the LVO B.M. Shaposhnikov reported as early as December 8, 1935!²²

39

Moreover, before the purge of the Red Army, schematism was distinguished by the command staff not only of the LVO and Siberian Military District, but of the entire Red Army! All Japanese officers who got acquainted with it, emphasized on December 9, 1935, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tukhachevsky, note the “inability” of the Soviet commanders “to make a decision in a timely manner in the event of a rapid change in the situation”²³. Having observed at the end of August 1936 the Polesye maneuvers of the KVO, the head of the Red Army UBP, commander of the 2nd rank A.I. Sedyakin concluded that “there were few original solutions”; The “scheme and template” to the command staff of this district, which was considered the most advanced, was also instilled in the first half of 1937...²⁴ the headquarters of the 5th mechanized corps—a formation whose mobility must have confronted it especially often with changes in the situation!

As for the lack of initiative of the command staff, which was encountered in the OKDVA in the autumn of 1937, the commander of this army, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher also admitted on December 10, 1935 at the Military Council that his "troops do not show the necessary initiative, speed of action on the part of battalion commanders, company commanders and platoon commanders" even in a meeting battle? The lack of initiative of the commanders of the OKDVA units was constantly noted by the inspectors from the army headquarters in 1936, and the commanders and headquarters of units and formations - also in the spring of 1937 ...

And again: if at the end of 1937 only the OKDVA command lamented over the lack of initiative of their commanders, then in the "pre-repression" period, at least at the level of subdivisions, the composition of the entire Red Army suffered from this vice! In 1935, the lack of "initiative, independence" among the unit commanders M.N. Tukhachevsky constantly recorded in the KVO, in the Moscow Military District, and in the LVO; The "insufficient" manifestation of "initiative, decisiveness" by these links of the command staff in the autumn of that year was also evident in the only rifle division of the BVO (43rd) covered from this side by sources. Japanese officers who got acquainted with the Red Army, who "very sharply" criticized the council, constantly faced this.

40

Tukhachevsky made it clear in his directive of June 29, 1936 (but the fact that the Soviet junior commander "does not

hesitates to take the initiative" - and in the report of October 7, 1936 "On combat training of the Red Army")?28, And in the directive letter of A.I. Yegorov dated June 27, 1937, it was stated that the command staff of the Red Army did not develop "skills for making and implementing" "initiative decisions" even in the winter and spring of 1937 ... 29

Interaction. With the ability to organize the interaction of various types of troops, things were about the same everywhere. Declaring that their commanders are coping with this task "satisfactorily" ("especially in the initial" period of the battle), the compilers of the OKDVA annual report immediately corrected themselves: the interaction is "more or less satisfactory [highlighted by me. - A.S.] is organized "only" to the depth of the immediate tasks of battalions and, less often, regiments, "and for subsequent periods of the battle it is either poorly planned or not planned at all. In addition, the commanders of rifle units often lose contact with the artillery that supports them, since they do not pull behind them, when advancing, the OSP sent by the artillerymen - the infantry liaison departments (read: they do not attach importance to interaction with artillery. - /S.). In a word, "the art of organizing combined arms [emphasis added by me. - A.S.] the combat level of a significant number of commanders is still low" (in separate tank battalions of rifle divisions, commander M.D. Solomatin, the head of the armored forces of the OKDVA, ordered the task of "organizing the technique of interaction" with other branches of the military in general "remained unfulfilled")thirty.

Approximately the same picture was in the BVI. "The commanders learned the basics of organizing interaction at the beginning of the battle," the district's annual report stated, "but as the battle develops in depth, as a rule, everything breaks, the infantry is forced to fight only with its own means or temporarily stop it. to restore the broken connection with the means of amplification interacting with it".

Tank

41

battalions of rifle divisions interact satisfactorily with infantry, but did not work out interaction with artillery ?!. This assessment is consistent with evidence from other sources. "In the line of the battalion, the regiment, there is insufficient coordination, insufficient interaction with artillery," the divisional commissar of the RL reported on August 3, 1937 at a meeting of political workers of the Red Army by the military commissar of the 16th rifle corps. Balychenko?? (and after all, the practical interaction of the military branches of the tetda was carried out just at the battalion level!). IN

Inspected on August 21 by representatives of the Red Army UBP at a bilateral tactical exercise of the 110th and 111th rifle regiments of the 37th rifle division, the interaction between machine tools and engineering units at the battalion level was simply weak.

What was said in the previous paragraph applies to commanders of the tactical level, but the September BVO maneuvers showed that the interaction of military branches in this district is not able to organize properly even at the operational level. For example, on November 21, 1937, I.P. Belov, when organizing a strike against the "blue" cavalry grouping, the command of the "red" army set tasks for its mechanized and cavalry corps and air brigade "without specific linking their actions with each other" (which is why the strike failed)³³.

The corresponding place is from the report made the next day by the commander of the troops of the Ural Military District, commander of the GP. Sofronov, as if written off from the BVO report: "On the spot, the commanders are making calculations for an offensive, and the interaction is going well [...] A different picture is obtained when the movement begins. As soon as the unit begins to move, and especially back - when retreating, the calculations, and control, and interaction are immediately lost ... 34

VHVO, reported at the same meeting S.K. Timoshenko, the interaction of the rifle battalion with tanks and artillery has not been worked out (in other words, they could not achieve practical interaction between the military branches in this district). However, the commanders of regiments and divisions had no practice in organizing interaction there ...

42

Approximately the same was reported at the November Military Council by almost all the commanders of the troops of other districts, both newly appointed and who had been in office for several years. The interaction of infantry and tanks, recognized as commanders of the ZabVO army commander of the 2nd rank M.D. Velikanov is still a weak point: infantry commanders do not know the "simplest conventional signs" that allow them to set tasks for the tanks assigned to them in battle. The messages of P.E. Dybenko (in the Leningrad Military District, the commanding staff knows how to organize the interaction of military branches poorly), M.A. Antonyuk (in the Siberian Military District this interaction is carried out "at a low level"), commander S.E. Gribov (in the North Caucasus Military District the commanders of divisions and regiments worked him "poorly", and the command staff as a whole "very poorly") and commander of the 2nd rank I.F. Fedko (in the KVO, the interaction of military branches due to flaws in the training of commanders and staffs was "poorly" worked out) ... 35 Fedko's assessment is confirmed by the report of the commander of the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO division commander F.I. Golikov (that tankers of the corps "did not at all" work out interaction with either infantry, or artillery, or cavalry, or air force)³⁶, as well as a random selection of units and KVO compounds. "In the preparation of a platoon, the organization of interaction with reinforcements [...] is poorly developed [...]," noted, having checked the combat training of his small units between August 8 and 12, 1937, the commander of the 45th Infantry Division, Colonel F.N. Remezov, and the commission of the temporarily correcting the post of the head of the 1st department of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army (ABTU RKKA) Colonel L.A. Knizhnikova, who checked the combat training of the 22nd mechanized brigade on August 19-21, discovered "insufficient knowledge of the technique of interaction between tanks and artillery" ³⁷.

From the final speech of K.E. Voroshilov, one can understand that, at least, the interaction of the infantry with the accompanying artillery was absent in the Moscow Military District. "All this does not work as it should, independently of each other," the people's commissar complained, sharing his impressions of the September maneuvers in the Moscow and Belorussian districts?³³.

43

More general assessments were also made at the council. So, from the report of the head of the ABTU of the Red Army, divisional commander G.G. Bokis, it was clear that the poor ability of tank commanders to organize interaction with

infantry and artillery was then characteristic of the entire Red Army ("On the spot," Bokis declared on November 22, "we interact well, but as soon as the situation changes, as soon as we enter the battle, this interaction is disrupted³?). And from the speech by the commanding officers of the BVO I.P. Belov, we can conclude that the command staff of the Red Army did not attach any importance to the interaction of various branches of the military! "It is customary for everyone," Ivan Panfilovich said on November 21, "that since a unit has approached the line from which you can rush to the attack or go on the offensive, then the issue of the day has been resolved, everything is immediately forward. It is considered a bad commander that one who hesitated a little. Everyone forgets that in any conditions the battle must be organized [and, among other things, the interaction of military branches should be established. — A.S.]". At the September maneuvers of the BVO, Belov witnessed how the battalion commander, urged on by the regiment commander (who, in turn, was hurried by the division commander!), threw the battalion into the attack, without waiting for the approach of a company of heavy weapons (i.e., battalion 45- mm guns and 82 mm mortars) and supporting artillery — i.e. without artillery support, for slaughter... True, Belov believed that the reason for this situation was the lack of purely technical skills among the command staff, namely the ability to calculate the time required for a lower-level commander to fully organize the battle. But if the Soviet commanders could not master this rather simple skill for so long, it means that they did not particularly strive for this - apparently not considering the same infantry support by artillery as something important enough...

And only the command troops of SAVO A.D. Loktionov stated that the interaction of the military branches is organized "correctly" with him and, on the whole, worked out "satisfactorily"¹.

So, in at least 10 out of 13 Soviet military districts (there is no information on the PriVO and ZakVO) - in other words, in the Red Army as a whole - the interaction of various types of troops in the second half of 1937 was poorly organized. But it's not better, if not worse! - was the case

and in

44

"pre-repression" 1935. As it was clear from the speech of A.I. Egorov at the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense on December 8, 1935, at the operational level in the Red Army then still did not achieve "the practical ability to organize in time and space the necessary interaction of rifle, mechanized and aviation formations in solving assigned tasks, in various conditions operations." At the tactical level, it was indicated in the report of the head of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin from | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year and on the tasks for 1936", "continuity" of "interaction of military branches in mobile forms of combat" is also "still far from real perfection". In fact, the main link in which the practical interaction of the military branches in battle was organized was the rifle battalions. And they, wrote on the same day, | | December 1935, K.E. Voroshilov M.N. Tukhachevsky, "still haven't mastered the ability to organize interaction with artillery and tanks on the ground" (i.e. in practice)...⁴?

No better than after the start of the purge of the Red Army, things were here in 1936. At the operational level, it was stated in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936, "the interaction of the main branches of the armed forces" "is not yet at the proper height", "in many cases there is no" even ... "a plan of action linked by lines and in time"! And from the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army" it follows that the Soviet command staff did not really know how to organize the interaction of the armed forces then even at the tactical level. If, as noted by the Deputy People's Commissar, the exercise is not rehearsed in advance or takes place in unfamiliar terrain (that is, in conditions that will be in war!), "driving a rifle battalion in cooperation with other branches of the military" "deteriorates sharply and often looks illiterate."⁴³

Not better than after the start of the purge of the Red Army, the picture is here and the first half of 1937. As noted in the directive letter of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, a "complete solution" to the problem of organizing the interaction of military branches in that period was not always achieved even at commander's classes! But in practice, in a real battle, it

could not be achieved at all: "the interaction of the headquarters of rifle battalions [i.e. the main organizers of the interaction of military branches. - / 4.S.] with the headquarters of the artillery divisions," the letter further stated, "not worked out" ... 49

Noted in November 1937 by G.G. Bokis also noted the poor ability of Soviet tank commanders to organize interaction with other branches of the military even before the start of mass repressions. "(...) From year to year," A.I. Sedyakin wrote in his report "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ..." A.I. Sedyakin, "there are insufficient skills of commanders of mechanical units and formations" inside mechanized formations and with other branches of the military". And in the "pre-repression" 1936, the misunderstanding of the need for interaction between the branches of the armed forces took on the bearers of black velvet buttonholes and very extreme forms. The commanders of mechanized brigades and corps, stated in his report of October 7 - rya 1936 "On Combat Training of the Red Army" by M.N. Tukhachevsky, they throw their tanks at the anti-tank defense without the support of infantry and (comcors - "often", and brigade commanders - always) artillery ... 46

The fact that the beginning of mass repressions did not worsen the situation here at all is clearly seen not only in the example of the Red Army as a whole, but also in the example of the three largest military districts. So, in the Air Military District — where at the end of 1937 the interaction of military branches was "weakly" organized due to flaws in the training of commanders and staffs — M.N. Even in 1935, Tukhachevsky had not met, in his words, "a single battalion commander" who would competently, on the ground, organize such interaction. At the publicized Kiev maneuvers in September 1935, "some" (as K.E. Voroshilov put it) combined arms commanders "forgot" to set artillery tasks during the battle, the long-range tank group for the infantry advancing behind it simply "disappeared" ", and the head of the artillery of the KVO N.M. Bobrov had to conclude that "with the staffs and commanders of tank[s] subunits, it is now necessary to thoroughly study the fundamentals [§1s! - / .S.] interaction with artillery" "8. Obviously, the same thing happened in the district of the commander of the 1st rank I.E. Yakira and in 1936:

'_ when even in the annual report of the KVO dated October 4, 1936, which embellished the reality, phrases appeared about "still insufficiently firm assimilation" of Tukhachevsky's instructions on "questions of organizing and conducting combat by the battalion" (at the level of which, we repeat, and carrying out - there was no practical interaction between the branches of the armed forces) and that the commanders of tank units "remain" "not completely finalized" "issues of interaction" with rifle units;

— when in the protocol of the party meeting of the headquarters of the 15th rifle corps, which took place on December 22, 1936 — the only one of the rifle corps of the KVO, from which at least some documentation was preserved for that year — we find the recognition of the chief of staff (colonel P.I. Lyapin) in the weak organization of interaction between "all types of troops";

- when, at the Polesye maneuvers, commanders and headquarters organized the interaction of infantry with tanks in such a way that A.I. Sedyakin considered it "unsatisfactory", and

- when even in both elite, "shock" divisions of the KVO - the 24th rifle Samara-Ulyanovsk Red Banner Iron and the 44th rifle Kiev Red Banner - the interaction of infantry with tanks even at the end of August (i.e. during the period when the cohesion of not only units, but also units ends!) Sedyakin was also rated as "failed".

Well, the situation that developed here just before the start of the purge of the Red Army is very clearly characterized by the order of I.E. Yakira I.F. Fedko No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937: the command staff of the KVO "does not know how to specifically organize the interaction of various branches of the military in a difficult combat situation", "headquarters of all branches of the military" are "poorly prepared to perform tasks" in "organizing interaction military branches". No difference with what

was noted here after the start of mass repression! (Of course, the new bosses are inclined to denigrate the results of their predecessors' work, but the materials of combat training checks carried out in the last "Yakir" months confirm the objectivity of the assessments of Order No. 0100.)

The situation that was typical for the BVO in the autumn of 1937 was the disappearance of interaction between the military branches shortly after the start of

47

battle, when moving it into the depths of the enemy's defenses, in the 27th rifle division of this district it was recorded during tactical exercises as early as March 1935, in the 37th division as early as October 1936, and in the 52nd - also in February 1937. From the context of the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937, it is also clear that this defect, caused by the poor preparedness of the commanders, was characteristic of the troops of the district even before the start of the purge of the commanders. After all, having touched upon the issue of the interaction of tanks and artillery during the breakthrough of a pre-prepared defense, the compilers of the report did not hesitate to point out that "due to the renewal of headquarters" (i.e. due to repressions. - A.S.) this problem again moved to the category of unresolved?. But in this case (as, by the way, in all the others, even in those when it comes to outright failures), they did not refer to the renewal of the command staff. So, there were no repressions here ...

In the 16th and 23rd rifle corps of the BVO, after the start of the purge of the Red Army, a weak one was recorded. organization of interaction with other branches of the military at the key, battalion level — but in 1935 it was typical for the entire district in general! "In 1935," it was directly stated in the order of the commander of the BVO troops, commander of the 1st rank I.P. Uborevich No. 04 of January 12, 1936, - the weakest link in the training of the command staff turned out to be the battalion commander and his headquarters, especially in the interaction of infantry, tanks and artillery on a company and battalion scale "...5! The same in 1936: this defect was noted then in both rifle divisions of the BVO, the organization of interaction between the combat arms in which was covered by sources (2nd and 37th) ...

But what about in the OKDVA, where in the fall of 1937 the interaction of the combat arms was organized (and even then with sin in half) only to the depth of the immediate task? The fact that after the completion of the immediate task, the interaction of the combat arms disappeared in 1935 was even recognized by the annual report of the Primorsky OKDVA group of October 11, 1935, which, in fact, tends to cover up its shortcomings! (And then 8 out of 10 rifle divisions of V.K. Blucher were part of the Primgruppa). Absolutely the same as the OKDVA report for 1937 states the report of the OKDVA headquarters on the results of combat training for December 1936-April 1937. (dated May 18, 1937; hereinafter - the report of the headquarters

48

OKDVA dated May 18, 1937): when the battle moves into the depths of the "enemy's" defense, the interaction of the military branches — due to the unpreparedness of the commanders — "dramatically loses its clarity and timeliness in time and space", and at the key, battalion level, disappears completely! 5?

In the autumn of 1937, in the tank battalions of the rifle divisions of the OKDVA, which included more than half of the tanks of this army, the tasks of "organizing the technique of interaction" with other branches of the military were, as we saw, not fulfilled. But "cases of poor organization of the interaction of tanks with artillery and combat aviation" in Blucher's army — as even the annual report of its armored forces of October 19, 1935 admitted — were "very frequent" in 1935 too!53 In the annual report of OKDVA dated September 30, 1936, who also often cheated in their favor, also could not help but admit that "interaction on specific combat tasks with other branches of the military" "still" is a "weak point" of their tank commanders. And according to the annual report of the armored forces of the OKDVA, tank headquarters were also "poorly prepared" for "coordination of actions with other branches of the armed forces". battalions...54 "Very weak successes" achieved in the organization of interaction with other branches of the military by tank commanders,

were also noted in the order of V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter period of study of the 1936/37 academic year⁵⁵, which ended even before the start of mass repressions...

The fact that the inability of the command staff of the Red Army to organize the interaction of the branches of the armed forces was by no means generated by the beginning of the purge of the army is clearly seen in the example of two more of those districts where in the fall of the 37th they complained about this inability - the North Caucasus Military District and the Moscow Military District. In the first of them, the inability of the headquarters of rifle divisions to establish interaction between infantry and tanks and the inability of tank commanders to maintain contact (and, therefore, interaction) with the infantry manifested itself as early as September 1935, at large tactical exercises in the Krasnodar Novorossiysk region. The same thing happened in September 1936: having visited the maneuvers of the North Caucasus Military District in the Krymskaya area, A.I. Sedyakin stated that in the same divisions (22nd and 74th), not only was the organization of interaction between infantry and tanks still not worked out, but also often violated

49

even the interaction of infantry with artillery...⁵⁶ In the Moscow Military District and in "pre-repression" September 1935, at the exercises of the 3rd Rifle Corps near Gorokhovets, in one of the two rifle divisions (14th) of the "real interaction" of military branches, according to M.N. Tukhachevsky, "nowhere" was organized, but in the other (17th) its commander G.I. Bondar from the very beginning threw infantry into the attack without the support of both tanks and even artillery! only aviation, but even artillery ...

As for the speech highlighted by I.P. Belov's lack of understanding of the importance of interaction between the branches of the armed forces, then the neglect of the need to carefully organize the interaction of the branches of the troops, the senior and highest command staff of the Red Army again clearly showed even before the start of its purge. After all, this task faced all commanders, starting with the company commander, and if in the fall of 1937, the new commanders of battalions, regiments and divisions did not want to reckon with it, it means that they were not used to reckoning with it even before the purge of the Red Army - when they commanded companies, respectively, battalions and shelves

Ensuring combat operations. "Combat support service, especially intelligence [emphasis mine. - / A.S.], - it was stated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0109 dated December 14, 1937 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for 1937 and tasks for 1938", - in all branches of the armed forces organized and carried out unsatisfactory"⁸. True, speaking on November 27, 1937 at the Military Council, K.E. Voroshilov stated that, thanks to the improvement in the work of headquarters, intelligence among the troops in 1937 "worked much more clearly, more consistently and more confidently" than in 1936⁵⁹. And in the annual report of the OKDVA, it was stated that by the autumn of 1937 the staffs were coping "satisfactorily" with the organization of intelligence (including maintaining contact with it)⁶⁰ (this assessment, however, also concealed the lack of proper energy and organization of additional reconnaissance during the battle, and ill-conceived organization of night

50

intelligence, and the fact that command intelligence in OKDVA was rarely organized).

However, all other sources at our disposal confirm the validity of the assessment given by the drafters of Order No. 0109. a common phenomenon throughout the Red Army," the Military Council of the LVOYA reported to Voroshilov on August 14, 1937. The "weak development" of "intelligence issues" in his district was stated on November 21 at the Military Council by the commander of the troops of the KVO I.F. Fedko; after him, A.D. Loktionov; The fact that the staffs are unsatisfactorily organizing reconnaissance can also be understood from the speech made the next day by the commanders of the PriVO Commander M.G. Efremov; the fact that "intelligence issues" continue to "remain a bottleneck" was also noted in the annual report of the BVO⁶² (of the four rifle regiments of the 23rd rifle

corps of the BVO, checked between August 18 and 29, 1937 by commander-23 K.P. Podlas and representatives of the UBP of the Red Army, in three - the 109th and 1109th regiments of the 37th rifle division and in the 156th regiment of the 52nd - "reconnaissance was sent out with a great delay ...). And in the Moscow Military District - as it followed from the speech of the commander of its troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny at the Military Council on November 21, 1937 - the commanders and staffs did not understand the significance of intelligence at all, organizing it as if only for the departure of the issue: "Reconnaissance is organized, sent out, and as soon as it left, they forgot about it. Nobody is interested in her, nobody demands anything from her. Organized, sent reconnaissance, she can walk until the end of maneuvers or exercises, not report anything, and no one will ask why she does not report. ("And the intelligence agencies themselves," added Semyon Mikhailovich, "like individual intelligence officers, are poorly trained."63) Judging by the letter of Lieutenant M.O. Grandfathers From the 223rd Infantry Regiment of the 75th Infantry Division of the KhVO K.E. Voroshilov dated December 8, 1937, "not with all seriousness" then they approached intelligence in the Kharkov district. For example, Deda wrote, the Field Charter of the Red Army in 1936 "govo

51

rit that b[ataglio]n is conducting reconnaissance by a group of selected fighters. But I must tell you that this does not happen in practice. The commander of the b[atallo] on reconnaissance simply appoints a platoon that he likes"64.

And Voroshilov, who announced progress in the organization of reconnaissance, immediately warned the tank commanders against ... an offensive without organized "really" reconnaissance - in fact, acknowledging by this that the wearers of black velvet buttonholes did not understand at all why reconnaissance was needed! The same was actually admitted by the head of the ABTU of the Red Army G.G. Bokis. The tank commanders, he stated, had not yet learned to conduct reconnaissance continuously (in other words, after the start of the battle they simply stopped organizing it!). Moreover, they did not learn how to conduct observation from a tank: even taking into account, Bokis emphasized, that the available tank observation means are unsatisfactory, they observe poorly (chi tai: do not attach any importance to this!) ...

Reports from the field confirm the correctness of the head of the ABTU of the Red Army. The tankers, the annual report of the BVO stated, are bad both in the management of reconnaissance agencies and in the organization of continuous reconnaissance. The weakest point in tactical training, emphasized on November 23 at the Military Council the commander of the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO division commander F.I. Golikov, is the organization of reconnaissance in the course of the initiated actions. On August 19-21, 1937, the commission of Colonel L.A. Knizhnikova stated the "unsatisfactory quality of observation" from tankabb. And the tank commanders of the OKDVA, as the annual report of this army admitted, generally showed "inability to organize" reconnaissance (and not just "use" it "to the end")!67

With illiteracy in the organization of reconnaissance, illiteracy in the organization of marching and sentry guards was quite naturally combined. "I must say," wrote K.E. Voroshilov Lieutenant M.O. Grandfather from the 75th Infantry Division of the KhVO, - that the majority of the command staff, including the highest staff, do not know how to practically organize guards; "Insufficient attention" they also pay to marching guards

52

niub8. Apparently, the same illiteracy of the command staff was also meant by the command troops of the ZabVO M.D. Velikanov (who noted on November 22 at the Military Council that in the tactical training of his infantry "especially" the weak point is the "outpost guard service"), and the commander of the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO F.I. Golikov (who declared in the same place on November 23 that ONE OF the "weakest points" in the tactical training of his troops was "protection of all types")69. We see no reason why such gaping gaps would then occur in three districts...

The conclusion of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0109 dated December 14, 1937 on the unsatisfactory organization of combat support should also apply to the logistics of combat

actions. This is confirmed by all other sources at our disposal that touch on this issue. The compilers of the OKDVA annual report admitted that little attention is "still" paid to the organization of the rear service; practical skill in managing the rear of the commanders is not enough." Questions of the organization of the rear, reported on November 21 at the Military Council by the command troops of the KVO I.F. Fedko, "remained poorly worked out"; the same was told there on November 23 by the commander of the 45th mechanized corps F.I. Golikov: "Experimental rear exercises revealed the entire weakness of the training of command personnel, staffs and units in the field of rear work." "It is not necessary to say that the issue has been fully worked out," admitted on November 21 P.E. Dybenko: about 70% of the exercises of the units of his LVO, the commanders did not practice in managing the real rear. With Dybenko, A.D. Loktionov (he, however, attacked the senior and top command staff here, pointing out, in particular, that the 5th department of the district headquarters "is not skillfully enough capable of ensuring the material planning of modern operations"). Well, and the command troops of the MVO S.M. Budyonny bluntly declared on the same day that "combat commanders on matters of rear service are completely unprepared", that "the rear remains a dark place even today for our commanders of all ranks" "\.

Obviously, things were no better in the KhVO, in the speech of the commanders of which questions of management rear not for

53

touched. Let us turn again to the letter of Lieutenant Deda dated December 8, 1937: "The biggest drawback in the training of troops is the supply of ammunition. This type of training was not done at all, both in the regiment [and. - A.S.] in b[atallio]

`no, r[o]te, platoon and in the department "... "2 The letter was devoted to issues of combat training in general - and yet this first document we discovered, covering the training of the command staff of a particular part of the Kharkov district, contains information about the inability to manage the rear! Therefore, it is difficult to assume that only the 223rd Rifle Regiment was in such a breakthrough from the entire district ...

So, after the start of mass repressions, in the second half of 1937, intelligence in the Red Army "in all branches of the military was organized and conducted unsatisfactorily." But exactly the same "common for all chiefs and staffs and an extremely dangerous breakthrough - the weakness of intelligence" - was also stated in the report of the head of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin dated [December 1935. "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ..."!73 The same thing happened in 1936. "Reconnaissance and support is the weakest link in all types of combat training," was stated in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 ...". "Intelligence remains a weak point in the training of most units and formations," echoed the order of the People's Commissar No. 00105 of November 3, 1936 "On the results of combat training for 1936 and tasks for 1937""4. "On the issue of intelligence it is already becoming ashamed to speak directly, it's a shame, you have to blush before the people's commissar, before the government, when they again see in our document that this issue is still weak," he was indignant on November 25, 1937, at meeting of the commission for the development of a draft order on the results of combat training for the 37th, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Egorov...75

Noted in November 1937 by K.E. Voroshilov, the reluctance of tank commanders to organize "real" reconnaissance before an offensive was also common even in 1936. In a report dated October 7 this year "On Combat Training

54

heh Red Army "M.N. Tukhachevsky had to note that the staff officers of the tank battalions did not even try to observe the reaction of the "enemy" to the actions of reconnaissance tanks! A.I. Sedyakin in September 1936, at the famous Belorussian maneuvers, happened to see that the 5th and 21st mechanized brigades of the BVO were advancing, right along Voroshilov, despite

"incapacity" of intelligence, "blindly"?76. The headquarters and battalion commanders of the 15th mechanized brigade of the KVO at the Shepetov maneuvers that took place in the same month sometimes did not organize reconnaissance before the attack at all; in the same way, without reconnaissance at all, the 8th mechanized regiment of the 8th cavalry division of the OKDVA attacked during the March maneuvers in Primorye, and the 18th mechanized and 1st heavy tank brigade of the BVO at the Polotsk exercises in October.. .

The fact that the ability of commanders and staffs to organize reconnaissance in the "pre-repression" period was as weak as after the beginning of the purge of the Red Army is clearly seen in the example of the three largest military districts - KVO, BVO and OKDVA. In the case of the BVO, as we have seen, this was already recognized by the compilers of the 1937 report of this district, who noted that "intelligence issues" in the BVO have not become, but continue to "remain a bottleneck". At the end of August 1937, in the 109th, 110th rifle regiments of the 37th rifle division of the BVO, reconnaissance was sent out belatedly, but the fact that "the organization and conduct of reconnaissance in all types of combat" there were "insufficiently worked out" and in 1936, he even recognized the annual report of the division dated October 1, 1936. 77. And in the second half of October, commander-23 K.P. Podlas saw that after the start of the battle in the 109th and 110th regiments, reconnaissance was not organized at all! The "unsatisfactory quality of observation from the tank", recorded in August 1937 in the 22nd Mechanized Brigade of the KVO and in the 15th and 17th Mechanized Brigade formed simultaneously with it, was noted back in September 1936 at the Shepetovka maneuvers. "Mediators for tank units," I.E. himself pointed out then. Yakir, - they complained that the young tank commander observed very poorly from the tank 78

The "inability to organize" and "to the end" "use" reconnaissance, which was typical for tank commanders of the OKDVA in the autumn of 1937, was characteristic of them even before the purge of the Red Army. Then even the annual report of the armored forces

55

The OKDVA of October 19, 1935 admitted that the commanders "do not have the necessary attention to the continuous conduct of combat reconnaissance", that "at the height of the battle they usually forget about it", and the annual report of the OKDVA of September 30, 1936 - that "organization and conduct of reconnaissance" is a "weak point" for tank commanders. Order of V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year noted that the organization of reconnaissance and surveillance of the OKDVA tank troops "very poorly" worked out and in the first half of the 37th ... 79

The commanders and headquarters of the tank troops of the BVO - as stated in the annual report of this district of October 15, 1937 - the inability to organize "continuous intelligence and control of intelligence agencies" also "remained" as a legacy from the previous period.

The documents of the BVO and OKDVA testify, as we see, to the fact that noted in November 1937 by G.G. Bokis, the inability of Soviet tank commanders to achieve continuity in reconnaissance was also characteristic of them before the purge of the Red Army.

The "unsatisfactory" organization of logistics support for the troops, recorded in the first months after the start of the purge, was also not the result of repressions. When planning operations, it was noted in the report of A.I. Sedyakin "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...", the issues of organizing the supply of troops are only touched upon "superficially" (because of which, in particular, such a trump card of the Red Army of those years as mechanized corps, during military games on three th day of the operation "was left without fuel." - / A.S.). It was the same at the 35th and at the tactical level: "the most important decisions of the command," Sedyakin pointed out, "especially in the crisis stages of the battle, organically very rarely associated with the arrangement of the rear", "in the dynamics of the battle, the control of the rear is easily disturbed and stops." "The rear," stated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 dated November 3, 1936, "remains the weakest point in the combat training of the Red Army." At the same time, at the operational level (as noted by the directive of the People's Commissar No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936), there was "absent" "rear planning" [as in the document. - A.S.] ", the most important operational decisions were made without taking into account the possibilities of supplying troops ... And according to the directive-

to a letter to A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, the Soviet staffs were "poorly trained on rear issues" and immediately before the start of the purge of the Red Army?⁰.

Documents of the largest military districts — OKDVA and KVO — testify to the same. Actually, the OKDVA report for 1937 already notes that they pay little attention to the organization of the rear "as before." Indeed, even the "pre-repression" annual reports of the Far East were forced to admit the inability of commanders and staffs to organize the supply of troops! So, in the report of the Primorsky Group OKDVA dated October 11, 1935, it appears that, when making a decision, the commanders "forget" to give the appropriate orders to the rear services (as we can see, they also became a "lack" of practical skill in managing the rear differ by no means after the repressions!). In the OKDVA report of October 21, 1935 - that the headquarters would "have not learned how to control the rear" "even when operating in open and medium-rough terrain." In her own report dated September 30, 1936 - that the headquarters of divisions and corps during a battle or operation either completely forget about rear issues (this is exactly what happened, for example, at the March maneuvers in Primorye. - A.S.), or reduce control them to issue only general instructions that the headquarters of rifle regiments and battalions "rarely take into account" the need to organize logistics support for troops not only during the battle, but also when planning it! In the report of the armored troops of the OKDVA for 1936 - that "in all groups" of the command staff "the logistics issues assigned to them" were "weakly worked out." and for the delegates of the army party conference) it meant that the headquarters of the units and formations "learned to satisfactorily manage" only "the rear, operating not at full strength and not in mobile forms of combat"⁸?. In other words, in a real combat situation in the late 30s. — when the rear services had to operate in full force, and the battles had to be, as a rule, maneuverable and dynamic — the "pre-repression" Far Eastern headquarters could not organize logistics either!

In the KVO in the fall of 1937, the issues of logistics organization were worked out poorly, but the fact that "in all military branches it is still weak with the organization of logistics for the entire operation" and that logistics issues in general require "further deepening and serious work" — this was also forced to be acknowledged by the compilers of the district's fraudulent annual report of October 4, 1936.⁸³. "Weakness in the training of command personnel, headquarters and units in the field of rear work", discovered after the start of the purge of the Red Army in the 45th mechanized corps, was also clearly caused not by arrests, but by the fact that in tactical exercises conducted by tankers of the KVO in the first half of 1937, the work of the rear was not taken into account ...

Troop management. The degree of ability achieved in the second half of the 37th degree of ability to organize continuous command and control of troops during hostilities was described in general terms by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0109 dated December 14, 1937: crucibles of a level required by the conditions of modern general military combat"⁸⁴. All other sources at our disposal confirm this assessment and allow us to specify it. In particular, they practically unanimously testify to the helplessness in management, which was manifested by the commanders and headquarters of rifle subunits - commanders of rifle squads, platoons, companies and battalions and battalion headquarters. Thus, in the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937, it was directly stated that "the command and control of the battle formations of a platoon and company still remains at a low level"⁸⁵. What exactly this "low level" meant is clearly seen from the results of checking four rifle regiments of the 23rd Rifle Corps of the BVO (109th, 110th and 111th - 37th Rifle Division and 156th - 52 - Y), carried out on August 18-29, 1937 by the command of the corps and the UBP of the Red Army. "Squad management has not been worked out," concluded order No. 042 of September 2, 1937, summed up the order of commander-23 No. 042 of September 2, 1937. "Most of the squad commanders do not know the statutory commands, they forget to set tasks for the observer, machine gunners, snipers and grenade launcher.

Worst of all with the preparation of the squad in the 156th and 111th [rifle] regiments.

In the preparation of a platoon in all parts, the interaction between fire, movement and [p. - A.S.] a neighbor [it is the commander who organizes all this. - A.S.]. [...] Platoon commanders do not have the necessary skills in command and control under various conditions - they get lost, do not show initiative."

Judging by the bilateral tactical exercises of the 110th and 111th regiments held on August 21, the commanders of companies and battalions could not provide high-quality control in the 23rd corps: they tried to control the units operating on a fairly wide front in alone, "running in battle from one company to another [or from one platoon to another. — 4.S.]"86.

And at the September maneuvers of the BVO, the "low level of command and control of battle formations" became visible not only in the platoon and company, but also in the squad and battalion. "The movement of units and the fire of machine-gun units - they are not coordinated with each other, as a rule, - speaking on November 27, 1937 at the Military Council, K.E. Voroshilov, "the interaction of rifle subunits" with the accompanying artillery is also "absent" 7. But it is the task of the battalion commander and his headquarters to coordinate the advance of infantry subunits with the fire of the "accompanying" artillery... And the low level department management confirm the impressions taken from the same maneuvers by the commander of the MVO troops S.M. Budyonny. "The combat formations of the squad, platoon and company have not been worked out," he stated at the same council on November 21. "[...] They advance [...] without linking movement with fire." And the reason for this is the commanders: "Quite and often I had to observe that the squad leader gave orders like this: "Squad, follow me, forward, run." And everyone ran. Imagine - in battle, because in this case the commander will be killed and the entire squad will be killed. Is it really possible to move like that under such fire? This is instead of commanding: "Separation, dash to such and such a line, you see, there is a bush or a ravine." And first the Riflemen run across one by one, under the cover of a machine gun, or, on the contrary, machine gunners under the cover of shooters. "I'm not saying that this is only in the Moscow District," Semyon emphasized.

Mikhailovich. "I was at the maneuvers of other okrugs and saw the same thing" 88,

As can be seen from the statements of Budyonny and Voroshilov, the commanders did not know how to manage a squad, platoon, company and battalion then even in the Moscow Military District. And judging by the speech at the Military Council by the commanders of the KhVO S.K. Timoshenko, who reported on November 22 about "insufficient interaction between fire and movement during the offensive", and in the Kharkov district. <:

"The management of the squad in battle is still low," admitted the OKDVA annual report. With the "unstable connection" between the commander and lower units noted in the same document, the "poor mobility of command and control bodies" of the units (most likely battalion headquarters. - A.S.) and the "unsatisfactory" readiness of company control cells ("The company commander, as a rule, controls the voice")® in the Special Far East, the commanders of platoons, companies and battalions could not manage well either. And only the command troops of SAVO A.D. Loktionov declared on November 21 at the Military Council that he had mastered combat management on the scale of a rifle company "satisfactorily"...91

The picture of the general weak ability of the commanders of rifle units to manage these latter is supplemented by the speech of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense A.I. Yegorov at a meeting of the Commission of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense on November 25, 1937, in which Alexander Ilyich emphasized that the commanders of units in the Red Army do not know how to control the fire of their squad, platoon, company or battalion: "Even at tactical conventional exercises, where, it would seem that tactics in all elements are presented, there is nothing in relation to fire. Who sets the sight how, whether he sets the sight at all, no one knows. The squad leader does not follow this. At the platoon leader

only one in the language: "The first section forward, behind me", gives a whistle, etc."; there is no question of massing fire ... 92

There are serious grounds to believe that the commanders of tank subunits (platoons and companies) were also lame at the time. Indeed, in both documents we discovered, characterizing the degree of skill of tank commanders

60

to be such an important means of control as radio communication, this skill is not highly valued. The commanders of the tank troops are characterized by "a lag in matters of radio training," admitted the annual report of the OKDVA. And the commander of a tank company from the 18th mechanized brigade, senior lieutenant Bulygin, speaking on October 18 or 19, 1937 at the asset of the BVO, indicated that tank commanders did not use radio communications enough. From the same speech it is clear that, criticizing their tankers for being "topographically weak" and "not sufficiently mastering the map", the BVO commanders I.P. Belov had in mind precisely the commanders of crews and subunits...73 "The immediate causes of this weak command and control of subunits are already visible from the previous presentation; this is the tactical illiteracy of the command staff and their poor command of the technique of management and organization of communications. Thus, it was precisely the narrow tactical outlook that forced the platoon commanders of the 23rd Corps to get lost (i.e., let go of control) when the situation changed; it was elementary ignorance of tactics that prompted detached commanders to expose fighters to the fire of the "enemy" during the September maneuvers and to indicate to the machine gunners during the August exercises in the 23rd Corps not on the flanks, but in the center of the battle formation (so that, having moved forward, stredky closed the firing sector for the machine gunners who remained to support them ...). It was precisely the poor command and control technique and communication organization that prompted platoon, company and battalion commanders to ignore the generally accepted method of command and control of these military units - using platoon and company control cells (i.e. observers and liaisons), battalion headquarters and technical types of communications - and manage alone, "voice", "running from one company to another" (of course, without doing much, and most importantly, every now and then losing control over the general situation). True, in the OKDVA - as the annual reports of this army and its 20th Rifle Corps make clear - they were forced to do this by the poor preparedness of their control cells. But since the training of these latter lay with the commanders themselves, the unpreparedness of the command and control cells testifies, first of all, to the lack of understanding by the commanders of their significance—i.e.

61

all about the same poor acquaintance with the technique of management and organization of communication. In the case of the 23rd BVO Rifle Corps, this misunderstanding is unambiguously established. "Platoon commanders," it was noted in the order of the commander-23 No. 042 of September 2, 1937, "as a rule, control the battle directly, they do not organize control cells, and if they are available, they do not use them for control"; company commanders also do not want to control the battle from a "prepared" (i.e., from having technical means of communication, liaisons and observers. - A.S.) command post (CP); battalion headquarters for command and control are also poorly used ... 9 * From the wording of the order of the commander of the 45th Infantry Division of the KVO No. command (the commanding officer of the platoon himself runs around with flags "5), we can conclude that here, too, the commanders themselves were to blame for the inefficiency of management: after all, "it was he who had to work out the" organization of management ". Also, apparently, The situation was also in the LVO: having admitted on November 21 at the Military Council that the commanders of his district did not always know how to properly use their headquarters, P. E. Dybenko probably had in mind the battalion commanders ...

In at least many cases, the subunit commanders' poor command of control techniques also meant poor command language. The ignorance of the "detachment committees" of the 23rd Rifle Corps of the BVO of the statutory commands has already been mentioned; in the 20th Rifle Corps of the OKDVA, apparently, not only junior, but also middle commanders, who were in platoons and companies, suffered from this defect. "At exercises in the field," it was indicated in the annual report of the corps without specifying, about

what category of command staff are we talking about - and in the service the expression "Come on! instead of statutory commands, the issuance of orders is carried out vaguely, in form and tone not in the spirit of the requirements of the statutes, which often leads to attempts at non-execution and bickering. In the Privolzhsky District, poor command language command was common among platoon and company commanders. "[...] The middle commanding staff did not do this very clearly when setting tasks," complained on November 22, 1937 on

62

The Military Council of the Komvos of the PriVO M.G. Efremov (out of habit calling the commanders the commanders), - did not mince out when orders were given, there was uncertainty ... 98 A. Commander of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District S.E. Gribov stated that the "poor knowledge" of the commanders (apparently, primarily of subunits. - A.S.) of the basics of topography also affected the "control in the dynamics of the battle" ..

The headquarters of the rifle battalions of the Red Army in the second half of 1937 also knew how to manage exceptionally badly (and not just "did not reach the level required by the conditions of modern combined arms combat"). After all, they were like that then even in the advanced BVO. "The weak sector is in the preparation of the planned tactical level, at the headquarters level, the organization of management is weak, the inability to use all means [as in the document. — A.S.] of technical communication," noted on August 3, 1937, at a meeting of political workers of the Red Army, the military commissar of the 16th rifle corps of the BVO RL. Balychenko® (under the "planned tactical link" and structures that have "all means of technical communication", one can "understand only headquarters, and at the July tactical exercises, the results of which were summed up by the military commissar, only regimental and battalion). And the battalion headquarters of the 109th, 110th, 111th and 156th rifle regiments of the 23rd rifle corps of the BVO at the end of August directly recognized the corps command and representatives of the UBN of the Red Army as poorly prepared ... The characteristic given to the headquarters in the annual report of OKDVA ("headquarters are inactive and inflexible in command"), clearly applies to battalion ones: after all, later in this document, "poor mobility of command and control bodies" of rifle subunits (i.e., battalion headquarters) is noted!01.

As for the combined arms units and formations - rifle regiments, divisions and corps - then the command troops of the North Caucasus Military District S.E. Gribov, speaking at the Military Council on November 22, directly pointed out the "weak" ability of his regimental and divisional commanders to command troops! 2. In fact, the same was said in the annual report of the OKDVA, stating "the lack of high-quality skills and dexterity in the commanders in the field of command and control in a rapidly changing environment and under conditions of significant

63

to saturate the active troops with technical means of combat" (in a word, in the conditions of modern warfare. — A.S.) and explained that its commanders manage satisfactorily only in such a battle, where equipment is used to a limited extent. In real all-arms combat saturated with equipment, they "make a number of gross mistakes and miscalculations"!93 Control in battle not only of infantry, but also of various equipment is the prerogative not only of battalion commanders, but also commanders of rifle units and formations ... At least the commanders of the regiments had in mind the command troops of the Ural Military District G.P. Sofronov, who declared on November 22 at the Military Council that in the dynamics of the battle, "as soon as the unit begins to move", his command staff loses control of the troops ... 104

At the bilateral tactical exercise covered by our sources on August 21, 1937, the commanders of the 110th and 11th rifle regiments of the 37th rifle division of the BVO also showed complete inability to control, abandoning the checkpoints prepared for them, where there were all means of communication, and those who ruled by running from unit to unit (and also weakly used their headquarters to organize control). The above evidence by P.E. Dybenko, according to which the commanders did not always know how to use their headquarters correctly then in the LVO, also probably applied to the commanders of units (and maybe formations) ...

These testimonies for five military districts, which we gleaned from various sources, but largely coinciding and generally painting the same picture of frankly weak (and not just "not reaching the level required by the conditions of modern combined arms combat") skills commanders of rifle units and formations to manage their troops, allow us to assert that the same picture was then in the entire Red Army.

However, the main burden in ensuring continuous control of a unit or formation in battle falls not on the commander, but on the headquarters. And the headquarters of units and formations were also poorly prepared. The unsatisfactory readiness of their military headquarters (or, what is the same, their weak cohesion) was noted by more

64

we who spoke on November 21-22, 1937 at the Military Council of the commanders of the military districts - the command troops of the Moscow Military District ("our headquarters [...] cannot yet clearly and systematically organize offensive or defensive battles"), the KVO, the North Caucasus Military District (in the district only the headquarters 9th Rifle Corps prepared satisfactorily), ZakVO, SAVO ("headquarters failed in the autumn exercises, management was lame"), URVO and SibVO⁶⁵. From the annual reports of the BVO and OKDVA it is clear that the command and control of troops in a modern, dynamically developing battle, the military headquarters were poorly prepared in these districts too: "in the first, they "untimely" communicated the commander's decision to the troops (i.e. . slowly prepared combat documents), and in the second they were "inactive and inflexible in control"! 06. (Having let the 110th and 111th rifle regiments of the 37th rifle division of the BVO go through a tactical exercise on August 21, 1937, the workers of the Red Army UBP directly pointed out the poor preparedness of their headquarters.)

The immediate cause of the poor training of the staffs of the "rifle units and formations" was poor command of the technique of staff service - and above all the technique of organizing communications with the troops and the technique of transmitting orders to them. "Instead of live communication and assistance to the troops, constant telegraph conversations and long, always overdue and therefore useless documents still remain the favorite, and often the only forms of control," the directive of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Commander of the 1st rank B.M. Shaposhnikova of August 23, 1937. As a result, "the organization of the leadership of troops during the battle is especially weak"! 7 (we recall that this is the most important of the requirements imposed by modern - combined arms and dynamically developing - combat)... "painlessly" switch from one type of communication to another (as well as with the "inaccuracy" and "indistinctness" of the combat documentation they compiled and, in general, with a low Headquarters culture - manifested, for example, in the fact that absolutely all of them then demonstrated "uncivilized

Z- 2255 65

new, careless work on the map")!98. Finally, the chiefs of staff and their operational departments often did not organize communications in battle at all! Thus, during the September maneuvers of the Moscow Military District, the chief of staff of the 3rd Rifle Corps "never once set a specific task for the communications chief to organize communications, and therefore, during the maneuvers, he turned out to be without communications." Others, like, for example, the chief of staff of the 4th Infantry Division during BVO maneuvers, "forgot" to approve the plan for organizing communications, i.e. "to think over the organization of communication throughout the depth of the battle" ... 10

The unsatisfactory training of the headquarters of tank units and formations - which determined the weakness of the management of these latter - can already be judged from the direct instructions of the annual reports of the BVO and OKDVA and the reports made at the November Military Council by the commanders of the troops of the LVO and ZabVO and the commander of the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO . According to them, the headquarters of the 7th mechanized corps was then unsatisfactorily trained (or, what is the same, poorly put together) in the LVO (during the September district maneuvers, neither the commander of this formation, divisional commander M.E. Bakshtynovich, nor his headquarters "could cope with corps management", "their control was disrupted at the decisive moment"), in the ZabVO - headquarters and the 11th mechanized corps

sa, and mechanized brigades, in the BVO - headquarters of mechanized brigades, and in OKDVA and in the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO - headquarters of both mechanized brigades and tank battalions! 9. In other words, we have direct recognition of the weakness of the headquarters of half of all mechanized corps and half of all mechanized brigades that were available in the second half of 1937. in the Red Army. A higher rating was found only in one case: after checking the combat training of the 22nd mechanized brigade of the KVO on August 19-21, 1937, the commission of Colonel L.A. Knizhnikova noted that "the functional training of headquarters commanders is quite satisfactory"...!!! In addition, it can be assumed that those commanders of the troops of the districts, who at the November Military Council only mentioned the unsatisfactory training of their military headquarters in general, had in mind the headquarters of tank formations. Finally, we have, although rather vague, but related to the tank headquarters of the Red Army as a whole, the confession of the head of the ABTU of the Red Army G.G. Bokisa from

66

November 22, 1937, according to which these headquarters "have not yet really mastered the issues of organizing command and control of troops"!12.

However, due to the fact that "troop control is the weak side of the entire" Red Army, a high-ranking political worker of the Red Army A.L. Shifres spoke even on September 24, 1935 (during the analysis of the large tactical exercises of the North Caucasus Military District) !!! 3 The directive letter of K.E. Voroshilov on the results of the operational training of commanders and staffs in 1935 (dated December 28, 1935), and the report of A.I. Sedyakin from | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...". The organization of "continuous control" during the operation, the first of these documents stated, "in a number of districts and fleets" has not yet "received proper study and assimilation." (These districts also included the most important and largest, which had such a powerful operational tool as tank formations. After all, according to the speech of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Army I. Yegorov at the Military Council on December 8, 1935, in the 35th, it was not possible to work out in practice the organization of communications (and, therefore, continuous control) in mobile army groups, the backbone of which should have been tank formations ...) And Sedyakin's report stated that the problem of continuous command and control of troops was unresolved and on tactical level: "continuity of command" "in mobile [i.e. common to modern warfare. - A.S.] forms of combat "in the Red Army" is "still far from real perfection." (A.I. Egorov, who used the materials of Sedyakin's report in his – after all, to some extent "ceremonial" – speech at the Military Council, softened this conclusion with the remarkably convenient expression "mainly" and stated that "commanders and staffs have mastered mainly the methods of deep and continuous command and control of troops in battle")...114

The same problems remained in the Red Army in 1936. "Government bodies," it was stated in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 ...", "have not yet learned how to properly organize control in the mobile phases of the operation";

67

"in the dynamics of hostilities, in most cases, communication is disrupted [...]". And in the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On combat training of the Red Army" stated "systematic underfulfillment of the requirements for eliminating weaknesses in combat control"!15.

For the first half of 1937, we do not have information about the quality of command and control at the operational level, but at the tactical level it was still not high. "Commander," A.I. Yegorov, dated June 27, 1937, "unsteadily manages and commands a unit in a tactical situation"; the headquarters of the regiments and battalions "as the organs of control of the battle were not put together"...!16

As we can see, "the level required by the conditions of modern combined arms combat" command and control in the Red Army did not reach even in the "pre-repression" period. Let's check this conclusion by comparing

no longer general assessments, but those that relate to the commanders and headquarters of a particular link.

November 25, 1937 A.I. Egorov had to point out that the commanders of rifle subunits in the Red Army did not know how to control the fire of their squads, platoons, companies and battalions. But the fact that in a platoon and a rifle company "fire control has not been practiced", that in a company and battalion "fire control in conditions of mobile combat and the interaction of different types of fire weapons" "is not up to par", he stated 8 more December 1935, speaking at the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense!¹⁷ Of the 45 tactical exercises covered by our sources, which took place in the "pre-repression" year of 1936 in parts of the three largest military districts - KVO, BVO and OKDVA, the inability of the command staff to control fire was noted at 30, and it was recognized as good or at least satisfactory only in three cases (in the remaining 13, the inspectors did not characterize it). The fact that in the KVO such a picture was then the norm is even indicated by the annual report of this district of October 4, 1936, which admitted, for all its "lacqueredness", that the commanders of rifle subunits "still do not have sufficiently strong skills in conscious management fire control during live firing (small reconnaissance, assessment and selection of targets, distribution of fire, setting fire missions)"!¹⁸. At least for company and battle commanders

68

it was then the norm in the OKDVA too: according to the annual report of this army itself dated September 30, 1936, the commanders and battalion commanders "did not learn how to use massive fire from heavy machine guns at the time of the fire preparation of the attack and to support the attack itself"! ¹⁹. But then the power of infantry fire was determined precisely by the machine gun ...

We saw further that at the end of August 1937, in the 109th, 110th and 111th rifle regiments of the 37th rifle division of the BVO, the commanders of the squads did not set tasks for their snipers, submachine gunners (fighters armed with an automatic rifle $\ddot{y}\ddot{y}$ - 36), grenade launchers (fighters who had rifle grenade launchers, i.e. rifles with a mortar put on the barrel for firing 40.6-mm Dyakonov rifle grenades) and machine gunners - and the latter were also located not on the flanks, but in the center of the combat order (due to which, having risen to the attack, the shooters closed the firing sectors to the machine gunners). But before the start of the purge of the Red Army, even the commanders of platoons, companies and battalions made similar mistakes in these units! So, in October 1936, the commanders of rifle companies in the !! 0th regiment in the same way did not set any tasks for their machine-gun platoons, and in the 109th and 111th they ceased to set them immediately after the start of the battle. Judging by the annual report of the 37th Division dated October 1, 1936, which acknowledged the inability of the battalion commanders to use their machine-gun companies, the battalion commanders did the same at that time. And in October 1936, the commanders of machine-gun (!) platoons also considered it possible to place machine guns inside the combat formation of shooters in the 110th regiment ... In [11th (others were not checked then), fire control was a "weak point" squads, platoons and companies even in May 1937!²⁰. A significant part of them not only poorly knew how to find targets and indicate them to fighters or subunits, but also (exactly what they were in August!) Did not know the commands used to control fire!

The inability of the commanders of rifle subunits to control combat formations (including the "interaction of fire and movement"), seen by Voroshilov and Budyonny at the September 1937 maneuvers in the Moscow Military District and the BVO, A.I. Sedyakin characterized as typical for the entire Red Army (and especially for the Moscow Military District!) in his report on | December 1935. Charak

69

thorny it was then for the BVO. At the first of two tactical exercises in 1935 in this district, which are covered in detail by surviving sources, the exercise of the 27th Infantry Division near Lepel on March 17, 1935, all control of the "interaction of fire and movement" (assuming the alternation of throws and dashes with lying down, digging in and preparing for the next throw by fire) was reduced to "loud "Forward", repeated by everyone from the battalion commander to the squad leader". The "underdevelopment" of the "interaction of fire and movement" was fixed and

at the second exercise, held in mid-September in the 43rd Infantry Division near Idritsa ... 12! The same was true in 1936: even at the advertised Belarusian maneuvers, in front of the head of the UBP of the Red Army, the commanders of the 2nd Infantry Division "managed" the attacking units in such a way that instead of "interaction of fire and movement" they demonstrated all the same "indiscriminate, movement forward, little realized in its tactical meaning. Judging by the instructions of A.I. Sedyakin to the fact that the "training of divisions and brigades" in the BVO at that time was distinguished by "great uniformity" was no better in other formations ...! BVO annual report of October 15, 1937, in which, as we have seen, it is stated that "the command of the battle formations of a platoon and a company" "still remains [emphasis mine. — A.S.] at a low level."

This can also be seen in the case of four rifle regiments, better illuminated than others by the sources of the 23rd rifle corps, in which in August 1937 the inability of platoon commanders to organize "interaction of fire and movement" was recorded. The fact that in the 109th and 111th regiments "the movement of the infantry is not always provided with fire" and that "the commanders [commanders] are to blame for this", commander-23 K.P. Podlas saw it during the exercises organized by him for these units in October 1936! He saw the same thing, and in May 1937 (i.e., before the purge of the Red Army) through the tactical exercises of the 111th and 156th regiments: control of the accumulation of forces at the starting line and "the interaction of fire and movement" is a "weak point" of unit commanders (and again, of all, and not just platoons)...123

70

The general "low" level of "combat squad management", recorded in the autumn of 1937 in the OKDVA, before the start of mass repressions, was characteristic of the entire Red Army! The junior commander, directly indicated in his report of October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army" M.N. Tukhachevsky, "weakly leads his unit in battle" (this "unit" most often was a detachment). "Tactical training of a junior commander," we read in A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, suffers from the same shortcomings as the training of the middle and senior commanders" (and this latter, it was noted a little higher, "unsteadily manages and commands the unit in a tactical situation")...124 As for the OKDVA itself, in both of its formations, for which this issue is covered by sources (the 21st and 26th rifle divisions), the squads were poorly managed in 1935 (when in the 21st "finishing committees" they demonstrated to the inspectors ignorance ... of the need for "interaction of fire and movement", and the 26th - inability to both control fire and give orders), and in the "pre-repression" March of 1937 (when the military commissar of the 63rd rifle regiment of the 21st division reported that junior commanders "still have not learned how to manage their unit"125).

We have seen that the poor ability to manage troops, characteristic of unit commanders in the second half of 1937, rested on their tactical illiteracy. But the same separated commanders of the 21st Rifle Division of the 1935 model, who did not know that an attack had to be prepared and supported by fire, also did not know the statutory rules for the battle of small units! The junior commander of the OKDVA infantry - the one that in the fall of 1937 showed the "low" art of "managing the squad in battle," - OKDVA chief of staff commander S.N. Bogomyagkov certified V.K. Blucher as "tactically weak" back in March of the same year, before the purge of the Red Army...126 The tactical illiteracy of the commanders of the BVO and MVO squads - the one that prompted them to attack without the support of machine-gun fire during the September maneuvers of 1937 - was a reality both at the end of 1935 (the Soviet squad leader, I.P. Khorikov, an employee of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army, recalled in November of that year, "does not differ in great tactical literacy"), and in the spring of 1936

71

(the general readiness of "the majority of junior and middle commanders" of the infantry of the Red Army, concluded the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 400115s of May 17, 1936, "weak") ... 127

The second of the immediate reasons for the inability of subunit commanders to control troops, characteristic of the second half of 1937, we recognized the poor command of technology.

management and organization of communication. But after all, ignorance of the statutory commands, shown by the separated commanders of the 109th, 1st and 156th rifle regiments during exercises in August 1937, in the 109th inspectors noted in January, and in the 111th 156th - and in May of the same year, before the start of mass repressions! In August 1937, the commanders of platoons and companies in the same 110th regiment did not pay attention to the organization of command and control cells and managed, "running in battle" from one of their squads (or platoons) to another, but in the 2nd Infantry Division of the same BVO, the same picture was in July 1936 ... In the 45th rifle division of the KVO in August 1937, platoon soldiers also "ran around with flags themselves" - but in the "pre-repression" May 1936 they had to do these are also company commanders (who also did not put together control cells for themselves)... In the autumn of 1937, VOKDVA company commanders also "usually controlled" with one "voice" - but it is known that in the 34th rifle division of this army The need to have control cells in companies and platoons was "unsteadily" understood by the middle commanders!² in the fall of 1935, in the 12th Rifle - in the fall of 1935, and in the spring of 1936, in the 1st Special Rifle - and in April 1936, in the 21st and 40th Rifles, and also in April 1937, and in the 69th Rifle, platoon and company commanders "replaced" control cells "running from unit to unit!"²⁹ or their own voice both in October 1936 and in April 1937 ...

In August 1937, the battalion commanders were also engaged in management by "running around" in four regiments of the 23rd Rifle Corps, thus not using their headquarters. But the same was shown by the battalion tactical exercise conducted (in the 286th rifle regiment of the 96th rifle division) during the inspection in April 1935 by the 2nd department of the Headquarters of the Red Army of the Ukrainian Military District (UVO, which on May 17, 1935 divided into KVO and HVO). Part of the battalion commanders of the 77th Infantry Regiment of the 26th Infantry and

72

One of the regiments of the 105th rifle division of the OKDVA did the same in March 1936, when these units were withdrawn for maneuvers in Primorye. Judging by the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On combat training of the Red Army" (in which it was necessary to note that "sometimes" "the battalion commander completely ignores his chief of staff!"³⁰), such "management" of the battalion was usual for the Red Army and in the autumn of 1936...

The "fragile" connection between the commander and lower subdivisions, which was typical for the same OKDVA in the autumn of 1937, could not be the result of the repressions that had begun either. The lack of Far Eastern commanders of "the necessary knowledge and practical skills in using various means of communication" was recorded again even before the start of the purge of the Red Army - in the report of the OKDVA headquarters dated May 18, 1937¹³¹.

Characteristic in the autumn of 1937 for tank commanders of the BVO and OKDVA, the poor command or insufficient use of radio communications, without which effective control of tank units is impossible, was also noted by them in 1935 (when at least two of of three mechanized brigades of the BVO - in the 4th and 5th - the commanding staff had little or insufficient command of the radio department, in 5 of the 13 OKDVA tank units checked on this account - "failed", and in the remaining 8 - only satisfactorily) and in 1936 -m (when the April inspection by the communications department of the BVO of the commanders of tank units showed that they "have not yet mastered the radio station for the most part", and when the OKDVA annual report of September 30 admitted that its tank commanders work on the radio know how "poorly")¹³². Moreover, in the "pre-repression" 1936, with radio control, tank commanders had a bad time in the entire Red Army! "Combats, commanders and command platoons," M.N. Tukhachevsky, "they constantly take off their headphones (radio) in a 'combat situation'"...¹³³

The poor command language command language command, which was noted in the PriVO and the 20th OKDVA rifle corps in the fall of 1937, was still characteristic of the entire Red Army in the last "pre-repression" months (command language, noting

73

elk in a directive letter to A.I. Egorova dated June 27, 1937, the commanders have "fuzzy"! 34) ...

The "weak knowledge" of the commanders of the basics of topography, which in the fall of 1937 was complained about by the command troops of the North Caucasus Military District, was noted even in the summer of 1936 even in the elite, "shock" 2nd Rifle Belorussian Red Banner Division named after M.V. Frunze and in the Primorsky OKDVA group ("our cadres," V.K. they even knew how to go in azimuth ...). And just before the start of mass repressions, in general, in the entire Red Army ("Topographic training of the command staff," it was indicated in the same letter from A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, "still weak"!36). We saw that in the autumn of 1937 the BVO command troops criticized their tank commanders for their "topographic weakness". But in three of the four tank formations of the BVO, for which information about the level of training of commanders in this year was preserved (in the 3rd, 4th and 18th mechanized brigades), the poor knowledge of topography by the commanders was also complained in the first, "pre-repression » half of 1937!

The poor preparedness of the headquarters of rifle battalions, which we established for the second half of 1937, was generally one of the most difficult problems of the "pre-repression" Red Army. With the battalion headquarters, summed up, speaking on December 9, 1935 at the Military Council M.N. Tukhachevsky, "the situation is bad, as almost everyone said"!37. With the current "weak training" of most battalion headquarters, it was noted in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 400115c of May 17, 1936, battalions "with their headquarters" in the summer may "still" turn out to be "the weakest link in the army's combat training system"! 38. The headquarters of the battalions, it was stated in the directive letter of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, "as the combat control bodies were not put together" and at the beginning of the 37th ... 139

The same is true in those districts by which we judged the viability of the headquarters of the rifle battalions of the Red Army in the second half of 1937 - BVO and OKDVA. The fact that in the BVO "battalion commanders, and especially battalion headquarters are weak", A.I. Sedyakin stated in his report of

74

December 1, 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ..."140. In the "pre-repression" 1936, out of ten cases known to us, when the headquarters of rifle battalions were assessed during checks of units and formations of the BVO, clear control was noted only in the water ... The fact that in OKDVA the preparedness of the headquarters of rifle battalions was "at a very low level"! "!, admitted even the annual report of this army of September 30, 1936, which did not disdain in attempts to embellish reality with outright lies! - In the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937, unsatisfactory management of rifle battalions was also attributed to their headquarters. The same as after the start of the purge of the Red Army, were the reasons for their poor management (low mobility and "inflexibility" in management, i.e., first of all, the inept use of various means of communication). The fact that in the Primorsky OKDVA group (which then united 10 of Blucher's 14 rifle divisions) the battalion headquarters always lag behind their battalions in battle and lose control with each move to a new command post, the group commander I.F. Fedko stated as early as May 15, 1936. The same was stated in the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937: "The use by the headquarters of all types of communications is still insufficient. The means of communication in various conditions of the situation are used insufficiently, competently and actively"...142

The fact that the poor training of the headquarters of the rifle battalions was to blame - by no means the beginning of mass repressions, is also clearly seen in the examples of specific formations and units. The "weak management organization" that distinguished the battalion headquarters of the 16th Rifle Corps of the BVO in July 1937 was also characteristic of them in July 1936, when out of the four battalions checked by the RKKA UBP, the 2nd and 81st Rifles three divisions recorded it ... The battalion headquarters of the 23rd Rifle Corps of the BVO were also notable for poor preparedness, not only in July 1937, but even before the start of the purge of the Red Army. Even in the annual report of the 37th division of this corps dated October 1936, it was admitted that "the battalion headquarters is still a weak link in the general system of staff training".

checked in the same month by the battalion headquarters of the 109th and 111th rifle regiments - exactly

75

like their colleagues from the 16th Corps in July 1937! - "all means of communication were not fully used" ... 143

As for the weak command and control skills that were demonstrated in the second half of 1937 by the commanders of the combined arms units and formations of the OKDVA` and SKVO, then, at least at the level of units (there is no information on the formations), this was characteristic of the Red Army and before beginning of mass repression. Recall one of the conclusions of the "Directive letter of A.I. Egorova dated June 27, 1937: "The commander unsteadily manages and commands the unit in a tactical situation ..." In the case of the OKDVA, the lack of command and control skills among the commanders of units and formations even before the purge of the Red Army is also visible from the report of the 1itaba of this army dated 18 May 1937, where, as we remember, it was noted that commanders from the Far East "do not have the necessary knowledge and practical skills to use various means of communication at various stages of the battle."

We saw that during the tactical exercises in August 1937, the commanders of the 110th and 111th rifle regiments of the 37th rifle division did not use the BVO to control the battle, not only the headquarters, but even the command post equipped with communications equipment - and personally ran from battalion to battalion. The new 110th regiment commander controlled the battle in the same way in October 1936 - when he used his staff officers as ... orderlies!

The poor readiness of the headquarters of the combined arms units and formations, noted at the end of 1937 in most of the military districts of the Red Army, was also characteristic of the Red Army before its purge. "Military headquarters," wrote M.N. Tukhachevsky, - everyone is still weak, lagging behind the development of events in battle. Cadres of staff commanders are weak in their training. "It seems to me," he added, speaking at the Military Council on December 9, "that when they praise the headquarters of divisions and regiments, they act too optimistically. What I have seen is not so good!"⁴⁴. In a report dated October 7, 1936, "On Combat Training of the Red Army," Tukhachevsky also had to emphasize that "combined arms headquarters — and, first of all, headquarters of rifle] divisions — need to sharply improve the quality of command and control in battle." The thesis that the management of rifle formations "is still at a disadvantage"

76

'lethargic level', he illustrated it with examples of staff officers' unprofessionalism⁴⁵.

The same was true in the last months before the start of mass repressions. The headquarters of the regiments, it was stated in the directive letter of A.I. Yegorov of June 27, 1937, "how the combat control bodies were not put together" ¹⁴⁶. And the poor preparedness of the then headquarters of rifle formations is established by their poor preparedness in the three most important strategic groupings of the Red Army - KVO, BVO and OKDVA. "The readiness of military headquarters for combat management in difficult conditions of the situation and terrain," was indicated in the materials for the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937, "continues to be" among the "lagging links" of combat training ("in an environment of significant to saturate the troops with technical means," added V. K. Blyukher's order summing up the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year, "the headquarters are doing their job poorly"). "The headquarters of all military branches," it was stated in the (quite, we recall, objective) order of the new command troops of the KVO No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937, "today they are not mobile and mobile control bodies and are poorly trained to carry out the tasks of combat control ". Well, the fact that things were no better in the BVO follows from the wording of the annual report of this district of October 15, 1937, according to which the "common weak point" of the military headquarters "continues to be" [emphasis mine. - A.S.] "untimely communication" of commander's decisions "To the troops" (i.e. one of the main tasks of the headquarters. - A.S.) ... ¹⁴⁷

As you can see, the poor preparedness of the headquarters of the combined arms units and formations even before the purge of the Red Army was also distinguished by those specific districts where they complained about it at the end of 1937. In addition to what has been said above about ABO, we point out:

- that all the headquarters of the rifle formations (6th and 8th rifle corps and the 44th and 51st rifle divisions) and one of the four headquarters of the rifle units (153rd rifle regiment) showed weak or simply unsatisfactory work 51st division; the remaining three received "satisfactory"), checked there by the 2nd department of the Headquarters of the Red Army in the spring of 1935;

— that at the end of 1935 the chief of staff of the 15th Rifle Corps "concluded that it was impossible to fight with such a headquarters," and

- that, according to even the "varnished" annual report of the KVO of October 4, 1936, the headquarters of the rifle regiments are there. poorly organized communications (i.e. doomed themselves to loss of command and control), and rifle divisions on the march were managed "not bad", but in battle they were "somewhat weaker" (i.e., not so good!) and in the fall of 1936 ... 148

In addition to what was said above about the BVO, we point out:

- WHAT "the provision of the maneuver planned by the commander, as well as control over the actions of the troops" (in a word, with the control of the battle. - A.S.) "couldn't cope" with all the headquarters of the rifle units and formations (27th rifle division and its 79th and 80th rifle regiments), checked there by the 2nd department of the Red Army Headquarters in the spring of 1935, and

- which, according to the summary of the political department of the BVO from | October 1935, "insufficient organization and clarity in the command and control of troops" were shown by the military headquarters there at the September maneuvers of 1935...149

In addition to what was said above about the OKDVA (where in the autumn of 1937 the military headquarters were "inactive and inflexible in command"), we point out:

- that the headquarters of rifle divisions - according to the recognition even of the annual reports of the OKDVA of October 21 and the 18th rifle corps of October 10, 1935! — they "did not cope" with management in the mountainous and wooded area typical of the Far Eastern Theater, "lagged behind the situation and were late in transmitting orders", "did not quite" master "forms of flexible and continuous management, especially in tense and fast changing environment" and in the autumn of 1935150;

— that communications were poorly organized (which means that they were "sedentary and inflexible in management." – A.S.) and all headquarters of rifle regiments (35th, 40th and 69th rifle divisions), checked there by the command of divisions or the army in the summer - autumn of 1936;

- that the headquarters of most rifle corps (20th, 26th and 43rd), as well as both rifle divisions (34th and 35th), for which relevant information was found,

78

were not knocked together there (which means they were "inactive and inflexible in management" - A.S.) and in the autumn of 1936 ...

Another district where the headquarters of units and formations were weak in the fall of 1937 was the SAVO, poor skills in practical work in complex forms of combat, staff officers (as N.D. . Kashirin) showed up in September 1935, at large tactical exercises in the Krasnodar Novorossiysk region. The headquarters of the rifle units of the North Caucasus Military District showed the same thing in September 1936 at district maneuvers in the Krymskaya area. Having observed the work of the headquarters of the regiments of the 74th Infantry Division and the 66th Infantry Regiment of the 22nd Infantry Division, Divisional Commander M.A. A Reuters from the UBP RKKA stated that THEY "are not yet prepared to manage complex fleeting battles" ... 15!

The immediate reasons for the poor readiness of the headquarters of combined arms units and formations in the second half of 1937 - poor command of the equipment of the headquarters service and the organization of communications - were also characteristic of the Red Army in the "pre-repression" period. The fact that the Soviet staff officers lack specific practical skills to carry out their functions, and the staffs as a whole lack coherence, was reminded, in particular, in a letter from the head of the political department of OKDVA L.N. Aronstam K.E. Voroshilov dated February 4, 1935 "Who and to whom transmits preliminary orders, who puts the situation on the map, who at this time prepares messengers, who prepares signalmen to go out to lay new communication lines, who simultaneously prepares instructions for rear and a number of other simultaneously prepared data on the organization of the battle" - all this, Aronshtam emphasized, is still unclear!5?, M.N. Tukhachevsky also had to be reminded that "it is necessary to develop a practical staff worker" on December 9, 1935 at the Military Council. "A staff commander," the marshal pointed out, "if it smells like a battle, he should immediately get worried, check whether the telephones are working, whether the radio is working, whether the orderlies are trained, whether there are the required number of messengers, whether the troops are located where he believes that they should be, or are not, what the neighbors do, etc. It would seem that our commanders have combat experience, but why

79

mu something all these moments are forgotten in the field. It turns out, let's say, an order, but the headquarters is faced with the fact that the radio station is not deployed, the cables are not laid in the right way, there is no messenger, etc."53. From the report of the same Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army", it can be seen that the irrational organization of work with documents and inattention to communication work for the headquarters of Soviet rifle regiments, divisions and corps was also typical in the 36th. And according to the directive letter of A.I. Egorova. dated June 27, 1937, the headquarters of the regiments were not put together (which means that they did not work out the technique of staff service and organization of communications properly) even before the start of mass repressions. It can be said with a high degree of certainty that at that time most of the headquarters of rifle divisions did not really master the technique of headquarters service and organization of communications: in both, about which we found detailed information for the first half of 1937 - shtadive-6 (MVO) and shtadive-21 (OKDVA), - this was the case. At the same time, division commander-21 brigade commander I.V. Boryaev, having listened on February 19, 1937 at the party meeting of the management and headquarters of the division, what's in the rack:

— do not achieve "constant knowledge of the situation and information about the enemy"; ,

— do not show "sufficient ingenuity in using means of communication to transmit orders";

— do not work out documents well — they come out late, are distinguished by verbosity and generally do not shine with quality;

- they "forget" to inform not only the higher headquarters and neighbors about the situation, but also the neighboring departments of their headquarters;

— That "today the headquarters is not fully assembled",

nevertheless considered it necessary to declare that Shtadiv-21 "in terms of its work and culture, undoubtedly, stands above the headquarters of our units and many others," which he, Boryaev, knows!154

Due to the imperfection of the equipment of the headquarters service, it was stated in the directive of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army of August 23, 1937, "the organization of command and control of troops during the battle is especially bad." But it was exactly the same in 1935 (recall the conclusion of M.N. Tukhachevsky that the howl

80

military headquarters "lag behind the development of events in battle"), and in 1936 ("due to the imperfection of headquarters work," it was noted in the order of the Commissar of Defense No. 00105 dated November 3, 1936 "On

the results of combat training for 1936..."—still a lot of time is wasted transmitting orders and reports"155)...

Of the specific districts, to the equipment of the headquarters service in the units and formations of which specific claims were made in the second half of 1937, we know only the OKDVA - where, as we saw, the headquarters with difficulty switched from one type of communication to another during the battle, "indistinctly" and "not neatly" compiled documents and demonstrated "uncivilized" and "sloppy" work on the map. But the same thing was noted there in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937! Let us recall once again one of the conclusions of the report of the OKDVA headquarters dated May 18, 1937: "The use by the headquarters of all [highlighted by me. — A.S.] means of communication are still insufficient. Means of communication in various conditions of the situation [and the change in this latter just made it necessary to switch from one type of communication to another. — A.S.] are used insufficiently fully, competently and actively..." and -105 and the headquarters of the regiments of the 35th and 105th rifle divisions), the quality of the headquarters documentation was also low. As for the quality of work on the map, it is characteristic, in our opinion, that in the "pre-repression" 1936 of the only rifle division of the OKDVA, which is illuminated by sources from this side (40th), the chiefs of staff of all (!) infantry regiments did not know the symbols used when drawing the situation on the map ...

The conclusion made in November 1937 by G.G. Bokis that the headquarters of tank units and formations "have not yet truly mastered the issues of organizing command and control of troops", A.I. Sedyakin was made even before the start of mass repressions, in December 1935! True, noting in his report "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...", that "From year to year, insufficient skills of commanders of mechanical units and formations are observed" "to organize uninterrupted control, especially on a forced march and

81

in a difficult battle, "he mentioned only commanders, but clearly had in mind headquarters. After all, in the very next line, he wrote about "insufficient skills of the commanders of mechanical units and formations" "to establish combat and material support for the actions of the mechanized troops"156, and it was the headquarters that should have been engaged in this ... Bokis's conclusion could be made in October "pre-repressive" of 1936. The headquarters of mechanized brigades and mechanized corps, M.N. Tukhachevsky, often have no connection with subordinate and higher headquarters and are poorly informed about the course of the battle. But after all, without communication and information about the situation, it is impossible to effectively control the troops...

The fact that the tank headquarters poorly controlled the troops even before the start of the purge of the Red Army is also evident from the examples of those specific districts and formations where they complained about these headquarters in the fall of the 37th. The commander and headquarters of the 7th mechanized corps of the LVO "failed to manage" the formation not only in the September maneuvers of 1937, but also in the maneuvers of the LVO on September 18-26, 1935 in the area of Dno-Porkhov-Pskov, when "insufficient skills" of organizing "uninterrupted control, especially on a forced march and in a difficult battle" led to the fact that the battle of the corps "flowed spontaneously" ...157

The "indistinct concentration of mechanized brigades headquarters", which distinguished in the autumn of the 37th BVO, was also not the result of the beginning of the purge of the Red Army: the annual report of this district of October 15, 1937 explicitly states that it "left" as a legacy from the previous period158. This is also confirmed by the fact that the only of the "pre-repression" headquarters of the mechanized brigades of the BVO, whose training is covered by sources, the headquarters of the 4th mechanized brigade, was poorly prepared in the spring of 1935 (when it spent on compiling and transmitting orders and reports to 3-5 times more time than it should be), and in the spring of 1937 (when all staffs in the brigade in general "were not able to organize and ensure the implementation of the commander's decision")...159

In the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO in the fall of the 37th, the headquarters of battalions and brigades were not knocked together (and, therefore, could not effectively manage the troops), but in the "pre-repression" autumn

1936 failure to provide

82

effective management was characteristic of all tank headquarters of I.E. Yakira! After all, the fact that “the general level of training of command personnel and staffs of special combat arms [i.e. armored forces and air force.

— A.S.] still does not fully meet the high requirements of the rapidly growing air fleet and motorized mechanized troops,” was even admitted in the annual report of the KVO dated October 4, 1936, which insanely embellished reality!¹⁶⁰

In the OKDVA, where in the fall of 1937 the headquarters of the tank battalions were badly put together and trained in general, these headquarters were not able to control subunits even in the autumn of 1935 (when they could not provide reliable communication with the companies and did not quickly transfer the positions - masquerading), and in the fall of 1936 (when even according to the annual report of the armored forces of the OKDVA, they were “weakly prepared” for commanding the battle of the battalion, and according to the report of the OKDVA dated September 30, for the most part they were generally prepared “unsatisfactorily” !!) , and in the spring of 1937 (when the commanders of these headquarters were poorly trained in radio communication - this is the main means of command of the tank headquarters). The headquarters of both OKDVA mechanized brigades—in the autumn of 1937, also poorly trained and poorly put together—should have been the same even in the spring: after all, even their workers were not good at radio communications at that time. The results of the work of the headquarters of the 23rd Mechanized Brigade in the summer of 1936 were even recognized by the annual report of the armored troops of the OKDVA as “unsatisfactory”!¹⁶².

B. Artillery

Shooting and artillery training. Judging by the November speeches of the commanders of the troops of the KVO, LVO and Zab-VO and prepared "for the chief of artillery" of the OKDVA by Major N.S. Kasatkin "Help-report on the combat training of OKDVA artillery in 1937", Soviet artillery commanders were then able to solve only simple fire tasks, i.e. hit only those targets that were in familiar terrain, were clearly observable and the hit of which was not hindered by any other factors. In OKDVA, even corps artillery, which

83

Raya must have encountered them especially often! To solve complex fire problems, the commanders lacked the knowledge of the theory of fire, which allowed them to use the analytical method of data preparation necessary when firing at an unobserved target and creatively apply the rules of fire. Instead of a theory, their luggage contained only mechanically serrated firing rules in relation to typical cases (“the biggest” of the shortcomings of the Soviet artillery, noted on November 22, 1937 at the Military Council, the head of artillery of the Red Army commander N.N. Voronov, is a “template and striving for it! ⁶³)... And by the end of 1937, the commanders of the OKDVA regimental artillery guns were not even able to correct direct fire!

However, the ability to solve only simple and typical fire tasks of Soviet artillery commanders was also distinguished in the “pre-repression” period. The knowledge of the theory of firing by artillery commanders, noted, speaking on December 8, 1935 at the Military Council, A.I. Yegorov, it is still “not enough to justify the rules of shooting” (and, therefore, to be able to apply these rules in difficult cases. - A.S.) ... ¹⁶⁴ And the All-Army Rifle and Artillery competitions between ground and anti-aircraft artillery battery commanders revealed that the mathematical training of regimental and divisional artillery commanders (i.e., the majority of Soviet battery commanders) does not allow them to freely cope with the analytical method of preparing data for firing, and hence with the solution of complex fire tasks (especially since some of the battalion commanders also had difficulty navigating in an unfamiliar area!).

Artillery, emphasized on November 21, 1937 at the Military Council by the command troops of the KVO I.F. Fedko, it is necessary to teach "to prepare artillery data at night"; besides, he recalled, "we taught the artillery to shoot at perfectly visible targets, which would not be possible in a combat situation."¹⁶⁵ 1935-1936 Indeed, in 1935 - as even the CVO report for that year admitted - he still had not liquidated his "mathematical [and, therefore, theoretical. - /WITH.]

84

illiteracy." And in the report of the political department of the KVO dated May 5, 1936, it was directly noted that "firing under difficult conditions, for the most part, gives unsatisfactory results" ... 166

The same is with another district, where, after the start of mass repressions, the inability of artillery commanders to solve complex fire tasks was noted - OKDVA. On the "insufficient theoretical preparedness of the senior n[ach] staff and [insufficient. - A.S.] mathematical literacy of the rest of the n[ach] composition "head of artillery of this army V.N. Kozlovsky complained as early as October 14, 1935; the same was noted in the report of the assistant chief of the 2nd division of the OKDVA headquarters, Major V. Nesterov, dated November 8, 1936, "On the combat training of OKDVA artillery in 1936": the command staff "does not know the theory of shooting well - this is the main a brake in the f] elkovo-) artillery preparation for the [om] s [residue] of artillery" ... 167 Well, in the "Materials on Combat Training of Artillery", prepared at the headquarters of the OKDVA (or the vanparat of its nachart) in April 1937 th, and in the order of V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter period of study of the 1936/37 academic year, we generally read almost the same phrases as in N.S. Kasatkina: the shooting and artillery training of artillery commanders is "extremely elementary"; only "an insignificant number of commanders" mastered the analytical methods of preparing initial data; command personnel cope only with those shooting exercises that are carried out in simple conditions - and "get lost in difficult ones"...168

As for the inability of the commanders of the regimental artillery guns of the OKDVA to correct even direct fire, which was ascertained in October 37, the poor preparedness of the junior commanders of the regimental artillery was noted there (in the "Materials on Combat Training of Artillery") also in "pre-repression" April.

Tactical learning. An idea of the level reached here in the second half of 1937 can, I think, be obtained from the admissions of the BVO annual report: "Command

85

the composition of artillery in tactical terms is not sufficiently prepared. The interaction of artillery with other branches of the military is poorly developed.

The technique and practice of concentrating mass fire has not been perfected.

At a low level, reconnaissance of unobserved targets, bad with artillery observation and reconnaissance! 69.

Indeed, at the November Military Council, the commanders of the troops and the KVO ("This is the weakest issue"), and the LVO ("Interaction with infantry, tanks [..] as a rule, no"), and ZabVO ("Weak area [...] is the fire escort of tanks within the division-corps"); in fact, the head of the artillery of the Red Army N.N. Voronov. A K.E. Voroshilov bluntly stated that "poor interaction of artillery not only due to the fault of the combined arms commanders, but also due to the fault of the artillery commanders" distinguishes the entire Red Army, that "the interaction of artillery with infantry and other branches of the military remains weak" in the entire Red Army! .

Only in the annual report of the OKDVA it was stated that the interaction with the infantry artillery worked out satisfactorily, and with tanks, albeit one of two methods, but also satisfactorily. However, the compilers of this report did not dare to ascribe to their artillery commanders at least a generally satisfactory ability to mass artillery fire: satisfactorily, it was admitted in it, they only know how to plan the fire of a division, and the fire of an artillery group is already worse. A similar state of affairs in the two largest districts - BVO (considered, we recall, advanced) and OKDVA - allows us to conclude that the generally weak ability to mass artillery fire was then characteristic of the artillery commanders of the entire Red Army.

Well, the fact that he was also characterized by inattention to the organization of reconnaissance and surveillance was admitted then by the head of artillery of the Red Army N.N. Voronov. "We do not know how to organize reconnaissance and use the data of this reconnaissance in a timely manner," he noted on November 22, 1937 at the Military Council and cited examples of complete tactical helplessness shown in the autumn experimental exercises in two

86

districts by commanders from high-capacity artillery units. Unable to organize reconnaissance of targets, they deployed their 203-mm howitzers "somehow", without knowing where the long-term fortifications that they would have to fire were located! Naturally, "then we had to [...] change firing positions"... "The situation with us is very bad," continued Voronov, "with artillery observation. Artillerymen [from the further presentation it is clear that the nachart also had in mind the command staff. - A.S.] still do not know how to observe, they have learned to observe only the gaps. "But the experience of the war shows that good artillery observation is capable of revealing the intentions of the enemy on a tactical and operational scale [and, therefore, helping to organize the disruption of these intentions with the help of artillery. — A.S.]"171.

From the same speech by N.N. Voronov, it can be seen that the commanders of the artillery of the Red Army "very badly" mastered the organization of equipment and camouflage of firing positions, especially for 45-mm anti-tank guns. "(...) The experience of Belarusian and Moscow maneuvers shows that we use these guns very ineptly in a situation close to combat. If we use these guns so openly in the first days of the war, they will be quickly suppressed enemy!"72. -

Thus, the tactical weakness of the commanders of the Soviet artillery in the second half of 1937 was determined by his weak ability to:

- organize interaction with other branches of the armed forces;
- massaging artillery fire;
- organize artillery reconnaissance and conduct surveillance and
- organize equipment and camouflage of firing positions.

But the poor ability of artillery commanders to establish interaction with infantry and tanks was characteristic of the Red Army in the "pre-repression" period. So, in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 400115s of May 17, 1936, the fear was expressed that the artillery battalions with their headquarters "according to

87

still [emphasis mine. — A.S.] will turn out to be the weakest link in the army's combat training system in the summer!"73. But practical interaction with other types of troops in artillery was carried out precisely at the level of the division! The fact that "the weak side of the preparation of artillery [Illerian] divisions should be recognized as their completely insufficient tactical work together with the infantry", M.N. Tukhachevsky reported to K.E. Voroshilov and October 7, 1936174. Yes, and from the theses voiced on November 27, 1937 by Voroshilov himself ("Interaction

artillery with infantry and other branches of the military remains [highlighted by me. - A.S.] weak [...]), it follows that the Soviet artillerymen were poorly able to organize such interaction even before the start of the purge of the Red Army ...

This is clearly seen in the examples of specific military districts, whose command complained about this problem in the autumn of 1937. Thus, in the AVO, the organization of the interaction of artillery with other branches of the military was a "weak issue" in 1936 as well. After all, even in the insanely "chotlacked" annual report of this district of October 4, 1936, it was admitted that the commander of the artillery division (i.e., the practical organizer of this interaction. - L.S.) "cannot yet be recognized as well prepared" and that "tactical use of battalion and regimental guns" (intended for operations in constant and direct contact with the infantry!) was worked out "weakly"! 75. As I.F. Fedko No. 0100 of June 22, 1937, "the main issues of interaction" with other branches of the military, "commanders of all levels" of the artillery of the KVO "did not work out" even by the beginning of the purge of the Red Army!

In one of the two artillery units of the BVO, about whose training in 1936 more or less detailed information has been preserved - in the 37th artillery regiment of the 37th rifle division - the organization of interaction with the infantry in October was clearly weak (the inspectors noted then, that the battalion headquarters checked by them, even before the battle, organizes such interaction only "satisfactorily", and during the battle - "somewhat worse" and that the regiment "does not always" provide fire for the "infantry movement"!⁷⁷). And in the other part - the 33rd artillery regiment of the 33rd rifle divi

88

zii — such an organization was more than likely weak: after all, the practical organizers of interaction — divisional headquarters — were not at all cohesive there as early as July 1936...

Even if we consider the message of the OKDVA report for 1937 on the satisfactory development of the interaction of artillery with lehotas and tanks embellishing reality, then even then the real picture will turn out to be no worse than that of Blucher's army in the "pre-repression" period. After all, in October 1935, OKDVA charter V.N. Kozlovsky openly admitted that his gunners did not provide "proper adhesion in the joint work of artillery and tanks" and that they "lagged behind" "the organization and implementation of support for counterattacks (that is, the organization of interaction with the infantry. - A.S.)" 178. Blucher's gunners could not interact satisfactorily with infantry and tanks even in the first half of 1937: in the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937, the unsatisfactory training of artillery division headquarters was stated, and the actions of the tank and infantry escort guns were recognized as the most weak point of interaction between military branches...

The commanders of the Soviet artillery also differed in 1[935-1936] by their weak ability to mass the fire. Speaking on December 8, 1935 at the Military Council, A.I. Egorov pointed out that in artillery battalions and groups "fire control has not been worked out" (and, as I.P. Uborevich reminded in his order No. 03 of January 6, 1935, "there is the basis of fire control of massed artillery")¹⁷. "The artillery of the division," M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army", - theoretically, mass fire control [...] worked out, but practically [highlighted by me. - A.S.] this important issue in all parts [emphasis mine. - A.S.] is not yet resolved and not fixed"...¹⁸⁰

In a single BVO, the "technique and practice of concentrating mass fire" also had to be "underdeveloped" not only in the autumn of 1937, but also in 1935-1936. After all, in the 35th fire control of the artillery battalion and artillery group in this district was worked out (and then, if you believe in part

89

by the authorized instance - to the report of the political department of the BVO dated October 21, 1935) only satisfactorily. Obviously, the situation did not improve in 1936 either: after all, all the then headquarters

artillery battalions of the BVO, about which we know something, were prepared either only satisfactorily (in the battalion of the 37th artillery regiment of the 37th rifle division checked in October), or "failed" (headquarters of the divisions of the 33rd th Artillery Regiment of the 33rd Infantry Division were not assembled at all).

The ability to mass artillery fire did not deteriorate at all with the beginning of the purge of the Red Army and in the OKDVA, even if the report is reported. the last for 1937 about the satisfactory planning of fire of the division and exaggerated. It could not succeed in the first half of the 1937 either: after all, according to the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937, the headquarters of artillery divisions, and the headquarters of artillery regiments and artillery groups, and 11 of the 13 headquarters of artillery chiefs of rifle divisions - in a word, all the main links planning the concentration of artillery fire in the army of Blucher were then unsatisfactorily prepared!

The unwillingness or inability of artillery commanders to organize artillery reconnaissance, RKKA artillery inspector N.M. Rogovsky stated in December 1935. At the same time, according to V.N. Kozlovsky, in OKDVA, reconnaissance was then "a weak point of artillery headquarters" "because of the small tactical horizons of staff commanders, who often did not know where and what to look for"...181 - on the ronne covering the training of the artillery unit of the BVO - the act of the inspector review of the combat training of the 37th artillery regiment of the 37th rifle division in October 1936 - we immediately stumble upon the words: "Insufficient attention was paid to the artillery [Illerian] | reconnaissance both on the march and during the battle "... 182 In the artillery of the KVO, as summarized in the order of the new commanders of this district No. areas" were "not worked out" and by the beginning of the purge of the Red Army ... 183

From a phrase uttered in November 1937 by N.N. Voronov ("Artillerymen still [emphasis mine. - / A.S.]

90

they don't know how to observe" [...]), it is clear that things were not going well with the observation of the commanders of the artillery of the Red Army even before the start of mass repressions.

Well, as for the inept selection and camouflage of firing positions, is it by chance that in the only case when our sources cover this side of the training of the command staff of the "pre-repression" artillery of the Red Army, this command staff again turned out to be no better, than the commanders of the sample of autumn 1937? An inspection of the 37th Artillery Regiment of the 37th Infantry Division of the BVO in October 1936 revealed that the deployment of the batteries "occurs in a pattern, without taking into account the situation and terrain"...184

Technical training. According to the OKDVA report for 1937, its commanders-artillerymen assimilated the material part of the guns (and then "in general") only satisfactorily, and the ammunition was even somewhat worse than satisfactorily studied. The knowledge of their equipment by the commanders of the artillery of the BVO, as stated in the annual report of this district of October 15, 1937, "is still unsatisfactory in many cases"!85. In the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Artillery Regiment of the 19th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District — recognized that autumn as the best in its district — in September 1937, there was a case of a 122-mm howitzer being put out of action "due to poor knowledge of the material part of the artillery ".... 186

But if in the autumn of 1937 the BVO artillery commanders' knowledge of their equipment was unsatisfactory "in many cases", then in the "pre-repression" 1936 - in all! In all rifle divisions in which the artillery department of the BVO checked the condition of the materiel of artillery that year (and there were 7 of these out of 12 available), the artillery commanders either did not withstand a direct test of knowledge of the materiel, or did not know how to conduct a technical inspection tools and devices (which also indicates a poor knowledge of technology).

"[...] The technical preparation of the beginning [of] the [staff] of the artillery is poor," Major V. Nesterov from the 2nd department of the headquarters of the OKDVA directly wrote in the report "On the preparation of OKDVA artillery in 1936" (as seen from the context, under "beginning

91

composition" he meant not only the technical, but also the command staff). Even if the report of the OKDVA report for 1937 about the satisfactory "on the whole" assimilation of the equipment of guns by the commanding officers is an exaggeration, then even then in the "pre-repression" 36th things were no better. "The assimilation of materiel," Nesterov wrote, "is weak, the knowledge of shells and fuses [as after the start of the purge of the Red Army! - 4.S.] - unsatisfactory [...]" "...[7 Obviously, things were no better than after the start of mass repressions, things were here at the beginning of 1937. "Technical training of command staff and in First of all, the knowledge of one's own materiel," was listed in the "Materials for Combat Training of Artillery," prepared by OKDVA staff officers in April 1937, "better than last year, but still weak"...188

B. Commanders of the engineering troops

We have only fragmentary information about the level of training they achieved in the second half of 1937, and only according to the OKDVA, where the tactical training of the command staff of the engineering troops was then clearly unsatisfactory. After all, even in the annual report of this army, it was admitted that he only occasionally and extremely poorly conducts engineering intelligence (and does not take into account the obtained intelligence in his decisions), and manages sapper units in battle in such a way that they quickly break away from the troops, which should be promoted. And the junior commanders there also lacked special training: they were insufficiently active and insufficiently dexterous even in such work as was usual for engineering troops,

like building bridges...

We were unable to find any information about the level of training of the command staff of the OKDVA engineering troops in 1936 and the first half of 1937. But the reports for 1935 - the OKDVA engineering troops of October 8 and the OKDVA itself of October 21, 1935 - also recognized the insufficiency of his tactical training. In particular, this command staff poorly controlled its units in battle even then...

92

D. Signal Corps Commanders

Information about the level of their education in the second half of 1937, we also found only a few - or only in two districts. At that time, the tactical skills of the signalmen commanders of the OKDVA were clearly lame: if the annual report of this army gave the commanders of the individual communications units here only "satisfactory", then the commanders of the communications units of the rifle units (who wore crossed lightning bolts with an asterisk not on black, but on raspberry, infantry pet faces) and artillery units - and completely "unsuccessful". By October, according to the report, the training of the junior signalmen commanders—apparently, both tactical and special—was only up to a satisfactory level, according to the report. The fact that "operational-tactical training continues to be a weak link in the overall training of signal commanders" was also recognized by the annual report of the BVO...189

But in approximately the same way - for the commanders of individual communications battalions, communications chiefs of rifle regiments and commanders of communications companies as satisfactory, and for all the rest as unsatisfactory - the tactical training of the commanders of the OKDVA signal troops was also assessed in the annual report of these troops dated October 7 1935. The exercise of the signal troops of the Primorsky OKDVA group, which took place on July 14-17, 1936, showed that the commanders of the battalions should also be "unsuccessful" in terms of tactics: they did not know how to organize communications throughout the entire battle moving in space. From the report of the communications troops of the Primgruppa for the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year of April 24, 1937 and the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937, it is clear that the requirements of modern warfare with its rapid changes in the situation tactical training commanders-

Blucher's signalers did not answer even before the start of the purge of the Red Army. The commanders of individual communications battalions "did not learn how to maneuver communications flexibly"¹⁹⁰, and the average commanders of the communications battalions of the rifle corps of the Primrgroup were also poorly able to navigate the terrain, work out field documentation and work at night. Composition of signal companies of rifle regiments and signal platoons of rifle battalions of the Primrgroup

93

(in which almost two-thirds of Blucher's signalmen with crimson buttonholes served) in the same way did not know how to "flexibly maneuver communications" and did not have skills in organizing communications in a difficult situation; signal commanders who served in the artillery regiments of Primgrupp were generally unsatisfactorily trained... The picture is clearly not the best than in the autumn of 1937!

The fact that in the BVO the tactical training of signalmen commanders was also lame even before the purge of the Red Army is already evident from the wording of the report of this district for 1937 quoted above ...

2. TROOPS

A. Foot soldiers

Tactical learning. In his speech on November 27 at the Military Council, K.E. Voroshilov. True, this characteristic directly applied only to the infantry of the BVO and MVO, whose actions at the September maneuvers of 1937 the people's commissar personally observed. However, from the context it is clear that with his impressions of the maneuvers of the Moscow Military District and the BVO, Voroshilov only illustrated the thesis that he had formulated before and applied to the entire Red Army ("How are our soldiers trained? [...] Our soldiers are poorly trained [...]"). "Our fighter," the people's commissar clarified, "doesn't know how to move [on the battlefield. - 4.S.]. He doesn't know how to run. He does not run, but walks, does not crawl, where, in fact, it will not be possible to crawl, but he always moves to his full height and not in groups, not units, but in a crowd. Fire and movement never go together. [...] The movement of subunits and the fire of machine-gun subunits - they are not coordinated with each other, as a rule [...] A shovel for our fighter, unfortunately, is still not a friend, a means without which a Red Army soldier cannot live, a means that will save him not only in battle, but also on vacation, at a halt, bivouac!"

In other words, neither a single soldier, nor Soviet infantry units in the autumn of 1937 were actually trained at all to act on the battlefield - they did not know how to move.

94

on it, applying to the terrain and the strength of the enemy's fire, neither to prepare an attack by fire, nor to advance in statutory battle formations, nor to dig in - in general, they were only targets for the enemy ...

Exactly the same impressions were made by S.M. Budyonny, who was present at both of them. "The combat formations of the squad, platoon and company," he reported on November 21, 1937 at the same Military Council, "are not worked out. There is no group tactics. They advance in a herd or a bunch, without linking movement with fire. [...] I'm not saying that this is only in the Moscow District. I was on maneuvers in other districts and saw the same thing. "I must also state frankly," continued the marshal, "quite honestly, openly, that the troops neglect field fortifications, they don't know how to dig in, they don't know how to equip a machine-gun point, they don't know how to build a system of fire. I observed this in my district and in other 'districts where I was'!¹⁹¹."

BVO documents testify that Voroshilov and Budyonny did not exaggerate anything. Having checked the combat training of the 37th Rifle Division and the 156th Rifle Regiment of the 52nd Rifle Division on August 18-29, 1937, the command of the 23rd Rifle Corps and representatives of the Red Army UBP revealed the same thing as both marshals - "unsatisfactory" (except for the 109th Y

rifle regiment of the 37th division) training as a single fighter ("under real fire, the enemy is located on distinct points of the terrain, does not dig in, does not observe the enemy", makes dashes slowly), and squads (advancing, in particular, not in groups, but in a dense chain)...193 The BVO annual report of October 15, 1937 paints the same picture: "The training of a single fighter and small units has not been completed and has a number of shortcomings, which negatively influenced the formation of a company, battalion and regiment [i.e. and the correctness of battle formations. – A.S.]", namely: "the fighter was not trained in the correct use of the terrain, did not receive the necessary skills in movement and dashes, in camouflage and self-digging"!94.

- The references cited by us S.M. Budyonny to other districts (and not only to Belorussky.) confirm that

95

The picture painted by him and Voroshilov was characteristic not only for the Moscow Military District and the BVO, but also for the Red Army as a whole. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that this picture was clearly observed then in the OKDVA, in the KVO, and in the LVO. The annual report of the OKDVA explicitly admitted that "camouflage and self-entrenchment are usually ignored during exercises", that even in defense they are "little and weakly used", that "fighters have few habitual and competent skills" of self-entrenching, and battle formations the infantry are distinguished by "insufficient organization and discipline." The latter must mean that they quickly became upset and turned into a crowd; in the annual report of the 20th Rifle Corps of the OKDVA, this was stated directly: "There is still a crowding of battle formations, especially during and after the attack." shedding light on the training of the then KVO infantry, - the order of the commander of the 45th Infantry Division, Colonel F.N. Remezov No. 0122 of August 25, 1937 on the results of checking the combat training of its units on August 8-12. Rifle platoons, it noted, "badly use the terrain", "poor camouflage, the pace and technique of crossings have been worked out poorly", "the technique of crawling has been worked out unsatisfactorily"!9. In the LVO, as P.E. Dybenko, "the initial period of training a single fighter and putting together small units were put on a very low level." This means that by the end of the year, not only the fighter, squad and platoon, but also the company, battalion and regiment had to be poorly able to act on the battlefield (this was actually confirmed by Dybenko himself, who stated that in combat training in 1937 d. his troops "did not achieve positive results")!97,

But after all, about all those flaws in the tactical training of soldiers and infantry units that Voroshilov and Budyonny, Chief of the General Staff of the RKKA.I. Yegorov reported back on December 8, 1935! In the infantry, he noted that day at the Military Council, "it is not always satisfactory to apply combat weapons to the terrain.

96

rows", "camouflage and a shovel are often used poorly during an offensive". This means that even in the "pre-repression" 35th fighters "neglected field fortifications", "didn't know how to dig in", walked across the battlefield to their full height where they should have crawled, and did not alternate between running and lying down. "During an offensive," Egorov continued, "sometimes there is a weak discipline in battle formations, a large concentration of those, and insufficient interaction between rifle subunits and machine-gun subunits!" This means that even in 1935 the "battle formations of a squad, platoon and company" were "not perfected", that even then the infantrymen advanced "not in groups, not in units, but in a crowd", "in a herd or a bunch" - And "without linking the movement" of rifle subunits with "machine-gun fire"... True, according to Yegorov, this happened "sometimes" or at most "often", but above we saw that his performance was characterized by the desire to soften the assessments. That the flaws he recognized did not occur "sometimes", but, as in the autumn of 1937, almost always - this is also evident when considering the situation in specific military districts (see below).

"Weak training of a single infantryman" was also stated in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 400115s of May 17, 1936. And the poor preparedness of infantry units was also stated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 of November 3, 1936, which noted that in infantry "there is still a crowding of battle formations"! 99.

And in general, what is there to talk about if the level of tactical training of the infantry immediately before the start of mass repressions, in the spring of 37, and after they began, in the fall of 37, was characterized by the leadership of the Red Army using almost the same expressions! Let us compare Voroshilov's speech cited above with the text of A.I. Egorova dated June 27, 1937: "A single fighter [during the winter period of training in the 1936/37 academic year, he was primarily trained. - A.S.] in his training does not have solid skills in running, crawling, in choosing a place for shooting, observation, and so on. Particularly weak are camouflage and self-entrenchment ... 200

The fact that with the beginning of the purge of the Red Army, the tactical training of the fighter and infantry units did not deteriorate at all, ho

4-2255 97

It is also clearly seen in the example of specific military districts, in which the weakness of this training was recorded in the autumn of 1937. So, the ugly picture seen by K.E. Voroshilov in September 1937 during the BVO and MVO maneuvers, in both of these districts it was normal in 1935. The infantry of two of the three infantry divisions of the BVO, the 27th (in March) and the 43rd (in September), checked that year by the 2nd Department of the Headquarters of the Red Army, attacked in exactly the same way as the one that participated in the maneuvers of 1937 g., without murmuring fire and movement, without disguise, at full height, without alternating dashes with crawling and digging in (camouflage was also neglected in the third verified division - the 29th). Judging by the fact that in the 43rd "single training of a soldier was far behind" and "in the same way, a platoon and squad required a lot of work"201, and in the 29th in the same September 1935 squad, platoons and companies were prepared only satisfactorily, a common occurrence should have been in the 35th in the BVO and yet another flaw noticed there by Voroshilov and Budyonny in the autumn of the 37th - the movement to attack "not in groups, not units, but in a crowd", "a herd or bunch"...

WWII, where "crowds", "herds" and "heaps" were also recorded during the September maneuvers of 1937, "thickening of battle formations" was also characteristic of the exercises of the 3rd Rifle Corps held in September 1935 near Gorokhovets, { which in general showed the same thing as the maneuvers 37 — that "the squad, platoon and company are tactically poorly prepared"202.

In the BVO, everything that Voroshilov and Budyonny saw in September 1937 bloomed luxuriantly in 1936 and the first half of 1937. Of the four rifle divisions checked there in April-July 1936 - the 2nd, 33rd, 48th and 81st - two (2nd and 33rd) were found to have the same unwillingness to dig in and inability to disguise, in all four - the same inability to attack, applying to the terrain (dexterously perform and correctly alternate dashes and crawls) and in two (2nd and 81st) - the same crowding of battle formations at the onset. Watching the attack of the 2nd Infantry Division at the Belarusian maneuvers in 1936, the head of the RKKa UBPA A.I. Sedyakin saw exactly the same thing that they saw at the BVO maneuvers in 1937. Voroshilov and Budyonny, the absence of a "combination of fire and movement", the absence

98

combinations of dashes with crawling and movement in "dense crowds" ("reason: single soldiers, squads and platoons undertrained")203. Since, according to Sedyakin's impressions, the "training of divisions" in the BVO then "was very even," then the infantry of other formations of the district should have "advancing" in the same way ... (At the Polotsk exercises in October 1936, units of the 5th and 43 The 1st Rifle Divisions showed a "striving" to prepare an attack with machine-gun fire?

An indication of the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937 that the infantryman in that year "was not sufficiently trained in the correct use of the terrain, did not receive the necessary skills in

movement and dashes, in camouflage and self-entrenchment", and the training of small subdivisions was not brought to an end, is an indication of the state of training of the infantry of the district on the eve of the purge of the Red Army: after all, both a single fighter and small units are worked out in the first half of the academic year! Obviously, they were "worked out" then in the Moscow Military District. Isn't it significant that in the only rifle division of this district, information about the tactical training of a single soldier of which, before the start of the purge of the Red Army, we discovered (6th), "methods of deserting, self-entrenching and camouflage" as early as between June 6 and 20, 1937 d. "Properly didn't know" even the cadets of the regimental schools?05 – future junior commanders?!

The infantrymen of the 37th rifle division of the BVO in August 1937, who were not used to the terrain and did not dig in, were poorly camouflaged at the Belarusian maneuvers of 1936 (September 8, 1936 A.I. Sedyakin saw heads sitting - soldiers of the division in the trenches per kilometer), and did not dig in both in October 1936 and in the first days of June 1937 (moreover, they didn't have "clear and correct skills of self-digging" then either ...)206. In August 1937, the infantrymen of the 37th division (with the possible exception of the 109th rifle regiment, in which the training of a single soldier was considered satisfactory) slowly made defections - but in April 1935 these latter "sluggishly » were carried out in the 109th regiment297. And in the 110th Infantry, the technique of their implementation (as can be understood from the notepad of the observer

99

for the teachings of the regiment commander-23 K.P. Podlas) did not work out by October 1936 either (perhaps the situation was the same then in the 109th 111th, about which Podlas wrote that the attack technique was "not at the proper height" in THEM)...208 In August 1937, the rifle squads of the 37th division attacked not in groups, but in a dense target, but the battle formations there were "not at the proper height" and in October 1936 (in the 110th regiment they were even before (!) Attack were "line and heap"). Even before the beginning of the mass repressions, in the early days of June 1937, there were no "clearly pronounced" (that is, correct) battle formations in the infantry of the 37th division!209

As for the OKDVA, ignoring or poor mastery of the art of camouflage by its infantrymen was clearly characteristic of it in 1935, when it was evident in two of its three rifle divisions, about the tactical training of the infantry of which specific information has been preserved. (in the 21st and 34th). In 1936, this defect was recorded in 4 out of 10 such divisions (in the 66th, 69th, 104th and 105th; in the first of them, the infantrymen had not yet dug in). 6 out of 10 (1st Pacific, 26th, 32nd, 59th, 69th and 92nd) demonstrated at that time one more defect characteristic of the OKDVA infantry of the autumn 1937 model - "undeveloped" (i.e., simply overcrowding) of the combat formations of the advancing infantry... we know anything concretely (in the 21st, 40th, 59th and 105th), and the weak crowding of small infantry units (inevitably entailing "insufficient organization" of battle formations) was recognized by the command "lagging link", one of the "main imperfections" of the entire army?!0. Recall that in the report of the 20th Rifle Corps of the OKDVA for [1937, it was written about the "crowding of battle formations" that it "still remains", i.e. it was typical there even before the start of the purge of the Red Army ...

In August 1937, "poor camouflage" and "weak sophistication" of the "tempo and technique of crossings" were noted in the 45th Rifle Division of the KVO, but in 1936 this was characteristic of the entire infantry of the Kiev district! "{...} There is no sufficient camouflage, mobility and dexterity," it was stated in report

100

political directorate of the KVO dated May 5, 1936, - defections are made sluggishly, etc.». "Questions of close combat [i.e. "running, crawling, jumping up, attacking, throwing a grenade and hitting with a bayonet." - A.S.] are still in the development stage," the compilers of the annual report of the KVO dated October 4, 19362, who constantly sought to gloss over shortcomings, also admitted!

"The initial period of training a single fighter and the cohesion of small units" - which in the 1936/37 academic year "were put on a very low level" in the LVO - is again the first, "pre-repression", half of 1937.

Fire training. Speaking on November 21-22, 1937 at the Military Council, the commanders of the troops. The MVO, KVO and HVO rated the level of fire skills of their infantry as "unsatisfactory" ("very low"); in fact, the commanders of the Siberian Military District, North Caucasian Military District and ZakVO did the same (the first of them indicated that the results of individual firing of infantrymen only approached satisfactory, the second that his rifle units did not advance beyond the first task of the firing course, and the third is that the training of his rifle troops is unsatisfactory on the whole). From the speeches of the commanders of the troops of the PriVO, SAVO, LVO and ZabvVO, it followed that their infantry had achieved satisfactory fire training, and the commanders of the BVO even reported "quite satisfactory" results?¹². The annual report of the OKDVA recognized the fire skills of its infantry as "low". It can be seen from the further presentation that the compilers of the report had in mind a result that was between satisfactory and unsatisfactory: if almost all Far Eastern rifle divisions fired from a rifle, according to the report, at "satisfactory", then for firing from an easel machine gun "bad" have already received 4 out of 13 (34th, 59th, 66th and 69th), and for shooting from a light machine gun - 11 out of 13 (in fact - all 13: 3, and 3.2 The scores obtained here by the 32nd and 40th divisions, the compilers of the report, without hesitation, declared satisfactory - although these latter began only with 3.5 ...) ²! 3. In fact, the fire skills of the OKDVA infantry were then unsatisfactory. The fact that in the 12th, 26th, 34th, 35th and 39th divisions it was precisely

101

such, recognized by the compilers of the report; From the information they provide, it follows that this list should also include the 32nd (which received 3.4 points in fire training), as well as the 59th, 66th and 69th (which received "failed" for shooting and from light and heavy machine guns, i.e. for two of the three types of small arms)?¹⁴. Thus, in 70% of the rifle divisions of the OKDVA, fire training then drew only to "unsuccessful" ...

In general, taking into account the fact that in at least 7 out of 13 military districts (there is no information on the Ural Military District, and satisfactory assessments of five districts by their command could be strained), things were unsatisfactory, the level of fire skills achieved during the second half of the 37th infantry of the Red Army as a whole, should be characterized as approaching unsatisfactory.

At the same time, the unsatisfactory fire training of the o03- began not only a small percentage of hits, but also a general poor command of weapons. At the September maneuvers of the BVO and MVO, K.E. Voroshilov noted that the rifle "serves as a burden to the fighter", that it "all around" "dangles just in the wrong place where it should have been", that the soldiers "shoot without a scope, just shoot to calm and cheer"? ¹⁵. Having stated the unsatisfactory fire skills of the 110th, 111th and 156th rifle regiments of the 23rd rifle corps of the BVO, tested by them on August 18-29, 1937, the corps command and representatives of the Red Army UBP noted that the fighter there is not only "fire often leads without setting the sight", not only is he not trained as an independent shooter (capable of making adjustments for the wind, target speed, etc. without instructions from the commander), but he has not even worked out the technique of preparing for shooting and firing a shot. ..²¹⁶ In the 45th Rifle Division of the KVO, as its commander revealed on August 8-12, 1937, low firing results were combined not only with a lack of training "in the quick detection and dexterous elimination of delays" when firing, but also again yet with the inability to prepare weapons for firing...²¹⁷ According to the report of the commander of the 18th rifle corps, commander V.K. Vasentsovich V.K. Blucher dated October 16, 1937, the shooting techniques were not worked out

102

then in the 12th and 69th rifle divisions of the OKDVA; in addition, they did not master the elementary techniques of shooting from a light machine gun (the soldiers did not know how to use a belt and an emphasis to achieve stability when shooting). Komtroy LVO P.E. Dybenko at the November Military Council also admitted that his fighter "is not trained in the automatic execution of techniques, and he devotes a lot of attention to how to do it"; instead of "watching the enemy all the time, the terrain", "he thinks" how to take up the rifle and how to load it ... 218

Information about the degree of mastery of grenade throwing for the second half of the 37th was found only according to OKDVA. According to the annual report of this army, its infantrymen threw training grenades on the whole to "satisfactory", but the combat ones - to "failed": not being trained to load a grenade and put it on a combat platoon, the soldiers involuntarily paid so much attention to this that no longer paid attention to the accuracy of the throw ...

But what has worsened here in comparison with the "pre-repression" period? Of the 7 military districts whose infantry fire training in the fall of the 37th was unsatisfactory or approaching that (MVO, KVO, KhVO, SKVO, SibvVO, ZakVO and OKDVA), at least 6 (we have no information on the KhVO) are exactly the same the picture was in the fall of the 35th! Fire training of the infantry of the Moscow Military District, North Caucasian Military District and Siberian Military District A.I. Sedyakin in his report dated | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ..." recognized as being only "at the elementary level"?!; in the KVO and OKDVA, even according to the data reported from there to Moscow, it was only satisfactory?20, which means that in reality it was only "bad". After all (as it was finally established in the summer of 1937), mass fraud was practiced in the KVO for many years when organizing firing and summing up their results (it was thanks to him that the district from year to year ranked first in fire training in the Red Army). Firstly, they made it easier for the shooter to hit the target - they unmasked the target (by painting it black or pouring white sand in front of it under the pretext of "struggle for culture at the shooting range"), increased it against the prescribed

103

the time of showing a moving target, reduced its speed, did not require them to independently search for a target (where to shoot, the commanders standing nearby suggested) and determine the distance to the target (it was reported in advance). Secondly, they tried to bring only the best shooters to inspector firing, and the bad ones were sent for this time to guards, outfits, to do chores and on various business trips ... Thirdly, the command of the units being checked organized falsifying holes in targets by ordering hit markers to punch holes in targets that mimic bullet holes. So, in August 1935, the head of the sniper team of the 131st Infantry Regiment of the 44th Infantry Division V.A. Vasilkovsky declared before the inspection check to one of his platoon commanders and two junior commanders: "You are the markers at this shooting, you need to provide at least 5 points," he explained what needs to be done for this, and handed each an awl ... 221 V-fourthly, in the units they "re-shooted" the firing, which gave an unsatisfactory result, justifying this by the fact that one or another bad-shooting fighter "did well in combat training all year round", and on the inspector's check "was nervous, frightened by the authorities, etc. ."222 (Such cases really did happen, but apparently, they were explained not so much by the excitement of those being verified, but by the fact that the inspectors did not make them the indulgence to which they were accustomed in their unit). Fifthly, if the inspectors were not from Moscow, but from their district, they themselves sometimes overestimated the results of the firing in their reports and acts, so that the district had something to report to Moscow. So, in 1933, when conducting an inspection check of the 2nd Caucasian Rifle Division, Deputy Commander of the UVO S.A. Turovsky and the notorious D.A. Schmidt, who in July 1936 became one of the first commanders of the Red Army to be repressed, "personally forwarded" the grades received by the shooters, and instead of 80-87% of the completion of shooting tasks, it turned out even ... 147%1223

We emphasize that these accusations of mass fraud, made after the arrest of I.E. Yakir and a number of other top commanders of the KVO cannot be considered fictitious in order to more strongly denigrate the "exposed

gov of the people." Indeed, against the command of the same BVO, whose commanders I.P. Uborevich was arrested and convicted at the same time as Yakir; no such accusations were made. At the same time, references to cases of falsification of the results of firing are constantly found in the documents of the CVO of Yakir's time: in the minutes of party meetings and meetings of party commissions, in the political reports of political workers, in the orders of superiors. So, by February 1936, a "whole series" of Yakir's orders and directives of the head of the political department of the KVO M.P. were already devoted to condemning the fraud practiced in the KVO. Amelina...?24

The "pre-repression" documents of the OKDVA also recorded many times the unmasking of targets, and "excessive guardianship of the fighters by the commanders"? 2 ° when firing, and the refusal to conduct firing in difficult conditions - on unfamiliar terrain, on rough terrain, in strong side wind...

"Bad" deserved in the 35th and Zak VO, although his command troops M.K. Lewandowski and reported on December 8, 1935 to the Military Council that in 54% of his units the individual fire training was excellent, in 27% it was good, in 18% it was satisfactory, and only 1% had "bad" here?26. Indeed, on November 21, 1937, Lewandovsky's successor commander N.V. Kuibyshev "with all responsibility" declared to the same council that in the ZakVO "fraud existed as a system in all types of training", that only "the best people" were "selected" for test firing there, and that when in the autumn of the 37th of this they were not allowed to do it, "the units that showed excellent results from year to year gave unsatisfactory results"227. Of all the speakers at the council of 1937, only Kuibyshev and I.E. Yakira I.F. Fedko, so it is impossible to suspect Kuibyshev of deliberately denigrating the past (especially since his predecessor has not yet been declared an "enemy of the people").

In the LVO, since the autumn of 1935, infantry firing skills have obviously not worsened. On December 8, 1935, B.M., who headed it. Shaposhnikov himself declared at the Military Council that "the Leningrad district has not yet mastered complex fire training"?28; it means that in the field of fire business his infantry was trained even then

tovlena no more than put up to her after the start of the purge of the Red Army "satisfactory".

The situation in the PriVO and BVO did not worsen in any way, even if we assume that the satisfactory and "quite satisfactory" assessments reported in November 37 by their new command troops M.G. Efremov and I.P. Belov, are overestimated. There was nowhere to deteriorate in the PriVO: in the fall of 1935, the fire skills of its infantry were "at the elementary level"? taking into account the relaxation of the requirements for the shooter, which was often noted there, was most likely unsatisfactory).

No higher than in the fall of 1937 was the fire skills of the Soviet infantry in 1936. True, by the end of the 37th, its level fluctuated between satisfactory and unsatisfactory (approaching the latter), while the level of individual shooting skills achieved by the infantry of the Red Army. By the autumn of 1936, M.N. Tukhachevsky rated (in his report of October 7, 1936 "On Combat Training of the Red Army") as satisfactory (and the more "ceremonial" order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 of November 3, 1936, even as "quite satisfactory")?31. But the estimates of 1936 were clearly overestimated - the central departments of the Red Army were unable or unwilling to reveal the bulk of cases of fraud in firearms practiced by the troops. In the BVO (as shown by a random sample formed by the few surviving data) and OKDVA, individual infantry shooting skills were frankly unsatisfactory by the end of 1936? to the annual report which was listed as "good"), "failure" most likely deserved it. In any case, when a year later, in the fall of the 37th, on

During inspector firing, units of the KVO were "required to shoot without eyewash", they "gave unsatisfactory results"...²³³ Finally, Tukhachevsky and order No. 00105 evaluated only individual shooting skills, while those who spoke at the November Military Council all about infantry fire training in general,

106

those. they also took into account the results of live firing — tactical exercises with live firing of subunits. And "each of Us knows," I.F. reminded the Military Council on November 21, 1937. Fedko, "that troops always give good and excellent results in live firing due to the wrong organization of firing" (live firing, A.I. Egorov also admitted, is carried out "for the most part in firing range conditions, in when the distances are known, when a number of other moments accompanying the shooting are also known to the command staff")²³⁴.

Of the specific military districts, we have information for 1936 only on the three mentioned above. But, as we can see, in two of them (and most likely in the third) the infantry fire training was no higher than after the start of the purge of the Red Army (in the BVO it seems to be even lower, but the statement about "quite satisfactory" fire training, achieved by the infantry there by the end of 1937, is apparently still false. mi 156th rifle regiments - back in August, the fire was assessed as a pure "bad" ...²³⁵).

The "lag" of the infantry in fire training was also stated in the last months before the start of the purge of the Red Army - in the directive letter of A.I. Egorova dated June 27, 1937.²³⁶ To clarify this estimate, we have information on 5 out of [3 military districts (combining the former part of the Red Army infantry).

In the AVO - as revealed in June 1937 by the new commander I.F. Fedko - "fire training in all branches of the military" was then "at a low level"²³⁷. That is, on the same level as in the fall, when the rifle units of the KVO showed "unsatisfactory results and, as the highest mark, satisfactory" at inspector shooting?

In the BVO, the "verification results" of fire training for the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year for the "overwhelming majority of units" turned out to be "low", or rather, frankly unsatisfactory (from a rifle to "bad"

107

64.2% of rifle regiments fired back, 88.1% from light machine guns, and 92.9% from heavy machine guns²³⁹). There was simply nowhere to fall below this level - so, even if the "quite satisfactory" assessment of the fire skills achieved by the BVO by the end of 1937 is stretched, the ability of this infantry to shoot after the start of the purge of the Red Army still did not deteriorate.

An analysis of OKDVA documents leads to the conclusion that by May 1937, the infantry's fire training in it was unsatisfactory ("bad" then it was necessary to put at least 7 out of 13 rifle divisions of V.K. Blucher - 12th, 21st, 26th, 59th, 66th, 69th and 105th), as in July (when at least 5 divisions deserved such an assessment - 12th, 39th, 40th, 69th and 105th) — average between satisfactory and unsatisfactory. That is, approximately the same as in autumn, when it was, according to our assessment, unsatisfactory.

The beginning of the purge of the Red Army also did not worsen the fire training of the infantry of the Moscow Military District. Indeed, on November 21, 1937, S.M. Budyonny pointed out that in most of its parts this learning "continues [emphasis mine. — A.S.] to remain at a very low level"²⁴⁰.

The same thing happened in the KhVO, whose new commander S.K. Timoshenko noted on November 22, 1937, that "no improvement has been achieved in firepower training this year. Checks

unsatisfactory results were established”²⁴¹, As we see, about the deterioration of the command troops didn't say anything...

Such a sample seems to us representative enough to conclude that in the last months before the start of mass repressions, the fire skills of the Red Army infantry were no better than in the autumn of 1937.

And what about the lack of familiarity with weapons, proper skills in handling them, when a rifle “served as a burden for a fighter”? The situation that K.E. Voroshilov observed in September 1937 at the BVO and MVO maneuvers (when the fighters fired “without an aim”, only “to calm and encourage”), it was common in the Red Army in the fall of the “pre-repression” 1935. “A rare case,” it was noted in the “Review of party political work at the maneuvers of 1935” compiled by the Political Directorate of the Red Army, “that a fighter was required to [...]

108

determine the distance to the target, set the desired sight ”...²⁴² In August 1937, in the 110th, 111th and 156th rifle regiments of the BVO, soldiers in tactical exercises fired without a sight and did not work out the technique of preparing for shooting and production shot, but in the 110th regiment they were poorly able to prepare for firing and correctly set the sight in October 1936 (light machine gunners - in February 1937), and in the 111th 156th - and in May 1937... In August 1937, the fighters of these three units were not trained as independent riflemen, but in the 111th and 156th regiments they did not know how to independently search for targets on the battlefield and determine the distance by eye before them and in “pre-repression” May... In August 1937, the infantrymen of the 45th Rifle Division of the KVO were not able to quickly find and eliminate delays arising during firing and even prepare weapons for firing - but that “rifle weapons are poorly known in the units” and that “the preparation of weapons for firing is low”, the headquarters of this division also said at the party meeting on August 13-14, 1936²⁴³. In the autumn of 1937, the fighters of the 12th and 69th rifle divisions of the OKDVA “did not bring to automatism” the methods of making weapons for battle and did not master the elementary methods of firing from a light machine gun - but in the fall of 1935, automatism in handling weapons, and in the spring “pre-repression” in 1936, the ability to prepare for firing from the DP and to conduct it was not in the entire OKDVA infantry in general! And the fact that in the 69th division a soldier “does not know how to prepare a weapon for battle”, the inspectors also stated in October 1936 ... ²⁴⁴ .

In the autumn of 1937, hand grenades were thrown at the OKDVA for “failure” - but in those five out of 11 | of the then rifle divisions of the OKDVA, for which there is relevant data, the average score for owning a hand grenade was unsatisfactory (3.2) and then²⁴⁵ Bogomyagkov also stated in October 1936²⁴⁶; all the marks known to us that were received in that year by rifle regiments and divisions of the OKDVA for grenade throwing were again “failures” ... “The art of throwing hand grenades in the mountains and forests [i.e. where the Far Easterners basically had to fight! - A.S.] the troops” of the OKDVA, according to the report of its headquarters dated [May 8, 1937, “did not master” and by the beginning of the purge of the Red Army ... ²⁴⁷

109

Physical training. “In the same way, the troops have not mastered bayonet fighting, or rather, they do not know it at all,” S.M. Budyonny²⁴⁸. The fact that this assessment can be attributed to the infantry not only of the Moscow Military District, but of the entire then Red Army, is confirmed by the statement of the Inspector of Physical Training and Sports of the Red Army, Divisional Commissar A.A., who spoke there on November 23. Tarasov about the “absence” of hand-to-hand combat in the Red Army (reduced to bayonet at that time)²⁴⁹.

But from the directive letter of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, it is clear that the bayonet battle in the Red Army was “not worked out” in the first half of the year! Estimates of the then state of the soldier's physical training in two specific districts, in which they were preserved, seemed to be written off from the November speeches at the Military Council: “the training of command and rank and file personnel in bayonet combat is completely unsatisfactory”, “practical techniques and skills in

hand-to-hand combat and combat in trenches are not instilled" (report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937); "The bayonet battle is forgotten" (speech by the commander of the 105th rifle division of the OKDVA brigade commander F.K. Dottol at the divisional party conference on April 25, 1937); "bayonet fighting is a weak point in the physical training of a fighter. Almost nothing has been done here" (order of the commander of the 23rd rifle corps of the BVO divisional commander K.P. Podlas on the results of the inspection of the combat training of the 111th and 156th rifle regiments on May 7–13, 1937)?250.

B. Tankers

Tactical learning. The level of tactical training of tank subunits (and units), achieved in the second half of 1937, was characterized, speaking at the Military Council on November 22, by the head of the ABTU RKKA G.G. Bokis. According to him, the crews, platoons and companies were well trained in the tank formations, but the battalions were still insufficiently assembled. (In the BVO, according to the annual report of this district dated October 15, 1937, not only tank battalions, but also companies were knocked together only "satisfactorily".) In the tank battalions of rifle divisions, to

110

at that time, only crews and platoons were well prepared; the companies, as Bokis made it clear, were still insufficiently assembled (and, consequently, the battalions were not assembled at all).

However, Bokis' assertions about the good training of tank crews are called into question by the information at our disposal about the tactical training of a single tanker fighter. True, they were found only in the tank units of the ZabVO and in the 22nd mechanized brigade of the KVO, but in both cases this training turned out to be no more than mediocre. Having examined the 22nd mechanized brigade on August 19-21, 1937, the commission of Colonel L.A. Knizhnikova from the ABTU of the Red Army revealed that the drivers, working out the task of driving the T-26 "at maximum speed, but not to the detriment of observation, shooting and camouflage", "insufficiently" take into account the features of the terrain (those that interfere and observe from the tank, and shoot from it, as well as unmask the car.)? 5!. And the command troops of ZabVO M.D. Velikanov, speaking at the Military Council on November 22, admitted the "poor training" of his drivers "for driving tanks with closed hatches, which leads to the crew wandering on the battlefield and not maintaining the set course"? 52 it was good: the driver's hatch on the T-26, BT-5 and BT-7 was located in the frontal hull plate and, being open, made the "mechanic driver" (and the entire tank) vulnerable even to rifle and machine-gun fire!

However, in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937, not only battalions, but also companies, and even platoons were clearly not put together in the tank forces of the Red Army! After all, according to the directive letter of A.I. Yegorov dated June 27, 1937, live firing (let us recall, tactical exercises with live firing) in the tank troops were worked out only on the scale of the crew ... In OKDVA, as noted in the report of its headquarters dated May 18, 1937, there were no even tank crews have been knocked together; judging by two of his four tank formations, about the tactical training of which at least something is known at that time (3rd and 4th mechanized brigades), they were then poorly put together in the BVO. And by the way, in these two districts there were about a third of the tank units of the Red Army!

111

As for the poor tactical training of the drivers of the 22nd Mechanized Brigade of the KVO, which was revealed in August 1937, it also indicates a poor cohesion of the tank crews. It is no coincidence that this latter and the same as the 22nd one, the inability of the "mechanic drivers" to drive the T-26 in such a way as to ensure the secrecy of the maneuver planned by the tank commander and good conditions for observation and firing by the commander, in the 3rd mechanized brigade of the BVO in April of the same year were recorded simultaneously ... But if in August 1937 in the 22nd mechanized brigade the crews were poorly put together, it means that they were badly put together there in the first, "pre-repression"

half of the year - after all, knocking together the crew in the tank troops "was the main task of training the winter period!"²⁵³

Retirement learning. A random sample formed by surviving sources indicates that the fire skills of Soviet tankers in the second half of 1937 should be considered unsatisfactory. In the 22nd mechanized brigade of the KVO, it was like this at the end of August, but it is impossible to admit the possibility of its improvement by winter: the backlog was too great. During the limited time that the battle allows for this, inspectors from the ABTU of the Red Army noted, the tankers of the 22nd "still do not know how to quickly and dexterously carry out the whole range of manipulations that make up the manufacture of a weapon, determine the initial data [for shooting. - A.S.] and the very production of an accurate and well-aimed shot "...²⁵⁴ As early as November 1937, fire training was unsatisfactory both in the 4th mechanized brigade of the BVO and among the average tank commanders of the OKDVA (i.e. . from the commanders of most of the tanks of this army - T-26 and BT-5, which were fired from a cannon by the commander), and separately taken by the 23rd mechanized brigade and separate tank battalions of the 22nd, 66th and 105th rifle divisions OKDVA, and the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO, and the 7th mechanized corps of the LVO - in general, in almost all units and formations for which relevant information was found ... In the 2nd mechanized brigade and separate tank battalions 26th and 40th rifle divisions of the OKDVA fire training by November 1937 was estimated at a satisfactory 3.5-3.6 points, but two of

112

four tank battalions of the 2nd mechanized brigade fired at "fail" (3.4 points)²⁵⁵. True, the state of tank armament, checked in the autumn in 7 out of 24 OKDVA line tank units (in the 1st-4th tank battalions of the 2nd mechanized brigade and separate tank battalions of the 40th, 92nd and 105th rifle divisions) turned out to be good.

And what? Although, on November 22, 1937, G.G. Bokis, the fire skills of tankers are estimated at lower scores than by the end of 1936, in fact, they have not worsened, since the scores obtained in 36th were overestimated due to insufficient demands on the shooters. We have no reason to doubt the validity of this statement, and besides, in many of the tank units listed above, fire skills were assessed as "failed" even before the start of the purge of the Red Army! So, the fact that in the 4th mechanized brigade of the BVO "the quality of training in fire fighting is unsatisfactory" was also recorded by the inspectors in March 1935. In fact, it was the same immediately before the start of mass repressions, in April 1937, when the brigade itself admitted that they had worked out only the first task of the tank firing course and that the soldiers in general "poorly know" and "the theory in the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO, the "fire business" in the same way was "not established" in the spring of 1935, and one of its two mechanized brigades (133rd), as noted in April 1937 at the brigade party conference, the head of its political department, battalion commissar Krylov, had "poor performance" in shooting on the eve of the purge of the Red Army? ⁵⁷,

In OKDVA, tank units used to be checked very liberally: in 1935-1936. in most of its tank battalions mentioned two paragraphs above {2nd and 23rd mechanized brigades and 26th and 40th rifle divisions; the battalion of the 105th division did not yet exist, and the battalion of the 22nd until October 1937 was stationed in the North Caucasus Military District} fire training was rated as "good" and "excellent"; Only the 1st tank battalion of the 2nd mechanized brigade had a "troika" and only in the autumn of 1935 (in that many, if not all, of THESE "fours" and "fives" should be attributed to the liberalism of the inspectors, with G.G. Bokis were in solidarity (see.

113

below) and the Far East themselves). However, a separate tank battalion of the 66th Rifle Division received "bad" fire training in 1936, and the 2nd tank battalion of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade in April 1937. In the same last month, the "unsatisfactory state of fire training"²⁵⁸ in their formation was also noted by the communists of the 23rd mechanized brigade (thus once again confirming the superficiality of the then checks of tank units by the OKDVA command). A

A separate tank battalion of the 26th Rifle Division, after the start of the purge of the Red Army, even improved its fire skills: if on April 26, 1937, the head of the armored service of the division, Major M.Ya. Balalaev rated it as weak, then in the fall it was recognized as satisfactory ...

In the same way, after the start of mass repressions, the condition of the tank armament of the 2nd mechanized brigade improved. Back in May 1937, it was by no means "good" there, but at best satisfactory (most likely unsatisfactory: after all, the care of guns and machine guns in the brigade was then set to "deuce") ...

Technical training. Judging by the same random sample, in the second half of 1937 the situation with the technical skills of the Soviet tankers was somewhat better than with the firepower. Of those units and formations for which we have relevant information, it was unsatisfactory in most separate tank companies of the rifle divisions of the ZakVO, a separate tank battalion of the 22nd rifle division of the OKDVA and the 23rd mechanized brigade of the same army. An inspection conducted in September 1937 of the 1st, 2nd and 4th tank battalions of the 23rd mechanized brigade showed that if the senior mechanics-drivers drive the T-26 and BT-5 by 4.03 points, then the more numerous junior, who have not even worked out the technique of gear shifting and starting off, only by 2.2; that even the senior "mechanic drivers" know the materiel only by 3.52 points, and the younger ones and minders - by 1.97 in general; that junior mechanics-drivers "do not have a clue" about the basics of driving theory ("about movement, speed, energy, traction force on the engine, on grip, manpower and specific gravity"), and minders do not know the device of transmissions, ignition systems and electrical equipment

114

tanks, "weakly know the engine, do not know how to adjust the machine" and even "lubrication periods" ...²⁵⁹ However, in six other tank units of the OKDVA (in separate tank battalions of the 26th, 39th, 4th, 92nd and 105th rifle divisions) tanks by November 1937 drove an average of 4.3 points, and the materiel in them and the 1st-4th tank battalions of the 2nd mechanized brigade knew then an average of 4, 1 point²⁶⁰. Note that the probability of overestimation of these estimates is very small: since the head of the armored forces of the OKDVA, commander S.I. Derevtsov, among other things, was accused of covering up shortcomings in combat training by superficial inspection of units, the autumn inspections of the 37th were "more thorough" than before (why did they reveal "a sharp decrease in combat training in all units"? ⁶¹). Other. the fact is that in general, in OKDVA, tanks were then driven not to "good", but to "satisfactory". After all, the above marks were clearly obtained for driving in uncomplicated conditions: "practical skills to overcome obstacles" - especially water obstacles and swamps - tankers from the Far East, according to the OKDVA report for 1937, "were poorly mastered"²⁶².

In the 22nd mechanized brigade of the KVO in August 1937, the picture was approaching the one that was in September in the Far Eastern 23rd. "The driver's staff," noted the 22nd commission of the ABTU RKKA, which checked it, "for the most part, they have mastered driving in simple conditions and drives [...] satisfactorily"⁶³. For combat work, such training, of course, was unsatisfactory (in addition, the junior mechanics-drivers and minders knew the material part of the tank, and especially its engine, to "unsuccessful"). However, by winter, things could improve: after all, the new command of the KVO paid special attention to the ability to drive tanks in the field, and, for example, in the 45th mechanized corps, if we are to believe the statement of I.F. Fedko at the Military Council - by November they had already achieved noticeable success ... In SAVO, as reported at the same council by his command troops, tanks were being driven satisfactorily by November (though only in flat conditions); about the "good preparation of the driver's staff for long marches"⁶⁴ (and, therefore, for the operation of the tank in general) reported to the council and command troops of the ZabVO ...

115

Satisfactory on the whole technical training of tankers of the Red Army in the second half of 1937 corresponded to the generally satisfactory technical condition of their combat vehicles. It was like this even in the 22nd mechanized brigade of the KVO in August (although the poor knowledge of technology by the majority

"mechanic drivers" and mechanics led to the fact that the tanks of the brigade were not adjusted - which increased the likelihood of a breakdown or accident in the very near future ...). In OKDVA September, an inspection of the 23rd mechanized brigade revealed that "the condition of the materiel does not fully ensure the combat capability" of the formation: "the machines have a large number of minor malfunctions." However, by October 1, the percentage of vehicles on the move in the 23rd increased from 80 to 92265, and in eight other Far Eastern tank units (1st - 4th tank battalions of the 2nd mechanized brigade and separate tank battalions of the 26th, 66th, 92nd and 105th rifle divisions) the technical condition of the materiel by November 37th was estimated at an average of 4.3 points ... 266

But in the 23rd mechanized brigade of the OKDVA, the tank was unsatisfactorily driven even in 1936! At the last experimental exercise on June 19-23, 1936, even the "best mechanic drivers" of this unit showed such "poor training" in working in the mining taiga conditions common for the Far Eastern Theater that out of 13 T-26s two were broken, two were imprisoned on stumps, and six more were "adjusted" so that the tracks of the tanks flew off. And in October, the "best masters of tank driving" of the brigades demonstrated to Colonel M.L. A swan from the ABTU of the Red Army, who drop their tracks even when turning on rocky ground and drive the T-26 at such speeds that they overheat the engine ... In the training battalion of the brigade, where many of those junior mechanics-drivers who terrified inspectors in September, the tank was driven only by 3.2 points, and the materiel was known only by 3.3 in February 1937, and they showed themselves to be "technically illiterate" even in vaprele?67.

Judging by the average score of 4.3 obtained in the autumn of 1937 for driving six OKDVA tank battalions, in two of them - separate tank battalions of the 40th and 66th rifle divisions - the tank was then driven at least "satisfactory".

116

creatively." And this is not only no worse, but even better than in the summer of the "pre-repression" 1936! In the battalion of the 40th division, driving was then mastered no more than "satisfactorily" (at the mountain-taiga exercise on July 13-15, even its best driver-mechanics showed "only satisfactory readiness"), and in the battalion of the 66th - to a frank "unsatisfactory": they "mastered only elementary driving", they did not even know how to turn the tank around and did not know in what modes the engine should be operated...268

In the fall of 1937, technical training in a separate tank battalion of the 92nd rifle division should have been no less than satisfactory: after all, knowledge of the material part in this and in nine other units was estimated with an average score of 4.1. But even this is better than before the start of the purge of the Red Army: at the party conference of the 92nd division at the end of April 1937, it was stated that "technical training" in the tank battalion is "bad"!269 The same is true with the technical condition of its vehicles. If in the fall of 1937 it was no less than satisfactory (the average score of the eight units tested then was 4.3), then by May 15, 1937, when 30% of its T-26 and 70% of T-37 (i.e. e. up to 45% of all tanks) was not on the move270 - it was only drawn to "failed" ...

After the start of the purge of the Red Army, the technical condition of the tanks of the 2nd mechanized brigade did not degrade at all. In 1935-1936 it (with the liberal approach of the inspectors) was assessed as "good"; In the autumn of 1937, after a more meticulous check, the assessment still turned out to be good: after all, of the eight tank units, the average score of which was 4.3, the battalions of the 2nd mechanized brigade accounted for half. No less than "satisfactory" was then received by another of these eight units - a separate tank battalion of the 26th rifle division. But in the fall of the "pre-repression" 1935, even a liberal check assessed the technical condition of his tanks at the same "satisfactory" ...

B. Gunners

We have only fragmentary information about the level of training of an artillery fighter in the second half of 1937. Significant, however, is the fact that in

117

In the orders alone for the 45th Rifle Division of the KVO for this period—devoted, of course, to more than one artillery—we find two whole references to the weakness of this training. [On July 3, 1937, due to poor training of riders during field exercises, the 122-mm howitzer of the 45th artillery regiment was put out of action, and a check of the combat training of rifle regiments carried out on August 8-12 showed that “in tactical training regimental artillery has not worked out a single training of a soldier-artilleryman”²⁷¹. This latter was clearly limping then in the regimental artillery of the OKDVA: the annual report of this army admitted that the regimental artillerymen were still slowly taking up firing positions and observation posts. Another failure in the training of the Far Eastern artillery - the poor preparedness of artillery reconnaissance - was also clearly characteristic of the KVO (as well as the LVO). Artillery scouts, wrote Major N.S. Kasatkin, “are accustomed to finding” only “targets that are placed quite openly at ranges”, and “signs by which you can find” a real, disguised target, “often do not know and do not study”²⁷². But the fact that artillery is accustomed to firing only “at perfectly visible targets”, that “no reconnaissance is carried out” during firing, was said, speaking at the Military Council on November 21, and I.F. Fedko and P.E. Dybenko²⁷³. This means that artillery reconnaissance officers could not acquire good training in their districts either ... And the commanders of the North Caucasus Military District also complained about the poor training of artillery riders ...

At the same Military Council, the head of artillery of the Red Army N.N. Voronov noted that throughout the Red Army the training of artillery observers was poor ...

We were unable to find any information about the “pre-repression” training of artillery scouts and observers, as well as about the “pre-repression” training of riders of the 45th artillery regiment, but it is known that in the 44th artillery regiment of the elite (!) 44th rifle division of the same KVO, the riders did not stay well in the saddle and badly controlled the horses in the summer of 1936 ... “Undeveloped” by August 1937 in the 45th division, the single training of a regiment fighter

118

howling artillery had to be worked out during the winter period of training, i.e. even before the start of the mass repression. Thus, it was by no means the last who forced her to limp. And the slow deployment of regimental artillery batteries at firing positions in the Primorsky OKDVA group (which included about two-thirds of the OKDVA rifle regiments) was also noted in the “pre-repression” March of 1937.

As for the readiness of artillery units, in OKDVA (according to its annual report) it was estimated (for regimental, divisional and RGK artillery) at 3.8-3.9 points²⁷⁴. Speaking at the Military Council in November, the commanders of the SAVO and SibVO troops spoke about the satisfactory readiness of their artillery; Command troops of ZabVO and PriVO declared that their artillery was prepared “not badly” or even “well” - but S.K. Timoshenko described the artillery of his HVO as “poorly trained”. In fact, P.E. gave the same assessment to his artillery units and command troops of the LVO. Dybenko: “Can our artillery work in the field? No”. From the picture he described of the emasculation of artillery field training by conventions and simplifications (“A battery or division leaves for a pre-prepared position, [clearly visible. - A.S.] targets are set, no reconnaissance, no choice of position is made”, “it came to the fact that [when — A.S.] they put the battalion in position, even put teams in front of the guns”), it follows that the gunners could not acquire good practical training at that time. Finally, the commander of the MVO troops S.M. Budyonny, declaring the poor readiness of the infantry units, added: “We are not preparing the battery properly yet either”²⁷⁵.

If we also take into account the statement made at the same council by the head of artillery of the Red Army N.N. Voronov that artillerymen are “strongly infected with fraud,” that fraud in the Red Army must be eliminated “in the very first place” among artillerymen?²⁷⁶, then we will inevitably have to conclude that the training of artillery units in the Red Army in

in the second half of 1937, on the whole, did not exceed a strictly satisfactory (more precisely, mediocre) level - and possibly even lower.

119

We do not have information about "pre-repression" artillery in six of the eight districts listed above, but the remaining two conclusions suggest unambiguously. In OKDVA, the training of artillery units clearly did not pull more than 3.8-3.9 points even in 1936 - when they received an average of 3.5 points in fire training, when the tactical training of units not even distracted by construction work turned out to be only "mediocre" (in particular, for divisions — by 3.5 points), equestrian — "Bad", and the maintenance of the material part and the technical condition of this latter — unsatisfactory⁷⁷. It is difficult to say whether the training of ZabuVO artillery was really "good" in the fall of 1937, but compared to the fall of 1935, when even the annual report of the political administration of ZabuVO addressed to Moscow described it as only satisfactory⁷⁸, it clearly has not worsened ...

G. Sappers

We have information about the training of a fighter of the engineering troops in the second half of 1937 only from OKDVA, where this training was frankly unsatisfactory. According to the annual report of Blucher's army, by October they had not completed the training of a single fighter even in such basic specialties in the engineering troops as a sapper and pontoon! In some places, even carpenters were unprepared ...

Correspondingly, subdivisions of the engineering troops were not then cobbled together in the OKDVA - neither in a tactical sense (their tactical training was only elementary, and some did not even have that!), nor even in a special one. Thus, technical subdivisions in the field, when working together with sapper companies, showed exceptionally "poor" results, because of which it was not possible to work out the mechanization of bridge work. Sapper units did not work out the construction of heavy-type fortifications, overcoming barriers; The "greatest" "backlog" was "in the technique of constructing landmines and minefields"⁷⁹ (the latter were then poorly able to equip the sappers of the North Caucasus Military District). In general, the OKDVA engineering troops in the autumn of 1937 could more or less successfully provide only

120

forcing rivers, and they could not help other branches of the military either in defense or on the offensive ... Equally unsatisfactory (except in 4 rifle divisions out of 14 and the fifth water rifle regiment) were trained and sapper units of other types of troops of this army.

In general, ZheVRKKA - if we believe the statement made on November 22, 1937 at the Military Council by the head of the Engineering Directorate of the Red Army, commander I.P. Mikhailin, - the special training of the engineering troops was then satisfactory (the commanders of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District and the ZabuVO, the only ones who "still touched on this issue"), and the tactical training were unsatisfactory. "Engineering units," it was also stated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0109 dated December 14, 1937 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for 1937 and tasks for 1938," did not achieve the necessary tactical and technical mobility for timely and provision of troops required by the situation, especially in mobile combat"⁸⁰.

We did not find general estimates of the training of fighters and units of the engineering troops of the Red Army in the "pre-repression" period, however, in OKDVA and SKVO this level was in no way higher than in the fall of the 37th. The annual report of the "Inzhstroy" OKLDVA of October 8, 1935, called the "field training" of its units and subunits "insufficient"⁸¹, but an uninterested person would replace this word with the same "elementary". If by the autumn of the 37th the engineering troops of the OKDVA could at least provide crossings over water barriers, and only heavy-type buildings were poorly erected from defensive structures, then by the fall of the 35th they had insufficiently mastered both the construction of crossings and sapper work in general (t.e. and construction

fortifications), and in the Primorskaya group, as poorly as in the autumn of 1937, they also worked out the construction of barriers. And in the autumn of 1936, as is clear from the OKDVA report for that year, even this level of training in ferrying and sapper business decreased; the original version of the report directly stated the "unsatisfactory" status of the "general state of training of the engineering troops"²⁸²

The training of the "inzhtroysk" of the North Caucasus Military District clearly did not exceed a satisfactory level in the autumn of 1936. True, please

121

vav then at the maneuvers of this district in the Krymskaya area, A.I. Sedyakin recognized the preparedness of the local sappers as "quite satisfactory", but another observer from the Red Army UBP, commander M.A. Reuter noted that sapper units are "poorly trained for close combat"²⁸³ (i.e. that their tactical training is no more than satisfactory).

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Shi D. Signalers

Describing on November 22, 1937 at the Military Council the training of a communications fighter, the head of the Communications Department of the Red Army, division engineer A.M. Aksyonov stated that "signallers as specialists are generally well trained", but pointed out that radio and telegraph operators still make distortions in the transmission and reception of radio and telegrams? 8%. Other sources at our disposal - the annual report of the OKDVA and the documents of the 45th Rifle Division of the KVO - allow, perhaps, to refine this assessment. According to the report, linemen, telephone operators, and Morse telegraph operators, and radio operators in OKDVA then had satisfactory training, but linemen poorly masked the wire communication lines they were laying, and the training of radio operators was uneven: in the communications units of rifle and artillery regiments they were less prepared than "satisfactory"²⁸⁵. What may be hidden behind this diplomatic wording can be seen from the order of the commander of the 45th Infantry Division No. 0122 dated August 25, 1937, on the results of checking the combat training of its units on August 8-12. The radio operators of the rifle regiments, it says, "are not trained to work with a key and receive by ear on real radio stations"²⁸⁶ (in other words, they are not prepared for combat work). In addition, the OKDVA signalmen did not fully master their technique, and therefore there were failures. Taking into account all these circumstances, the training of a single fighter signalman of the Red Army in the second half of 1937 should be recognized as no more than satisfactory.

The training of communications units and subunits, the annual report of OKDVA, on average, is satisfactory (from good in separate battalions of communications of an army subordinate

122

to unsatisfactory in 2 of the 14 battalions of communications of rifle divisions and in the communications units of rifle regiments of 4 of 14 rifle divisions and the 18th corps artillery regiment). We do not have information on other districts and on the Red Army as a whole.

However, according to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 of November 3, 1936 and the directive letter of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, "inaccurate transmissions", distortion of re- _ given information, the work of signalmen of the Red Army was different both in 1936 and in the first half of 1937. The materials of inspections of the units of the KVO, BVO and OKDVA fully confirm this ... In OKDVA, the training of ordinary signalmen was assessed as satisfactory even in the "pre-repression" period; even at that time, the poor preparedness of the radio operators of the communications units of the artillery and rifle units was also noted there. Linemen of wire communications, at least in the Primorsk group of OKDVA, poorly masked again in the "pre-repression" first half of 1937 ... The training of the OKDVA communications units as a whole was satisfactory in 1936 - the first half of 1937 th (moreover, in the fall of 1936, it "barely reached a satisfactory level"? ⁸⁸), and the training of communications units of rifle and artillery regiments in the first

half of 1937 was unequivocally unsatisfactory, i.e., perhaps even worse than after the start of the purge of the Red Army...

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So, the beginning of mass repressions did not in any way affect the degree of training of the commanders, headquarters and troops of the Red Army; in the second half of 1937 it remained exactly the same as in 1935-the first half of 1937 (namely, just as unsatisfactory or close to unsatisfactory).

And this despite the fact that from June to November 1937 in the army there really was a massive renewal of the command staff and a massive promotion of him to higher positions. ` So, in the KVO on November 20, 1937, 90% of the commanders and 60% of the chiefs of staff of the corps were replaced, 84% of the commanders and

} | 123

40% of division chiefs of staff, 50% of brigade commanders and 37% of regiment commanders - as well as 75% of district headquarters commanders (including 92% of chiefs and 75% of assistant chiefs of departments). In the BVO, "beginning with corps commanders, ending with platoon commanders, everyone was moved and promoted" - so that already at the September maneuvers "all command personnel, with a few exceptions, were young in their positions, maybe not so young in his age position, but young in his positions". In the KhVO, almost all commanders of regiments and divisions were replaced; in the North Caucasus Military District, the command staff became "NEW", "starting from the commander of a company, battery, squadron"²⁸⁹. In OKDVA, by the end of 1937, all corps commanders, two-thirds of division commanders, and both commanders of mechanized brigades were replaced; By mid-October 1937, the composition of the headquarters of battalions and regiments had been updated "on average by 60-80%", and in the Primorskaya Group by that time "the majority of commanders" of not only formations, but also parts...²⁹⁰

In the literature, it is customary to emphasize the fact that many of the commanders who were not subjected to repressions turned out to be demoralized and began to work carelessly? This phenomenon actually took place; at the November Military Council, he was talked about by the command troops of the HVO S.K. Timoshenko (who "was struck by the confusion of the commanding and commanding staff, passivity in work and the desire to insure himself from responsibility"), the Komsomol of ZabvVO M.D. Velikanov ("The cleansing work carried out in the troops of the district, in its initial stage, of course, introduced some elements of confusion, insecurity, distrust of superiors and even panic and a weakening of the pace of combat training"), a member of the Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District, corps commissar K. G. Sidorov ("Some division leaders, due to the fact that a significant number of seizures are now beginning, gave up")...²³² But, as we see, this did not affect the level of training of the Red Army!

124

Our conclusion that the beginning of mass repressions did not affect the preparedness of the Red Army is also confirmed by the fact that, at least at the level of command districts, there were very few complaints about the decrease in the level of training of commanders, headquarters and troops due to the renewal of the command staff. . At the November Military Council, only three of the 12 commanders of the military districts who spoke there spoke about such a reduction (and two of them spoke only about headquarters). And these statements are not at all as unambiguous as it seems at the first acquaintance with

True, the command troops of ZakVO N.V. Kuibyshev expressed himself extremely sharply: "the main reason" for the "unsatisfactory level" of the combat training of the district "is that ... the district was bled very badly"³³ His report that two divisions in ZakVO is commanded by majors, and three are commanded by captains. It is no coincidence that it was his speech that such an ardent propagandist of the thesis about the crushing of the Red Army by the repressions of 1937-1938 abundantly quoted. like V.A. Anfilov?

34. But isn't it more logical to attribute the unsatisfactory education of the Transcaucasian District to another circumstance, about which a little

N.V. himself mentioned below. Kuibyshev (but did not mention Anfilov!), to the fact that "in the national units [and the ZakVO, two-thirds consisted of divisions staffed by representatives of the ethnic groups of Transcaucasia. - A.S. the level of training of command personnel is so low that it is necessary to second experienced senior commanders to assist them"? "A large percentage of the command staff" of the ZakVO, Kuibyshev noted, even "does not speak Russian" - and therefore "not only does not read military literature", but also "cannot even work independently with the usual charter"! "Judge for yourself: how can a commander who cannot read the charter grow? I have a large percentage of commanders who cannot read the book [my emphasis. - A.S.] "2% 5. In no other district (even in the Central Asian one, which also consisted mainly of national units) was there then such a large percentage of commanders - representatives of non-Slavic ethnic groups of the USSR ...

125

The fact that one of the reasons for the poor training of the ZakVO is "ignorance of the Russian language by the national command staff" (which "terribly interferes with the level of combat training") was pointed out then by N.V. Kuibyshev, but to declare this reason "the main one" (and not the last of the four) meant to be accused of "Great Russian chauvinism." That is why, I think, the commanders of the ZakVO announced the renewal of the command staff as the "main" reason ...

And besides, the speech of N.V. Kuibysheva actually confirms what we have established above - that there was no real "deterioration" in the training of the army after the start of the purge of the Red Army. It directly follows from it that the unsatisfactory preparedness of the commanders, headquarters and troops of the ZakVO was also when the divisions were commanded not by captains with majors, but by brigade commanders and divisional commanders: after all, Nikolai Vladimirovich named as the "second" reason for this level of training eyewash that existed in the district "as a system"?⁹⁷. Here again, he did not call a spade a spade: eyewash could be the reason not for a bad level of preparedness as such, but for the fact that this level - which distinguished the ZakVO even before the start of its purge - became visible only in the autumn of 1937. As Kuibyshev pointed out further (and as we noted above), it was the abolition of all kinds of "pre-repression" "indulgences" in firing that led to the fact that in the fall of the 37th part of the ZakVO, "from year to year showing excellent results" of fire training, "gave unsatisfactory results"...

In addition to N.V. Kuibyshev, the commander of the Moscow Military District S.M. Budyonny. But, firstly, he believed that the repressions had an effect here only on the military headquarters of his district, which, due to the fact that they were "almost completely renewed", were not cohesive and therefore "cannot yet clearly and plan- properly organize offensive or defensive battles"?³⁸. And secondly, it is impossible (as A.S. Knyazkov does) to fully trust what the marshal said and conclude that the headquarters in the Moscow Military District "became [highlighted by me. - A.S.] unable to perform their managerial functions" only after the repressions? The first materials that came across to us

126

The last "pre-repression" checks of the MVO compounds paint a picture that practically does not differ from the one that S.M. Budyonny! On June 10-13, 1937, having familiarized himself with the 6th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District, Colonel P.I. Vorobyov noted that, although both the headquarters of the division and the headquarters of its regiments are knocked together, there is little sense from this: "the skills in managing the battle are practically {highlighted by me. - A.S.] "they have" not enough yet. And the headquarters of the battalions (in exactly the same way as after the beginning of the repressions! - A.S.) are not even knocked together ... 300 From the directive letter of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, it is clear that we are not yet in the worst case! The spring checks of the troops of a number of districts, it was indicated (as we remember) in the letter, revealed that "as combat control bodies" there "did not form" headquarters not only of battalions and artillery divisions, but also of regiments ...

To the permanent renewal of the personnel of the igtabs of battalions and regiments [read: to the ensuing lack of coherence. - A.S.] and the poor preparedness of the battalion headquarters due to this eternal renewal, and only satisfactory - the regimental deputy commander of the MVO troops B.S. Gorbachev complained to the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense as early as December 8, 1935.¹³⁰¹ Only the reasons for the renewal were different then - the transfer of command staff to other districts, the formation of new units and formations ...

At the statement of the third of the commanders of the districts, who spoke at the November Military Council about the decrease in the training of commanders, headquarters and troops due to the beginning of the purge of the Red Army - A.D. Loktionova - we will stop below.

At the November Military Council, the new commander of the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO commander F.I. Golikov³⁰². However, he did not develop this thesis and talk about the uncontrollability of his brigades and their battalions! For our part, we note that the crowding of "pre-repression" headquarters in the 45th mechanized corps was hardly of any use.

127

a lot of. After all, neither in 1936 nor in the first half of 1937 did these headquarters train in command and control in a situation close to combat: neither corps, nor brigade, nor battalion bilateral exercises in the corps during this period was not conducted, and other tactical exercises - at least in the 133rd mechanized brigade - were "rehearsed and conducted according to [in advance. - A.S.] developed and lost scheme "...³⁰³

In the same way, the OKDVA report for 1937 does not dramatize the situation either, noting that "recently the composition of the headquarters of battalions and regiments has been updated by an average of 60-80%", he only indicates that "the question of their increased additional training"³⁰⁴ - but by no means claims that the headquarters have become incapacitated! This is understandable: although the headquarters and battalions of the regiments in the OKDVA were indeed incapacitated or incapacitated, they were so even before the start of the purge of the Red Army. Even the OKDVA annual report of September 30, 1936, admitted that the readiness of the battalion headquarters in this Blucher army was "at a very low level" and that the regimental headquarters were not completely or not at all cohesive. According to the materials for the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937 and this report itself, "the skills of organizing and managing the battle in most headquarters" of the Special Far Eastern "were not high" in the spring of 1937; battalion headquarters managed there "unsatisfactorily" and then...³⁰⁵

Another complaint about the deterioration in the training of the troops (or rather, again the headquarters) in connection with the repressions was found by us in the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937. , but, in connection with the renewal of headquarters, this issue remains relevant for the work of the next year"³⁶⁶. Is it not indicative of Lee that the "renovation of staffs" affected the success in solving only one particular problem? If the "renewal of the headquarters" had led to their helplessness in other situations, the compilers of the report would obviously not have kept silent about this: personnel reshuffles were by no means initiated by the district, and the district could not bear responsibility for their consequences.. |

128

Another proof that the renewal of the personnel of the headquarters of the tank units and formations of the BVO in the summer of 1937 did not make these headquarters noticeably less capable is the fact that at the September maneuvers of 1937 the tank commanders of the BVO acted clearly no worse than on Belarusian maneuvers of 1936 (although, unlike these last ones, they did not rehearse their actions in advance!). The fact that the commanders of the BVO at the September maneuvers of 1937 worked clearly no worse than in 1936 was attested at the November Military Council not only by the commanders of this district, I.P. Belov, but also an outside observer - the head of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, commander of the 2nd rank GI. Kulik (he, however, noted that organizing a general military

new commanders do not know how to fight - but, as we have seen, their predecessors did not know how)307. And in relation to tank headquarters, such a conclusion also follows from a statement made on October 18 or 19, 1937 at the BVO asset by Senior Lieutenant Bulygin, commander of a tank company from the 18th mechanized brigade. Unlike the previously rehearsed maneuvers of 1934-1936, Bulygin pointed out, maneuvers-37 "gave us a lot and taught us how to solve tactical problems, made it possible to control our units [...]"308. But if the commanders of tank units actually controlled their military units during maneuvers (and at the same time no worse than in 1936, when everything was tracked in advance), then this should have been done (and also no worse than in 1936) and headquarters of tank units and formations.

In general, while we can - and then with reservations! — point out only one case of deterioration in the training of commanders, headquarters or troops due to the start of mass repressions. As stated at the November Military Council, the new commander of SAVO A.D. Loktionov, the "young staff" of the military headquarters of his district does not have the skills and experience. Therefore, the headquarters failed at the autumn exercises, the management was lame"309. And this information still needs to be verified by comparing the level of training of the indicated headquarters after the start of the purge of the Red Army and before it. It is possible that in this case, too, the staffs were poorly prepared even before the start of the repressions.

\$ - 2255 129

NOTES

\ Russian State Military Archive (hereinafter - RGVA). F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 245, 248.

2 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 152.

3 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR November 1937 Documents and materials. M., 2006. S. 65.

4 Ibid. S. 113.

5 Ibid. S. 94.

\$ RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2.D. 247. L. 114-109, 100-99, 78-77 (sheets of the case are numbered in descending order).

7 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937. S. 80.82.

& RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 614. L. 293.

3 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 312.

YURGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 248.

And cit. lo: Zakharov M.V. General Staff in the prewar years. M., 2005. S. 92.

12 RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 172, 171; F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 4.

13 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 72.

14 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 102.

15 Ibid. D. 203. L. 61.

16 Ibid. D. 202. L. 12 and rev.

17 Ibid. L. 11 and about.

18 Ibid. F.9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 4; F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 10, 56, 72.

19 Ibid., F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 379. L. 68; F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 54. L. 76; F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 8a. L. 33v.; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 246. L. 17.

2 7am same. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 61v.

21 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 39, 56, 103; F. 37464. Op. 1.D. Sh. L. 63; D. 12. L. 48, 57, 66.

22 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19.L.72.

23 Ibid. L. 117.

24 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213.L. 67; F.9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 rev.).

25 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 16.

26 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 166.

27 Ibid. L. 116, 117; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 205.

23 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 40. L. 90 and reverse; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 30.

29 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 61.

30 7am same, F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 244, 245; D. 1058. L. 266.

31 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 151, 152.

32 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 18. D. 62. L. 147.

33 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 42.

34 Ibid. S. 108. .

35 Tim. pp. 120-121, 114, 87, 88, 50.

130

36 Ibid. S. 221.

37 RGVA. F. 37928. Op. 1. D. 269. L. 34; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2233. L. 35.

38 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 312.

39 Ibid. S. 175.

40 RGVA. F. 4. Op. 18. D. 54. L. 36-37. In the text of this speech, published in the collection "The Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR November 1937 Documents and Materials" (p. 43), the phrase "Everyone forgets that in any situation the battle must be organized" is omitted.

41 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, November 1937, pp. 80, 81, 82.

42 RGVA. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 16; F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 325, 361.

43 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12 06.-11 (sheets of the file are numbered in descending order); F. 9. Ol. 36. D. 4227. L. 32-33.

44 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 61, 60.

45 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 378.

46 Ibid. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 37-38.

47 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 120.

48 Ibid., L. 328-329, 331; F. 25880. Op. 4. D. 45. L. 374.

49 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 70-71, 87; F. 40334. Op. 1. D. 204. L. 58; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 68.

50 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 152.

51 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 18v.

52 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 24v.-25.

53 Ibid. D. 574. L. 103.

54 Ibid. D. 583. L. 9; D. 1049. L. 105.

55 Ibid. D. 614. L. 87v. (the second of two sheets of this file, i.e. number 87).

56 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 219. L. 428; F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 64; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 32.

57 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 119.

58 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 332.

59 Ibid. S. 313.

60 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 246.

61 7am same. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 247. L. 54.

62 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, pp. 55, 81, 103; RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 153.

63 RGVA. F. 4. Op. 18. D. 54. L. 14. In the text of this speech, published in the collection "The Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR November 1937 Documents and Materials" (p. 30), in the phrase "Reconnaissance is organized, sent, and as soon as she left, they forgot about her" omitted conjunction "and".

64 RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 247. L. 30.

65 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, pp. 175, 314.

131

66 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2233. L. 35.

67 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 255.

68 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 247. L. Z1 and rev.

\$ Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR November 1937, pp. 120, 220.

®RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 246.

7 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937. S. 27, 55, 62, 80, 81, 221.

72 RGVA. FO. 31983. Op. 2. D. 247. L. 30v.

73 Ibid.-F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 361.

74 Ibid.: F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12v.; F. 4. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34v. |

75 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 297.

76 RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 58.

P There. F. 37464. Op. 1.D. 11.L.76.

78 Ibid. F. 25880. Op. 4. D. 80. L. 483.

79 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 104; F. 583. L. 9; D. 614. L. 87v. (the second of two sheets of this case, having the number 87).

80 Ibid. F.9. Op. 29. D. 213.L. 357; F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 142; Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 35v.; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12, 11; D. 203. L. 60.

81 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 21; D. 573. L. 8; D. 583. L. 6, 11; D. 1049. L. 104.

\$2 Ibid. D. 584. L. 27v.

83 Ibid. F.9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 67.

84 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 332.

85 RGVA. FO. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 169.

86 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 95.

87 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, November 1937, pp. 311, 312.

88 Ibid. S. 29.

® Ibid. S. 94.

% RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 249, 250, 259.

91 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR November 1937, p. 81.

9 Ibid. pp. 295-296.

93 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 255; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 133, 132.

34 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1.D.26.L. 95.

95 Ibid. F. 37928. Op. 1. D. 269. L. 34.

% Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 65.

97 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 614. L. 295.

% Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 103.

I am there. S. 87.

132

100 RGVA. F. 4. Op. 18. D. 62. L. 147.

101 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 248, 250.

192 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 88.

103 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 245.

154 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 108.

105 Ibid. pp. 26, 54, 73, 80, 87, 109, 114.

106 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 152; F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 248.

107 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 229.L. 22.

108 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 248.

109 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, pp. 181, 240.

by the same place. pp. 61,122, 220; RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 177; F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 255.

11RGVA. FO. 9. Op. 36. D. 2233. L. 37.

112 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937 vol. p. 175.

13RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 223. L. 223.

114 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 41. L. 38; F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 361; F. 4. Ol. 16. D. 19. L. 5.

115 Ibid. F.9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 29.

116 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 62, 60.

117 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19.L.7.

18 7am same. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 88.

19 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 10.

120 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 54.

121 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 153, 205. -

122 Ibid. D. 213. L. 45, 41.

123 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 48, 66, 106; D. 26.L. 54.

124 7am same. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 30; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 59, 62.

125 Ibid. F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 12. L. 276.

126 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 15.

127 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 182. L. 79; F. 62. Op. 3. D. 40. L. 49.

128 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 136.

129 Ibid. D. 587. L. 212.

130 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 33.

131 7am same. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 24v.

132 Ibid. D. 574. L. 316; D. 583. L. 9; F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 133.

133 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 35.

134 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 61.

135 7am same. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 579. L. 406.

136 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 62.

137 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 120. The fact that Tukhachevsky had in mind exactly the battalion headquarters is clear from the context.

138 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 40. L. 49.

133

139 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 60.

140 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213.L. 406.

141 7am same. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 583.L.7.

142 Ibid. D. 584. L. 26v.-27.

193 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 76; D. 12. L. 48, 67.

144 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 325; F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 120.

145 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 49.

146 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 60.

147 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 620. L. 3, 26; D. 614.L. 86 (the second of two sheets of this case, bearing the number 86); F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 0b.); D. 2529. L. 152.

148 Ibid., F. 40334. Op. 1. D. 196. L. 100; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 81.

149 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. L. 196. L. 151; F. 9. Op. 29. D. 219.L. 439.

150 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 573. L. 7, 11; D. 574. L. 59.

151 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 34.

152 Ibid. D. 185. L. 18.

153 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19.L. 120-121.

154 Ibid. F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 7. L. 5 rev.—6, 9.

155 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34v.

156 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 378.

157 Ibid. L. 379.

158 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 176-177.

159 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 173; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2344. L. 47.

160 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 69.

161 7am same, F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 1049. L. 105; D. 583. L. 8.

162 Ibid. D. 1049. L. 104-105.

163 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, November 1937, p. 166.

164 RGVA. F. 4. Ol. 16. D. 19. L. 8.

165 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 53.

166 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 106; Op. 36. D. 1854. L. 202.

167 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 270; D. 579. L. 412.

168 Ibid. D. 614. L. 58, 87 and rev. (the second of two sheets of this file, numbered 87).

169 Ibid. F.9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 174.

170 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937. pp. 52, 63, 122, 166, 317.

171 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, pp. 162, 165.

172 Ibid. S. 165.

173 RGVA. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 40. L. 49.

174 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 34.

175 Ibid. D. 1759. L. 91, 92.

176 Ibid. D. 2611.L. 250(2).

17 Ibid. D. 37464. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 75.

178 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 574. L. 271.

134

179 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L.7; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1413. L. 481 rev. 180 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 36-37. 181 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 272.

182 Vol. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 12.L.75.

183 Ibid., F. 9. Op. 2611!.L. 250(2).

184 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 75.

185 Ibid., F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 255; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 174.

186 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 247. L. 227.

187 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 579. L. 413 and rev.

188 Ibid. D. 614. L. 59.

189 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 186.

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191 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937 E. S. 310-311.

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193 RGVA. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 95.

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196 Ibid. F. 37928. Op. 1. D. 269. L. 34, 35.

197 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 61.

198 RGVA. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L.7.

19 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 40.L. 49; F. 4. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34v.

200 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 58.

201 Ibid. D. 196. L. 202.

202 Ibid. F. 9.. Op. 29. D. 220. L. 262.

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21 7am same. F. 9. Op. 36.D. 1854. L. 205; D. 1759. L. 87.

212 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937. pp. 31, 46, 55, 63, 73, 82, 89, 95, 103, 115, 121.

213 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 251, 306.

214 Vol. S. 308.

215 Ibid. S. 31, 315.

216 RGVA. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 95, 96.

217 Ibid. F. 37928. Op. 1. D. 269. L. 34.

218 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 67.

219 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 403-418.

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220 See: Ibid. L. 108-109; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 138, 428; D. 583. L. 30.

221 Ibid. F. 1417. Op. 1.D. 285. L. 57-58.

222 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 124.

223 Ibid. L. 126.

224 Ibid. F. 1417. Op. 1. D. 285. L. 57.

225 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 122.

226 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 67.

227 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 75. .

228 RGVA. \$. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 76.

229 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 414.

230 See: Ibid. D. 214. L. 130.

231 Ibid. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 29 (the fact that we are talking about the infantry is evident from the context); F. 4. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34v.

232 See: Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 144; D. 12. L. 62, 71. 84; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 53; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 211. L. 356; D. 575. L. 30, 37-38, 93, 139, 139a; D. 582. L. 8, 19-20, 44, 53, 62; D. 583. L. 30; D. 584. L. 308-309; D. 587. L. 18, 21, 32, 49, 54, 58, 161-162, 164, 187, 188, 211; D. 1460. L. 133v.; F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 249; F. 34352. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 147.

233 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937 S. 55.

234 Ibid.; RGVA. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 6.

235 RGVA. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 96.

236 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 58.

237 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611.L. 249 vol. (1 rev.).

238 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 55.

239 Calculated according to: RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 170-172.

240 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 31.

241 Ibid. S. 95.

242 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 220. L. 79.

243 Ibid. F. 37928. Op. 1.D.2.L.25.

244 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 587.L.21.

245 Calculated from: Ibid. D. 574. L. 428.

246 Ibid. D. 587. L. 207.

247 Vol. D. 584. L. 25 06.26.

248 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 30.

249 Ibid. S. 236.

250 RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 58; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 26; F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 58. L. 19; F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 153.

251 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2233. L. 36.

252 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, November 1937, p. 122.

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254 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2233. L. 36.

255 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 1058. L. 262.

256 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 166; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2344. L. 48.

257 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 17; F. 900. Op. 1. D. 32. L. 282v.

258 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 45. L. 95.

259 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 1058. L. 132 and rev.

260 Calculated from: 7 same. L. 262.

261 Ibid. L. 265.

262 Ibid. D. 584. L. 262.

263 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2233. L. 36, 37.

264 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, November 1937, p. 122.

265 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 1038. L. 174 and rev., 274.

266 Calculated from: Ibid. L. 262.

267 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 223; D. 582. L. 39; D. 241. L. 76, 161-162.

268 Ibid. F. 34352. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 126; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 582. L. 49.

269 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 56. L. 23.

270 Ibid. D. 23. L. 127.

271 Ibid. F. 37928. Op. 1. D. 269. L. 35.

272 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 614. L. 194.

273 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, November 1937, pp. 53, 63.

274 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 304.

275 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937. pp. 14, 29, 63, 83, 96, 115, 122.

276 Ibid. S. 166. to

277 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 579. L. 412 rev.—413 rev. The above facts make us ignore - as overestimated - the general assessments by the OKDVA command of the training of their artillery units in 1935-1936. (from 4.2 to 4.7 points for regimental, divisional and RGK artillery in 1935 and from 4.2 to 4.5 in 1936 (Ibid. D. 584. L. 304)).

278 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 214. L. 183.

279 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 261.

280 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 332.

281 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 331.

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2.3 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 29, 34.

· 284 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 181.

285 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 291 (meaning that sheet numbered 291, which is in the file between sheets 259 and 260), 260.

286 Ibid. F. 37928. Op. 1. D. 269. L. 35.

287 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34v.; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 57.

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288 Ibid. D. 583. L. 19.

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291 See, for example: Suvenirov O.F. All-Army Tragedy // Military Historical Journal. 1989. No. 3. S. 44; Anfilov V.A. Road to the tragedy of the forty-first year: M., 1997. S. 62; The Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945. Military-historical essays. Book. 1. Severe tests. M., 1998. S. 81.

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293 Ibid. S. 73.

294 Anfilov V.A. The collapse of Hitler's campaign against Moscow. 1941. M., 1989. S. 65-66; He is. The road to the tragedy of the forty-first year. pp. 55-56. .

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296 Ibid.

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300 RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 246. L. 17.

301 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 50.

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303 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 198.

304 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 248.

305 Ibid. D. 583. L. 7; D. 620. L. 3; D. 584. L.27.

3% 7am same. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 152.

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309 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937. P. 80. |

Chapter 2

IN THE BATTLE AT LAKE KHASAN (July-August 1938)

At the beginning of this conflict, on July 29-31, 1938, the 75th Infantry Regiment of the 19th Infantry Division of the Korean Army of the Japanese, with the support of the border guards, the 25th mountain artillery and 19th engineer regiments, drove back the Soviet border guards and two reinforced battalions of the 118th and [19th rifle regiments of the 40th rifle division of the 1st (Primorsky) army of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front, occupied the Zaozernaya heights located on the Soviet-Manchurian border, in the most remote part of the Posyetsky district, Bezymyanny and Machine-gun Hills, behind which lay Lake Khasan. On August 2-3, supported by the 25th Mountain and Rasinsky Heavy Artillery Regiments, the 75th repulsed the attacks of the 40th Rifle Division, which had fully deployed by that time east of Lake Khasan, and together with the 76th Infantry Regiment of that the 19th Infantry Division continued to hold the captured heights. Having concentrated in the Khasan area the 32nd, 39th and 40th rifle divisions, the 2nd mechanized brigade, the 121st cavalry regiment of the 31st cavalry division, the 39th corps artillery regiment united by the command of the 39th rifle corps, division of the 22nd artillery regiment of the 22nd rifle division, for the battery of the 187th and 199th artillery regiments of the RGK, engineer battalions of the 39th and 43rd rifle corps, 32nd engineering and four construction battalions, 6 On August 1938, the Soviet command launched a general offensive against Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya, which also involved large aviation forces.

139

During August 6-9, despite the introduction of the last two regiments by the Japanese [the 9th division - the 73rd and 74th and part of the Qinyuan guard battalion, the 32nd, 40th and 115th rifle regiments The 39th division, together with the reconnaissance and 2nd 3rd tank battalions of the 2nd mechanized brigade, ousted the enemy from part of the territory he had occupied, and on August 10-1 repulsed repeated Japanese attempts to regain lost positions. But the heights of Zaozernaya, Bezymyanny and Machine-gun Hills could not be completely captured, and the final cleansing of the Soviet Union by the Japanese

territory in the area of Lake Khasan occurred only after the cessation of hostilities, which was carried out on August 11!.

The latter circumstance means that the Soviet troops failed to complete the task they set. (The advance they have achieved looks all the more modest since the allegations still repeated about the penetration of the Japanese into Soviet territory to a depth of 4 kilometers are a propaganda myth?. In fact, the enemy occupied only the chain of heights indicated above along the border line, and it was only necessary to throw it back a few hundred meters.) And this despite the fact that the Japanese were not supported by either tanks or aircraft, while the Soviet side brought into battle up to 250 tanks and made 387 sorties of SB and TB-ZRN bombers, 534 sorties of bombing I-15 fighters and 82 sorties of light bombers and SSS and R-Zet attack aircraft, during which almost 209 tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy³. The Soviet side also had superiority in manpower. Even though its infantry divisions were not in strong recruitment, the total number of troops committed to battle reached 23,000 people, while the Japanese fought no more than 15,000 (after all, even taking into account the combat actions, but the 120th Infantry Brigade of the 40th Infantry Division, which was never brought into battle, the number of their troops did not exceed 20,000 people) ... 4

The clearly weak effectiveness of the actions of the Soviet troops is also evidenced by the fact that, having superiority in artillery and absolute superiority in tanks and aircraft, they suffered greater losses than the enemy. By most gender

140

according to the data (received by June 2003 by I.M. Nagaev), killed, dead from wounds and missing (the same dead, since there is no news of the capture of prisoners by the Japanese) only the troops of the Red Army (not counting the border troops of the NKVD) lost at least 1106 people on Hassan; 2752 wounded were registered (100 of them, who died not at the stages of sanitary evacuation, but already in hospitals, were taken into account among the 1106 dead, so the total number of Red Army servicemen disabled by the enemy during the Khasan battles is, as of today, 3758)⁶. Information about the losses of the Japanese is less accurate. According to Japanese sources cited in Russian literature, they amounted to 526 killed and 913 wounded. Soviet staff officers, summarizing the results of the Khasan battles in the fall of 1938, indicated that, "according to official data", the Japanese lost "in the battles for Zaozernaya" (apparently, they meant all the battles in the Khasan area. - A.S.) 1047 killed and about 4800 wounded. But if these "official data" were Japanese (and there is no need to consider any others: by definition, the side that suffered them has the most accurate information about losses), then how could they be available almost immediately after the end of the conflict? Soviet side? Another version of the magnitude of Japanese losses (600-650 killed and 2,500 wounded) that has recently been found in Russian literature? definitely does not deserve any credibility, since it is based on data from the Soviet side - the text of a TASS report published on August 15, 1938 in the Pravda newspaper WITH A REFERENCE to "an assessment of our command" ... Thus, according to the most reliable to date According to the data, the ratio of the number of servicemen put out of action by the enemy (3758 Soviet and 1439 Japanese) is 2.6:1 in favor of the Japanese.

To analyze the level of training of commanders, staffs and troops participating in the Khasan battles, we will use such published sources as the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. dedicated

141

the combat work of the 2nd mechanized brigade, artillery and engineering troops, the organization of communications and logistics support for hostilities, and, finally, introduced into scientific circulation by V. Katuntsev and I.

Kotsem fragments of reports of employees of special departments and materials of meetings of participants in the battles.

1. COMMANDERS AND HEADQUARTERS 4. Combined arms, infantry and tank

Operational-tactical thinking. We will not find fault with the extremely unfortunate direction of attack chosen by the Soviet command before the offensive on August 2 - in the forehead, and not in the flank and rear. It was dictated not by tactical, but by political considerations - not by the desire to aggravate the conflict by the invasion of Soviet troops into Manchurian territory. After all, it was only possible to get around the heights located on the very line of the border ... However, even after Moscow allowed to cross the border of Manchukuo on August 5, in order to be able to bypass the enemy from the flanks, "all types of troops, especially infantry, discovered, "as later noted in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0040," the inability to maneuver. The "shortage" of "maneuverability" in the actions of the Soviet troops!² was also noticed by the Japanese (without a doubt, they were the informers of the compiler of the report of the French Ministry of War quoted by us). From the letter of the manager of the French consulate in Mukden, M. Germain (of course, who also drew information from the Japanese) to the French ambassador in China dated August 3, 1938, it is clear that the reason for this was precisely the weak development of modern, "maneuverable", operational-tactical thinking at the command staff of the Red Army. After all, Germain reported on the "lack" of the Soviet troops' "initiative and adequate command"!³. By "adequate command" here was clearly understood the inability to make competent decisions (Germain specifically mentioned the inability to organize interaction and communication), and in the 30s. In the 20th century, such decisions involved a bold use of manoeuvre; it goes without saying that the mastery of "maneuverable" operational-tactical thinking was not facilitated by the French

142

lack of initiative. (Germain's information was based on the impressions of the Japanese from the offensive of the 40th division on August 2, but, judging by the message of order No. and not only in the 40th division, but also in other "Khasan" formations.)

With the lack of initiative and desire for maneuver among the Soviet commanders who fought on Khasan, it was quite natural to combine "slowness in making decisions"! ".

It is impossible not to mention the tactically illiterate use of tank units by the commanders of the 32nd and 40th rifle divisions, who abandoned these units (separate tank battalions of their divisions and attached 2nd and 3rd tank battalions of the 2nd mechanized brigade) in an attack on "generally tank-inaccessible" terrain in full force. "It would be more expedient," the staff officers, who analyzed the combat work of the mechanized brigade, later pointed out, "it would be to use tanks to attack only by individual subunits up to a platoon in close cooperation with the infantry, and use the rest of the tanks" as self-propelled artillery, which, hiding in the folds of the terrain, would support the infantry with fire from a place. The direction of entire tank battalions into the attack resulted in only unnecessary losses, since, moving through extremely difficult terrain, the T-26, BT-5 and BT-7 still "could not simultaneously enter the front line of the enemy's defense to suppress firing points" ⁵. (The fact that "tank units were used ineptly" was also noted by the compilers of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 004016.)

But in the 40th Rifle Division, the lack of initiative of the commanders was evident even in June of the "pre-repression" 1935. "Template and schematism in actions have not been eliminated," he noted in his order No. 062 of July 1935 division commander - 40 V.K. Vasentsovich, one notices the desire to guess the decision of the leadership, rather than accepting one's own on the basis of conclusions from the situation! "!, And in the spring of 1935 this flaw was typical

143

for the entire OKDVA in general (since June 28, 1938 - the Red Banner Far Eastern Front, and on July 23 - the Far Eastern Red Banner Front). At the spring exercises, said on December 10, 1935, at the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense (hereinafter - the Military Council), the commander of the OKDVA, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher, we are convinced that "troops do not show the necessary initiative, speed of action on the part of battalion commanders, company commanders and platoon commanders" even in a meeting engagement. "I come," Vasily Konstantinovich said, "to one sector, I see that the situation is such that an immediate offensive is necessary. I ask the battalion commander: "The situation clearly dictates the need for quick action and an attack on the enemy, why don't you attack?" He replies: "There is no order." I go up to the junior commander and ask: "Do you understand the situation?" He says, "Clear." He says: "The enemy is advancing, about 300 people, of these 300 people, half is in front of us, and this half, which is in front of us, bypasses the rear with the other part." [...] I ask him: "Why don't you advance?" He replies: "There is no order." Then I say to him: "What would you do, what would you do?" He says: "I would go on the attack." - "Well, go on the attack." Went. But he was not supported by the neighboring department, he was not supported by the neighboring company. This is a very typical example for our military units.

And in the "pre-repression" 1936? "The commanders show little manifestation of independent, strong-willed decisions, especially in critical moments of the battle," emphasized on March 29, 1936, the commander of the Primorsky OKDVA group (since June 28, 1938 - the 1st Army of the Far Eastern Front) commander of the 2nd rank I.F. Fedko, summing up the results of the maneuvers that took place on March 11-18, the "blue" side of which was just the "Khasan" 32nd Infantry Division!!? "The ability to show bold initiative" was also absent from all the unit commanders tested in the OKDVA in May-August 1936 (including the commanders of two battalions who later fought on Khasan, from the 95th Infantry Regiment of the 32nd 1st division and 120th rifle division - 40th)20; In the spring of 1937, the division commanders of the OKDVA also complained about the lack of initiative of the command staff, speaking at the party conferences that were held at that time in the formations ...

144

The inability of the command staff of the OKDVA to maneuver was again demonstrated as early as the March maneuvers of 1936 in Primorye, when the actions of the troops, according to the same I.F. Fedko, "flowed straight in the open, without any intentions or attempts to deceive" the enemy? embellishing reality, the compilers of the report on the results of combat training of the OKDVA for the 1935/36 academic year (dated September 30, 1936; in the future, such documents will be referred to as annual reports or reports for such and such a year). In the 196th Infantry Regiment of the 66th Infantry Division, the unaccustomed command staff to maneuver then reached the point that they attacked head-on even a firing point that they encountered during the offensive - i.e. threw the fighters straight to the slaughter! At least the commanders of squads, platoons and rotarmy V.K. Blucher lacked the ability to boldly maneuver even in the last months before the start of the purge of the Red Army. Indeed, as stated, respectively, in March and May 1937, the chief of staff of the OKDVA commander S.N. Bogomyagkov and temporarily correcting the position of the head of the 2nd department of this headquarters, commander B.K. Kolchigin, junior commanders in the Far East are "tactically weak", while the average "level of individual training in the field of tactics" is also "low"? This assessment was fully confirmed by the actions of the commanders of two rifle companies of the 63rd rifle regiment of the 21st rifle division, who tried on July 5-6, 1937 to recapture the Vinokurka height captured by the Japanese. Komroty-9, Lieutenant Kuzin, having the opportunity to outflank the enemy, completely abandoned not only "bold attempts to envelop the flanks and cut off the retreat abroad", but also "any kind of maneuver" in general - and attacked the height in the forehead! And commander-4 lieutenant Nemkov did not show any initiative ... 23

The slowness and heaviness of the maneuver during the battle inside the enemy's defensive zone (i.e., the lack of the command staff's ability to quickly make decisions in a changing situation) was also recognized by the annual report of the Primorsky OKDVA group (which included all three divisions that fought later on Khasan) dated 11 October 1935

In the "pre-repression" spring of 1937, the decision-making by commanders in OKDVA was often complained of in the 59th Infantry Division, in the 62nd Infantry Regiment of the 21st, in the same "Khasan" 40th ("Combats, to [om] company, - appeared in the political report of the head of its political department, divisional commissar K. G. Rudenko dated March 10, 1937, - did not learn how to solve tactical problems in short [...] "24) ...

The unwillingness to take into account the peculiarities of the terrain in their decisions among the Far Eastern command staff was again met before the purge of the Red Army. In the Primorskaya group (i.e., in the "Khasan" divisions), the commanders of formations, units and subunits considered it possible to set unbearable tasks for the troops, throw them on the offensive on completely unsuitable terrain as early as the autumn of 1935. In the 32nd division, this was also done at the March maneuvers of 1936, and on May 26, 1937, at the 3rd party conference of the OKDVA, Blucher's deputy commander M.V. Sangursky warned against "passion for wide swings when making detours over very difficult terrain", on which the equipment designed to help the infantry in battle would fall behind? In other words, the decision-making on the use of equipment without taking into account the characteristics of the terrain, commanders in the Far East - and above all, as in Khasan, combined arms! - they also practiced on the eve of the purge of the Red Army ...

Interaction. The degree of ability of Soviet combined-arms and tank commanders and staffs to organize the interaction of various types of troops that was revealed on Khasan is characterized by both Soviet and Japanese sources in the same way. "The absence of a mutual combination of actions of aviation, artillery, tanks with infantry" was singled out by senior lieutenant of state security Dokhin as one of the "main shortcomings in the actions of our units"²⁵; the same thing - according to Japanese informants - was also stated in the report of the French Ministry of War: "Communication between the military branches was a weak point." The Japanese were particularly struck by the fact that "massive tank attacks" were "not supported" by other branches of the armed forces: "Soviet artillery and tanks, despite their superiority, failed to coordinate their actions during tank attacks and curb them at the right time

anti-tank equipment of the Japanese? As a result, Japanese anti-tank guns not suppressed by Soviet artillery knocked out and burned 93 Soviet tanks²⁸, i.e. up to 40% of those entered into battle. So, on August 6, 1938, out of 114 vehicles of the 2nd mechanized brigade that went on the attack, 49 were burned and knocked out, i.e. 43%²⁹. (Soviet staff officers added to the reasons for such high losses also the lack of interaction between tanks and infantry). The artillery commanders were also to blame for the inability to "coordinate actions" (see below), but, as noted in the staff report on the analysis of the actions of the 2nd mechanized brigade, tank commanders, who "did not work out enough and mastered the basics of combined arms combat during interaction with all branches of the military," were also unable to "clearly and expediently set tasks to support them with artillery fire" (and according to the report on the actions of artillery, they generally "forgot" to set them)³⁰.

The "infantry commanders" also "could not set specific tasks" for the tanks supporting them. And the compilers of the report on the combat work of the artillery burst out with a straight cry: "We must finally ensure that the infantry commander knows how to use artillery [...]"³¹. In a number of cases, the infantry commanders showed on Khasan an "absolute misunderstanding" of the "technics of interaction" with artillery, and generally "forgot" to set tasks for artillery assigned to his units - at least regimental and anti-tank guns ... ³¹

In general, Soviet commanders did not seem to attach much importance to establishing interaction with other branches of the military! "The work during the organization of the attack," stated the above-mentioned report on the actions of the 2nd mechanized brigade, "was carried out more independently and independently of the infantry commanders, artillerymen and tankers [as in the document. — A.S.]"³². The organization of interaction between the combat arms was not too much of a concern to the commanders and chiefs of staff of the 32nd and 40th divisions, who were in no hurry to bring to the attention of the commanders attached

tank battalions of the 2nd mechanized brigade specific tasks that they will need to solve in the offensive on August 6. Because of this, instead of three

147.

days turned out to be only a few hours... And on August 1, the organization of interaction between the combat arms did not worry too much not only the division commander-40 Colonel V.K. Bazarov, who decided to attack the enemy on the move, already at 07.00 on August 2, but also the chief of staff of the Far Eastern Front, commander of the GM. Stern, who approved this decision. Because of this haste, some of the infantry and tank commanders of the 40th division again did not have time to organize interaction with each other on the ground, and, in fact, there was no artillery preparation and support for the attack at all! Of the five artillery battalions, only one managed to approach the indicated deadline, and not only the battalion commanders, but also the commanders of the rifle regiments did not manage to establish contact with the artillery ...

But the interaction of tanks of the 2nd mechanized brigade with artillery, as was even admitted in the corresponding annual report of the Primrgroup OKDVA, which included this brigade, was "weakly" organized even at the maneuvers of the Primorsky group in September 1935³³. in the brigade and in 1936, which was shown, for example, by the March maneuvers of that year in Primorye ... Interaction with the infantry at the 2nd mechanized brigade before the repressions also could not be better than on Khasan, because before the repressions it was not practiced at all ! "Joint exercises of the mechanized brigade with infantry," noted the staff officers, who analyzed the actions of this unit on Khasan in the fall of 1938, "and others [here they were wrong; see above. - A.S.] was not previously practiced by the military branches. Training in the brigade was based more on independent actions of the brigade behind enemy lines and on the flanks. There was not a single exercise of the brigade headquarters together with any rifle division [...]"³⁴.

In the 40th Rifle Division, the "absolute misunderstanding" by some infantry commanders of the "technics of interaction" with artillery (and with tanks too) was still there even before the purge of the Red Army, in June of the "prosperous" 1935! "Issues of interaction," it was noted in the order for division No. 062 dated | July 1935 - insufficiently worked out [in the draft version of the order - "not worked out". - A.S.]. Part of the command staff [...] believes that the interaction will go by itself [...]"³⁵. "Absolute" (or close to

148

as such) infantry commanders in the 40th division showed a "misunderstanding" of the "technics of interaction" with other branches of the military throughout 1936. In January of this year, the commander [of the 18th Infantry Regiment T.V. Lebedev and the chief of staff of the 119th Rifle Regiment, Uzhakin, were not able to "link" the actions of the infantry and tanks even when solving a tactical briefing, and the commanders of the training battalion of the 120th Rifle Regiment did not work out the interaction with machine tools and artillery even by October ...

In the 32nd Rifle Division, the "underdeveloped" ability to use attached artillery was also common before the purge of the Red Army. In May 1936, it was revealed in the first checked battalion of the 32nd (from the 95th rifle regiment; the same was found in the battalion selected for verification in the 40th division - from the 120th regiment). On June 19-23, 1936, the command staff of another battalion of the 32nd division, which participated in an experimental exercise, showed the lack of training in establishing communication with divisional artillery. Equally poor mastery of the "interaction technique" was revealed during this exercise by the commanders of the only regiment of the 39th Infantry Division, which later fought on Khasan, the 115th Infantry Division (then, until | July 1936, it was also called 1st Chita Rifle, and the 39th Division - [1st Pacific Rifle). -

Cases when both infantry and tank commanders did not attach any importance to the interaction of military branches in units and formations that fought in Khasan in 1938 were also common before the purge of the Red Army. In the 40th division, the tankers "did not always persistently strive for interaction" with

other branches of the military and in June 1935, and infantry commanders - just before the start of mass repressions. The reports of special officers about the actions of the commanders of the 40th division at the exercises of the 39th rifle corps held in March 1937 are simply amazing: "The infantry considered divisional artillery as a burden [51s! - /.WITH.]. They forgot to set tasks for artillery and did not fully use its firepower, "and the battalion commander of the 120th Infantry Regiment, Matsul, did not set a task for the tank company attached to him ... 36

In the 115th Rifle Regiment of the 39th Division (then still [-th Chita), the battalion commander, Captain Lee Chun Wang, did not

149

began to organize interactions with either artillery or tanks and in June 1936 - at the above-mentioned experimental exercise. Other battalion commanders of the 1st Chita, the regimental commander himself, and the commander of the only battalion of the 32nd division that participated in this exercise also showed a lack of understanding of the very need for interaction between the branches of the armed forces in this exercise. After all, they are "comp not enough" used not only the divisional artillery attached to them or supporting them, but also their own artillery - battalion and regimental ... 37

And the unwillingness to take into account the time required to organize the interaction of the military branches, which was shown on August 1, 1938 by Colonel Bazarov and Corporal Commander Stern, was just another manifestation of the vice, which the commander of the BVO troops spoke about on November 21, 1937 at the Military Council commander of the 1st rank I.P. Belov: "It is generally accepted that, since a unit has approached the line from which you can rush to the attack or go on the offensive, it means [...] everything is immediately forward. It is considered a bad commander that one who hesitated a little. Everyone forgets that in any conditions of the situation, the battle must be organized. As we showed in the previous chapter, already from the context of Belov's speech, it is clear that this disregard for the need to carefully organize the interaction of the combat arms of the Red Army was again clearly manifested by the senior and highest command staff of the Red Army before the start of mass repressions.

Ensuring combat operations. Analyzing the actions of the enemy shortly after the end of the Khasan battles, the Soviet staff officers bluntly stated that "we have no intelligence [emphasis mine. — A.S.] in general"³⁹. Indeed, without any idea of the enemy's defense system, not only the offensive of the 40th division was launched on August 2 (when the haste of V.K. August - for the preparation of which there were three days! Neither the enemy fire system nor the anti-tank defense system (ATD) was reconnoitered by any of the "available means" (aerial photography, observation, night searches, reconnaissance in force). Combined arms and infantry commanders

150

they simply did not organize reconnaissance; the tank ones were not up to par here either. True, the attack sites were indicated to the latter too late, so that they only managed to conduct a "series of reconnaissance missions", during which the terrain "was not sufficiently reconnoitered and assessed, hard-to-reach places to the front line were not found everywhere, and combat courses, taking into account the terrain, respectively not marked in any way." But the tank commanders did not organize "combat reconnaissance during the attack", when the first echelon of attacking tanks, moving 300-400 meters in front of the main forces, would open "the anti-tank system, detect obstacles and thereby indicate the direction of action for the rest of the tanks." ..⁴⁰

Neglect of reconnaissance thwarted, in particular, the bypass of the right flank of the Japanese and the blow to their rear, which was supposed to be inflicted by a tank company of the reconnaissance battalion of the 2nd mechanized brigade. 17 out of 19 BT-7 and BT-5 rushing forward flew into an unexplored swamp between the heights of Zaozernaya and Machine-gun Hill - and instead of hitting the rear of the enemy, the company had to take up all-round defense ... Half of the vehicles got stuck in the swamp on the outskirts of Machine-gun Hill 2nd tank battalion of the same brigade.

The lack of information about the enemy was also one of the reasons why it was not possible to establish interaction between infantry and tanks. Knowing nothing about the sectors of the Japanese defense that they were to attack, the infantry commanders could not assign specific tasks to the tank units and subunits supporting them (such as: "to suppress firing points 50 meters to the left of landmark No. 3", etc.)...

But in the 40th Rifle Division, the commanders only "periodically" organized reconnaissance during tactical exercises in June 1935⁴². An attack without sufficient reconnaissance was undertaken by the commander of the first battalion tested in the division (from the 120th rifle regiment) in May 1936, and in the 119th rifle regiment both the commander of the battalion selected for verification and the commander of the reconnaissance company (!) "weakly" organized in October⁴³. The headquarters of the regiments of the 40th is exactly the same as on Khasan, without even trying to reveal the location of the enemy! - behaved in August 1936 (when they

151

checked at the exit in the field with means of communication). And a poor study of the intelligence obtained is tantamount to refusing to conduct intelligence at all! - for the headquarters of the 40th division it was typical both in August 1936, and in the "pre-repression" March of 1937 ...

In the 32nd Rifle Division, reconnaissance was poorly organized (and after the start of the battle, sometimes it was not organized at all) at the March maneuvers of 1936 in Primorye. Without sufficient reconnaissance, the very first battalion commander, checked in the 32nd division in May 1936 (from the 95th rifle regiment), threw his battalion into the attack...

Let us note here that in a real battle "poor organization" of intelligence and "lack of sufficient intelligence" would almost certainly turn into the same as on Khasan, "lack of intelligence at all." After all, in most cases, when the troops of the "pre-repression" OKDVA had to fight a real battle - in the border incidents near Khunchun, Turiego Rog and Vinokurka - that was exactly what happened. Near Hunchun on March 25, 1936, the commander of a separate cavalry squadron of the 40th division (whose direct purpose, by the way, was reconnaissance!) Captain S.A. Bonich threw the squadron into the attack on the height occupied by the Japanese company at the border sign No. 8 ("eight") without any reconnaissance. In the same way, on November 27, 1936, during the incident near Turiego Rog, the attack of the Pavlova Hill captured by the Japanese was carried out, although the actions of the attacking rifle company and BT-5 tanks were led by the commander of the 63rd rifle regiment of the 21st rifle division colonel I.R. Dobysh, 16 hours have passed since the loss of the hill. Therefore, only when they reached the crest of the hill, the attackers discovered that there was no enemy on it, that he had left it the same previous night when he captured it, and that the regiment commander had been preparing to attack from an empty place for half a day ... "General neglect of intelligence" ⁴⁴ was also shown by lieutenant Nemkov, commander of the 4th rifle company of the same 63rd regiment, which attacked on July 6, 1937 the height of Vinokurka, occupied and fortified by the Japanese... Far Eastern commanders of the Red Army were so unaware of the need for reconnaissance in the war that, once in

152

tense atmosphere of a real battle, they completely forgot about it!

Well, what about Far Eastern tankers? "Reconnaissance of the path" in the "mountainous-wooded-swampy area" (from this set in the Khasan region there was only a forest) - as even the corresponding annual report of the OKDVA admitted - was "unsatisfactory" in the fall of 1935. The fact that Blucher's utankists "do not have the necessary attention to the continuous conduct of combat reconnaissance", that "in the midst of a battle they usually forget about it", was again noted even then and also not by the inspectors, but in the annual report of the OKDVA armored forces themselves dated 19 October 1935. According to the annual report of the Special Far East on September 30, 1936, the "weak point" of its tank commanders was "the organization and conduct of reconnaissance (especially combat)" in 1936 as well. And from the order of V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter period of study of the 1936/37 academic year, we see that no matter what organization

Whatever the intelligence, the commanders of the Far Eastern tank units "very weakly" owned even before the start of the purge of the Red Army ... 45

The ability of commanders and staffs to organize dark support for the troops received in the analytical materials compiled after the battles no less deadly characteristic than the ability to organize reconnaissance: "complete rear illiteracy of command and command personnel", "shrugging off and unwillingness to resolve rear issues by commanders of all degrees and ranks. Indicative in this respect is the bitter fact that the 40th rifle [rifle] division] and all its units during the entire operation did not issue a single order on the rear.

But, according to the corresponding annual report of the Primorsky group itself (which included all the units that fought later on Khasan), the commanders in it "forgot" to give appropriate orders to the rear forces (both before the battle and during the battle!) And to orient the rear men in the situation and in the autumn of 1935-47. They behaved practically in the same way here in 1936, when, according to the corresponding annual report of the armored troops of the OKDVA, "in all groups of commanders and in all

153

units and formations" turned out to be "weakly worked out the logistics issues assigned to them" and when even the heavily "varnished" OKDVA annual report of September 30, 1936 admitted that the headquarters of regiments and rifle battalions "rarely take into account" logistics issues, even if they have enough time to organize the battle, and that the headquarters of divisions and corps still "forget" about logistics (or about giving specific orders to the rear) in the process of starting a battle or operation.

In the Chhasan 32nd Division in that "pre-repression" year, things were even worse—exactly the same as then on Khasan! At the March maneuvers of 1936 in Primorye, the headquarters of the 32nd not. he led the rear completely - neither during the battle, nor before the battle - and did not even know where his rear was, and the commanders of all ranks (again, like on Hassan) did not take into account the problems of logistics at all in their decisions. ..

In a real combat situation, tabs of OKDVA units and formations would not have been able to organize logistics support for their troops even before the start of the purge of the Red Army. Indeed, according to the report of the OKDVA headquarters on the results of combat training for December 1936 - April 1937. (dated May 18, 1937; hereinafter - the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937), they then "satisfactorily" knew how to manage only "rear units operating not in full strength and not in mobile forms of combat." .. The only document we have found that specifies this general thesis paints exactly the same picture that was revealed later on Hassan. "Even orders to me, as the head of the convoy | echelon, no one gave instructions where to move and for what purpose, - complained on May 9, 1937 at a party meeting held after a tactical exercise, a rear man from the 62nd rifle regiment of the 21st rifle division Baranov, - but how and what to whom to give a ride is to guess how to do it yourself ... 50

Troop management. Combined-arms and infantry commanders who participated in the Khasan battles showed that they did not master the technique of control and organization of communications at all. Massive misunderstanding of that element was demonstrated.

mental fact that in order to facilitate command and control of troops

154

in modern combat there are technical means of communication! Both the commanders of rifle battalions and the commanders of rifle regiments left their command posts equipped with telephone and radio communications at the beginning of the battle and "rushed" to lower units in order to lead by "personal example and personal communication"? As a result, they themselves lost control (since they could not be in all their units at the same time), and higher commanders (who, having lost contact with them and not receiving any information from them, ceased to be aware of events,

and, consequently, they lost the opportunity to make timely and adequate decisions)... The commander of the 14th battalion of the 95th regiment of the 32nd division, in his lack of understanding of the basics of managing modern combat, went even further: he not only ignored the technical means of communication, but also used his communications platoon as infantry riflemen, and sent the battalion communications chief to command a rifle company. "This shows how much the battalion commander needed communications and the head of communications, and [though only in part. – A.S.] explains why the issues of interaction with tanks and artillery, especially in the regiment and battalion link, were not resolved during this operation"...52

The commander of division-40 V.K. did not understand the importance for command and control of technical means of communication. Bazarov, who three times during the fighting unnecessarily transferred the divisional command post to a new location before the telephone line was extended there. communications and deployed radio stations. Evidently, the chief of staff of the front, GM, did not fully understand this meaning either. Stern: after all, his decision to throw the 40th on the offensive on the move led to the fact that the division did not have time to deploy all means of communication ...

The employees of military headquarters did not understand the importance of technical means of communication either. In the regimental and battalion levels, they (just like regimental commanders and battalion commanders) preferred "personal communication" to control by telephone and radio. The headquarters, it seems, generally ignored communication issues in their work! After all, along with indications of "insufficient leadership" on their part of the work of communications chiefs and their ignoring "when calculating on the organization of management" of the capabilities of communications

155

The report, which analyzed the organization and work of communications in the Khasan battles, contains an eloquent phrase: "As a rule, communications are remembered only when it is absent"53.

The low quality of management, demonstrated by the "Khasan" headquarters, was also manifested in the poor quality of the staff documentation. "Documents were often presented [...] verbose, indistinctly and sloppily written, with corrections, on scraps of paper, without numbers and dates, with the most unthinkable addresses [...]"54.

The low quality of control demonstrated by the "Khasan" infantry commanders was also manifested in their inability to ensure the movement of their units to attack with fire. The reason that the Soviet infantry on Khasan "discovered an inability" to "combine movement and fire"55 should be seen primarily in this...).

"Clear control" of their units and subunits was not able to be ensured on Khasan by tank commanders and headquarters, at least in the 2nd Mechanized Brigade7. Tasks for subordinates were unclear there, and during the tank attack on August 6, control was generally lost!

However, the loss of command and control of troops due to the inability to properly organize and use communications in the "Khasan" divisions was common even before the purge of the Red Army.

In June 1935, the headquarters of the 40th Rifle Division also worked in such a way that "control fell out of hand during the exercises" - also because the "issues of communication" by the staff officers were mastered "insufficiently". The headquarters of the first battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment tested at the detachment exercise failed to manage (not even in battle, but on the march!) And in July of the "prosperous" 1936 - and also due to the fact that he did not know how to use technical types of communication. The very first staffs checked in the 40th division showed that they were bad at organizing communications (and not only by telephone or radio, but also through delegates of communications and signaling with flags), and, in general, they were poorly prepared for command and control of troops - and in August 1936...

156

The headquarters of the 32nd Rifle Division "did not ensure the continuity of command", "insufficiently" controlled the means of communication and "did not have contact with the regiments for a long time" - in a word, it demonstrated almost a complete set of its Khasanian flaws, again and again before the purge of the Red Army, at the September maneuvers of 1935 in Primorye⁵. Even if the commanders and staff officers of the OKDVA did not abandon their command posts in the 35th and did not rush to the troops, then they (as the annual report of the OKDVA of October 21, 1935 admitted) ignored their duty to inform the higher headquarters about changes in the situation even then. And the commanders of units and subunits of the 32nd division - and at the March maneuvers of 1936. At the same maneuvers in the 32nd, one more inevitable consequence of ignoring the CP was constantly noted - the loss of command and control of the troops. However, the headquarters of the rifle battalions in the Primorsky OKDVA group (which included both the 32nd and 40th divisions) at the beginning of 1936 lost control even with a simple transfer of the command post to a new location ...

According to the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937, the Far Eastern command staff lacked "the necessary knowledge and practical skills in using various means of communication", "insufficient" "use by headquarters of all types of means of communication" - and in general "insufficiently complete, competent and active use of means of communication was evident even immediately before the start of the purge of the Red Army⁶. Moreover, even then, in the "pre-repression" spring of 1937, the OKDVA headquarters stated:

— That "combat organization and control skills in most headquarters" are generally "worth low";

- that "the preparedness of military headquarters for combat control in difficult conditions of the situation and terrain" (i.e., in the conditions that were evident on Khasan!) is generally one of the "lagging links in combat training";

- that "in an environment of significant saturation of the troops with technical means" (i.e., in such a situation as it has developed on Khasan!) "headquarters with their task" in general "do not cope well";

- that in the battalion level (whose commanders and staff officers on Khasan, as we saw, did not even understand why they needed technical means of communication), command and control of troops is

157

is directly "unsatisfactory" (that the headquarters of the battalions of the 40th DIVISION "were not the organizing principle in a combat situation, as well as the governing bodies" - this, after the exercises of the 39th Rifle Corps in March 1937, was confirmed from the words of their informants-commanders and special officers) ...
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In August 1938, staff officers from the Far East showed a lack of culture in compiling headquarters documentation, but in June of the "pre-repression" 1935, operational duty officers at the headquarters of the 40th division could not even remember (let alone put it on paper) any information about the situation confused them, and in March of the "pre-repression" 1936, all three chiefs of staff of the rifle regiments of the 40th division did not know (as the tactical briefing conducted by the division commander showed) ... - kov, used when drawing the situation on the map!⁶

The infantry commanders in the 32nd and 40th divisions were not able to provide a "combination of fire and movement" either in 1936, when this was revealed there at every check for which one of the battalions was selected, and at the beginning of 1937- First, when the report of the OKDVA headquarters dated May 18, 1937, stated the widespread "poor training" of infantry unit commanders in managing firearms³. At least four out of nine commanders of rifle battalions and one out of three commanders of rifle regiments did not organize interaction with a neighboring subunit (unit) in the 32nd division even at the March maneuvers of 1936 in Primorye ... The general low professionalism of infantry commanders in the "Khasan" troops and before the purge of the Red Army came to the point that:

- in the 40th division in June 1935, two mock infantry commanders demonstrated frank "illiteracy" in the management of the battalion;

— in the 32nd division during the March maneuvers of 1936, the commanders of the 94th rifle regiment brought their units 200-400 meters to the front line of the enemy's defense in ... columns (that such compact battle formations at such a distance quickly melt under fire, it has been known since the time of the Franco-Prussian and Russian-Turkish wars of the 70s of the XX century, since the execution of the Prussian guards near Saint-Privat on August 18, 1870 and the Russian one near Gorny Oak

158

nyak and Telish on October 12 (24), 1877 - from the time when there were not only machine guns, but even magazine rifles ...);

- in the 115th rifle regiment of the 39th division on the eve of the purge of the Red Army, many commanders (as the commander of the 39th division commander D.S. Firsov stated on April 26, 1937 at the divisional party conference) did not know their duties in battle at all;

- and Lieutenant Kuzin, commander of the 9th rifle company of the 63rd rifle regiment of the 21st rifle division, who happened to attack the height of Vinokurka occupied by the Japanese on July 5, 1937, showed this ignorance in a real battle: he replaced in "especially difficult moments" of the machine gunner, but "neglected the command of the company, in particular, having gone to the starting position for the attack, he could not organize the preparation of the attack by fire"⁶⁴,

As for the inability to control tank units and subunits, the units of the 2nd mechanized brigade were not controlled in battle not only on August 6, 1938, but also in the "pre-repression" 1936. After all, according to the reports of OKDVA and of its armored forces during that year, the headquarters of the tank battalions of the 2nd mechanized brigade "for managing an independent battle of the [batal]on and in coordinating actions with other branches of the military" were "weakly prepared", and the "middle and senior command staff" of all the Far Eastern tank units (i.e., commanders of tank platoons, companies and battalions.) "weakly" knew how to work at a radio station (without a radio, with the help of some signal flags, it was actually possible to control only tanks that were next to the commander's, i.e. except perhaps a tank platoon ...)

B. Artillery

Shooting and artillery training. From the report prepared in the autumn of 1938 by the Far Eastern staff officers on the combat work of artillery in the Khasan battles, it can be concluded that the rifle and artillery training of the battery commanders (no information was given about other command units) turned out to be the same as the preparedness of the batteries as a whole. - "mediocre". From the message of this document that the battalion commanders coped with "fire work"

159

"better when firing at observable targets, worse when firing at unobserved targets (raids)", it is clear that they clearly had difficulty firing at unobserved targets. And even such an elementary task as the resumption of fire on previously sighted targets was carried out "with great friction in terms of time and quality" (documentation containing data obtained by zeroing in firing positions "[v. — A.S.] carried out carelessly")⁶⁶

But if in August 1938 the shooting and artillery skills of Blucher's artillery battery commanders turned out to be "mediocre", then on the eve of the purge of the Red Army, in the spring of 1937, it was even worse! "Most of the command staff (including battery commanders)," V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year - in terms of shooting, they were poorly prepared '7... , who later fought on Khasan, solved tactical tasks with "bad luck" (only the commander of the 199th artillery regiment of the RGK managed to earn a "troika"), and in eye determination of distances, at least "approaching satisfactory" results was able to get the command staff of only two of the twelve competing "Khasan" batteries - batteries

artillery battalion of the 118th rifle regiment of the 40th division and a battery of the same 199th artillery regiment of the RGK! (Giving them, perhaps, a higher than "unsuccessful" rating was provided not by the battalion commanders, but by the commanders of platoons or guns ...)

The commanding staff of Blucher's artillery also differed in poor ability to shoot at unobserved (or poorly observed) targets even before the purge of the Red Army. He could not shoot well at these targets and in 1935 - when, according to the very same head of artillery of OKDVA V.N. Kozlovsky, did not possess the necessary "sufficient theoretical background" and sufficient "mathematical literacy"⁶⁸... He could not shoot them well in 1936, when, according to the report of the assistant chief of 2 Department of the OKDVA Headquarters Major V. Nesterov dated November 8, 1936 "On Combat Training of OKDVA Artillery in 1936",

160

still "knew the theory of shooting poorly" (in the same 40th artillery regiment of the "Khasan" 40th division in November 1936, only half of the commanders were able to solve at least two of the 12 tasks he proposed ...) b? . And the fact that their artillery commanders "got lost" when firing at poorly observed targets and did not at all work out shooting to kill at unobserved targets and on the eve of the purge of the Red Army was also recognized by the "Materials on Combat Training of Artillery", prepared by then at the headquarters of the OKDVA (or in the apparatus of the OKDVA nacharta), and the order of V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter period of study ... ⁷⁰

As for the "friction" with the resumption of fire on previously zeroed in targets, then if in 1938 the Far Eastern commanders-artillerymen only casually documented these zeroing, then in the "pre-repression" 1935 the artillery command staff of the Primorsky OKDVA group (which included almost all artillery units and subunits that fought in bulk on Khasan) could not even properly carry out the sighting itself, "not being able", according to the annual report of the Primgruppen dated October 11, 1935, "to correctly choose the target and method of sighting" ! "Friction" with the resumption of fire on previously shot targets, Blucher's artillery commanders had to experience in the "pre-repression" 1936, when they (as the same Major V. Nesterov concluded) had a "low" shooting technique and bad (how, by the way, did they know how to shoot to kill in 1935...? ⁷¹

Tactical learning. Information from the staff report on the combat work of artillery in the Khasan battles forces us to admit that the tactical training of the artillery commanders participating in them is frankly weak (the report itself speaks only of the "insufficient" tactical training of artillery as a whole). After all, fire planning turned out to be a "weak area" of artillery headquarters (which, by the way, were generally "not coordinated" and so "unprepared" that they could not even draw up a sensible report, not to mention "out of the blue, careless often illiterate" "documentation")⁷². "Insufficient" (as the special officers have already noted) turned out to be the administration of artillery

6 - 2255 161

⁷³ The technique of interacting artillery with infantry and tanks was also "completely not worked out" not only by infantry and tank commanders, but also by artillery commanders, among whom there were also "cases of absolute misunderstanding of this issue"⁷⁴. From the report "The main shortcomings in the actions of our units", compiled after the Khasan battles by senior lieutenant of state security Dokhin, we can conclude that there were many such cases: after all, one of the "main shortcomings" was named "lack of initiative commanders of batteries [highlighted me. — A.S.]" (that the artillery organized interaction with the infantry not only "tactically competently enough", but also "little intensively" - this was also noted by the compilers of the report on the combat work of artillery) ... ⁷⁵ However, that talk about interaction with other branches of the military, if the artillery commanders on Khasan "received very poorly" even a simple maneuver with wheels...⁷⁶

However, the general level of tactical training of the artillery commanders of Blücher was assessed as weak even before the start of the purge of the Red Army! In the "Materials on the Combat Training of Artillery", compiled at the headquarters of the OKDVA (or in the apparatus of its nacharta) in April 1937, it was directly admitted that this training "should be considered unsatisfactory"...⁷

Artillery headquarters on Khasan turned out to be "not coordinated", but in the 40th artillery regiment of the "Khasan" 40th division, even the most trained (!) Of the headquarters of the divisions was not put together in October of the "pre-repression" 1936 ...

Artillery headquarters on Khasan turned out to be "unprepared" - but, according to the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937, all of them are the headquarters of divisions, and the headquarters of artillery regiments, and the headquarters of artillery groups, and the headquarters of artillery chiefs rifle divisions (with the exception of the [2nd and 34th] — were "unsatisfactorily" prepared on the eve of the purge of the Red Army (and not only in the "Khasan" troops, but throughout the OKDVA)!⁸

Artillery fire control by the commanders of the Far Eastern artillery was "insufficiently" mastered even before the purge of the Red Army. In the 32nd artillery regiment of the 32nd division, [th division of the 39th

162

artillery regiment of the 39th division and the 187th artillery regiment of the RGK (information on other "Khasan" artillery units was not found) it was not possible to fully work out the fire control of at least a division in 1936 ... And the "unsatisfactory" preparedness of all Artillery staffs of the OKDVA, recorded in the spring of 1937, means that both the planning of artillery fire and its control were "insufficiently" mastered by the commanders of the Blücher artillery immediately before the start of mass repressions.

As for the poor ability to interact with other branches of the military, take the initiative and maneuver the wheels, then, as noted in the materials prepared by him on October 14, 1935 for the annual report, OKDVA chief V.N. Kozlovsky, Blücher's commanders-artillerymen were not able to provide "proper adhesion in the joint work of artillery and tanks" even in 1935⁹. In 1938, they "were not intensively and not tactically competent enough" to organize support for the infantry, but they "interacted" with it in the same way even before the purge of the Red Army... Division No. 069 of July 20 [1935, "have not yet received the proper commanding skills and dexterity in maneuvering a gun on the battlefield, do not know how to quickly and correctly respond to data from the simplest tactical situation, do not know how to make a reasonable commander's decision based on the situation [so in document. - A.S.]"; commanders of regimental artillery guns "combat skills in using a single gun" are also "low" 80. (Judging by the exact same picture revealed by inspectors in May 1935 in the 21st Infantry Division, things were the same then in the entire Primorskaya group OKDVA, and hence the thing of the same "Khasan" division - the 32nd.) The same was recorded by the order for Primgroup No. "" to independent actions of the WHYM", THEM "have poor knowledge of the issues of the combat use of a separate weapon in various types of infantry combat." "I'm not surprised," concluded the commander of the Primgroup, "that issues of interaction still remain the weak point of all detachment exercises."

163

Indicating in his order No. 062 dated | July 1935 that the artillerymen "do not always persistently strive for interaction" with the infantry⁸², division commander-40 clearly had in mind divisional artillery ... In the 32nd artillery regiment of the 32nd division and the Khasan -th division of the 39th artillery regiment of the 39th division and the 187th artillery regiment of the RGK, the poor ability of battery commanders to independently make tactically competent decisions (which means their "little intensive and insufficiently tactically competent" interaction with the infantry!) was also noted by the fall of 1936 th. And in the 40th artillery regiment of the 40th division, even the most trained of the divisions interacted poorly with the infantry even in October 1936...

B. Commanders of the engineering troops

Their training revealed completely unforgivable gaps. The headquarters of both (39th and 43rd) sapper battalions, in essence, turned out to be incapable of performing their functions - "as a rule", they "did not properly manage the course of defensive work" after capturing part of Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya "and did not even keep the necessary documentation on the work performed". The commanders of the sapper units showed an inability to "quickly make the simplest engineering calculations in the field and especially [...] express them graphically" 83,

The level of training of the commanders of the engineering troops of the OKDVA in 1936 - the first half of 1937 is not covered by the sources we discovered, it is only known that by the autumn of 1935 the headquarters of the units of these troops did not have enough skills in organizing special engineering work in conditions of maneuvering combat. However, work on the excavation of the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya trenches, the equipment of machine-gun nests and the installation of wire fences cannot be attributed to special engineering, and the battles during which they were carried out were by no means maneuverable, but positional. Therefore, we still have no grounds to say that before the purge of the Red Army, the commanders and staffs of the engineering troops of Blucher were no better prepared than in the days of the Hassan battles.

164

The published sources of information do not contain information about the level of training of the signal commanders who participated in the Khasan battles.

2. TROOPS

A. Foot soldiers

Tactical training. The infantry, stated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0040, found on Khasan "the inability to act on the battlefield, to maneuver, to combine movement and fire, to apply to the terrain, which in this situation, as well as in general in the conditions of the Far East [Far East - ka. - A.S.], replete with mountains and hills, is the ABC of combat and tactical training of troops"84. During the period of the most fierce fighting, until the night of August 10, 1938, she also neglected self-digging - and THEN, ALTHOUGH she "appreciated the value of a shovel", "did not deepen and improve the trenches, hoping for a sapper" 85, and showed elementary illiteracy in matters of disguise. Pieces of turf, with which the parapets of the trenches were somehow lined, were cut out right there, in front of the parapet, so that the trenches turned out to be unmasked anyway - plots of land with cut turf ...

However, the inability to maneuver, due not only to the lack of "maneuverable" tactical thinking among the commanders, but also to the weak cohesion of the units, the infantry of the "Khasan" divisions showed even on the eve of the purge of the Red Army. "The maneuvering of subunits in combat formations is unsatisfactory," the headquarters of the OKDVA stated after the exercises of the 39th and 43rd rifle corps in March 1937 with the participation of these divisions86. "[...] The maneuvering of combat formations is not fast enough and clumsy," read the report "The state of combat training of the OKDVA by July 15, 1937", based on the materials of checks carried out in May-June (and even before May 17 revealed, in particular, "poor training" - i.e. lack of cohesion, and hence the inability to maneuver - rifle companies of the 40th division)?7.

We are not talking about the fact that in October of the "pre-repression" 1936 (due to distraction during the summer period of study

165

most of the OKDVA units: for chores and construction) two-thirds of the rifle battalions of the 39th and 40th divisions were generally found to be "damp in terms of combat units" and that the same picture should then have been in the 32nd division (in the 40th

Between June 15 and July 15, 1936, an average of 54% of servicemen were cut off from combat training, and on the 32nd - 47.4%⁸⁹) ...

The inability to combine movement and fire (due, as noted above, to the poor preparedness of the commanders) in the "Khasan" divisions was a reality in 1935, when the order of the commander of the Primorsky Group OKDVA No. view of machine-gun fire and infantry movement in the mountains [i.e. in the conditions that were on Hassan. — A.S.] and taiga" were worked out not even "insufficiently", but "particularly insufficiently"!⁹⁰ Blucher's infantry was also characteristic in the fall of 1936 ...

In June 1935, the infantry of the 40th division, both single fighters (who did not disguise themselves, lying down after a defection), and entire units, were distinguished by their inability to apply to the terrain. And what about the infantry of the 32nd in March 1936, when during maneuvers in Primorye it "weakly used" the terrain "for the purpose of the most sheltered approach to the enemy"?! From the political report of the head of the political department of the 40th division, divisional commissar K.G. Rudenko dated March 19, 1937, it is clear that its infantrymen were not able to disguise themselves or apply to the terrain even on the eve of the purge of the Re

As for self-digging, then, if in August [1938 the infantrymen of the 40th division only neglected it, then in the "pre-repression" March of 1937 they (as it was admitted in the same political report) were not trained in this art at all - not "rules for tracing and trenching", or an excerpt from them??. And under enemy fire, as indicated in the order of V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year, the soldiers clumsily dug in all over OKDVA ...

Fire training. Published sources refer here only to grenade throwing, indicating that the fighters do not

166

"They could use F-1 hand grenades, because they didn't even know that before throwing it was necessary to pull out the safety pin! The reason for this clearly lay in the insufficient supply of parts of combat grenades for practice. "We asked him [political commissar Matveev. — 4.S.], when will we be throwing combat grenades, all wooden and wooden?" - recalled who served in 1937-1938. in the anti-tank battery of the 120th rifle regiment of the 40th division V.S. Sharonov...⁹³

But things were exactly the same before the purge of the Red Army! "Grenade throwing," the compilers of the OKDVA annual report of September 30, 1936, also admitted, "is carried out on training grenades (blanks). Combat grenade throwing is carried out only by the demonstration method. As a result, when the 2nd Rifle and 1st Machine Gun Companies of the 63rd Rifle Regiment of the 21st Rifle Division advanced to the conflict area near Turye Rog on November 26, 1936, some of the fighters refused to "pick up a grenade, as they they don't know her." Such were the consequences of the fact that "the rate of release of combat grenades for practice" was "absolutely insufficient" in the "pre-repression" 1935/36 academic year. For 1936/37, the norm was also approved such that the vast majority of OKDVA fighters could not even throw one live grenade!⁵ At the same time, with grenades F-| the Red Army soldiers could not get acquainted at all: these "LimonkKI" in the "pre-repression period" "were not released for practice and were not subject to consumption." However, after the conflict at Turiego Rog, in anticipation of a new clash with the Japanese, the F-| was sent to the 63rd regiment - and, thus, in the event of a new incident, the fighters would not be able to use this weapon in the same way as on Khasan ! However, the 3rd rifle company of the 310th rifle regiment of the 104th rifle division of the OKDVA could not use any hand grenades as early as January 28, 1937, since it had not yet begun to study and use this type of weapon ...

Physical training. "We neglect the bayonet fight," one of the participants in the meeting of the command and

167

the political composition of the Posyetsky border detachment (which discussed the actions not so much of the border troops, as of the troops of the Red Army)?7,

But the ability of Blucher's infantrymen to work with a bayonet was also assessed as "unsatisfactory" in 1935 - not by the border guards, but by the OKDVA headquarters itself, in the army's annual report of October 21, 1935! The first two battalions tested in the Khasan 32nd and 40th divisions (from the 95th and 120th rifle regiments) showed "poor training of all units in bayonet fighting" in May 1936. According to the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937, Blucher's infantry had a "completely unsatisfactory" ability to work with a bayonet on the eve of the purge of the Red Army (at the same time, in the 32nd division, it was indicated in the report, "they do not engage in bayonet combat at all") ...

B. Tankers

"The crews of tanks and subdivisions," it was stated in a report compiled by Far Eastern staff officers in the fall of 1938 on the actions of the 2nd mechanized brigade in the Khasan battles, "did not work out the actions of tanks in close combat [...] The tank crews turned out to be insufficiently prepared for military driving in difficult conditions with closed hatches" and showed "insufficient training" in observation through optical instruments?°.

But the tankers of the 2nd mechanized brigade would not have been able to successfully operate in close combat even at the beginning of 1936-go:

- when even on the six "best vehicles" allocated on February 1 by the "best company" of its best (2nd) tank battalion to repel the attack of the » weapons are prepared for battle and

- when in the entire Primorskaya group (as the inspection of the head of the ABTU RKKA commander of the 2nd rank I.A. Khalepsky and the group commander I.F. Fedko revealed) the tank commanders, who also performed the functions of a tank gun gunner, were not accustomed to observe behind the battlefield, look for targets and maneuver the tower, and in charge

168.

fire was practiced only when the tank was moving on a flat area! 100

They would not have been able to act competently in close combat even in the "pre-repression" spring of 1937;

- when, according to the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937, tank crews were not knocked together in the entire army;

- when the level of field tactical training of the 2nd mechanized brigade was estimated at the OKDVA headquarters only as a "troika" and

— when the inspection of the 2nd tank battalion of the 2nd mechanized brigade, carried out on April 9, 1937, which later fought on Khasan, showed that they still did not know how to prepare a tank gun and a machine gun for firing, and that the commanders Tanks not only don't know how to make adjustments when aiming, but also don't know how to transfer fire from one target to another...

As for the ability to drive a tank through difficult terrain with closed hatches, then, if in August 1938 the driver mechanics of the 2nd mechanized brigade did it with difficulty, then in June of the "pre-repression" 1935 they, apparently, did not manage to lead their T-26 and BT-5 through the Khasan swamps and hills - neither with closed hatches, nor with open ones! After all, as the audit then found out, in the entire Primorsky OKDVA group, "mechanic drivers" did not know how to drive a tank "in difficult conditions" at all ... then only about a quarter of the regular number of tanks, and the "mechanic drivers"

the remaining three-quarters learned to drive only "under the conditions of the simplest, rectilinear movement"!0'. The fact that in the 2nd mechanized brigade "many drivers still do not have"

the corresponding "training", the chief of staff of OKDVA S.N. Bogomyagkov also stated in October 1936...102

"The weakness of skills in finding targets" (i.e., in observation, and, possibly, even through open hatches), Far Eastern tankers also differed in 1935, when even the compilers of the OKDVA report for that year recognized this! 03, and (as we saw above) at the beginning of 1936 ... In a separate tank battalion of the "Khasan" 40th Infantry Division, tank commanders "turned out to be unable to control tanks with closed hatches" ("lose control, lose communication") and in February 1937

169

B. Gunners

"[...] Artillery worked mediocrely," Komcor GM reported to the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense on November 26, 1938, who commanded the Soviet troops on Khasan. Stern!05. This is not surprising, given the degree of training of artillery units. "Battery readiness [as. – A.S.] of the fire unit as a whole in all artillery, mediocre," concluded the compilers of the report on the work of the artillery in the Khasan battles! %. About divisions, therefore, there is nothing to say!

However, mediocre (the average score for fire training is 3.5) was the training of batteries in the OKDVA in October 1936 - and even then only in those units whose soldiers were engaged in combat training, and not in construction and household work! 7. Only three batteries of the 40th artillery regiment of the "Khasan" 40th division were then prepared for "satisfactory", and only two of the three batteries of the 39th artillery regiment of the 39th division were trained in firing. , the third one earned "unsuccessful" (artillery of the 32nd division was not checked at that time). Other batteries of the divisional artillery of the "Khasan" divisions (6 in each) and practically all the batteries of their rifle regiments "as trained combat units" in October 36 "virtually did not exist"!108

At best, the mediocre training of batteries in the "Khasan" formations was also "pre-repression" in the spring of 1937. At the March competitions in the Primorskaya group, the batteries, fielded by all twelve artillery and rifle regiments of the 32nd, 39th and 40th rifle divisions, did not cope (with the exception of the battery of the 94th rifle regiment of the 32nd division) one of the firing ranges, slowly deployed to firing positions, slowly prepared for firing and were weakly camouflaged. In other words, "in general, throughout the artillery" of these divisions, "the readiness of the batteries as a firing unit" turned out to be not even "mediocre", as on Khasan, but unsatisfactory! Competing in May 1937 among themselves, the batteries of the 40th artillery regiment received (on a five-point system) only from 3 to 3.7 points!®. And in the 32nd and 39th artillery regiments by April 1937

170

ordinary fighters were unsatisfactory or not at all trained; consequently, the batteries could not be well prepared there for a long time.

On the eve of the purge of the Red Army, the batteries of the artillery regiments of the RGK, the 187th and 199th, that fought on Khasan, were just as mediocrely prepared. After all, those two of them that were put up for the competitions mentioned above also demonstrated poor camouflage, slow deployment and readiness for firing.

G. Sappers

The compilers of the report on the actions of the engineering troops on Khasan only touched on the training of the fighters and subunits, noting their inability to arrange wire fences in close proximity to the enemy and their poor ability to build field structures from bags of earth (the area in the Khasan area was absolutely treeless) .

But, according to the annual report of the "inzhtroysk" OKDVA of October 8, 1935, parts of these troops were distinguished by "insufficient field training" even in 1935!!®. In particular, the 32nd engineer battalion, which set up barbed wire on Zaozernaya on August 10-11, 1938, and the 32nd separate engineer company (later turned into a separate engineer battalion of the "Khasan" 32nd rifle division), the barrier service was still poorly worked out. and then, a year and a half before the start of the purge of the Red Army ... Clearly, the OKDVA engineering troops would have acted no better than on Khasan in 1936, when the "general state" of their training was generally "unsatisfactory" !!!

Information about the level of training of the fighters and units of the signal troops who participated in the Khasan battles is not available in published sources.

3. READINESS OF THE TROOPS

The Khasan events also revealed the absence of V.K. Blucher of an elementary order - which, in turn, led to a lack of proper combat readiness. Troops,

171

stated the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0040, "they went to the border on a combat alert completely unprepared. The emergency stock of weapons and other combat equipment was not planned in advance and prepared for handing over to units, which caused a number of outrageous outrages during the entire period of hostilities. Heads of front departments and commanders. The units did not know what, where and in what condition weapons, ammunition and other military supplies were available. In many cases, entire artillery batteries ended up at the front without shells, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unshot, and many soldiers and even one of the rifle units of the 32nd division arrived at the front without rifles and gas masks at all. Despite the huge stocks of clothing, many fighters were sent into battle in completely worn out shoes, half-bare, a large number of Red Army soldiers were without overcoats. The commanders and staffs lacked maps of the combat area"!!2.

But after all, in the same (or even more unattractive) form, Blucher's troops went out on alert and before the purge of the Red Army!

So, a number of training alarms carried out between | | and January 5, 1936 in units of the Primorsky OKDVA group, showed that the raised units were going to go into battle with actually faulty machine guns. Having taken these latter from the emergency reserve (NZ), they did not remove the thick grease that protected them during storage, and the machine guns could not give automatic fire: the mechanisms lost their MOBILITY... the form of cans with [cooling. - / A.S.] liquid and cans of lubricant. [...] The tanks, as a rule, would not start, the elements of some of the telephone sets were frozen" IZ.

Raised between October 12 and 17, 1936, on alarm, the battalion of the 118th rifle regiment of the "Khasan" 40th division "appeared to be incapable of combat"!4, and the property of the artillery depot of the 40th artillery regiment is exactly the same as in August 1938, it turned out that it was not planned in advance for divisions. I found the same thing then I check

172

and in the artillery warehouse of the current allowance of the 39th artillery regiment of the "Khasan" 39th division. And in the warehouses of its 116th Infantry Regiment, there was complete disarray: machine guns of inviolable stock were stored mixed with machine guns of the current allowance, shells mixed with harness, explosives, etc. If there was an alarm, and the regiment commander, just like in August 1938, would not know "what, where and in what condition weapons, ammunition and other combat supplies are available" ...

"They introduced themselves in a non-combat-ready form" during their training alert on October 19 and 23, 1936 and units of the 177th rifle regiment of the 59th rifle division. At the armory of the 176th regiment of the same division, all the weapons were not adjusted, and the breech of the machine gun, which was stored "literally under the nose of the warehouse manager", turned out to be "completely shrouded in cobwebs" ... Since "all these outrages were a surprise" for assistant commander of the regiment, chief of ammunition supply and commander of the regiment!¹⁵, even here the unit commander could not know "what, where and in what condition weapons, ammunition and other combat supplies are available"... .

"The combat readiness of the troops is still at a low level," V.K. Blucher No. 00337 of November 14, 1936 - The collection of troops on alert is extremely slow, the readiness for combat is unsatisfactory", and the storage and savings of clothing and weapons are "at an unacceptably low level"...¹¹⁶

Less than two weeks later, the validity of these assessments was confirmed by the conflict at Turye Rog. On November 26, 1936, up to 30% of the fighters of the 1st battalion of the 175th rifle regiment of the 59th rifle division sent to the conflict area went on a campaign in torn shoes, some of the fighters of the regimental battery attached to the battalion were without gloves and winter footcloths (although the regiment had all the necessary clothing) PT, and the personnel of the 1st division of the 8th cavalry artillery regiment of the 8th cavalry division - without sheepskin coats, felt boots and food supplies ...

On January 1, 1937, the commanders of the 1st Battalion of the 120th Rifle Regiment of the "Khasan" 40th Division, alerted, - in the same way as a year and a half later - came to

173

the assembly point without compasses and maps, and the cars and T-27 wedges available in the battalion could not get out at all, as they were without fuel.

On January 2, 1937, the "flagrant outrages" of the Khasan days were anticipated when the units of the 66th Infantry Division, intended to support the border guards, were raised on combat alert. In the 198th Rifle Regiment, some of the fighters came out not only without pouches with cartridges, but also without rifles (!), many without warm underwear and in torn felt boots (although the regiment had both underwear and serviceable felt boots), the command staff - without compasses, maps, flashlights ... The regiment did not have lighting rockets, hand grenades and the prescribed ammunition load for easel and light machine guns, the regimental gun ammunition was not prepared, and part of the machine guns - all because of the same excessively thick lubricant - failed with automatic shooting... The same thing was found that day in the units of the 197th Infantry Regiment. A separate reconnaissance battalion of the 66th division went on a campaign completely unarmed - without rifles and pouches for cavalymen and without shells for tanks, and a separate tank battalion - with shells not prepared for battle and with machine guns that could not give automatic fire ...

On January 15, 1937, on January 15, 1937, on combat alert, part of the units of the 63rd Infantry Regiment of the 21st Infantry Division, caused by the expectation of a repeated invasion of the "Japanese-Manchus" in the Turie Rog. In the 7th Rifle Company, which constituted the first echelon of the regiment, "already when getting into the vehicles, they remembered the machine-gun disks left in the room under the bunks. The bandoliers ended up not in the hands of the fighters, but somewhere in the hands of the foreman, and they were also looking for them during landing"¹⁸. In the third echelon - the 3rd rifle battalion - there were no gas masks, suitable boots and sheepskin coats, the radio batteries were not charged in the communications company, and the unit for charging them could not be started ...

On February 25-28, 1937, a purely "Khasan" picture was also shown by training alerts announced to the 62nd rifle and 21st artillery regiments of the 21st division. In the first of these, the wearable supply of ammunition was not pre-arranged under

174

bags, hand grenades for the whole battalion, there were only 40 pieces, junior platoon commanders and middle commanders turned out to be without personal weapons at all, 7 out of 15 light machine guns tested in the 7th and 9th rifle companies, could not give automatic fire, belonging to manual they didn't take machine guns, it turned out to be in unsatisfactory condition for easel machine guns, and most of the soldiers didn't have accessories for cleaning rifles at all ... The command staff, as in the Khasan days, went out without compasses, flashlights, colored pencils, rulers, and some even without maps... In the 21st artillery regiment, soldiers ran out of the barracks without weapons and equipment and then ran after him back to the barracks (however, some people continued to sleep even 40 minutes after the alarm was announced). And yet, most of the Red Army soldiers ended up in the field without sacks, many without bowlers, most commanders without compasses and maps (and many without field bags, pencils, measuring instruments and celluloid circles) ... Artillery units did not they could not get ammunition, because their commanders, as in the days of Khasan, did not know exactly where the shells intended for them were stored in the warehouse ...

A separate tank battalion of the 21st Rifle Division on combat alert on February 25 could not leave at all, because it did not have gasoline ... -

Raised on April 24, 1937 on combat alert, the "Khasan" 115th rifle regiment of the 39th division also turned out to be "unable to repel the enemy on the border": going on a campaign, they forgot to take gasoline, canned food, linen, and even a large amount of the number of fighters ... 119

On April 26, 1937, "flagrant outrages" similar to Khasan's were manifested by the alert of the 76th rifle regiment of the 26th rifle division. The warehouses again did not know which units to issue what, and as a result, for example, a tankette platoon of a reconnaissance company received only 3-4 machine-gun magazines for each T-27 instead of the prescribed 48 (however, six out of ten tankettes were due to the "faults that had not been eliminated since the autumn" of 1936, they could not go on a campaign at all ...). The units again acted "mostly incompetent" - leaving part of the personnel in the barracks, not taking bayonets to the newly issued hands from NZ

175

rifles, without a daily supply of food, with faulty field kitchens...120

A separate tank battalion of the 35th rifle division, to which a combat training alert was announced on the night of May 3, 1937, failed to receive the prescribed ammunition load and had to act without part of the commanders: due to the fact that alerting the latter about the alarm was poorly organized, many did not appear at all, while others were late for two or three hours .. With

As for the spare barrels for machine guns, as checks showed, in some parts of the 1st Pacific (future "Khasan" 39th) rifle division they were not assigned to specific machine guns (and therefore were not fitted) and were not shot in April 1936. In the 59th and 66th rifle divisions, spare barrels were not fitted (and in most cases were not shot) and in August 1936; inspectors found them there, not shot, in October...

As for the rifles, in parts of the 104th and 105th rifle divisions they were not shot even in July 1936, in parts of the "Khasan" 39th division and in the armories of the 176th and 177th rifle regiments 59 th division - and in October 1936, and in the 7th rifle company of the 63rd rifle regiment of the 21st division (again received from the warehouse) - in January 1937 ...

About the fact that gas masks are out of order in Blucher's army units (as well as there are no flasks), the deputy head of the political department of the OKDVA, divisional commissar I.D. Vaineros warned again even before the purge of the Red Army - in the middle of May 1937, at the 1st party conference of the Primorsky OKDVA group ...

LJ*

As you can see, the facts do not confirm the generally accepted opinion, according to which, "one of the reasons for the failure of the Soviet troops during the battles near Lake Khasan was the purge" of the Red Army!?!1. Yes, all commanders

units that fought on Khasan "performed their posts for less than a year, and some literally for several weeks or days"!22 same

176

mistakes, showed exactly the same unprofessionalism; exactly the same as on Hassan, there were flaws in the training of their troops!

Yes, for example, Colonel N.E. By the beginning of the Khasan battles, Berzarin led the 32nd Infantry Division for only a few months. But what could be expected from him if he commanded the regiment, as before the repressions?

Greater organization when speaking to the conflict area? But when the 77th rifle regiment of the 26th rifle division, which Berzarin commanded in 1935-1937, was raised in December 1935 on a combat alert, a significant part of the units, as in the Khasan days, came out with non-combat-ready machine guns (there were no spare barrels, but here machine guns taken from NZ, but not cleaned from excessively thick grease, could not give automatic fire at all ...).

The best organization of the offensive? But the check arranged. command of the Primorsky Group OKDVA in December 1935, showed that the senior commanders of the 77th regiment (which included the unit commander) "Instructions for deep combat" (and, by the way, the Field Regulations in force at that time) know superficially . Nothing had changed here even by the beginning of the purge of the Red Army: as admitted on April 26, 1937, at the divisional conference, division commander-26, Colonel N.M. Glovatsky, both the organization of intelligence and the conduct of the offensive itself in the 26th division (and, therefore, in the 77th regiment) were poorly worked out ...

The best logistics organization? But at the March 1936 maneuvers in Primorye, the commander of the "13th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division" (the same 77th Infantry Division was hidden under this name) N.E. Berzarin did not take into account, when making decisions, the issues of logistic support ...

The best training of troops? But at the end of March 1937, the combat training of the 77th regiment was organized in such a way that it gave "exceptionally poor results." Berzarin's fighters performed the first task of the firing course then (depending on the type of weapon) by only 1.2-1.5 points, grenades were thrown by 1.3 points ... air"! 123

177

Yes, captain Koksharov, who commanded the 119th rifle regiment of the 40th rifle division on Khasan, was only a company commander just a little over two years before that ... But what could be expected from him if he commanded, as before the repressions, a company ? Hasan lacked initiative and "adequate command"? But, commanding in March 1936 during the conflict near Hunchun [the th rifle company of the 118th rifle regiment of the same 40th division, Koksharov also "underestimated the seriousness of the situation", "did not show the necessary initiative"! 24 and acted by no means adequately! Advancing on March 25 with a company to the conflict area, instead of taking all measures to provide prompt assistance to the platoon and squadron fighting, he threw the entire company to pull out a battery stuck in the mud - a job for which a platoon would have been enough ...

In turn, what could be expected, commanded the 119th regiment, as before the repressions, Colonel A.M. Smir- new?

The best organization of command and control? Yes, Captain Koksharov irrationally managed the regiment, ignoring RADIO COMMUNICATIONS AND "recognizing" "only wire, and without any hint of" covert command and control of troops (which provided for the coding of telephone and

telegraph messages)!125. But under A.M. Smirnov, in June 1935, in the [19th regiment, they were just as "afraid" to use radios "and did not master the issues of covert control"...126 The same "radio fear" is also indicated by the corps on March 9-12, 1937, the inability of the old command of the 119th regiment to timely establish contact with the artillery and tanks attached to it. |

Ability to make smart decisions? But, deciding in January 1936 tactical flying, regiment commander-119 A.M. Smirnov acted so fussily that he forgot to assign a task to one of his three battalions... With good tactical preparedness, with high commanding qualifications, ignorance of the symbols used when plotting the situation on a map cannot be combined - expressed by Major A.M. . Smirnov in March 1936...127

The best training of troops? But. On May 18, 1937, temporarily correcting the post of chief of the 2nd division of headquarters

178

OKDVA division commander B.K. Kolchigin described the 119th regiment as "weak"!128

And what could be expected if the 94th Infantry Regiment of the 32nd Infantry Division on Khasan was headed by its "pre-repression" commander, Major F.I. Kim, dismissed in July 1937 as a "Corburite factionist with a Shanghai orientation"? The March maneuvers of 1936, during which Kim commanded the "3rd Battalion of the 13th Infantry Regiment" (under this name the training battalion of the 76th Infantry Regiment of the 26th Infantry Division was hidden), showed that this commander- A Korean is not able to competently manage even a battalion, that he does not know the basics of command and control in modern combat at all! After all, he not only did not know how to properly use his headquarters (working for him himself and even illiterately setting reconnaissance tasks), he not only replaced his company commanders (not even taking them with him on reconnaissance), but also - exactly like ha san commanders! - did not care at all about the restoration of communication with the headquarters of the regiment, which was absent from him during most of the maneuvers ...

Yes, the commander of the 2nd mechanized brigade, Colonel A.P. Panfilov, the commanders of his tank battalions and, in general, 99% of his command staff were in their positions only two days before the start of the Khasan battles. But is it possible (following M.B. Baryatinsky and M.V. Kolomiets) to attribute to this circumstance the fact that "due to the unorganized movement of the columns and the haste, the brigade covered a route 45 km long in 8-11 hours ", and "part of the units, due to ignorance of the route, wandered for a long time" around the city of Voroshilov!29? Also cleaning up the Red Army, on February 1-4, 1936, due to the same "disorganized movement" and "haste", a platoon of twin-turret T-26s from the 2nd tank battalion of this brigade was sent to the conflict area near Xianghe the route of 150 km covered ... 56 hours!136 Even in March 1936, the speed of the columns of the 2nd mechanized brigade was affected by the fact that the battalion commanders "continued to be insufficiently demanding on the discipline of the march" ...131 As for wandering around the city of Voroshilov, the ability to navigate the terrain - and even more so in the city, which, as in this case, is a place of permanent residence.

179

yannoy dislocation of the connection! - a must for a lieutenant who has just graduated from the school ...

Is it possible (following I. Zheltov and I. and M. Pavlov) to say that "massive unjustified repressions" "had a negative impact on the combat readiness of the troops and the work of headquarters" of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade on Khasan!3?? The "combat readiness" of this brigade, even under the old, "pre-repression", command staff, was such that:

- in February 1936, among the tanks that had been mothballed since March 1935 (and accounted for 75% of the entire tank fleet), there was no "such a machine that it would not

reconnaissance and 4th tank battalions due to the fact that the commanders considered it possible to operate vehicles with defects, by February 20, respectively, 30% (6 T-37 out of 20) and 48% (29 BT-5 out of 60) tanks;

- in March 1936, the attention of the command staff to the care and conservation of materiel was "so weakened that in the future such a situation" could "threaten a sharp decrease in the combat capability of the brigade as a whole";

— at the beginning of 1937, the brigade received "unsatisfactory" training in "caring for weapons and preparing them for firing";

- in the middle of the summer of 1937 (when the repressions were just beginning), 40-50% of the tanks in the brigade were non-combat-ready (with an allowable 15%) ... 133

As for the work of the headquarters, on December 3, 1937, the head of the armored troops of the OKDVA, brigade commander M.D. Solomatin, who was not only new and, accordingly, free in his assessments, but had also served in the Far East for a long time and therefore knew what he was talking about, and the "pre-repression" personnel of the OKDVA tank headquarters described it as "a lagging link in combined-arms tactics"!³⁴ (let us recall that on Khasan, units of the 2nd mechanized brigade had to participate precisely in the combined-arms — requiring the interaction of various types of troops — battle).

As can be seen from the above, the order of the Commissar of Defense No. 0040 dated September 4, 1938 was absolutely right when he stated that the training of "troops, headquarters and command

180

commanding staff" of the Far Eastern Front during the Khasan battles was "at an unacceptably low level"!³⁵. But since it was no different from the training of the Far Eastern commanders, headquarters and troops of the "pre-repression" period, then this last one should also be called "at an unacceptably low level" ...

NOTES

1 See: Katuntsev V., Kots I. Incident. The background of the Khasan events // Motherland. 1991. No. 6-7. S. 16.

2See: Ibid. pp. 15, 16.

3 Calculated from: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. T. 1. M., 1960. S. 234, 235; Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents // Clouds are gloomy on the border ... (To the 65th anniversary of the events at Lake Khasan). M.; Zhukovsky, 2005. S. 204, 215.

4 See: Classified removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, combat actions and military conflicts. Statistical research. M., 1993. S. 71, 72; Koltyukov A.A. Armed conflict at Lake Khasan (instead of a preface) // On the border, the clouds go gloomily ... P. 18.

5 See: Nagaev I.M. To clarify the losses of Soviet troops during the hostilities in the area of Lake Khasan in 1938 // Clouds go gloomily on the border ... P. 130. (Notes to this work, placed in the specified collection on p. as notes to the article by V. I. Korotaev "The reaction of the West to the military conflict near Lake Khasan (according to documents of foreign origin of the RGVA)"). Nagaev cites a figure of 1112 people, but it also includes those who died not from the impact of the enemy, but in disasters, etc. With the deduction of such persons, of whom 6 have been identified so far (Burikov P.D. Irreversible and sanitary losses of Soviet troops in the battles near Lake Khasan // Clouds are gloomy on the border ... P. 63), there remain 1106 servicemen of the Red Army who died from enemy influence.

6 See: Classified removed. S. 72; Burikov P.D. Irrecoverable and sanitary losses of the Soviet troops in the battles near Lake Khasan // At the border, the clouds are gloomy... P. 64; Nagaev I.M. Decree. op. S. 130.

7 See: 1939. History lessons. M., 1990. S. 291; The seal of secrecy has been removed. S. 71; Koltyukov A.A. Decree. op. p. 21 (all these publications give rounded figures - 500 killed and 900 wounded); Sokolov B. Unknown Zhukov: a portrait without retouching in the mirror of the era. Mn., 2000. S. 152.

8 See: Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 324.

See, for example: Book of Memory of the Russian Federation. 1923-1939 vols. T. 1. M., 1998. S. 122; Burikov P.D. Decree. op. S. 65; Cherevko K.E. The Soviet-Japanese conflict in the area of Lake Khasan in 1938 // Clouds are gloomy on the border ... P. 179.

19 See: Clouds are gloomy on the border... P. 388.

181

ty and "up to 2500" wounded, then the "Book of Memory" and P.D. Burikov (see note 9 to this chapter) already writes about 650 (&s! - A.S.) killed and, without any reservations, about "2500" wounded.

! Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). M., 1994. S. 58.

12 Quot. by: Korotaev V.I. The reaction of the West to the military conflict of Lake Khasan (according to documents of foreign origin of the RGVA) // Clouds are gloomy on the border... P. 107 S. V. Kaymakova "Local history laboratory: historical and cultural heritage of wars").

13 Quote p5: Ibid.

14 Op. by: Katuntsev V., Kots I. Decree. op. S. 17.

15 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. pp. 217, 215.

16 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). S. 58.

17 Russian State Military Archive (hereinafter - RGVA). F. 34352. Op. 1.D. 1. L. 123.

18 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 166-167.

19 7am same. F. 36393. Op. 1.D. 12. L. 61v.

20 Ibid. L. 122 about.

21 Ibid. L. 61 about.

22 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 15, 32v.

23 Vol. F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 13. L. 144, 147.

24 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 379. L. 68.

25 Ibid. D. 373. L. 238.

6 Cit. by: Katuntsev V., Kots I. Decree. op. S. 17.

27 Op. by: Korotaev V.I. Decree. op. S. 107.

28 See: Light tanks and armored vehicles of the Red Army. 1931-1939. Part 1. M., 1996. S. 35.

29 See: Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 216.

30 Ibid., pp. 217, 219; Nagaeva E.I. "The God of War" at Lake Khasan (combat activity of artillery during the period of hostilities in the area of Lake Khasan in 1938) // Clouds are frowning on the border ... P. 141. (Notes to this work, placed in the specified collection 369, erroneously titled as footnotes to the article by A. A. Koshkin "At the border clouds go gloomily...")

31 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. pp. 218, 202, 198, 199; Nagaeva E.I. Decree. op. S. 141.

32 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 218.

33 See; RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 104.

34 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 219.

35 RGVA. F. 34352. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 123.

36 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 39. D. 41. L. 79.

37 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 222.

38 Ibid. F. 4. Ol. 18. D. 54. L. 36-37. In the text of this speech, published in the collection "The Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937. Documents and materials" (M., 2006, p. 43), the last of the phrases we quoted was omitted.

39 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 325.

182

40 7am same. pp. 218-219.

41 Zheltov I., Pavlov I., Pavlov M. Tanks BT, Part 2. Wheeled-tracked tank BT-5. M., 1999. S. 41.

41 RGVA. F. 34352. Op. 1. D. 1.L. 123.

43 7am same. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 582. L. 2.

44 Ibid. F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 13. L. 147.

45 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 573. L. 12; D. 574. L. 104; D. 583. L. 9; D. 614. L. 87v. (the first of two sheets of this case, having the number 87).

46 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. pp. 293, 294.

47 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L.21.

48 Ibid. D. 1049. L. 104; D. 583. L. 6, 11.

49 Ibid. D. 584. L. 27v.

50 Ibid. F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 8a. L. 36 about.

51 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 227.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid. S. 228.

55 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T.13 (2-1). S. 58.

56 Op. by: Katuntsev V., Kots I. Decree. op. S. 16.

57 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 219.

58 RGVA. F. 34352. Op. 1. D. 1.L. 123.

59 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 573. L.7.

60 7am same. D. 584. L. 24 Ob., 26v.-27.

61 7am same. D. 620. L. 3, 26; D. 614. L. 86 (the second of two sheets of this case, having the number 86); D. 709. L. 412.

62 Ibid. F. 34352. Op. 1. D. 1.L. 123; D. 2. L. 26.

63 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 28v.-29.

64 Ibid. F. 34352. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 122; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 588. L. 32; F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 52. L. 12; F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 13. L. 147.

65 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 1049. L. 105; D. 584. L.9.

66 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 198.

67 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. |. D. 614. L. 87 (the second of two sheets of this case, having the number 87).

68 Ibid. D. 574. L. 270.

69 Ibid. D. 579. L. 412; F. 34352. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 216.

70 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 614. D. 58, 87 and rev. (the second of two sheets of this case, having the number 87).

71 Ibid. D. 574. L. 29; D. 579. L. 412.

72 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. pp. 198, 202.

73 Quoted from: Katuntsev V., Kots I. Decree. op. S. 17.

74 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 198.

75 Op. by: Katuntsev V., Kots I. Decree. op. C, 17; Nagaeva E.I. Decree. op. S. 141.

76 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 198.

77 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 614. L. 57.

78 Ibid. D. 584. L. 33v.

79 Ibid. D. 574. L. 271.

183

80 Ibid. F. 34352. Op. 1.D. 1. L. 138.

7am same. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 34 and rev.

82 Ibid. F. 34352. op.1.D. 1.L. 123.

83 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 246.

84 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). S. 58.

85 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 245.

86 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 29v.

87 Ibid. D. 614. L. 81 (the second of two sheets of this case, having the number 81); D. 620. L. 13.

38 RGVA, F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 582. L. 1, 17.

Ibid: D. 583. L. 27-28.

% Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 203.

91 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 218. L. 8.

92 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 379 ... 67.

93 Cit. lo: Katuntsev V., Kots I. Decree. op. S. 14.

3" RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 10; F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 15. L. 93.

35 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 587. L. 188; D. 584. L. 251-252.

% Same. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 126v.

97 Op. by: Katuntsev V., Kots I. Decree. op. P. 17. |

98 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 573. L. 18; D. 584. L. 26; F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 122 rev.

9 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 220.

100 RGVA, F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 187. L. 78, 82, 85, 192; F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 206.

101 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1.D. 4. L. 128; D. 11.L. 206.

102 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 1049. L. 73.

03 Ibid. D. 574. L. 105.

194 Ibid. D. 709. L. 191.

195 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR in 1938, 1940. Documents and materials. M., 2006. S. 215.

106 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 198.

107 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 579. L. 412v., 413.

108 Ibid. D. 582. L. 1, 3, 11-12.

109 Ibid. D. 34352. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 90.

110 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 331.

IT 7am same, D. 579. L. 552.

12 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). S. 58.

13 RGVA. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 64v.

113 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 582.L. 6.

115 Ibid. L. 25, 27.

16 Ibid. D. 579. L. 510.

17 Ibid. D. 178. L. 504.

18 Ibid. F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 15.L. 23.

19 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 52. L.9.

120 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 709. L. 606.

121 Voytkovyak Ya.

184

Far Eastern Red Banner Front. 1937-1938 // Military historical archive. Issue 15. M., 2000. P. 119. See also: Anfilov V.A. The road to the tragedy of the forty-first year. M., 1997. S. 58; Rubtsov Yu.V. Marshals of Stalin. From Budyonny to Bulganin. M., 2006. S. 159; Milbach V.S. Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (Red Banner Far Eastern Front). Political repressions of the commanding staff, 1937-1938. SPb., 2007. S. 196, 214-215.

122 Wojtkowiak J. Decree. op. S. 119.

123 RGVA. F. 33879. Ogp. 1. D. 271. L. 348-349; F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 49. L. 35.

124 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 96. L. 4.

125 Events at Lake Khasan in the final documents. S. 227.

126 RGVA. F. 34352. Ogp. 1. D. 1. L. 123.

127 Tim. D.2.L.26.

128 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 20v.

129 Baryatinsky M., Kolomiets M. Light tank BT-7 // Armor collection. 1996. No. 5. S. 18; Baryatinsky M. Soviet tanks in battle. M., 2007. S. 83.

130 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 187. L. 77.

131 7al. D. 588. L. 54.

132 Zheltov I., Pavlov I., Pavlov M. Decree. op. S. 40.

133 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 187. L. 205; D. 94. L. 45, 46; D. 584. L. 28; D. 1058. L. 268.

134 Ibid. D. 1057. L. 75.

135 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). S. 57.

© Chapter 3

BEFORE THE END OF MASS REPRESSIONS

{autumn 1938)

To assess the level of combat training of the Red Army during this period, we analyze the information reported by the top military leaders at meetings of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense (hereinafter referred to as the Military Council) on November 21-29, 1938. Many of those who reported there clearly heeded K.E. Voroshilov to be "absolutely honest, truthful and, of course, frank in their speeches, so that there are no embellishments, no glossing over, no lubricating formulations and provisions in their speeches"! This not only enhances the credibility of what these military leaders themselves said, but also helps to 'REVEAL "embellishments, glossing over and lubricating wording" in the speeches of those who could not or did not want to change anything in their own, prepared even before their arrival in Moscow. report.

1. COMMANDERS AND HEADQUARTERS

A. Combined arms, infantry and tank

Operational-tactical thinking. Judging by the speeches at the Military Council, at least the top commanders of the Red Army in the fall of 1938 were characterized by a lack of flexibility of thinking - an inability to act according to the situation, a craving for a template. Thus, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army coman

186

darm 1st rank B.M. Shaposhnikov pointed out on November 26 that the commanders of the operational level "correctly" developed the operation plan "in statics", but "when the operation turned into dynamics" (that is, when a new situation developed. - A.S.), "it was difficult to accept decisions." The same was reported (November 21) by the commander of the Belarusian Special Military District (BOVO; the word "special" was included in the names of the BVO and KVO on July 26, 1938), commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev: when organizing the entry into the breakthrough of the success development echelon, the top command staff "very often" makes "decisions according to some established scheme", "this scheme is applied to any situation, regardless of the situation that takes place in this case "...?

The command staff of the Leningrad Military District (LVO) had a poor command of even the theoretical foundations of decision-making: as Commander M.S. Khozin, he still demonstrated "an insufficiently correct understanding of the nature of modern combat [emphasis mine. — A.S.]"³.

And the commander of the troops of the Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO), commander of the 2nd rank S.K. Timoshenko pointed out the lack of initiative of the junior commanders of his infantry ("junior commanders have not been instilled with the skills to act decisively and independently"). Judging by his own indication of the unacceptable "linearity" of battle formations, then both the middle and part of the senior infantry commanders of the KOVO, commanders of platoons, companies and battalions, were characterized by lack of initiative. After all, pulling the subunits into line meant that not one of their commanders dared to look for opportunities for a faster advance - to feel for gaps and other vulnerable spots in the enemy's defense and throw their subunits there.

Message from B.M. Shaposhnikov, perhaps for the first time (A.D. Loktionov's statement about the "failure" of the "young staff" of the military headquarters of the Central Asian district in the autumn exercises of 1937, which requires verification, does not count) confronts us © with the fact of a real deterioration in the preparedness of command personnel due to the repression of 1937-1938. True, the rollback here occurred only to the level of 1935 - when the commander

187

The operational level also had to "difficulty in making decisions" when the situation changed during the operation (after all, as he stated in his report of 1935, "Head of the 2nd Department of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin, in operational training then "everything was based on a template or training in a formally difficult environment. Internal operational difficulties (chemistry, engineering service, replenishment reports, supply) were touched upon superficially." And according to a directive letter from the People's Commissar of Defense dated December 28, 1935, "in a number of districts and fleets" they were not able to achieve "correct accounting of the terrain and actions of the enemy" - which means they had to "difficulty in making decisions" with countermeasures taken by the enemy). Nevertheless, in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 and on tasks for [1937]," nothing is said about "difficulties in making decisions" during the operation that began, i.e. . in the course of 1936 this shortcoming was apparently eliminated. So Shaposhnikov was, apparently, right when he pointed out that the "shortcomings" in the operational preparation of 1938 (the first of which he called "difficulty in making decisions") were due, in addition to organizational inconsistencies, to "updating commanding staff"...

M.P. Kovalev about the craving for formulaic solutions, manifested in 1938 by the highest command staff of the BOVO. Indeed, at the end of 1936, the above-mentioned directive No. 22500ss did not mention this flaw either.

But here is the "insufficiently correct understanding of the nature of modern combat", noted in 1938 by the commanders of the LVO, this command staff demonstrated by no means only in the 35th, when, according to the testimony of those who spoke on December 8-9, 1935 at the Military Council, the commanders of the LVO B. M. Shaposhnikov and Deputy Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tukhachevsky, the battalion and regimental headquarters in this district did not assimilate the "Instructions for deep combat" that gave such an understanding, when the command staff there "all around"

188

did not use "the capabilities that are available in military units" to achieve the "mobility, flexibility, maneuverability, etc." inherent in modern combat and was only capable of "stencil decisions" (again, unsuitable for modern combat with its rapidly changing environment), when the commanders of the rifle units of the LVO did not show the initiative vital in this rapidly changing environment. No, "there was an insufficiently correct understanding of the nature of modern combat" among the command staff of the Leningrad District throughout the entire "pre-repression" period. After all, as it followed from the directive of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated June 29, 1936, and his own report dated October 7, 1936 "On combat training of the Red Army", in the 36th and "fragile" assimilation of the statutory provisions on driving a rifle battalion in cooperation with other branches of the military (i.e., as required by modern combat), and the inability of the commanders of rifle subunits "to independently move forward" were typical for the entire Red Army? And at the command classes held in the Red Army in the winter and spring of the 1937th, the command staff "did not develop the skills to make and implement bold and proactive decisions"! - this one is reflected even in the directive letter of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Yegorov dated June 27, 1937, the fact also testifies to the unfavorable situation with the assimilation of the principles of modern combat ...

Well, and the lack of initiative of the junior (as well as middle and part of the senior) infantry command personnel of the KOVO, noted in 1938, which led, in particular, to the linearity of battle formations, i.e. to the frontal pushing back of enemy troops instead of their dismemberment and destruction, the consequence of mass repressions was not unambiguous. "I watched," M.N. told the Military Council on December 9, 1935. Tukhachevsky, - three districts - Ukrainian [as early as May 17 divided into Kiev (KVO) and Kharkov (KhVO). - A.S.], Moscow, Leningrad. How do they come? [...]

If you go down, enter the battle formation of a battalion, company, platoon and see how the commanders make decisions, then, unfortunately, this initiative, independence,

189

we still do not have wedging into the flank and rear of the enemy to the extent that it is necessary. There is a uniform, equalized movement. Breaks are just afraid. [...] How is the situation in the Ukrainian district (and this is the advanced district)? I constantly had to see that the platoon commander lying idle. Why doesn't he follow the tanks if the path is clear before him?" !! The same thing happened in the KVO and the 36th: from the directive of Tukhachevsky of June 29, 1936, it is clear that the junior and middle infantry commanders were then not capable of taking the initiative, "to move forward independently" in the entire Red Army, but that the junior infantry commander "does not dare to take the initiative, [...] does not intervene [so in the document. - A.S.] into the gap formed in the order of battle, etc.", Tukhachevsky also wrote in the October report "On the Combat Training of the Red Army"!?. Of the two documents that have survived from the first half of 1937, highlighting the level of tactical thinking of the commanders of platoons, companies and battalions of the KVO, one is an order for the 17th rifle corps No. 011 of March 3, 1937 on the results of battalion exercises in 71 th and 286th rifle regiments (respectively, the 24th and 96th rifle divisions) - paints the same picture: "There is no desire to find the enemy's flank, attack on the flank and destroy the enemy, closing his retreat!" (The fact that such a picture was then typical is also fully confirmed, as we remember, by the objective order of the new commander of the KVO commander of the 2nd rank I.F. Fedko No. they are brought up "in the spirit of initiative, determination, courage"; as a rule, they are instilled with the same "scheme and template in actions"14.) "Tactical training of a junior commander," noted in A.I. Egorova dated June 27, 1937, "suffers from the same shortcomings as the training of middle and senior commanders"15; consequently, the junior commanders of the KVO infantry were also distinguished by lack of initiative before the start of the purge of the Red Army ...

Interaction. The question of the ability of commanders and staffs to organize the interaction of combat arms at the council was touched upon by only three of the 16 commanders of military districts, individual armies and individual corps. They have here

190

the picture was bleak. According to the commander of the deployment

the 57th special rifle corps, division commander N.V. Feklenko, his command staff "learned to correctly set certain tasks" for the interaction and use of various types of troops, but the headquarters that organized the implementation of these tasks "were still poorly worked out issues and organization of interaction between rifle troops" p. others!. Things were even worse in the LVO: M.S. Khozin noted not only the "insufficient assimilation" by the infantry commanders of the "organization of interaction with [others. — A.S.] military branches and its preservation, especially in the dynamics of battle", BUT and "insufficiently correct understanding" by the command staff of the "nature of modern combat" - "especially in terms of tactics of interaction between military branches"!". In other words, the commanders of the LVO obviously did not even know how to "competently set certain tasks" for interaction ... In the Moscow District (MVO), there was a complete failure. "Interaction of troops in combat," Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny, - turned out to be at a low level, and the issues of managing this interaction during the battle are so weak that in some cases we observed that the types of troops tried to solve the tasks facing them on their own. So, at the autumn maneuvers of the district, the combined arms commanders only "sometimes" used artillery; there were "cases when artillery was abandoned, it was not used operationally" ...

In other districts, things were a little better: in the final speech of K.E. Voroshilov on November 29, it was said that "the interaction of all branches of the armed forces" in the Red Army "is not really worked out", that it is simply "bad"!

However, the head of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin and Deputy Commissar of Defense M.N. Tukhachevsky practically stated the same thing and [December 1935! The "continuity" of "interaction between military branches in mobile forms of combat," was indicated in Sedyakin's report "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...", "is still far from real perfection." The commanders of rifle battalions, noted in a letter dated the same date to K.E. Voroshilov Tukhachevsky, "still have not mastered

191

the ability to organize interaction with artillery and tanks on the ground"20, and yet the practical interaction of military branches was carried out then, we recall, precisely at the battalion level...

"Bad" (and at least "not really worked out") the interaction of military branches was in the Red Army in 1936. "The interaction of the main branches of the armed forces", was stated in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 ...", "is not yet at the proper height", and "in many cases it is absent" even "an action plan linked by milestones and time"! At the tactical level (as is clear from M.N. Tukhachevsky's report of October 7, 1936 "On Combat Training of the Red Army") those who were supposed to carry out the interaction of military branches in practice were the commanders of rifle battalions, not only they did this "often" "illiterately", but in general they did not particularly strive to organize interaction with artillery and tanks! According to the same report, the commanders and headquarters of tank units and mechanized formations behaved in exactly the same way in 1936, throwing their tanks into the attack without support and artillery (only sometimes commanders and headquarters of mechanized corps used the artillery battalion of their rifle and machine gun brigade) and infantry, and tank commanders of direct infantry support (!), who did not pay attention to the target designation signals given to them by infantrymen ... 22

"Bad" (and at least "not really worked out") the interaction of military branches was in the Red Army on the eve of its purge, in the winter and spring of 1937. As follows from the directive letter of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, a "complete solution" to this problem at that time was not always achieved even in commander's exercises, and in practice it was not achieved at all: after all, the interaction of the direct organizers of the interaction of military branches - the headquarters of rifle battalions and artillery divisions - was then "not worked out" ...? 3

The fact that the inability of commanders and staffs to organize interaction between the combat arms, noted in the autumn of 1938, was by no means caused by repressions is also evident from the material of specific military districts. Arms, complained to

192

November 1938 by the command troops of the Moscow Military District S.M. Budyonny, are trying to "solve the tasks facing them on their own", but didn't the command of the 5th mechanized corps act in the same way during the maneuvers of the Moscow Military District in September 1936 - they threw their BT-7s onto the defensive zone of the "enemy" without artillery and air support? At the September maneuvers of 1938, Budyonny was indignant, the general commanders only "sometimes" set the tasks of artillery, but didn't such a by no means small general commander of the MVO act in the same way in September 1935 at the exercises of the 3rd rifle corps near Gorokhovets, as commander of the 17th Infantry Division G.I. Bondar, who moved the division on the offensive without artillery preparation? "Weak skills in the use of artillery" were also found among the combined arms commanders of the 6th Infantry Division MVO-?

In the LVO, "insufficient assimilation" by infantry commanders of "the organization of interaction with [others. — / A.S.] military branches and its preservation, especially in the dynamics of the battle" and "insufficiently correct understanding" by the commanders of the "tactics of interaction between military branches" was also evident not only in November 1938, but also in 1935- m, when, having become acquainted with the 56th Infantry Division of the LVO,

M.N. Tukhachevsky concluded that "there are still a lot of shortcomings in interaction"? practical organizers of interaction.

Ensuring combat operations. Speeches that touched upon the ability of the command staff to organize reconnaissance revealed such failures here that one can speak of a misunderstanding by the Soviet commanders of the autumn 1938 model of the very purpose of reconnaissance! "Reconnaissance in most cases is carried out only in front of the front," reported, for example, on November 22 the commander of the troops of the Kalinin Military District (KalVO), divisional commander I.V. Boldin. "The scouts don't look for flanks"²⁶ (which means, let's add, they don't fulfill the tasks of the Intelligence — to find out the forces, actions and intentions against

7-2255 193

Nika. After all, this latter can concentrate its efforts precisely on the flanks). But tasks for reconnaissance officers are assigned by a higher-ranking commander or chief of staff... In the 57th separate rifle corps, commanders and staffs made another mistake that prevented reconnaissance from fulfilling its task: they did not achieve continuity in reconnaissance. Needless to say, outdated information about the enemy just does not allow the commander to make an appropriate decision about the situation, as well as the lack of information at all? .. But most shocking was the statement made on November 25, 1938, by the commander of the 5th mechanized corps of the BOVO divisional commander M.P. , Petrov that "before the battle and in the battle it is necessary to teach and put into practice [highlighted by me. — A.S.] tank reconnaissance"²⁷. It follows from this that, at least in the 5th mechanized corps (then uniting the 5th and 10th mechanized brigades), tank commanders and headquarters did not organize reconnaissance at all!

In both speeches, where the ability of commanders and staffs to organize the logistics of combat operations was characterized, this ability was assessed as truly devastating. In the MVO, reported on November 21 S.M. Budyonny, the "command apparatus" of companies, battalions, regiments and divisions "failed" to "financially support the combat work of the troops." And the commander of the 1st separate Red Banner Army (until June 28, 1938 - the Primorsky OKDVA group, and until September 4, 1938 - the II (Primorskaya) army of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front) commander GM. Stern admitted on November 23 that his commanders "are at best barely literate in matters of logistics" and "many questions related to the work of the rear" do not know at all ... ²⁸

But the neglect of the coverage of the flanks and the continuity of reconnaissance, as noted in the report of A.I. Sedyakin from | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...", in the Red Army it was commonplace even in the 35th. Even in 1936, the continuity of intelligence, as was recognized in the report of the district headquarters itself on the results of combat training in the 1935/36 academic year (dated October 4, 1936; in the future, such documents will be referred to as annual reports or reports for such and such

194

period), did not achieve in the advanced KVO either. They did not achieve it then in one of the two rifle divisions checked on this account (37th) of the advanced BVO (in the other - the 33rd - they did not organize reconnaissance at all), but in the rifle divisions of the BVO, withdrawn in October 1936 for large tactical exercises near Polotsk, the 5th and 43rd - they also ignored reconnaissance on the flanks (this is evidenced by the fact that they did not organize even a simple observation of the flanks). By the way, the 43rd Rifle in 1938 became part of the Kalinin District, so the Kalining Military Command also complained about what was in its troops before the purge of the Red Army ... The fact that the oblivion of the principle of continuity of intelligence was not generated by the purge of the Red Army , is clearly seen from the wording of the order on the CVO No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937 ("The weakest point in the preparation of headquarters continues to be [emphasis added by me. - A.S.] the issue of organizing continuous reconnaissance") and the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937 (in tank units and formations "remained" [highlighted by me. — A.S.] the inability to carry out "continuous reconnaissance").

Practiced in 1938 by tank commanders of the 5th mechanized corps, the complete disregard for intelligence for Soviet tankers was also common before the purge of the Red Army. As we remember from Chapter 1, in 1936 the 8th Mechanized Regiment of the 8th Cavalry Division of the OKDVA went into battle without reconnaissance at the March maneuvers in Primorye, and [the 5th Mechanized Brigade of the KVO at the September Shepetov maneuvers, and The 18th mechanized and [1st heavy tank brigade of the BVO at the October Polotsk exercises ...

And what has changed since the "pre-repression" times in the ability (more precisely, inability) of the commanders and headquarters of the Moscow Military District and OKDVA to establish logistics support for the troops?

From the statement of the same S.M. Budyonny at the Military Council on November 21 [1937 ("the rear remains a dark place and [highlighted by me. - /S.] today among our commanders of all ranks"³⁰) it is clear that the "control apparatus" of subunits, units and formations The Moscow Military District "did not know how to financially support the combat work of the troops" even before the purge of the Red Army. And in OKDVA - even according to the annual reports of the Far Easterners that varnished reality! - "the headquarters did not learn how to manage you

195

scrap", and the commanders "forgot" to give orders on the rear in 1935, the headquarters of formations during the battle, and the headquarters of units and battalions and during the organization of the battle suffered from such forgetfulness in 1936 ?!. According to the report of the army headquarters on the results of combat training for December 1936-April 1937. dated May 18, 1937 (hereinafter - the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937), the headquarters of the Far Eastern units and formations were able to "satisfactorily" control only "rear units operating not in full force and not in mobile forms of combat"³ ? — i.e. in a real combat situation, even before the start of the purge of the Red Army, they were not able to organize logistics support ... Is it not possible to say the same about this "pre-repression" OKDVA command staff as G.M. Stern said of the "post-repression" that he was "at best, barely literate in matters of logistics" and "many issues related to the work of the rear" (how, for example, to organize logistics support for troops "in mobile forms of combat ".), does not know at all?

Troop management. A number of speeches indicate that the commanders of rifle subunits in the Red Army in the autumn of 1938 were poorly or not at all able to control the battle formations of their platoons, companies and battalions and organize the preparation and support of the attack by fire. Thus, in the Moscow Military District, the commanding staff of the infantry had just begun to understand how "interaction of battle formations" should be organized; in KalVO, he may have understood this, but in practice he "did not pay due attention" to "linking fire with movement". Judging by the words of the commanding troops of the KOVO (where "combat control of a platoon, company and even battalion" was generally "weak") and BOVO (where there was "insufficient training in the interaction of fire and movement of units in a platoon, company")³³, the same problems were in these districts. Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division of the BOVO Brigade Commander S.I. Eremin, the only commander of the combined arms division who spoke at the council, noted that his "command staff still poorly mastered fire control"³⁴. And in the Transcaucasian Military District (ZakVO), as Commander I.V. Tyulenev, the command staff "sometimes" generally "didn't know what to do during the battle, especially the close one!"³⁵

196

Speech by the command troops of KOVO S.K. Timoshenko also reveals the direct cause of the "poor command and control" of rifle subunits—poor command or even ignorance of command and control techniques, lack of elementary commanding skills. "The commander," noted Semyon Konstantinovich, "strives to "control the legs" [i.e. give all orders personally, running from one of his units to another. - A.S], to be everywhere by yourself, does not use the control cell and headquarters. "Weak" and "topographic training of the command staff" (that the command staff "does not accurately and correctly orientate itself on the ground", that its topography "is a sore point", was also said by commander-57 N.V. Fek- Lenko, and deputy commander of the MVO troops, divisional commander I.G. Zakharkin; in the 5th mechanized corps of the BOVO, its commander M.P. Petrov noted, the leaders of the tank columns "as soon as they left the road, they got lost")... ³⁶

As for the igtabs that ensure the control of units and formations, all those who raised this issue stated the same thing: the "control apparatus" of battalions, regiments and divisions (i.e. their headquarters) are not able to "truly control troops in battle" (commissioned troops of the Moscow Military District S.M. Budyonny); during the autumn maneuvers, "headquarters worked poorly" (member of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District, divisional commissar A.I. Zaporozhei); "We don't have such close-knit headquarters capable of commanding troops in battle now" (Commanders of the LVO M.S. Khozin); "headquarters are not yet full-fledged governing bodies" (corporate commander-57 N.V. Feklenko); "the training of staffs is at a low level" (by command troops of the ZakVO I.V. Tyulenev); "Headquarters will not be able to properly manage combat operations, and therefore, the war" (K.E. Voroshilov)³⁷.

Voroshilov also named the immediate reason for this incapacity of the military headquarters: they "still are not well-coordinated and poorly trained"³⁸. In the Central Asian Military District (SAVO), the headquarters spent so much time working out combat documents that the commander of the district commander I.R. Apanasenko literally broke through at the council:

197

in the document I mean the time to organize the battle. - A.S.] does not remain, or rather, it remains only to play the trumpet and go [on the attack. - A.S. 1 "39. The command troops of the KOVO also complained about the inability of the staffs to compile documentation otherwise than by spending a lot of time, and the commander of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army (formed on June 28, 1938 from the troops of the Amur Group OKDVA and up to On September 4, 193, which was called the 2nd Army of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front) commander I.S. Konev. The commanders of the LVO noted that its staff commanders not only "have no skills in staff work," but also do not have the tactical outlook necessary for a staff officer, which also does not allow them to perform "their functional duties of command and control" in a combat situation (about that "the basis of the modern operation was mastered superficially by the headquarters," the command troops of the KOVO also declared) "9.

However, according to the report of A.I. Sedyakin dated December 1, 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...", the commanders of the rifle units of the Red Army did not know how to organize the interaction of fire and movement even in the 35th. Obviously not up to the mark was they then and the management of battle formations. "During the offensive," stated on December 8, 1935, at the Military Council, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Egorov, - sometimes there is a weak discipline of battle formations, a large concentration of those ""! (Let's note once again that the excusable "sometimes" was most likely inserted only due to Alexander Ilyich's desire to smooth over sharp corners - a desire that is clearly noticeable when comparing his report with Sedyakin's report ...). The same picture in the Red Army clearly existed in the 36th: summing up the results of the academic year, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. alternation of fire and movement of attacking units.) and that in the infantry "there is still a crowding of battle formations"? (comparison of the text of the order with the report of Deputy People's Commissar M.N. Tukhachevsky on October 7, 1936 "On combat training

198

'tovke RKKA' shows that the words 'sometimes' and 'occurs' again appeared only out of a desire to avoid too large doses of criticism...). No better than in 1938, things were here on the very eve of the purge of the Red Army, by the summer of 1937. "Commander," A.I. Yegorov of June 27, 1937 - unsteadily manages and commands a unit in a tactical situation those. in combat conditions. - A.S. | "...43

The fact that before the purge of the Red Army the commanders of rifle subunits managed these latter no better than in 1938 is also evident from the material of specific districts and formations. In the Moscow Military District in 1938, the commanding staff of the infantry was not able, as we have seen, to organize "interaction of battle formations"; this wording is not entirely clear, but if the interaction of fire and movement was meant

battle formations, then, according to the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army, the Moscow Military District was poorly able to organize it in 1935. And if S.M. Budyonny wanted to talk about the management of the actual movement of infantry combat formations, then in the very first verified UBP of the Red Army, before the very beginning of the purge of the Red Army, June 6-20, 1937, the MVO rifle division (6th) command staff showed "poor skills in managing troops in general.

In 1938, the infantry commanders of the KalVO "did not pay due attention" to "linking fire with movement," but in the 43rd rifle division of this district, "interaction of fire and movement" was "underdeveloped" in the fall of 1935 ("Weak commanders in the company level," commented the 43rd chief of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army S.N. Bogomyagkov commented on this place in the inspection report). And in the 48th Rifle - in the spring of 1936 (when the very first rifle squad tested in it attacked without taking into account the "opportunities and technical equipment of the enemy", i.e., clearly without alternating dashes with lying down and preparing the next throw light machine gun fire)"5. (At that time, both of these divisions were part of the BVO.)

The commanders of the infantry of the ZakVO in 1938 "sometimes" did not know their duties "in the process of combat" at all, but is it not indicative that in the "pre-repression" spring of 1937 such commanders (in the person of, for example, many commanders of the 115th Infantry regiment of the 39th Infantry Division) met

199

{as we saw in chapter 2) and OKDVA, whose personnel were, in the words of its commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher, "special"?

In the Kiev district, the "weakness" of command and control of the battle of rifle units was also characteristic not only for 1938, but also for the "pre-repression" first half of 1937, when it was noted in all four rifle divisions of the KVO, for which the relevant information. About the 100th division, who checked it in May or June 1937, the commander of the 8th rifle corps said this bluntly (there is a "weakness of the command staff in managing units"), the commander of the battalion, checked in March in the 134th rifle regiment 45 th division, commanded "contrary to all statutory requirements", and on February 19-22 in the 71st and 286th rifle regiments (respectively, the 24th and 96th divisions) battalion offensive "generally lost * ...

In the Belorussian district, "insufficient development of the interaction of fire and the movement of units in a platoon, company" was insufficient and during the entire "pre-repression" period:

- and in 1935 - when it was recorded in two of the three rifle divisions checked by the 2nd department of the Headquarters / General Staff of the Red Army (in the 27th and 43rd);

- and in 1936 - when, according to the commander of the troops of the district, commander of the 1st rank I.P. Uborevich, the bulk of the commanders of his rifle platoons "poorly" knew how to interact with a machine-gun company in an attack"? and when in three out of five tested BVO rifle divisions of the Red Army (in the 2nd, 37th and 81st), platoon and company commanders often either did not control the interaction of fire and movement at all (fortunately they simply did not organize fire support for the attack), or they controlled this interaction clearly weakly (since they weakly or did not control the fire of their units at all);

— and in the first half of 1937 — when, according to the district's annual report of October 15, 1937, "platoon and company combat order management" "still" "remained at a low level" and when in both rifle shelves of the BVI,

200

about the tactical training of the then commanders of which at least some information was preserved (in the 111th and 156th regiments of the 37th rifle division), the organization of "interaction of fire and movement" was a "weak point" even in the first half of May"8 .

In 1938, the commanders of the rifle units of the 2nd Infantry Division of the BOVO were "poorly" able to control fire, but the same flaw was also recorded by the commission of the Red Army UBP, which checked the 2nd in July 1936.

As for control techniques and commanding skills, "foot control" (and not through a control cell or headquarters) among the commanders of rifle units of the Ukrainian / Kiev district was a common thing in the spring of 1935 (when one of the two battalion commanders tested in the UVO during a tactical exercise by the 2nd department of the Red Army Headquarters, did not come closer than a hundred meters to his headquarters in battle), and in 1936 (when in both KVO rifle divisions illuminated by sources from this side - the 44th and 45th d - the unit commanders did not care at all about the preparation of their control cells). In the same way, even before the purge of the Red Army, the topographic training of the command staff was limping in the UVO / KVO. So, by 1936, even ... the reconnaissance commanders of tank units were not able to navigate on the map in the KVO! "You will meet with this," emphasized January 16, 1936; at the First district meeting of the Stakhanovites, the head of the armored troops of the KVO N.G. Ignatov, - in a number of units, and in Novograd-Volynsk, and in Zhitomir, and in Proskurov, etc. "4. In mid-July 1937 (when the repressions had not yet affected the bulk of the command staff), "very poor topographical training" was discovered among all the commanders checked on this score in the 24th and 96th rifle divisions - in both divisions QUO, about such checks in which we know something from sources!50

We do not have information about the level of topographic literacy of the *pre-repression" command staff of the Moscow Military District and those formations of the Trans-Baikal Military District (ZabVO), from which the 57th Special Corps was formed in the fall of 1937, but it is more than likely that this the level was no higher than in 1938. After all, even before the start of the purge of the Red Army, in the spring of 1937, it was low throughout the Red Army.

201

armies! "The topographic literacy of the command staff is still weak," it was directly stated in the directive letter of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 193751.

The commanders of the 5th BOVO mechanized corps (that is, the 5th and 10th mechanized brigades) in 1938 did not know how to navigate the terrain, but in the 5th mechanized brigade many commanders did not know how to do this in 1936 either. "[...] Separate tanks and even tank platoons," he noted, "writing in his report on the Belarusian maneuvers the attack of the 1st heavy tank and 5th mechanized brigades on September 10, 1936, the headquarters of the BVO, "due to insufficient intelligence, ing to navigate the rough terrain from the tank, broke away, which significantly delayed the concentration in the assembly areas after the attack by artillery [the "enemy". - A.S.] "5?. Before the start of the purge of the Red Army, in the first half of 1937, the inability of tank commanders to navigate was generally characteristic of the entire Belorussian district: it was noted then in three of its four tank formations, for which at least some information about the level of training of command personnel was preserved during that period (in the 3rd, 4th and 18th mechanized brigades).

The same with the training of headquarters. In November 1938, K.E. Voroshilov believed that the headquarters would not be able to "manage military operations properly", but could they have done this in the "pre-repression" 1935? According to the letter of M.N. Tukhachevsky to Voroshilov from | On December 1935, the military headquarters in the Red Army were "weak, lagging behind the development of events in battle," and the "cadres of staff commanders" were then "weak in their training." Higher headquarters - as follows from the report of A.I. Yegorova at the Military Council on December 8, 1935 — they also could not "manage combat operations properly", because they did not know how to do the most important thing here — they did not have "the practical ability to organize in time and space the necessary interaction of rifle, mechanized and aviation formations ". (Wartime army departments, as was directly stated in the letter of the People's Commissar of Defense to the highest officials of the Red Army dated December 28, 1935, "in terms of their preparedness" "are at a low level" ... 53) |

202

But could the headquarters "properly manage military operations" in the "pre-repression" 1936? As for the military, the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 400115s of May 17, 1936 stated the poor preparation of most battalion headquarters, and from the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army" it followed (as we saw in Chapter 1) that the unsatisfactory control of rifle formations was due precisely to the poor preparedness of the headquarters of these formations. From the remark of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 dated November 3, 1936 about the "underdevelopment" of "issues of command and control and communications" in tank units and formations, it is clear that the tank headquarters were not able to "manage properly" military operations ... In 1936, however, the headquarters in 1936 "properly manage combat operations" could not unequivocally: as noted in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 At that time, they were able to organize not only the interaction of military branches and interaction between formations in general, but also simply "correctly organize control in the mobile phases of an operation" (and, in particular, "plannedly and correctly use all means of communication")⁵⁵.

The military headquarters (the highest information for this period could not be found) would not have been able to "manage combat operations properly" even before the start of the purge of the Red Army - in the spring of 1937. Regarding the battalion and regimental in the directive letter A.I. Yegorov of June 27, 1937, directly noted that "as combat control bodies" they "did not form together" in the Red Army at that time,³⁶ and the low suitability of formation headquarters for such control is evident from the then level of their preparedness in the three largest military districts. In fact, by the summer of the 37th:

- in the KVO (as stated in the order of the new commander I.F. Fedko No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937, which was by no means exaggerated), absolutely all military headquarters were "poorly prepared to carry out the tasks of managing the battle";

- in the BVO, absolutely all military headquarters (as can be seen from the annual report of the district of October 15, 1937) "continued" untimely to bring (in a concretized, of course, form) the decision of the commander to the troops (i.e.

203

take on one of their main functions) and not properly control the execution of the orders of the senior chief (and the headquarters of the mechanized brigades were not yet sufficiently cohesive), and, finally;

- VOKDVA (according to the materials to the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937 and the order of V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter period of training in the 1936/37 academic year) "the skills of organizing and controlling the battle in most headquarters" "were low"; absolutely all the military headquarters there "worked satisfactorily" only "in a simple environment", and in conditions of "significant saturation of the troops with technical means" (i.e. did their job poorly)⁵⁷,

Nothing has changed here in comparison with the "pre-repression" period and the MARO (we have no information about the "pre-repression" state of military headquarters in other districts from those whose command troops criticized these headquarters in November 38). In the 38th, the headquarters of the battalions, regiments and divisions of the Moscow Military District did not know how to "really manage troops in battle" and worked "badly" on autumn maneuvers - but on the same maneuvers that took place in this district in the 36th, "the work of headquarters" was "very weak in all parts" even in such an elite formation as the 5th mechanized corps ° 8. Both the corps and brigade headquarters there precisely "didn't know how to really control troops in battle": the first one could not achieve flexibility of command "in various combat situations", and the second ones could not organize interaction between their battalions...⁵? But isn't it significant that in the last days before the start of mass repressions, June 6-20, 1937, in the only division known to us from this side of the then MVO (6th Rifle Division) there was not enough practical "skills in combat control", neither regimental nor battalion (which were not even knocked together) headquarters?⁶⁰

Noted by K.E. Voroshilov, the "lack of coordination" of the military headquarters of the Red Army of the 1938 model and the "poor training" of their workers were a reality in the 35th, when (as M.N. Tukhachevsky emphasized on December 9, 1935 at the Military Council) in the military headquarters they did not really know "who and to whom is transmitting preliminary orders, who

204

puts the situation on the map, who at that time is preparing messengers, who is preparing signalmen for the exit to lay new lines of communication, who is simultaneously preparing instructions on the rear and a number of other data on the organization of the battle being prepared at the same time "when the Red Army has not yet been" you - a practical staff worker has been worked"b1. From the report of Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936, "On the Combat Training of the Red Army" and the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. in the practical implementation of their functions and the "lack of coordination" of headquarters) distinguished the Red Army in the 36th. Even in such an important strategic grouping of the Red Army as the KVO, according to the annual report of this district of October 4, 1936, then there was "not a single headquarters where the main workers" "would have full work practice", and "linkage and interaction in work between the main departments of the headquarters" were "insufficient"63 Judging by two of the three largest military districts, this was also the case in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937 (the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937 directly stated "lack of order" in the work of their military headquarters,4 and in the KVO, the equipment of the headquarters service was then imperfect in all three military headquarters, which are illuminated from this side by surviving sources - the 72nd rifle regiment of the 24th rifle division and 286- th and 287th rifle regiments of the 96th rifle). We do not have information on SAVO, but in the second of the districts, about which it is known that in November 38th their staff officers worked out combat documentation too slowly - Kievsky, this flaw was again evident before the purge of the Red Army. In the summer of 1935, all the military headquarters of the KVO suffered from it, according to which information about this side of their training was preserved (6th and 15th rifle corps, 51st rifle division and its 153rd rifle regiment), in August 1936 - go - all divisional (shtadivs-7, -46 and -60) and regimental headquarters that participated in the Polesye maneuvers, and in the first half of 1937 - two of the three military headquarters of the KVO, about the training of which some kind of information (72nd and 287th rifle regiments). At the headquarters of the 7th Infantry Division at the Polesye maneuvers, an urgent (!)

205

it took four hours to write the order to withdraw, but it took 26 hours to draw up and bring to the regiments the order to defend the line of the Pripyat River... 26 hours!65

The general weak training, characteristic in 1938 for the staff officers of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army, also does not contrast with the level of training of the "pre-repression" staff officers of the troops of the Amur Group OKDVA (united in 1938 into the 2nd Army). In fact, even in 1936:

- the photographic level of the headquarters of the rifle battalions (as even the annual report of the army of September 30, 1936 admitted) was "at a very low level" throughout the OKDVA; 66

- in half of the linear tank units of the Amur Group (in separate tank battalions of the 35th and 69th rifle divisions), the training of staff officers looked "especially bad" even against the background of the general "poor" preparedness of the headquarters of the Far Eastern tank units and even according to the assessment the annual report of the OKDVA armored forces themselves; e7

- the staff officers of the four rifle divisions of the group (35th) were completely unable to interact with each other and organize radio communications; in another division (34th), as well as in one of the two rifle corps of the group (20th), the military headquarters were also poorly put together, and the staff officers of the third division (69th) did not even know how to choose a place for a command post and organize moving this last one.

Even in the last months before the start of the purge of the Red Army, the military headquarters of the 69th Rifle Division lacked "staff precision and culture", the headquarters of its rifle battalions were "completely not knocked together"⁶⁸, and the divisional and regimental headquarters of the 35th Rifle (there is no relevant information about other Amur military headquarters of this period) issued documentation of poor quality...

In 1938, in the Kiev district, "the basis of the modern operation by headquarters" was "learned superficially," but it is more than likely that things were the same there in 1936. After all, the compilers of the annual report of the KVO of October 4, 1936, covering this issue, resorted to a suspiciously vague formulation: "the general nature of the actions of modern armies in difficult conditions of operation and battle" its headquarters imagine "on the whole quite [highlighted me. - A.S.] clearly

206

and right"? What may lie behind such vagueness is shown by the following example: first, the compilers cheerfully declare that the headquarters of their formations "MASTERED CONTROL IN MOBILE BATTLE AND WIDE CONDITIONS", and then indicates that:

— the headquarters of divisions and corps did not work enough and had little practice in organizing command and control in a meeting engagement (i.e., in combat under difficult conditions!);

- Headquarters "do not always correctly use", "depending on the situation", various means of communication (which is important just "in mobile combat and in difficult conditions", when the situation often changes!);

- Headquarters "do not have sufficient means of movement and control that would meet modern combat", "due to which" headquarters "often were not where they should be in the course of the operation" (how can they control in mobile combat?), A

- "during counter and offensive operations, there are not isolated cases when the headquarters of such mobile [! – A.S.] troops, like cavalry and motorized mechtroops", "simply lagged behind their troops" (this is how they "mastered control in mobile combat")...⁷⁰

In other words, the "general nature of the actions of modern armies in difficult conditions of operation and battle" in 1936, the headquarters of the KVO, quite possibly, did not imagine at all "clearly" and not "correctly" ... Talo of tactical outlook not only in 1938, but also in 1935, when, according to the statement we have already quoted more than once, B.M. Shaposhnikov, the battalion and regimental headquarters there had not yet mastered the "Instructions for deep combat" (that is, the basics of modern tactics for those years).

B. Artillery

Shooting and artillery training. Speech by the Chief [of the General Staff of the Red Army B.M. Shaposhnikov, who noted on November 26, 1938, that the Soviet artillery "fires mainly at squares"!, forces us to recognize the shooting and artillery training the then Soviet

207

artillery commanders are nothing more than mediocre. After all, shooting at squares meant that commanders did not know how to hit badly or not at all observable targets ... Our conclusion is also confirmed by the fact of only "satisfactory" (read: mediocre) rifle and artillery training of the artillery commanders of such an important strategic grouping, as the Kiev district was directly recognized on November 22 by the commander of the KOVO troops S.K. Timoshenko. Artillery commanders of the Siberian District (SibVO), as well as the command staff of the regimental artillery of the North Caucasus District (SKVO) and the commanders of artillery battalions of the MVO, did not shoot better then: the results of the final firing (depending before

just from the qualifications of a battery or division commander) turned out to be there - like the KOVO artillery - only "mediocre" ... 72

True, I.R. Apanasenko reported to the SAVO commanders at the council that his artillery was shooting "not bad"; according to two other commanders, the situation was the same in the artillery of the LVO (in various types of which, from 58 to 70% of the final firing, according to M.S. Khozin, were performed "good" and "excellent"), and in batteries of divisional artillery of the Moscow Military District (of which, according to S.M. Budyonny, 63% showed good and excellent results in the final firing)⁷³. But these estimates and figures cannot be trusted. Let us recall the statement made at the same council a year earlier by the head of artillery of the Red Army commander N.N. Voronov, according to which the Soviet gunners are not only "heavily infected with fraud," but practice it on such a scale that fraud in the Red Army must be eliminated "in the very first place" among artillerymen. Therefore, the statements of the commanders of the SAVO, LVO and MVO troops cannot serve as evidence of the good shooting and artillery training of the artillery commanders of these districts, and even more so, they cannot shake our conclusion about the mediocrity of this training in the artillery of the then Red Army as a whole.

But the artillery of the Red Army was clearly doomed to firing at squares even in the "pre-repression" period. Firing at unobserved targets presupposes a good knowledge of the theory of shooting, and the command staff of the Soviet artillery has it.

208

lerii and in 1935 was, according to the General Staff of the Red Army, "insufficient to justify the rules of shooting"?⁷⁴. The inability to apply the analytical method of data preparation, used when firing at unobservable targets, among the artillery commanders of the Red Army was widespread in 1936 (when it was found even among some of those who were selected to participate in the All-Army Rifle artillery competitions of battery commanders!), and in the first half of 1937, when even in such a strategically important military district as OKDVA, only an "insignificant number" of artillery commanders mastered the analytical method (and the bulk still "lost" if it poorly observed the target, and "did not work out" "shooting to hit unobserved targets") and when artillery was "accustomed" to shoot only "at perfectly visible targets" even in the advanced KVO!⁷⁵ Accordingly, artillery shooting training commanding staff of the artillery of the Kiev district was no more than satisfactory, not only in 1938, but also before the start of the purge of the Red Army. As, however, in the 35th (when even the annual report of the KVO of October 11, 1935, which greatly embellished reality, admitted that the "mathematical illiteracy" of artillery commanders, which did not allow them to master the theory of shooting, and hence solve complex fire tasks, only decreased, but did not disappear), and in the 36th (when the political department of the KVO, in its report of May 5, 1936, did not dare to hide from Moscow that artillery "firing under difficult conditions, for the most part, gives unsatisfactory results", and the compilers of the heavily "varnished" annual report of October 4, 1936, that the commander of a division in the district "cannot yet be recognized as well prepared," and when eyewash in the artillery of the KVO bloomed so luxuriantly that the assurances of the report in It is impossible to trust the "good" ability to shoot battery commanders!⁷⁶ For example, in the 60th Infantry Division there was a case when the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 60th Artillery Regiment, Captain Oristov, informed the firing battery commanders in advance of the coordinates of their observation post and firing positions of their batteries. In one of the regimental batteries of the same division, when

203

when shooting at tanks, gun commanders also counted those holes in the target that were made by those who fired before them. In the 100th Rifle Division, the gunners were given larger targets, and in one of the regimental batteries, the shooters themselves were replaced before firing - instead of the junior commanders of military service, they were put on the guns of the re-enlisted. And in the elite 44th Rifle Division, the reports were falsified: if artillery firing turned out to be successful, it was registered as a credit, and if it was badly fired, as a training one ...).

In the same way, the results of the final firing of the artillery of the Kyiv district were "mediocre" not only in 1938, but also in 1936. The fact that these firings were carried out on "mediocre" divisions and artillery groups was even admitted by the compilers of the KVO report for 1936, who did their best to hide their failures, and the information they cited about the generally good results of battery firings are, as we have just noted, explicit subscripts.

As for the mediocre shooting and artillery training, which distinguished in the 38th artillery commanders of the Siberian Military District, the command staff of the regimental artillery of the North Caucasus Military District and the commanders of the artillery battalions of the Moscow Military District, then in the "pre-repression" 35th in all these districts, artillery fire training (determined primarily by shooting -artillery training of command personnel) was, according to the report of A.I. Sedyakin from 1 December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...", in general, "at the elementary level" ". Accordingly, in the 1936 and the first half of the 1937, it was hardly able to rise above the same mediocre mark...

Tactical learning. In the Red Army, indicated on November 29, 1938 by K.E. Voroshilov, "the interaction of the military branches is bad", but "the interaction of artillery with the other branches of the troops served by it is especially bad", "as the artillerymen themselves admit, and non-artillerymen especially cry about it, it, unfortunately, is poorly connected with the infantry, badly interacts - works with cavalry, with tank troops"? . The same was acknowledged on November 23 by the head of artillery of the Red Army commander N.N. Voronov: "The interaction of artillery with ground troops and with aviation is unsatisfactory." But
This

210

interaction is organized by commanders and headquarters! Taking into account the fact that, according to Voronov, the artillery commanders also poorly controlled their units (both on the march and in battle), and also poorly organized artillery reconnaissance and observation (without setting, for example, specific tasks for observers), The tactical training of Soviet artillery commanders of the autumn of 1938 can be confidently described as unsatisfactory.

Such an assessment, in general, is not contradicted by the information reported by the commanders of the troops of the districts. S.K. Timoshenko characterized the tactical training of the KOVO artillery commanders as satisfactory, but commander V.Ya. Kachalov admitted that his divisional artillery was "prepared for firing" only "in a stable position, maneuvering with wheels was poorly practiced" and that "hadn't achieved maneuverability" and not artillery0 (they admitted that the commanders of artillery of the North Caucasus Military District were tactically prepared Badly.)...

And again: "the interaction of artillery with other branches of the troops served by it" was clearly bad in the 36th. According to the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army", the "weak side of the training" of the artillery divisions was then "their completely insufficient tactical work together with the infantry"! and the practical work on organizing interaction with other branches of the artillery in artillery lay precisely on the commander and headquarters of the division ... From the statement of K.E. Voroshilov at the Military Council on November 27, 1937 that "the interaction of artillery with infantry and other branches of the military remains [highlighted by me. — A.S.] weak"⁸², it follows that it was also weak in the first, "pre-repression" half of the 1937th.

As for the ability of artillery commanders to control their units, then, according to the above-mentioned report by Tukhachevsky, in the divisional artillery "mass fire control" (i.e., control of units whose fire was massed) was also practiced in the 36th only theoretically - but "practically" this question "in all parts" was "not resolved and not fixed." Obviously, things were no better here in the first half of the 37th: after all, the "training" of the artillery command staff "for command and control

211

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210

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fire" (as established in the first half of June by I.F. Fedko's check of the new KVO command troops) was then "weak" even in the advanced Kiev district⁸³,

In our opinion, three facts testify very eloquently to the state of affairs with the organization in the "pre-repression" period of artillery reconnaissance. In 1935, even in such a strategically important grouping as OKDVA, the commanders of the artillery headquarters not only poorly organized this reconnaissance, but, according to the head of artillery of the army V.N. Kozlovsky, "did not know" often, "where and what to look for". In the only act of the inspector review of the combat training of the artillery unit of the advanced (!) BVO (37th artillery regiment of the 37th rifle division) that has survived from 1936, we immediately come across the phrase: "Insufficient attention is paid to artillery reconnaissance, as on the march, as well as during the battle. And in one more advanced district - the KVO - "the questions of organizing and conducting reconnaissance in the process of battle by all means" were (as established by the same check by I.F. Fedko) were "not worked out" even on the very eve of the purge of the Red Army, in June 1937⁸⁴..

Already from what has been said in the previous two paragraphs, it can be seen that the tactical training of the commanding officers of the artillery of the Kiev district was no more than satisfactory, not only in the 38th, but also at the moment the mass repressions began (when, according to the same order of I.F. Fedko No. 0100 of June 22, 1937, this command staff "did not work out" the "most important issues of interaction" with other branches of the military, and the organization of topographic reconnaissance ... ⁸⁵). This training was by no means more than satisfactory even in 1935-1936. Indeed, in the 35th in the KVO (as even his report for this year admitted) the fire control of the artillery group was only satisfactorily worked out, and tactical artillery exercises were of poor quality. And in 1936, as the compilers of the corresponding annual report again confessed, the commanders of divisions in the KVO "could not be recognized as well trained", the chiefs of staff of the artillery regiments "poorly" led the communications service, and "the tactical use of battalion and regimental guns" was worked out "poorly" ... ⁸⁶

Technical training. Recognizing in his speech on November 23, 1938 that the technical training of the artillery of the Red Army is "bad", N.N. Voronov thereby admitted that she was bad

212

and at the command staff. It is significant that this time S.K. Timoshenko, who insisted (see above) that in terms of small arms and artillery and tactical terms, they nevertheless, they are satisfactorily prepared (i.e., higher than the average for the Red Army.) ... ⁸⁷

However, on December 11, 1935, the Military Council heard that the commanders of the Soviet artillery were "technically poorly prepared" (from N.M. Rogovsky, inspector of artillery of the Red Army)⁸⁸. Judging by the situation in the two most important military districts, this preparedness was clearly not the best in the subsequent "pre-repression" months. The technical training of the artillery commanders of the OKDVA in November 1936 was described (by Major V. Nesterov from the 2nd department of the headquarters of this army) as "poor", and in April 1937 (in the "Materials on Combat Training of Artillery", drawn up at the same headquarters or in the apparatus of the chief of artillery OKDVA) as "weak". As we showed in Chapter 1, the technical knowledge demonstrated by the 36th command staff of the artillery of the BVO deserved the same assessment, and from the reservation: the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937 (knowledge in the field of caring for artillery materiel among the commanders "still [emphasis added by me. - A.S.] in many cases unsatisfactory" ⁰) it is clear that the same picture was in this district in the last months before the start of the purge of the Red Army.

B. Signal Corps Commanders

Frequent at that time cases of the termination of the work of communications in the dynamics of the battle, the head of the Communications Department of the Red Army, brigade commander I.A. Naydenov, in his speech on November 25, 1938, explained that "the heads of communications units and subdivisions themselves are not yet well trained

in tactical and technical terms"?!. From the clarification "themselves" "it follows that other signal commanders were not better (but rather even worse) prepared. But if the level of their preparedness was such that they could not ensure the maintenance of uninterrupted communications during the battle, then, thinking

213

It turns out that we should not talk about "not good enough", but about the mediocre technical and tactical training of the then Soviet signalmen commanders.

However, in the "pre-repression period" this training was even worse! Even according to the annual report of the OKDVA signal troops dated October 7, 1935 (which, of course, could have embellished the state of affairs), the technical training of the Far Eastern commanders of the Hervyazists was then only satisfactory (read: mediocre), and in terms of tactics, even such an assessment deserved only commanders of battalions and communications companies and communications chiefs of rifle regiments, while others were unsatisfactorily trained. In the other largest military district, Kievsky, as even its heavily "varnished" annual report of October 11, 1935 admitted, the tactical training of the chiefs of communications centers was then unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly, both the technical and tactical training of signal commanders was then no more than satisfactory in the Red Army as a whole - after all, it did not exceed this level in it even in 1936. In the KVO then, according to even the annual report of this district of October 4, 1936, up to 60% of the command staff of the communications troops "required serious improvement" in technical training; the fact of the weakness of the technical training of the then commanders of the OKDVA signal troops was also (albeit indirectly) recognized even by the report of this army for 1936, which delicately noted that the "technical training" of signal commanders "rests on the weakness of the general educational level." And the only source on the BVO that has survived here is a report on the verification by the commission of the UBP RKKA of the course of combat training of the 2nd Infantry Division on July 3-8, 1936, stated that the "overwhelming majority" of the signalmen commanders of the 2nd DIVISION "poorly" knows electrical and radio engineering, radio commanders "do not yet have the proper skills, even in preparing radios for action," and telegraph commanders showed "unsatisfactory" work on Morse devices?2.

As for tactical training, even the report of the KVO for 1936, which was recklessly lying, did not dare to declare that its signal commanders had mastered the issues of organizing communications more than "quite satisfactorily". In the BVI - judging by. co

214

stored sources - the tactical training of signal commanders was then as unsatisfactory as the technical one: on June 8-23, 1936, having checked separate signal battalions of the 16th rifle corps and the 2nd and 81st rifle divisions, the communications department of the BVO I found that in the first two of them, the tactical-special training (i.e., knowledge of the tactics of the signal troops) among the commanders is weak, and in the third, the commanders did not work out the prescribed special-tactical tasks (they also do not shine with tactical training). At the beginning of July, signal commanders of the 2nd Infantry Division also revealed illiteracy in the field of general tactics - the commission of the UBP RKKA found there such a "general gap in the training of command personnel" as the inability to work with a map ... 33 In 1936, the exercise of the Signal Corps of the Primorsky Group revealed such flaws in the tactical training of the commanders that it was hardly possible to eliminate them even by winter. The commanders of communications battalions did not know how to organize communications throughout the entire battle moving in space, almost all commanders were poorly able to work with a map and work out operational documents ... The command structure of the communications units of rifle units can be judged by the fact that during the tactical exercise, which took place in the first days of April 1936, in the 1st Special Rifle Division—the only one that the available sources characterize from the side of interest to us now—this command staff showed that they were unable to organize communication either in the offensive or in the oncoming in battle, not even on the march, and does not know how to maneuver communications... The fact that "the work of all types of communications" in the Red Army is "tactically not flexible enough" was also noted in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 of November 3, 1936 .94.

As we have shown in Chapter 1, the tactical training of the command staff of the signal troops of the Red Army (there are not enough sources for technical conclusions) remained no more than satisfactory even immediately before the start of mass repressions.

The speakers at the council did not cover the training of the commanders of the engineering troops.

215

2. TROOPS A. Foot soldiers

Tactical learning. Speech by K.E. Voroshilova on November 29, 1938, points to the certainly weak tactical training of the then single infantryman: "The troops are still not properly trained to use a shovel, use the terrain [i.e. apply to her. - A.S.], to disguise themselves. [...] We still don't know how to conduct close combat." True, from further words of the People's Commissar it can be concluded that at least part of these assessments were inspired by his personal impressions of the September maneuvers of the MVOZ5, however, the speeches of a number of commanders of troops and members of the military councils of the districts confirm that the tactical training of a single - where is weak in the entire Red Army. So, infantrymen not only of the Moscow Military District, but also of the Kalvo and ZakVO (and possibly the LVO, where "work with a shovel" "got its place mainly" only after the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0165 of August 27, 1938 .96). Close combat was poorly practiced not only in the MVO, but also in the BOVO (where it was replaced by a simple running around in a crowd - "come down with a rampart, then we'll sort it out"97), and in the LVO (where an ordinary infantryman was not yet accustomed to observing the battlefield); poor camouflage was also characteristic of the BOVO infantry. (True, according to the commanders of this last M.P. Kovalev, the general tactical training of the infantryman was still satisfactory there, but it is suspicious that Kovalev kept silent about the inability to disguise himself; only a member of the Military Council of the BOVO reported about this flaw divisional commissar I.V. Rogov...) In KOVO, the weakness of the training of an infantry fighter was indicated by S.K. Timoshenko's poor ability to act in reconnaissance, patrol, sentry and marching guards - in a word, wherever a soldier was required to show initiative and

independence...

We have to admit that the tactical training of the then infantry units of the Red Army was also weak. This is already evidenced by the fact that they still did not know how to achieve a well-coordinated "interaction of fire and movement" in the course of an infantry attack. "Until now, we have fire on its own, and movement on its own,

216

moreover, the fire is conducted in such a way that it strikes its people, "K.E. summed up on November 29. Voroshilov; of his in training, determined to infantry even recognized the commanders of the BOVO M.P. Kovalev, clearly not this defect be "absolutely honest, truthful and, of course, frank in his speech" ... And in the "special" Kiev district, the divisions were not even a little slightly knocked together: the combat formations of the KOVO infantry of the autumn 1938 model were "distinguished by crowding"! 9?

But from the fact that "camouflage and a shovel during an offensive are often poorly used", and "the use of battle formations on the ground is not always satisfactory" - about all this, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Egorov reported to the Military Council as early as December 8, 1935.100 Let us emphasize again that the assessments of this report were clearly smoothed, and Alexander Ilyich probably should have omitted the words "often" and "not always" ... Of the 12 rifle divisions of the UVO / KVO, BVO and OKDVA, we have information about the tactical training of the infantry in 1935 (12th, 21st, 27th, 29th, 34th, 37th, 40th, 43- th, 44th, 51st, 96th and 3rd collective farms), poor camouflage was directly recorded in 9, and in 6 inspectors noted poor application to the area ... In the "pre-repression" 1936 of 5 infantry divisions of the advanced BVO, whose tactical training is covered by sources (2nd, 33rd, 37th, 48th and 81st), the inability of fighters to disguise was noted in 3, poor skills in applying to the terrain - in 4, neglect of self-digging - in 3; out of 7 such divisions of the OKDVA (12th, 59th, 66th, 69th, 92nd, 104th and 105th) - respectively in 4.2 and 2 (in reality, apparently, in more: judging by the confessions of the annual report

OKDVA itself dated September 30, 1936, in the materials of inspections of the seven Far Eastern divisions, not all the shortcomings of these formations were listed). In the advanced KVO (as the political administration of this district itself reported to Moscow on May 5, 1936), "sufficient camouflage" of a fighter on the battlefield could not be achieved anywhere else in the spring of 36 ... 10!

Well, in the last months before the start of the purge of the Red Army, with the above skills, the Soviet infantry fighters were not only no better, but almost even worse,

217

than in 1938! "Especially weak is camouflage and self-entrenchment," was the directive letter of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937¹⁰². In the winter and spring of 1937, the BVO report for that year echoes him, the fighter "did not acquire the necessary skills" "in camouflage and self-digging" (and also "was not sufficiently trained in the proper use of the terrain"). "The shovel is rarely and ineptly used in all types of combat activity," notes the order on the KVO No. 0100 of June 22, 1937¹⁰³. In the orders for the 17th and 23rd rifle corps, the only ones in the KVO and the BVO, from which documentation for the first half of [1937] has been preserved, we find not only complete confirmation of these estimates (infantry of the 37th Rifle Division of the 23rd Corps, "self-digging skills", as checks showed, were not "vaccinated" either in April or by June 11, "camouflage elements" - even, at least in April, and in the 17th Corps the shovel was used "rarely" even in mid-July), but also an indication that in the Kiev district the infantryman did not know how to apply the terrain in the same way as in the Belorussian district (in units of the 24th and 96th Rifle Divisions [of the 7th Corps] checked on July 13-16 [the fighters of the 7th Corps turned out to be not taught "to move skillfully during the offensive by methods depending on the nature of the terrain"]...¹⁰⁴ According to the order of V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year, the inability to dig in under enemy fire was then also characteristic of the OKDVA infantrymen, and we find commanders' complaints about the soldiers' inability to disguise themselves in the documents of four of the then 12 Blucher rifle divisions (21st, 40th, 59th and 105th). We have no data on the "pre-repression" state of affairs with self-digging in the ZakVO, MVO and LVO, but in two other specific military districts, whose command complained in 1938 about the poor ability of their infantrymen to dig in and / or disguise - Belorussian and Kalinin (formed in 1938 from a part of Belorussian), as we see, this skill has not diminished since the "pre-repression" times. We add that of the 12 listed above, for which there is information about the tactical training of their infantry in 1935, four

218

BVO DIVISIONS - 27th, 29th, 37th and the future "Kalinin" 43rd - it was bad with camouflage in all four. .

And with regard to the ability of the infantry to conduct close combat between the BOVO of the 1938 model and the "pre-repression" BVO, the similarity is generally absolute! The 27th Infantry Division of the BVO, checked on this score in March 1935, is exactly like the infantry of the BOVO in the 38th! — instead of close combat, she demonstrated exactly the same simple crowd movement according to the principle of "fall in a rampage, then we'll sort it out" — "spontaneous uniform frontal attack", "spontaneous movement shot by the enemy" ... At the famous Belarusian maneuvers in 1936, exactly the same "indiscriminate, little realized in its tactical meaning, forward movement" was also shown by the "shock" (!) 2nd rifle division; perhaps others attacked there in the same way (as the head of the UBP of the Red Army, commander of the 2nd rank A.I. Sedyakin, who observed the maneuvers, noted, the training of divisions in the BVO was then distinguished by "great uniformity" ...). According to the district's annual report of October 15, 1937, "the necessary skills in movement and rushes" (i.e., in the most important elements of all the same close combat) the infantryman in the BVO "did not receive" and in the first half of 37- go...¹⁰⁵

We have no information about the conduct of close combat by the infantry of the "pre-repression" MVO and LVO, but we can confidently say that - as in the case of camouflage, self-entrenchment and

In the application to the terrain - the inability to conduct this battle, the infantry then distinguished itself throughout the Red Army. In fact, back in 1936 this was the case in all three major military districts. The BVO was mentioned above, but for the KVO and OKDVA even the compilers of such fraudulent documents as the reports of the named districts for 1936 had to admit this! "Issues of close combat," the authors of the "Kyiv" report pointed out reluctantly, "are still in the process of development [...]". The authors of the OKDVA report were even more frank: "tactical training of infantry units" is characterized by "weak close combat skills"...106 The fact that the Soviet infantryman "does not have solid skills in rushing, crawling" and other elements close combat, was also noted in the directive letter of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937¹⁹⁷. (As we have seen

219

higher, this was the case even in the advanced BVO, and OKDVA "skills and practical skills in the art of close combat" among the infantry, according to the report of the headquarters of this army of May 18, 1937, "absent" then "absolutely"!108)

As for the poor ability of the KVO fighters to act in reconnaissance, patrol and security, noted in November 1938, in the "pre-repression" period these vices were also inherent in the infantry of the entire Red Army! Recall the assessment of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 dated November 3, 1936: "Intelligence remains [highlighted by me. - A.S.] a weak point in the preparation

for forging most parts and connections! 99. And in the last months before the start of the purge of the Red Army, as stated in the directive letter of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937 - the Soviet infantryman poorly mastered even actions in patrol and guarding; what to say about more complex actions in reconnaissance?

The "interaction of fire and movement" of infantry subunits in the Red Army was also lame not only in the 38th, but also in the 35th. "During the offensive", reported on December 8, 1935 to the Military Council A.I. Yegorov, "sometimes it is noted" "insufficient interaction of rifle units with machine-gun units". The word "sometimes" here clearly embellished reality. This phenomenon occurred even at the Kiev maneuvers, which were rehearsed for a long time by units of the advanced (!) KVO, where heavy machine guns more than once lagged behind their advancing infantry. Of the four rifle divisions of the advanced BVO, the tactical training of the infantry of which in 1935 is covered by sources, flaws in the interaction of fire and movement were noted in one, and in the other (27th) this interaction was absent in principle! In the Primorsky OKDVA group (i.e., in the main grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East), "the issues of the interaction of machine-gun fire and infantry movement in the mountains and taiga" (i.e., in the conditions usual for the local theater), according to the - for the commander of the group No. 0517 dated [November 5, 1935, they were also "worked out" "insufficiently" then ...! 10

Even in 1936, of the 7 rifle divisions of the OKDVA, the tactical training of the infantry of which that year was illuminated by sources, a weak ability to combine fire and movement was noted in 3, and in the advanced (!) BVO - as can be seen from the

220

'tired four paragraphs above the impressions of A.I. Sedyakin from the Belorussian maneuvers of 1936 - there was no interaction between fire and movement at all! For the first half of 1937, of all the troops of the BVO, documentation was preserved only for the 23rd Rifle Corps, but even in it we find a statement of the fact that infantry (even in the first days of June!) cannot combine fire and movement. The same follows from the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937, which indicated poor interaction between the shooters and machine gunners (who were supposed to prepare and cover the throw of the shooters forward) inside the squad and between squads (that is, between rifle and machine gun) in a platoon (companies and battalions had not yet been knocked together). We do not have information on the CVO, but from the data for the other two largest districts, one can

conclude that the defect we are now examining for the Soviet infantry was typical even on the eve of the purge of the Red Army.

What has been said in the previous two paragraphs relieves us of the need to emphasize that the inability of the infantry to combine fire and movement was not the result of repressions in that particular district, which admitted this inability at the Military Council of 1938 - Belorussian.

The crowding of battle formations, which was characteristic of the infantry of the Kyiv district in 1938, also distinguished this infantry even before the purge of the Red Army. The fact that "in the offensive there are often cases of too much concentration of battle formations" did not dare to deny even the annual report of the KVO dated October 11, 1935, which shamelessly glossed over its shortcomings (in fact, "accumulations of significant infantry groups, well observed by the defenders behind 1!/,—2 kilometers," could not be avoided even during the carefully rehearsed Kiev maneuvers of 1935!) And!. Tactical training company, platoon and squad, reported | September 1936 K.E. Vo-Roshilov A.I. Sedyakin his impressions of the Polesye maneuvers of the KVO, "with a few exceptions, not up to par with your demands." Since the head of the UBP of the Red Army reported the same thing after the Belarussian maneuvers that had passed two weeks later, at which the infantry attacked "in crowds from squads"! 12, it can be concluded that crowding during the offensive in the KVO had

place and on

221

Polesky maneuvers, in August 1936 ... In one of the two rifle divisions of this district, on the tactical training of infantry for the first half of 1937, detailed information was preserved (in the 96th), - her command of the 17th Rifle Corps found "unworked out" also on June 3-4; Thus, the crowding of battle formations in the KVO was a common thing even before the start of the purge of the Red Army. ` -

Fire training. At the Military Council, its level was more or less clearly characterized by 8 out of 15 commanders of military districts and individual armies. If you believe their speeches, then in four districts - Moscow, Belorussian, Kalinin and Kharkov - infantry fire training was then unsatisfactory (in the BOVO and KhVO it was close to satisfactory, but in the KalVO the infantrymen fired poorly from two types of rifle of three weapons, and in the Moscow Military District all the inspected units from a rifle, and from a light machine gun, and from an easel machine gun fired exclusively to "failure"). Still in four districts - Leningrad, Kiev, North Caucasus and Central Asia - the infantry, according to the reports of their commanders, extended the fire to "satisfactory" (for the last three districts, this follows from the fact that in the North Caucasian Military District and SAVO they fired well from a rifle, from an easel machine gun - mediocre and from a light machine gun - bad, and in KOVO, respectively, mediocre, mediocre and bad!13). But at the same time, in the LVO, two of the six rifle divisions had "bad luck" for the fire, and the infantrymen of the entire district "did not master" the light machine gun ...!14

Apparently, the commanders of the SibvVoO and ZakVO troops also wanted to say about the satisfaction of the fire skills of their infantrymen, the first of whom reported only that they shoot "excellently" from an easel machine gun, and "worse" from a manual machine gun, and the second - that two of its six rifle divisions are no longer "bad" in fire training, as in 1937, but "satisfactory" and that from a rifle "in all parts of the district" 40-60% of the fighters shoot "excellently"!! (If, for all that, the fire skills of their infantry as a whole

222

`took on "good", then the commanders S.A. Kalinin and I.V. Tyulenev, of course, would not have failed to report so directly.)

The fire training of the infantry of the 1st and 2nd separate Red Banner armies (i.e., the former OKDVA) was also then maximally satisfactory. After all, small arms there, as inspectors from the UBP RKKA established, were not "brought to accurate combat, and in the 34th Infantry Division of the 2nd Army in August 1938, even among the fighters allocated to repel the supposed

attacks by the Japanese turned out to be "unable to shoot a rifle and even open the lock [bolt. - A.S.] "...116

Thus, even if we rely on the self-reports of the commanders of the troops of the districts, of which, of course, by no means all were able to heed the appeal of the people's commissar not to allow "no embellishments, no smearing, no lubricating formulations and provisions" - even in this case, the fire skills of the Soviet infantry of the autumn 1938 model should be characterized as average between satisfactory and unsatisfactory. If we take into account the old traditions of godless multi-level fraud in firearms training, then the assessment should be "failed", and only "failed".

In this opinion, we are also strengthened by the clearly unsatisfactory ability of the then infantrymen of the Red Army to use hand grenades. After all, even in the "special" Belarusian district, junior commanders and those very often did not know how to correctly, to the end, screw the fuse into a grenade or forgot to pull the safety pin before throwing - because of which, at one of the tactical exercises with live shooting almost 50% of more than 180 grenades thrown by junior commanders did not explode. ("Grenade throwing as a fire type of combat training," MP Kovalev was forced to state on November 21, 1938, by the BOVO command troops, "we have not mastered it yet!" 7.)

But what has changed here in comparison with the "pre-repression" period? The fire training of the infantry of the Kyiv district was no more than satisfactory not only in 1938, but in 1935. In fact, in the spring of that year, out of the three rifle divisions checked in the UVO / KVO by the 2nd department

223

Headquarters of the Red Army, one (44th) received "good" in fire training, and two (51st and 96th) received only "satisfactory" (at the same time, in the 96th, as in the KVO of the 1938 model, poorly owned machine gun). From the assessments of fire training given in the annual report of the KVO dated September 11, 1935, it follows that the "Kiev" infantry then deserved the maximum "quite satisfactory" for fire training! 18, And since the report strongly glossed over reality, and eyewash in fire training in the district of I.E. Yakira was developed (see Chapter 1) as in no other, the true assessment could even be "failed"... According to the annual report of the KVO dated October 4, 1936, the fire skills of his "good", but (not to mention the possibility of falsifying the numbers in the report itself) these were the results of inspector firing, on which, as we saw in chapter 1, parts of I.E. Yakira systematically rubbed his glasses. It is known, for example, that at the inspection firing of the 1st battalion of the 132nd rifle regiment of the 44th rifle division in September 1936, company commanders senior lieutenants Mirny and Veretelnikov and platoon commanders lieutenants Ivanov and Golubik - with the knowledge of the battalion commander captain K.P. . Troshchia - carried out the replacement of shooters: if a fighter fired well, he was taken to the line of fire once more, as part of another unit. In addition, the command staff there also organized the falsification of holes in the targets; the same was done then at inspector firing in the 1st battalion of the 70th rifle regiment of the 24th rifle division (where a file and a pile were used for this purpose), and the shooters were replaced by willows of the 60th rifle ... Known to us control firing, carried out without warning, brought only from 2 to 3.5 points to the rifle units of the KVO in 1936! 9. So the fire skills of the KVO infantry were no more than satisfactory even in 1936... Well, in the first half of 1937 it was definitely not at a satisfactory level, but at a "low level"! All the documents of units and formations that have survived from this period fully confirm this assessment of the order of the new command troops KVO No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937. "Poor shooting", "low level of fire training" were constantly complained at then at party meetings 2 -th battalion of the 135th rifle and machine-gun brigade; O

224

"Low performance in firearms training" was also vied with each other at the April party conference of the 60th Infantry Division. "We have the results of shooting training, which are also not very good [...]," the VLKSM bureau of the 131st rifle regiment of the 44th rifle division noted in its report for the period January 20-June 23, 1937, "we shoot badly." One and the same picture

the results of inspections by the headquarters of the 17th rifle corps of units of the 24th and 96th rifle divisions were also revealed. Thus, the results of the firing conducted on March 28-April 5, 1937 in the 71st Rifle Regiment of the 24th Division and the 287th Rifle Regiment of the 96th, showed "that the quality of fire training has sharply decreased in compared with the previous (1936) year"; "very low" was also the result of firing conducted in the 96th division on June 7-10, and a check of the results of the 4th training period, carried out on July 13-16, revealed that fire training was also weak in the 96th and 24 -yY...120

The fire training of the infantry of the Belorussian district in the 38th was only approaching satisfactory, it was also the same in the 35th. Even according to the data reported then to Moscow (in the annual report of October 21, 1935) by the political department of the BVO, half of the final marks of rifle divisions in fire training were unsatisfactory, another quarter were satisfactory, and only a quarter were good!?! If we take into account the widespread I.P. Uborevich's practice of relaxing the requirements for a shooting fighter, then the true assessment of the fire skills of the BVO infantry in 1935 will generally turn out to be pure "unsuccessful". (If, noted in September 1935, after checking the combat training of the 29th Infantry Division of the BVO, Assistant Inspector of the Infantry of the Red Army RS. Ziffer, to the unit, accustomed to receiving "good" for shooting, "all requirements are made completely and without any concessions, the results begin to fluctuate and, as a rule, do not rise above "satisfactory"...122") [6 to 3.3 points! 23), the "failure" in the fire infantry of the BVO deserved in 1936. And for the first half of 1937, this assessment was actually given to her. The results of the final training for the winter period of May firing, indicated in the report of the BVO for 1937,

8- 2255 225

"the vast majority of units are low"...124 Thus, the fire skills of the infantry of the Belorussian district after the purge of the Red Army did not worsen at all. (If we accept MP Kovalev's assertion that in the fall of 1938 this training was approaching satisfactory, then it turns out that the situation even improved; however, Kovalev clearly wishful thinking...)

All that has been said about the BVO also applies to the Kalinin District, whose troops until 1938 were part of the Belorussian District.

The fire skills of the infantrymen from the Far East, even judging by the final assessments of the units and formations contained in the annual reports of the OKDVA dated October 21, 1935 and September 30, 1936,¹²⁵ were unequivocally unsatisfactory in 1935- m, and 1936. According to the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937 and the certificate reflecting the results of the May and June checks "The state of combat training of the troops of the OKDVA by July 15, 1937", in the last "pre-repression" months this training was satisfactory, but the analysis of other documents makes recognize it as approaching "failure". After all, firstly, out of Blucher's 13 rifle divisions, 7 km on May 7 and 5 on July deserved only "failure" here, and secondly, many of the then satisfactory points were obtained only thanks to eyewash. "We are accustomed, to one degree or another, to do [so in the document. - / A.S.] deviation from charters, instructions, we got into the habit of rounding the results of the shooting, in order to thereby increase the overall score [...]", - the commander of 32 th Infantry Division Colonel N.V. Smirnov ... 126 As for the specific facts cited at the Military Council of 1938, then, as we saw in Chapter 2, small arms were not brought to accurate combat in many Far Eastern units, checked in 1936- m. And the lack of elementary skills in handling weapons, revealed in 1938 in the 34th Infantry Division, among its fighters was also evident in the "pre-repression" February 1937 - and also in the unit allocated to repel a possible Japanese attack! In this unit - the 1st battalion of the 102nd rifle regiment - they did not know how to fill with cartridges even

magazines for light machine guns, no tapes for easel ones, and also to put these tapes in cartridge boxes ...

The fire training of the infantry of the Moscow Military District and the KhVO was also drawn to "failure" not only in 1938, but in the "pre-repression" period. VMEVO at the 35th level, according to the head of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin, was generally "elementary"; "at a very low level," said S.M. Budenny, she "continued to remain [emphasis added by me. - A.S. " iv 37-m127, A.S.K. Tymoshenko, reporting on November 22, 1937 to the same council about the unsatisfactory fire training of the infantry of his HVO, noted that compared to the previous (that is, "pre-repression" - 4.S.) time, this training had not improved, but did not mention and the deterioration...

Obviously, as a result of mass repressions, the fire training of the infantry of the North Caucasian Military District, Siberian Military District and LVO did not deteriorate. In the first two, she was still in the 35th (according to the same report by A.I. Sedyakin dated | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...") "at the elementary level ". It was clearly unrealistic to rise from it higher than the satisfactory one, in which the infantry of both districts were listed here in the 38th, in the year and a half remaining before the purge of the Red Army (as we saw, even the advanced districts could not achieve this at that time). Av LVO - as it appears from the report of his command troops P.E. Dybenko at the Military Council on November 21, 1937 - by the summer of the 37th, the infantryman had poorly worked out elementary methods of handling weapons. In such conditions, the fire skills of the "pre-repression" infantry of the LVO could not be more than satisfactory (i.e., be higher than in the 38th) ...

In the ZakVO (as we saw in Chapter 1), the infantry in the "pre-repression" years did not have a "failure" in fire training only due to eyewash. In SAVO, at least, from a light machine gun to "unsuccessful" they also shot not only in the 38th, but throughout the entire "pre-repression" period: tasks for firing from a DP, noted in November 37th at Military Council of the SAVO A.D. Loktionov, NOT PERFORMED "From YEAR TO YEAR"... 128

Poor handling of a hand grenade, demonstrated in the 38th infantrymen of the Belorussian district, was clearly

227

characteristic of them in the 36th. After all, it is hardly a coincidence that those two rifle regiments of the BVO, about the successes of which in grenade throwing in the "pre-repression" period, information has been preserved (110th and 111th), in October 1936, they had unpredictable 1.4-1, 8 points...!29

Physical training. A bayonet fight, noted on November 29 by K.E. Voroshilov, in the Red Army in 1938 "were not really engaged"! 29, In the Moscow Military District, confirmed S.M. Budyonny, bayonet fighting by the autumn of 1938 was "really" "not mastered"!30; apparently, the situation was the same in the LVO, where they took up this battle only in the fall ...

However, in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937, bayonet combat in the Red Army (as noted in A.I. for the infantry of the OKDVA (for other districts there is no information for 1935-1936), the inability to work with a bayonet was characteristic throughout the entire "pre-repression" period. In 1935, even OKDVA report for this year;

B. Lanquists

Tactical learning. Judging by the speeches of those who at least somehow touched upon this issue, tactically, the tank units and subunits of the Red Army in the autumn of 1938 were prepared no more than satisfactorily. According to the reports of the respective commanders of the troops, the concentration of tank crews, platoons and companies in the LVO was then quite satisfactory, and that of battalions was satisfactory; in the North Caucasus Military District tank companies and

the squadrons were only put together satisfactorily, while the tank battalions and regiments were even "worse". Approximately the same, apparently, was the case in the Moscow Military District (where "personnel" "achieved coherence" only "of the crew, platoon and company"), and in

228

KalVO "somehow" was worked out only "the action of the crew", and already "companies were not worked out completely"...133

But after all, in the first, "pre-repression" half of the 37th - as is clear from the message of A.I. Egorov of June 27, 1937, about the lack of practice in the tank troops of the Red Army of combat firing (i.e. tactical exercises with live firing) even on a platoon scale - even tank platoons were not properly put together in the Red Army! In those tank battalions that were transferred in 1938 (together with the rifle divisions they were a part of) from Belorussian to the Kalinin district, companies were unlikely to have been knocked together in the 36th. After all, all four tank companies, transferred at the end of 1936 by separate tank battalions of rifle divisions of the BVO to the 4th mechanized brigade, "tactically" turned out to be prepared "weakly"!34. And they were taken from four different battalions... We do not have information about the "pre-repression" level of concentration of tank units of the Moscow Military District, LVO and North Caucasian Military District, but the example of the advanced BVO is impressive...

Fire training. Even if we assume that the commanders of the district troops who reported to the council did not embellish the situation, the firing skills of Soviet tankers of the autumn 1938 model on the whole still have to be considered no more than satisfactory. The commanders of the KOVO (as well as the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps) reported that his tank units were shooting well, but in the other two largest groupings of the Red Army troops - Belarussian and Far Eastern - the tankers unequivocally fired at a clean "bad". After all, in the BOVO the results of firing from 45-mm tank guns (which were on the overwhelming majority of the tanks of the district) were "bad", M.P. Kovalev, whose report actually had a frankly "ceremonial" tone ... And in the Far East, reported brigade commander S.M. Krivoshein, tower commanders not only "shoot badly", but also "often do not know guns",

229

and the very first live shooting carried out by the commission "gave unsatisfactory results" 135.

But the fire skills of the tankers of the Belorussian District were clearly unsatisfactory even in 1935. Otherwise, why the annual report of the BVO political directorate dated October 21, 1935, downright crackling about the excellent ability of commanders to manage tank units and subunits and about the good skill of driver mechanics, about any success in the fire training of tankers is silent; Moreover, instead of talking about successes, he begins to complain about the lack of good fire training methods and insufficient supply of ammunition? Our suspicions are confirmed by the message of A.I. Yegorova at the Military Council on December 8, 1935:: even shooting on familiar terrain and at familiar targets, the tankers of the Red Army that year could not achieve a result higher than "quite satisfactory" ... "Failure" the fire skills of the tankers of the BVO clearly deserved the day before purges of the Red Army: in two of the three tank units / formations, the results of the checks of fire skills of which we know in the first half of 1937 (a separate tank battalion of the 52nd rifle division and the 3rd mechanized brigade), it was just that , and in the third part (training battalion of the 10th mechanized brigade) it barely reached a satisfactory level ...

In the Far East, according to the annual report of the OKDVA armored forces themselves dated October 19, 1935, "the tower commander, who is the responsible owner of the tower both in terms of skillful possession of weapons and exemplary care of weapons", was not "developed" and in 35-m! 36., No better than in the 38th, things were here in the 36th, when the commanders of the towers in OKDVA

they fired only from flat areas and only at targets whose location was known in advance, and when they (as the report of the OKDVA armored forces for 1936 admitted) had not yet mastered the 45-mm tank gun 20K model 1932 that was on most of the Far Eastern tanks / 34 g. No better than in the 38th, things were here in the first, "pre-repression" half of the 37th - when the commanders of the towers knew the theory of fire and the materiel of tank weapons to "bad"

230

"Even in the best of the Far Eastern tank units (in the 2nd mechanized brigade) and when they were unsatisfactory (as the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937 stated) looked after the guns and prepared them for firing ...

, And in the Kiev district, if, of course, we take on faith the statement of S.K. Timoshenko about the good shooting shown by his tankers in the 38th, the fire skills of the tank troops even improved after the purge of the Red Army! After all, the fact that in the "Pre-repression" 36th this training was simply unsatisfactory

In fact, they did not dare to deny even the compilers of the annual report of the KVO dated October 4, 1936, who shamelessly varnished reality (from a machine gun, they wrote, the tankers of the district shoot only at "satisfactory", and from a cannon - "weaker" than from a machine gun !37)! From a completely objective order of the new command troops I.F. Fedko No. 0100 of June 22, 1937, it follows that the fire skills of the tankers of the KVO were "at a low level" even on the very eve of the purge of the Red Army!38.

Technical training. Only a minority of those who spoke at the council of district commanders also spoke about the level of technical training of their tankmen. Nevertheless, it is clear (and very revealing!) that in two of the three "largest groupings of the Red Army" - all the same in Byelorussia and the Far East - things were unsatisfactory (or practically unsatisfactory) with this training. After all, as the same M.P. Kovalev, in the tank troops of the BOVO, with the exception of the 4th mechanized brigade participating in the large Minsk exercises in September 1938, "they did not master driving enough in the field"!39. What was behind this wording can be judged by what the commander of the 5th BOVO mechanized corps M.P. Petrov: driving a car across the battlefield (and not along the tankodrome!), the drivers quickly strayed from the combat course indicated by them, since they were not able to overcome the natural obstacles they encountered and tried to go around them; as a result, the tanks dispersed in all directions... In addition, the BOVO commanders reported, "the park service and the operation of vehicles are poorly established, in connection with which we have frequent accidents"! 40. Well, av 1st and 2nd

231

separate Red Banner armies, stated at the council brigade commander S.M. Krivoshein, "Mechanic drivers don't know how to drive"...141

But the "insufficient" mastery of "driving in the field" in the tank troops of the Belorussian district was evident both in the summer and autumn of 1936, when in both mechanized brigades of the BVO (5th and 21st) illuminated from this side by sources "Insufficient technical literacy of mechanical drivers in driving cars in difficult field conditions" could not be overcome, even by specially training them for 7–20 days before the Belarusian maneuvers (and breaking nine BT-5s in the 5th mechanized brigade alone)142. In the 21st mechanized brigade, maneuvers still "gave a jump in accidents" 143, and the tanks of the 5th mechanized brigade in these famous maneuvers went off course in the same way as in the "post-repression" 1938, when the brigade was already in the 5 th mechanized corps M.P. Petrova!

In all tank formations of the BVO, about the level of the then technical training of which at least some information was preserved, the "practice of driving cars" in the field was "insufficient" in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937. Moreover, among these

formations - along with the 3rd and 10th mechanized and 1st heavy tank brigades - there was also the 4th mechanized brigade, which in 1938 did not differ in this shortcoming!

(As you can see, even before the purge of the Red Army, tanks and another mechanized brigade, which was part of the 5th mechanized corps of the BOVO - 10th, had to stray from the combat course.)

The command of the Belorussian district also complained about frequent accidents in 1935 (when only according to the data reported by the units and formations themselves, who tried to hide the state of emergency from the district command as much as possible, in accidents and disasters in the tank units and formations of the BVO from 5.3 to 9.7% of tanks hit - and all through the fault of the personnel!). Operation and park service, judging by those two tank units, for which only the information of interest to us has been preserved, in the BVO were poorly established even in 1936. Weak equipment operation skills inherent in the personnel of one of these units

232

In [a separate tank battalion of the 37th rifle division), I decided to keep silent even the annual report of the division of October 1, 1936, and in the other (in one of the tank battalions of the 4th mechanized brigade), tanks were operated and maintained in such a way that by July 1936, they (as the former commander of this unit, Major P. M. Arman, without hesitation admitted in March 1937 on the staff of the People's Commissariat of Defense) were not on the move at all 100%!¹⁴⁵ The same random sample for the first half of 1937 -th (formed by data on the 3rd and 4th mechanized and [th heavy tank brigades, the training battalion of the 10th mechanized brigade, a separate tank battalion of the 81st rifle division and the 27th mechanized regiment of the 27th cavalry division) testifies that the park service and operation in the tank troops of the BVO were poorly established even in the last months before the purge of the Red Army: clearly a good statement of this matter turned out to be only in one connection, but unsatisfactory or "bad" - in three

parts and connections.

In the Primorsky group of the OKDVA (the future 1st Separate Red Banner Army), the "mechanic drivers" did not know how to drive tanks over the terrain on which they were to fight (mountainous and wooded swampy), both in June 1935 and in March 1936 . In four tank units of the OKDVA, illuminated from this side by sources (separate tank battalions of the 40th, 59th and 66th rifle divisions and the 2nd tank battalion of the 23rd mechanized brigade), such a picture was also in the fall of 1936 , and at least in a third of the Far Eastern tank units (in the battalions of the 23rd mechanized brigade and in separate tank battalions of the 35th [one of the four linear tank units of the Amur OKDVA group, i.e. the future 2nd Red Banner Army — A.S], 59th, 66th, and 92nd Rifle Divisions), the drivers at that time generally mastered only "elementary questions" or "basics" of driving!¹⁴⁶, i.e. they didn't know how to drive a tank in the same way as in 1938... Of the 10 tank units and divisions of the OKDVA, for which relevant information was found for the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937, in 5 (training battalion of the 23rd mechanized brigades, separate tank battalions of the 59th, 92nd and 105th rifle divisions and an armored company of a separate reconnaissance battalion of the 40th rifle division) tanks also knew how to drive poorly.

233

B. Gunners

Those who spoke at the council, who touched on the question of the training of a single artilleryman and artillery subunits, spoke almost exclusively about subunits. The preparedness of these latter in the autumn of 1938 could not be considered more than satisfactory, already by virtue of N.N. Veronov

"insufficiency" of the "field training of artillery"¹⁴⁷. The unsatisfactory camouflage of the guns was widespread; the commanders of the KOVO and SAVO troops also noted the slow deployment of artillery units in firing positions (read: poor field training of crews) ... And in the autumn of 1938, batteries were not even knocked together in the ZakVO!

The weak training of a single artillery fighter is evidenced by the fact noted by the military commissar of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, brigade commander G.K. Savchenko's poor knowledge of the rules for cleaning guns.

We do not have sources containing a final assessment of the field training of the artillery of the Red Army (or specific military districts) in the "pre-repression" period. But all the documents we found covering the training of fighters and artillery units of the OKDVA in 1935 also point to "weak" camouflage of firing positions (according to the admission made in October by OKDVA commander V.N. Kozlovsky, self-digging was "neglected", "as a general phenomenon"!) and accurately hit fast-moving targets - in general, it was precisely on the weak field training of artillerymen (According to the KVO and BVO, no information could be found on the then level of training of fighters and artillery units.) The field training of OKDVA artillery was clearly weak and in 1936. After all, most of the batteries of divisional and regimental artillery and platoons of battalion artillery, whose work at tactical exercises that year is covered by sources, this training turned out to be exactly this (batteries of 76-mm divisional and regimental artillery shek slowly deployed to firing positions and

234

were set to fire, and platoons of battalion artillery, those. 45-mm anti-tank guns, back in May 1936, were "weakly put together not only for firing at fast moving targets, but also at fixed firing points"...149). Somewhat better in 1936 was the field training of BVO artillery (once again no information was found on the KVO): divisional artillery batteries tested in the summer in the 33rd rifle division and crews of battalion 45-mm guns, as a rule, "in the field acted uncertainly", they were not able to mask the guns and quickly maneuver the wheels, but in the autumn in the 5th artillery regiment of the 5th rifle division, even the inspector from the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army noted the high rate of preparation for opening fire, and in the 37th artillery regiment 37- The first rifle (as the commander of the 23rd rifle corps commander KP Podlas, who had just received him under his command), "personnel for operations in a combat situation" was "trained"!50. But on average, the field training of the artillery units of the two districts described above was in the 36th just as insufficient as that of the artillery units of the Red Army in the 38th ...

In the OKDVA, this training was still weak in the first, "pre-repression" half of the 37th, when all the batteries of the regimental and divisional artillery of the Primorsky group (representing all nine of its rifle divisions) brought out for competition in March were slowly deployed, slowly they were made for shooting and. poorly camouflaged. Such a stable weakness in the field training of artillery in one of the most important military districts should indicate that in general, in the "pre-repression" Red Army, this training was at least "insufficient", i.e. no higher than in the 38th ...

From what has been said in the two previous paragraphs, it can be seen that even in the "pre-repression" period, the artillery of the Red Army was also characterized by two other shortcomings noted in it in 1938 - unsatisfactory camouflage of guns and the slow deployment of units on fire positions.

As for the poor knowledge of artillerymen of the rules for cleaning guns, noted in 1938, in the "pre-repression" 1936 they were poorly known even in the 44th artillery regiment of the elite 44th rifle division of the KVO, and in OKDVA, it seems same, everywhere (in the artillery regiments checked that year her

235

rifle divisions and artillery battalions of its rifle regiments, which accounted for more than half of their total number, the maintenance of guns was carried out, as a rule, on "unsatisfactory" and "satisfactory").

G. Sappers

At least some information about their training at the council was reported only by the command of the Moscow Military District and the LVO, where this training was by no means higher than satisfactory. The sapper units of the LVO, traditionally engaged in the construction of border fortified areas in the summer, were not properly prepared for the construction of crossings and field fortifications, and in the MVO, sappers not only built roads and bridges "mediocrely", but also "mediocrely" mastered their technology!⁵¹,

We do not have information on the "pre-repression" engineering troops of the Moscow Military District and the Leningrad Military District, but in such an important district as the OKDVA, things were no better in the 35th than in the LVO in the 38th. The sapper units there devoted just as much time to the construction of fortified areas, in the same way (as the annual report of the "inzhtroysk" OKDVA themselves of October 8, 1935 admitted) they had "insufficient field training"!⁵² and in the same way (as reported by already the headquarters of OKDVA) did not sufficiently master the construction of crossings. And in the "pre-repression" 1936, as even the report of the OKDVA for that year admitted, this "insufficient" level of training in engineer and ferry business decreased (due to the continued diversion of engineering troops for construction) even more ...

D. Signalmen

Describing on November 25, 1938, the training of a communications fighter, the head of the Communications Department of the Red Army, brigade commander I.A. Naidenov pointed out that "the standards for the deployment of wire communications and radio and for work on equipment are basically met, units of the 1st and 2nd armies are lagging behind"! ⁵³. However, the quality of the work of the radio operator, telegraph operator and telephone operator was determined not only by the speed of preparing the equipment for

236

work and the number of characters transmitted per minute, but also the percentage of distortion during transmission - and Naidenov did not say anything about this last one. To assume that there was no problem of distortions, the recognition of the commander of the troops of such a not very backward district as Leningradsky, M.S. Khozin, who noted that when working with a key, the district's radio operators give "a very large percentage of distortions"...! Boldin about the "decent" special and "bad" tactical training of his signalmen!⁵⁵ - it would hardly be a mistake to assume that the training of soldiers and units of the signal troops of the Red Army in the autumn of 1938 as a whole did not exceed a strictly satisfactory level.

But approximately the same picture was in the Red Army and in the "pre-repression" period. In summing up, respectively, 1935/36 and the winter training period of 1936/37 academic year, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. transmission was not noted, but in contrast to the speaker in the 38th I.A. Naidenov admitted that the work of both radio operators, and telegraph operators, and telephone operators is distinguished by "inaccurate transmissions", a large percentage of distortions!⁵⁶. Signalers of the KalVO in 1938 had a "decent" special and "bad" tactical skills, but in 1936 the signalmen of the BVO (of which the KalVO was created in 1938) were poor in both! In all three communications units of the BVO (separate communications battalions of the 16th Rifle Corps and the 2nd and 81st Rifle Divisions), about the current level of training of which information was preserved, radio operators and / or telegraph operators and telephone operators made a lot of distortions during transmission, and in the communications battalion of the elite (!) 2nd division (others were not checked in this regard), the signalmen were poorly trained in tactical terms - they didn't really know how to crawl, dragging a telephone and a cable reel, NOR overcome obstacles with the same load. .. (We have no information about the "pre-repression" training of signalmen of the LVO.)

237

Thus, by the time the mass repressions ended, in the autumn of 1938, the level of combat training of the Red Army had not changed compared to the "pre-repression" period. The only exception we found was a certain decrease in the level of operational-tactical thinking of the command staff of the operational level, which now found it difficult to make decisions in the dynamics of hostilities. And this despite the fact that the purge of the Red Army in 1938 (as K.E. Voroshilov recalled in November at the Military Council) "entailed and could not but entail a huge shift in command personnel." So, in KOVO in the spring-autumn of 1938, 80% of the commanders of rifle divisions (12 out of 15) and 50% of the commanders of mechanized brigades (3 out of 6) were replaced, in BOVO only from April to November 1938 the composition of battalion and artillery division commanders was updated to 50%, the composition of commanders of companies, batteries and squadrons - by 55%, and the armored units of the Red Army (as the head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army Commander D.G. Pavlov stated at the November Military Council) "the entire command staff has been updated. A young commanding staff, who did not have sufficient experience, entered the big positions. However, this youngster coped with combat training!"⁵⁷. The latter (as can be seen from the same speeches at the council) was an obvious stretch, but, we admit, the "youngsters" coped with combat training no worse than his repressed predecessors.

NOTES

1 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, 1940 Documents and materials. M., 2006. S. 35.

2 Ibid. pp. 158, 73.

3 Ibid. S. 53.

4 Ibid. S. 90.

5 Ibid.

6 Russian State Military Archive (hereinafter - RGVA). F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213.L. 357; F. 62. Op. 3. D. 41.L. 38.

7 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR 1938, 1940, p. 158.

&RGVA. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 72.

9 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 32; F. 62. Op. 3. D. 40. L. 90.

10 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 61.

238

And 7am. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19.L. 116.

12 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 40. L. 90; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 30.

13 Ibid. F. 900. Op. 1. D. 269. L. 51.

14 Ibid. F. 9. Ol. 36. D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 rev.).

15 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 59.

6 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, 1940, pp. 110, 111.

17 Ibid. pp. 54, 53.

18 Ibid. S. 42, 41.

9 Ibid. S. 242.

20 RGVA. FO. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 361, 325.

21 7am same. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12v., 11.

22 Vol. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 32-33, 37-38.

23 Ibid. F. 31983. Ol. 2. D. 203. L. 61. 60.

24 Ibid. D. 246. L. 34.

25 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 120.

26 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, 1940, p. 106.

27 Ibid. S. 152.

28 Ibid. S. 42, 120.

2) RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 vol.); D. 2529. L. 176.

30 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, November 1937 documents and materials. M., 2006. S. 27.

31 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 573. L. 8; D. 574. L. 20-21; D. 583. L. 6, 11.

32 Ibid. D. 584. L. 27v.

33 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, 1940, pp. 43, 69, 90, 106, 169.

34 Ibid. S. 128. -

35 Ibid. S. 103.

36 Ibid. pp. 169, 111, 152, 138.

37 Ibid. pp. 42, 200, 54, 111, 103, 242.

33 Ibid. S. 242.

39 Ibid. P. 100. In prepared for K.E. Voroshilov "Reference on speeches at the Military Council for 21-26.X1.1938 (according to paragraph 1 of the agenda)" these words are erroneously attributed to the commander of the troops of the Siberian Military District commander S.A. Kalinin (Ibid. C .200.)

40 Ibid. S. 200, 54.

41 RGVA. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L.7.

42 Vol. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34v.

43 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 62.

44 Ibid. D. 246. L. 34.

45 Ibid. D. 196. L. 205; D. 214. L. 138-137 (sheets of the file are numbered in descending order).

% Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 75; F. 37929. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 96; F. 900. Op. 1.D. 269. L. 51.

47 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1.D.26. L. 3.

48 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 169; F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 54.

239

49 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 268. L. 126.

50 Ibid. F. 900. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 171.

51 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 62.

52 Ibid. D. 215. L. 63.

53 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 325; F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 16; F. 62. Op. 3. D. 41. L. 39.

54 Ibid. F. 4. Op. [5a. D. 422. L. 34v.

55 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 11] iob.

56 Ibid. D. 203. L. 60.

57 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 vol.); D. 2529. L. 152; F. 33879. From. 1. D. 620. L. 3; D. 614. L. 86 (the second of two sheets of this case, having the number 86).

5% Cit. Quoted from: Sokolov B. Mikhail Tukhachevsky. The life and death of a red marshal. Smolensk, 1999, p. 344.

5 RGVA. F. 31983. Ol. 2. D. 213. L. 16.

80 Ibid. D. 246. L. 17.

61 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 120.

62 Ibid. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34 0b.; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 35-36.

63 Ibid., F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 147, 72.

64 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 27v.

65 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2.D. 213. L. 67.

66 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 7.

67 7am same. D. 1049. L. 105.

68 Ibid. D. 614. L. 38, 39.

69 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 67.

70 Ibid. L. 107-108, 72.

7 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, 1940s S. 161.

72 Ibid. pp. 170, 195, 94. Even according to the data that he cited, reporting to the council, S.M. Budyonny, 63% of the final divisional firing in the artillery of the Moscow Military District was carried out only on "satisfactory" and "poor". (See: Ibid., p. 42.)

73 Ibid. pp. 101, 170, 42. In a paper prepared for K.E. Voroshilov "Information on speeches at the Military Council for 21-26.XI.1938 (under item] 1st agenda)", this statement by I.R.

Apanasenko was erroneously attributed to the commander of the troops of the Siberian Military District, commander S.A. Kalinin. (Ibid., p. 171. Cf.: p. 101, 94.)

74 RGVA: F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 8.

75 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 614. L. 58, 87 and rev. (the second of two sheets of this case, having the number 87); Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 53.

76 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 106; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1854. L. 202; Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 91, 92.

77 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 409, 413, 417. It is clear from the context of the report that, when evaluating the firepower training of military districts, Sedyakin had in mind the training of both infantry and artillery (for the Moscow Military District and the North Caucasus Military District this is indicated directly).

240

4

N. 73 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, #. 1940 = S. 242.: 79 Ibid. pp. 124-125. 80 Ibid. S. 91. 81 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 34. . 2 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR November:} 937 S. 317. S 83 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 36-37; D. 2611. L. 250 (2). E 84 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 272; F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 75; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 250 (2). 85 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 250 (2). 86 Ibid. D. 1759. L. 91, 92, 110. 87 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, __. 1940 gt. C, 125, 170. 88 RGVA. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 258. | 89 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 579. L. 413v.; D. 614. L. 59. © The same. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 174. 91 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, 1940 vols. S. 133. 92 RGVA. FO. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 110; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 19; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 49-48 (sheets of the file are numbered in descending order). 93 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 48. 34 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34v. 95 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, -1940 tg. pp. 242, 245. % 7am same. P. 54. 97 Ibid. S. 152. . 98 Ibid. P. 245. I am there. P. 90. © RGVA. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 7. 101 7am same. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1854. L. 205. - 102 The same. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 58. 103 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 169; D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 rev.). 104 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 49, 66; F. 900. Op. 1. D. 269. . I, 170. 105 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 178, 75v.; D. 213. L. 45, 41; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 169. 1%6 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 87; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 11. 197 7am. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 58. 108 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 26. . 109 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34v. 10 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 203. 11 7am same. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 53; F. 4. Op. 15a. D. 409. L. 182. 112 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 69. Compare: Ibid. L. 42, 47. 13 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, 1938, 1940. S. 91, 101, 195. According to the minutes of the morning meeting on November 22

241

1938, command troops of KOVO S.K. Timoshenko gave completely different data on the fire skills of his infantry: "Shooting from a rifle and an easel machine gun is good, from a manual mediocre." (Ibid., p. 90.) However, the attribution of this message to the commander of the Kiev district should be recognized as a mistake by the one who led, or rather the one who edited the protocol in March 1939 (Timoshenko's speech was not taken in shorthand). After all, to assume an error in the document on which we rely - in prepared for K.E. Voroshilov "Information on speeches at the Military Council for 21-26.XI.1938 (on item! 1st agenda)," impossible Yes, in this information, what some speakers said was also sometimes attributed others (see notes 39 and 73 to this chapter). In this case, the assertion that the infantrymen of the district shoot mediocly from a rifle and a heavy machine gun, and badly from a hand gun, attributed by the "Information" to the commander of the KOVO troops S.K. Timoshenko, could only belong to this latter: after all, clarifying what was said, the speaker gave information on the 19th and 131st rifle regiments, and these units were then stationed precisely in KOVO (part of the 7th and 44th infantry regiments, respectively). rifle divisions of this district).

14 Ibid. pp. 59, 54.

15 7am same. pp. 94, 103.

16 Ibid. pp. 123, 164.

117 Ibid. S. 70.

118 See: RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 108-109.

19 7am same. Op. 36. D. 1955. L. 39; D. 1854. L. 202; D. 1725. L. 135-136; D. 1919. L. 125; F. 1417. Op. 1. D. 285. L. 115; F. 3367. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 22.

120 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36.D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 vol.); F. 37928. Op. 1. D. 14. L. 19, 30; F. 40334. Op. 1. D. 212. L. 181; F. 3369. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 52; F. 900. Op. 1.D. 269. L. 69, 126, 169.

121 See: Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 214. L. 130.

12? There. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 214-213 (sheets of the file are numbered in descending order).

123 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. . D. 11. L. 144; D. 12. L. 62, 71, 84; F. 31983. Ol. 2. D. 214. L. 53.

124 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 170-172.

125 See: Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 211. L. 356; D. 574. L. 138, 428; D. 575. L. 30, 37-38, 93, 139, 139a; D. 582. L. 8, 19-20, 44, 53, 62; D. 583. L. 30; D. 584. L. 308-309; D. 587. L. 18, 21, 32, 49, 54, 58, 161-162, 164, 187, 188, 211; D. 1460. L. 133v.; F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 249; F. 34352. Ol. 1. D. 2. L. 147.

126 Ibid. F. 36393. Ol. 1. D. 51.L. 14.

127 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 409; Military Council of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 31.

128 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 82.

129 RGVA. F. 37464. Op. . D. 12. L. 62, 71.

12% Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR 1938, 1940. S. 245.

242

130 Ibid. S. 42.

131 RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 58.

132 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 573. L. 18.

133 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, 1940, pp. 55, 91, 42, 106.

134 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2344. L. 46.

135 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR 1938, 1940, pp. 70, 125.

136 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 112-113.

137 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 94.

138 Ibid. D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 rev.).

139 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, 1938, 1940, p. 70.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid. S. 125.

142 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1753. L. 287.

143 Ibid. D. 2121. L. 76.

144 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. |. D. 13. L. 6.

145 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 41. D. 6. L. 84.

146 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 582. L. 29, 49, 58; D. 1049. L. 80.

147 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR 1938, 1940, p. 125.

148-RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 143, 271.

149 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 123.

150 Ibid., F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 35; F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 75.

151 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, 1940, pp. 54, 59, 42.

| 152 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 331. and

153 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1938, 1940, p. 132.

154 Ibid. S. 56.

155 Ibid. S. 56, 106.

156 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34v.; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 57.

157 Ibid. pp. 236, 182, 67, 134.

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Chapter 4

IN THE BATTLE ON THE RIVER Khalkhin-Gol (May-September 1939)

This conflict began in mid-May 1939 with battles between the Mongolian border guards and Colonel Yamagata's detachment (made up of cavalry units of the Manchukuo Army and units of the 23rd Infantry Division of the Japanese Kwantung Army) in a 5-20-kilometer strip along the eastern the banks of the Khalkhin-Gol River, contested by each other by the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) and Manchukuo. At the end of May, following the 6th cavalry division of the Mongols, the troops of the 57th special rifle corps of the Red Army stationed on the territory of the MPR began to arrive in the conflict area - first, the rifle and machine gun battalion of the 11th light tank brigade with attached batteries, a company of armored vehicles and a sapper company, and then a unit of the 149th rifle. regiment of the 36th rifle division and the 9th armored brigade. They managed to capture a small foothold on the eastern coast of Khalkhin Gol, but already on May 27 they were pushed back by the Japanese. An attempt made on May 29 to turn the tide of events and expand the bridgehead failed, and on June 5 K.E. Voroshilov ordered the 57th Corps to go on the defensive... After that, there was a month-long lull, interrupted by an unsuccessful attempt by the battalion of the 149th regiment on June 24 to capture the Japanese military camp in the Depden-Sume area and a number of battles of local importance.

In June, the Soviet-Mongolian grouping on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was reinforced by the Soviet 7th and 8th mobs.

244

armored brigades, the 185th artillery regiment of the RGK and the Mongolian 8th cavalry division, and the Japanese-Manchurian - the rest of the 23rd infantry division, the 26th and 28th infantry regiments of the 7th infantry division, | - I am a tank group, a number of artillery units and cavalry units of Manchukuo. ". On July 2, the Japanese command attempted to destroy the Soviet-Mongolian grouping on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. Following a diverting frontal attack, which pushed the Red Army units back into the line of coastal dunes, the Japanese moved their main forces around the enemy's left flank. On the night of July 3, their 23rd and one regiment of the 7th Infantry Division crossed to the western coast of Khalkhin Gol, occupied Mount Bain-Tsagan and, gaining a foothold on it, with the forces of two regiments began to move along the western coast to the south - threatening Soviet Mongolian troops surrounded. However, this detour maneuver was thwarted by a counterattack under the 11th light tank and 7th motorized armored brigades and the 24th rifle regiment of the 36th rifle division drawn from the reserve. Their concentric attacks already on July 3 forced the Japanese grouping on Bain-Tsagan to go over to the defensive, and by the morning of July 5 it was completely thrown back to the eastern coast. On the night of July 7-8, the Japanese again attacked the Soviet-Mongolian troops on this coast, but could not achieve any progress. -

Having won the "Bain-Tsagan battle" and reinforced by the 82nd rifle division and the 5th rifle-machine-gun brigade, who arrived from the Ural and Trans-Baikal military districts, on July 9, the 57th corps, in turn, went on the offensive with the purpose of defeating the Japanese group. However, this blow failed, and the counterattack carried out by the Japanese on July 12 generally put the Soviet-Mongolian troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol in a difficult situation: they were engulfed from both flanks and used up all their reserves. On July 13, when the main forces of these troops had already begun to retreat to the western coast, the situation became completely critical: the 603rd Rifle Regiment of the 82nd Division, which covered the withdrawal, could not withstand the enemy's attack, and on its shoulders the Japanese almost broke through to one from crossings. "Nevertheless, this breakthrough, like the penetration into the positions of the 149th Rifle Regiment of the 36th Division and the rifle and machine-gun

245

battalion of the 11th light tank brigade, reached by the Japanese on July 23, was liquidated...), and the Japanese forces opposing them (united on August 10 into the 6th Army and again reinforced with artillery and parts of the Manchukuo troops) were preparing for a new offensive with the aim of destroying the enemy.

The 1st Army Group was the first to complete training, whose ground forces by that time consisted of the 36th, 57th and 82nd rifle divisions, the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade, the 6th and 11th light tank brigades, the 7th, 8th and 9th motorized armored brigades, the 212th airborne brigade, the 6th and 8th Mongolian cavalry divisions, the Mongolian motorized armored brigade, a number of artillery units of the RGC and communications units. On August 20, the Soviet-Mongolian troops launched a general offensive, inflicting the main blow on both flanks of the enemy, and by the morning of August 25, having bypassed these flanks with motorized armor and motorized rifle units, they surrounded the main forces of the 6th Army. On August 24-26, attempts by the Japanese 14th Infantry Brigade, which had again approached the battle area, to release the encircled were repulsed by the 57th Infantry Division and the 6th Light Tank Brigade. At the same time, the encircled group was divided into several isolated pockets of resistance and by August 3] was completely destroyed.

To assess the training of the commanders, headquarters and troops of the Red Army who fought at Khalkhin Gol, we will analyze mainly official documentation introduced into scientific circulation by V.G. Krasnov and V.O. Daines! (Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, orders for the 57th Corps and the 1st Army Group, and reports from those who controlled the actions of the 57th - special officers, the inspection group of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Deputy People's Commissar

defense G.I. Kulik), as well as the memoirs of the former commanders of the headquarters of the front group, which on July 5, 1939 united the troops stationed in Mongolia, Transbaikalia and the Far East.

246

1. COMMANDERS AND HEADQUARTERS

I. Combined arms, infantry and tank

Operational-tactical thinking. One of the reasons for the long-term failure of the troops of the Red Army in the Khalkhin Gol battles was, without a doubt, the lack of "maneuverable" thinking among the Soviet command, the predilection for frontal strikes and the neglect of coverage and detours (all the more unforgivable that the Soviet group abounded in mobile

mi connections, and the open steppe terrain favored their use). The "tactically illiterate">?, which led to a frontal attack on the heights occupied by the enemy, was not only the first decision of the command of the 57th corps to attack, taken by him at the end of May. The plan of the offensive on July 9 did not provide for bypass actions and flank attacks either (which already belonged to the new command: on June 12, 1939, commander-57 division commander N.V. Feklenko was replaced by division commander G.K. Zhukov, and the chief of staff of the corps brigade commander A.M. Kushchev - brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov). And only after July 25 K.E. Voroshilov demanded that Zhukov's immediate superior, commander of the front group, commander of the 2nd rank G.M. Stern - "not to be limited to frontal attacks, but to systematically go around the right and left flanks of the enemy, for which to have sufficient fists on the flanks with armored units" 3 - only after that at the headquarters and front and 1- th army groups began to develop a plan to encircle the Japanese group. (As you can see, the idea of this environment did not belong to G.K. Zhukov or G.M. Stern, but to Voroshilov or, more likely, to the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, commander of the 1st rank B.M. Shaposhnikov.) Highest and senior the command staff of the Red Army, who fought at Khalkhin Gol, also demonstrated only a formally mechanical assimilation of the idea of decisiveness and activity of action. Of course, you can defeat the enemy only by acting offensively. However, right up to August, the desire of the Soviet command to attack, its determination were, as a rule, thoughtless. They constantly "Turned offensive for the sake of offensive, actively-" Stew for the sake of activity, when (as on May 29) units rushed into

247

the offensive was not assembled into a shock fist, but scattered, one by one, when (as on July 9) the offensive was launched without taking into account the state and capabilities of the troops, when on June 24 the commander of the 149th rifle regiment of the 36th rifle division, Major I.M. Remizov, without tactical necessity, attacked the Japanese camp near Depden-Sume and, having not achieved success, without any benefit ruined up to a third of the battalion participating in the attack, 4 armored vehicles, a tank and a truck ... A & I understand your desire to wrest the initiative from enemy, - telegraphed July 12, 1939 G.K. Zhukov K.E. Voroshilov, - but the desire to "go on the attack and destroy the enemy", as you often write about it, does not solve the matter. [...]. We are suffering huge losses in men and materiel, not so much from the superiority of the enemy forces and his "valor", but because you, commanders and commissars, consider only the desire and impulse to defeat the enemy."

Memories of the former staff member of the front group V.A. The recruit, who participated in the writing of an analytical work about them shortly after the end of the Khalkhin-Gol battles, also points to the general defectiveness of the operational-tactical thinking of the command of the 57th corps / 1st army group, namely, to the oblivion of the principle of concentration of forces in the direction of the main blow. Even during the August operation, Novobranets wrote, "we advanced in numerous detachments, dispersed forces and means, and beat the enemy with "spread fingers"5.

In the link of commanders of divisions at Khalkhin Gol, lack of initiative flourished, incompatible with the "war of engines". It is not for nothing that Colonel General G.M. Stern declared in December 1940 that "the question of the independence and initiative of our commander" received "particularly great importance" after the fighting in Finland and at Khalkhin Gol. Moreover, to prove his words, Stern (who fought in both Mongolia and Finland) referred specifically to the Khalkhin-Gol battles, which showed that "our people are very fond of acting compactly. Comrade Zhukov probably remembers how he had to prove more than once that the front was not busy enough. In other words, commanders who are not accustomed to making independent decisions and showing initiative

248

"we were afraid to act in isolation from neighboring units and

they tried not to lose elbow contact with them, so that the units deployed at first on a broad front gradually "shrank" and formed compact groups that controlled only certain sectors of the front...

,5 Data on the degree of mastery of "pre-repression" ,highest command staff of the Red Army "maneuverable" thinking, 'the ability to take the enemy in the flank and rear in the sources we discovered was found very little. However, one cannot fail to recall that in March 1935 "the still considerable propensity of commanders and staffs for frontal maneuver and insufficient originality and courage in tactical maneuver" was revealed even when testing on a one-sided war game the commanders and staffs of six connections of the BVO are districts where, according to the statement of K.E. Voroshilov, served as "the most qualified, better trained" commanders of the Red Army. At the same time, one of the two division commanders, who, according to the head of the 2nd department of the RKKA Headquarters A.I. Sedyakin, "did not use the situation to maneuver on the enemy's flank" and "led the troops to a frontal attack", was ... the commander of the 4th Cavalry Division of the TGC. Zhukov (who even thought of throwing saber squadrons into a frontal attack on tank units!). ,Author — G.S. Isserson is not only the commander of the "shock" 4th Rifle Division of the Red Banner named after the German Proletariat, but also a prominent military writer, whose work on the East Prussian operation of 1914 was a great illustration of the thesis about the benefits of "maneuverable thinking" and flanking attacks! If we also remember that the commander of the 16th mechanized brigade of the BVO, who also on October 3, 1936, at the big tactical exercises near Polotsk for a long time did not dare to take a detour, was ... a well-known theorist of combat use tank (i.e. mobile!) Troops Colonel S.N. Amosov, we must conclude that the desire to achieve success not with frontal, but with flank attacks among the highest command staff of the "pre-repression" Red Army was instilled extremely slowly and not difficultly. AND

which, therefore, Khalkhin-gol

249

With a high degree of probability, frontal strikes could have taken place even if this conflict had occurred before the start of mass repressions...

Formal-mechanical assimilation of the principle of active action, thoughtless determination among the higher and senior command staff were also encountered before the purge of the Red Army. Thus, in the OKDVA in 1935, the commanders of divisions and brigades were exactly like the command of the 57th Corps in preparation for the offensive on July 9, 1939! - often they did not want to take into account that the troops subordinate to them would not have enough strength or time to carry out their daring plans. And the commanders of the units are exactly like the regiment commander-149 near Depden-Sume on June 24, 1939! - often tried to throw their troops forward in a completely unfavorable situation. According to the directive letter of K.E. Voroshilov dated December 28, 1935, "correct accounting" in the preparation of the operation of "the terrain and actions of the enemy" was then absent in a whole "several districts" ...? In such an advanced district as the KVO, the lack of "sufficient ability" among the senior command staff to take into account the availability of time, forces and means when developing an operation plan, even according to the report of the KVO on the results of combat training in 1935/36, which shamelessly embellished the state of affairs.

year (dated October 4, 1936; hereinafter such documents will be referred to as annual reports), were also found in 1936 (the features of the source suggest that in reality these were not isolated cases, but a general phenomenon. ..).

In the same "pre-repression" 36th common occurrence in the Red Army was such a sign of the general defectiveness of the operational-tactical thinking of the highest command staff, which manifested itself at Khalkhin Gol, as the oblivion of the principle of concentration of efforts. When deciding on an operation, it was stated in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 and tasks for 1937", top commanders forget about the need to concentrate forces in the direction of the main attack, "there is desire to be everywhere
"strong"...

Well, the lack of initiative of the unit commanders not only also took place in the "pre-repression" Red Army, but was, one might say, its "calling card"! On

250

We remember that in 1935 "all the conclusions" of the Japanese officers who got acquainted with the "Red Army" were "permeated" with "characteristic indications" of the Soviet commanders' "lack" of "self-activity, courage and determination", of the vitality to make a decision in a timely manner when quickly - a swarm of changes in the situation", to the fact that the Soviet commanders in general "have an insufficiently developed ability to make a decision [i.e. take the initiative. - A.S." Let us also recall the assessment given on December 9, 1935 at the Military Council under People's Commissar of Defense (hereinafter referred to as the Military Council) Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union M. N. Tukhachevsky: «[...] If you go down, enter the battle formation of a battalion, company, platoon and see how commanders make decisions, then, unfortunately, we still do not have this initiative, independence, wedging into the flank and rear of the enemy to the extent necessary [...] ! - A.S.] " ! 3. So it was then in the Trans-Baikal group OKDVA (from May 17, 1935 - the Trans-Baikal Military District, Zab VO), whose 36th and 57th rifle divisions later fought on Khalkhin- Gole. Spring exercises, admitted [December 0, 1935 at the Military Council, Commander of the Special Far Eastern Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher, showed that there is no "the necessary initiative, speed of action on the part of battalion commanders, company commanders and platoon commanders"...14 Also in the directive of June 29, 1936, M.N. Tukhachevsky had to be resolutely reminded that "it is the duty of every commander and soldier to move forward independently", that one must take the initiative! The junior commanders, on the question of whose initiative Tukhachevsky specifically dwelled in the report of October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army", i.e. detached and part of the then platoons, did not acquire such an ability even by the fall (the only exception was, perhaps, the 24th rifle division of the KVO. "Junior commanders, lieutenants and even ordinary soldiers," reported | .E. Voroshilov, the head of the Combat Training Department of the Red Army (UBP RKKA), commander of the 2nd rank A.I. Sedyakin, who visited it, was tactically "active, proactive and act competently, consciously, Erinally"! 6, But in another examined by him then divi

251

zii - "shock" of the 44th rifle - he did not find anything like that ...). The situation that took shape here in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937 is quite clear from the nature of the commander's exercises then carried out in units. "Skills for making and carrying out bold and initiative decisions were not developed" (directive letter from the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937); "Commanders in most cases are instilled with a scheme and pattern in actions instead of educating them in the spirit of initiative, determination, courage" (order of the commander of the troops of the KVO, commander of the 2nd rank I.F. Fedko No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937) ; "There were very few such assignments in the course of which the commander would instill courage and reasonable audacity in solving problems and assertiveness in their implementation" (order of the OKDVA commander on the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year); "in the process of training with the average command staff, his strong-willed qualities, determination and courage are not developed" (order of the commander of the 23rd

rifle corps of the BVO divisional commander K.P. Podlas No. 04 of January 15, 1937)¹⁷. It is simply impossible to develop in such an atmosphere of initiative...

Interaction. "The interaction of the military branches is almost absent [...]," stated, speaking on July 2, 1939, the Civil Code. Zhukov by telegraph, K.E. Voroshilov¹⁸. "Organize interaction on the scale of a battalion and a regiment," Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Commander of the 1st rank G.I. Kulik, "the commanders and staffs don't know how"!¹⁹. (Recall that the practical implementation of interaction was then carried out precisely at the battalion level.)

And the top commanders often completely ignored the need to organize the interaction of military branches! In the May battles, the command of the 57th Corps threw infantry into battle even without artillery preparation; in the "Bain-Tsagan battle", a similar illiteracy was demonstrated by the new commander-57 G.K. Zhukov. We are talking about his famous order to the 11th light tank brigade dated July 3, 1939 to attack the Japanese anti-tank defenses on Mount Bain-Tsagan without

252

'posts of infantry and artillery. Initially, however, it was assumed that the 24th Infantry Regiment of the 36th Infantry Division would interact with the tanks—but it was also supposed to "support only one of the three attacking tank units?" that the regiment did not reach its original positions by the appointed time, Zhukhov ordered the tankers to attack without infantry at all. As for artillery, the 185th artillery regiment of the RGK and artillery units located on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol were redirected against the Japanese troops on Bain-Tsagan, but no interaction was organized between them and the tank battalions, and the tank attack took place and without artillery support...²¹ In his *Memoirs and Reflections*, Georgy Konstantinovich explained his decision by saying that "it was impossible to delay the counterattack, since the enemy, having discovered the approach of our tank units, began to quickly take measures for defense and began to bomb columns of our tanks. And there was nowhere for them to hide – for hundreds of kilometers around there was absolutely open area, devoid of even shrubs"²². However, this version does not stand up to criticism. By the time Zhukov made the decision to attack without infantry, the Japanese had already taken "measures for defense" and had already organized defense (including anti-tank). Is it true; from the report of the head of the special department of the 57th corps dated July 9, 1939, it can be concluded that Zhukov did not know about this: according to the report, "in an attack on the powerful anti-tank defense of the enemy" [1st brigade was thrown "as a result of incorrect information" "on the part of an instructor [of the department of the headquarters of the MNRA [of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army. — A.S.] Afonina"]²³. But from the text of the conversation held in October 1950 by G.K. Zhukov with the writer K.M. Simonov can see that when ordering to attack Bain-Tsagan with tanks alone, Zhukov still knew that the Japanese had already managed to huddle on the mountain and create anti-tank defenses there. "They moved the division," he told Simonov about the situation in which he made the decision, "and organized a double anti-tank defense—passive and active. Firstly, as soon as their infantrymen came to this shore, they immediately buried themselves in their round anti-tank

253

kovy holes. You remember them. And secondly, they dragged with them all their anti-tank artillery, over a hundred guns. [...] I decided to attack the Japanese with Yakovlev's tank brigade. I knew that without the support of the infantry, she would suffer heavy losses, but we deliberately went for it. [...] She turned around and went. She suffered very heavy losses from Japanese artillery fire, but, I repeat, we were ready for this [i.e. knew that the Japanese had already organized a defense saturated with anti-tank artillery. — A.S.]"²⁴.

Zhukov's statement about the enemy's bombing of the 11th light tank brigade is also false. Reconstructing the picture of the actions of the Soviet and Japanese aviation on the morning of July 3, 1939, V.I. Kondratiev found no mention of Japanese attacks in Soviet sources.

bombers against Soviet tankers; only the 6th cavalry division of the Mongols was subjected to such blows that morning ... 25

In a conversation with K.M. Simonov in October 1950, G.K. Zhukov gave another, more convincing explanation for his decision to throw tanks at Bain-Tsagan without infantry support: "there was a threat" that the Japanese would "crush our units" on the western coast of Khalkhin Gol and "force us to leave the bridgehead" on the east coast. "And on him, on this bridgehead, we had all hope. Thinking about the future, this could not be allowed. Indeed, in the absence of a bridgehead, an offensive to defeat the Japanese grouping would have to begin with such an extremely difficult task as forcing a water barrier. But, one way or another, the decision made by Zhukov still did not give an effect. It was not possible to defeat the Japanese grouping on Bain-Tsagan by attacking tanks not supported by infantry and artillery. The Soviet troops managed to do this only after two days of fierce fighting, on the morning of July 5 - and only after the tanks were supported by the 24th Rifle Regiment, which finally approached! The attack of the tank battalions, apparently, was able to delay the advance of the enemy along the western coast of Khalkhin Gol (and, accordingly, his exit to the rear of the Soviet grouping on the eastern coast), but this delay was unlikely to be of fundamental importance for the outcome of the plan conceived by the Japanese. operations. In fact, after the approach of the infantry, the Bain-Tsagan group was defeated

254

This is despite the fact that the 11th light tank after the suicidal attack on July 3 was left with less than half the tanks. Therefore, we venture to assert that with the use of a full-blooded brigade and interacting with infantry and artillery, the rout would have taken place even if the Japanese had reached the rear of the Soviet troops for some time,

wandering on the east coast...

,X. The price for ignoring the need for interaction between the branches of the armed forces was paid a colossal one: of the 132 BT-5s that went into the attack on July 3, which was not supported by infantry and artillery, 82 were lost, i.e. 62%! At the same time, 46 of them (a whole tank battalion!) burned down and only 36 were hit, those. The 247th auto-armored battalion of the 7th motorized armored brigade, which attacked after the tanks, with the same "complete lack of interaction with artillery" and infantry, lost 33 out of 50 of its BA-b and BA -10 (i.e. 66%): 20 armored vehicles burned down and 13 were hit⁸,

In a telegraph conversation with G.K. Zhukov July 12 K.E. Voroshilov reminded the commander-57 that "to abandon tanks [read: only tanks. - A.S.] companies and battalions at the gate

drunken enemy" he tried "repeatedly"¹²⁹

,2 After the unsuccessful offensive of July 9, the need

Zhukov (produced on July 31 to corps commander) nevertheless mastered the task of achieving interaction between the branches of the armed forces. After all, during the preparation of the August offensive operation in the rear of his troops, for a whole month, there were intensified

3rd interaction between tanks, artillery, infantry and aircraft. But many commanders need such

'Interactions were still ignored! According to the

To the opinion of V.A., who participated in the preparation of the analytical work: A recruit, in the August operation, as before, "there was no interaction between the branches of the armed forces - they all acted independently, adhering to

As an operational plan only in general terms. For example, tanks broke through into the rear of the enemy, smashed fuel depots there, and at that time the infantry remained without their support and

perished under fierce Japanese fire. Introduced into scientific circulation by M.B. Baryatinsky and M.V. Kolomi-Tsem materials of the "Report on the use of armored

255

troops on the river Khalkhin-Gol" show that this lack of interaction between tanks and infantry in the August battles was caused by elementary tactical illiteracy of tank commanders. In particular, the 6th light tank brigade repeatedly — despite the fact that each time it failed! — tried to attack enemy resistance centers without infantry support. "Thus, on August 21, in the area of Small Sands (8–10 km south of Nomonkhan-Burd-Obo)," she "fell a knot of resistance three times (2 times with one battalion, [] once with two), but each time she was forced to return - go to the starting position "and only lost 11 BT-7 in vain. "The next morning the knot of resistance came to life again" and "was destroyed only in cooperation with the rifle battalion"?'

And again: how did this picture differ from the one that was in the "pre-repression" period? The commanders and staffs were not able to "organize interaction on the scale of the battalion and regiment" - but wasn't it the same in the Red Army in 1935? Battalions, stated in his letter to K.E. Voroshilov dated December 1, 1935 to M.N. Tukhachevsky, "still have not mastered the ability to organize interaction with artillery and tanks on the ground, abusing the setting of tasks on the map..."³². In other words, the battalion commanders and their headquarters did not know how to achieve real interaction then. Even in the advanced BVO, as noted in the order of the commander of its troops, commander of the 1st rank I.P. Uborevich No. 04 of January 12, 1936, "in 1935, the weakest link in the training of command personnel was the battalion commander and his headquarters, especially in the interaction of infantry, tanks and artillery on a company and battalion scale [highlighted by me. - A.S. | "... 33 Commander of the LVO Army Commander [th rank B.M. Shaposhnikov, speaking on December 8, 1935 at the Military Council, pointed out that the "Instructions for Deep Combat" (which was entirely based on the interaction of military branches!) were not assimilated by both battalion and regimental headquarters; The context of this statement allows us to assume that Boris Mikhailovich had in mind not only his district, but the entire Red Army. Indeed, on March 17, 1935, the headquarters of the 79th and 80th rifle regiments of the 27th rifle division of the

256

"After the start of the battle, they simply stopped organizing any kind of interaction between the combat arms! And all the military headquarters of the Primorsky OKDVA group, as even the goev report of this group of October 11, 1935 admitted, did so in the autumn of that year ... As is clear from the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 "On combat training of the Red Army", the Soviet infantry commanders and their headquarters even then knew how to organize interaction between artillery and tanks only during exercises, which were rehearsed in advance (in other words, in a real battle they couldn't do it). And indeed, in the advanced BVO in the summer and autumn of that year, the battalion commanders were poorly able (or even completely forgot!) to set tasks for the artillery supporting them in both rifle divisions, information about the verification of which in this regard was preserved both by the vryalov 37th and in "shock" 2nd. The regimental headquarters of the OKDVA, as even the annual report of this army of September 30, 1936 admitted, made progress in organizing the interaction of the military branches. that year, in only two of the 14 rifle divisions of the OKDVA Chv 21st and partly in the 12th), and the training of the headquarters of the rifle "battalions" (and hence their ability to organize the interaction of military branches) "remained", according to the compilers ' couple, "at a very low level e" M. "; According to the directive letter of A. I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, "the interaction of the headquarters of rifle battalions with

fecal interaction of infantry with artillery - in the Red Army was "not worked out" even by the beginning of its purge³⁵. The situation in such an important strategic grouping of the Red Army, Jacques of the KVO, by the commanders of the last I.F. Fedko then characterized (in Order No. 0100 of June 22, 1937) even sharper: the entire "command staff" "does not know how to specifically organize the interaction of various branches of the armed forces in a difficult combat situation", all "headquarters of all branches of the military " Also "poorly trained to perform the tasks of [...] organizing the interaction of childbirth

troops"36. (As we saw in Chapter 1, Fedko's recent appointment did not prevent him from being objective.) The same is true of another important grouping of Soviet troops, the OKDVA. In the link "rifle battalion - artillery battalion", ascertained

92255 257

elk in the "Brief Report on the results of the combat training of the OKDVA troops" in December 1936 - April 1937 (dated May 18, 1937; hereinafter - the report of the OKDVA headquarters dated May 168, 1937), the organization of interaction between military branches "remains unsatisfactory rhetorical" - and it is precisely through the fault of the battalion commanders and their headquarters ... 37

Since the work on the real, practical implementation of the interaction of infantry with artillery and tanks was carried out precisely at the battalion level, described above (The situation meant that the very interaction of military branches was "almost absent" not only on Khalkhin Gol, but also in the "pre-repression" Red Army .

Such a conclusion will remain valid even if we assume that at Khalkhin Gol the indicated "absence" was to blame for the commanders and headquarters not only of the battalions and regiments, but also of the formations and the 1st Army Group (which represented is already an association). After all, "the practical ability to organize in time and space the necessary interaction of rifle, mechanized aviation formations in solving assigned tasks, in various conditions of operation" in the Red Army, as A.I. Egorov, the commanders and staffs of the formations did not have the willows of the 35th; such a skill, according to Yegorov, had yet to be "achieved" ...38 As for the formations, at the exercises of the 27th Infantry Division of the BVO known to us in March 1935, not only the regimental headquarters, but also the divisional ; in the Primgroup OKDVA, all (i.e., divisional) headquarters did the same (see above) in the fall; the headquarters of both divisions, withdrawn in the same month for the district exercises of the North Caucasus Military District (SKVO) - the 22nd and 74th rifle divisions - could not cope with the use of their tank battalions ...

As is clear from the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 ...", the headquarters of the associations "interaction of the main branches of the armed forces" often did not know how to organize even in the 36th. "In the interaction of ground forces, in many cases there was not even a "plan of action linked by lines and time"! 3 But isn't it significant that in the only surviving source covering the level of

258

According to the then headquarters of the KVO formation — the protocol of the party meeting of the headquarters of the 15th Rifle Corps dated December 22, 1936 — we immediately come across the phrase: «(...) We are weakly organizing the interaction of all branches of the military [...] >40? And what do all the materials of inspections of the then headquarters of the rifle divisions of the OKDVA (shtadivov-35 and -69) that we discovered say about the same thing? that the inability to organize the interaction of military branches, which distinguished the command staff and headquarters of this district even on the eve of the purge of the Red Army, existed at all levels, i.e. at the level of formations. The report of the OKDVA headquarters dated May 18, 1937. The command of the 57th Corps in May-July, and the command of the 6th Light Tank Brigade even in August 1939 generally ignored the need to organize the interaction of military branches, but isn't it the same did many top commanders of the "pre-repression" Red Army? Let us recall how the commander of the 17th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District G.I. Bondar, at the exercises of the 3rd Rifle Corps near Gorokhovets in September 1935, moved his units on the offensive without artillery preparation - in exactly the same way as Commander-57 N.V. Feklenko and Nashtakor-57 A.M. Kushchev in May 1939! Almost without artillery support, the commander of the 27th Infantry Division of the BVO, brigade commander P.M., threw his rifle battalions into the offensive. Filatov at the Polotsk exercises on October 3, 1936. To set the tasks of artillery "some" (as K.E. Voroshilov put it on December 14, 1935 at the Military Council) general military commanders (i.e. , and corpora) "forgotten" and on

the famous Kyiv maneuvers of 1935... And the commanders of mechanized brigades and corps, as it appears from the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army", even in the 36th they constantly did the same as G.K. Zhukov and the command of the 6th light tank brigade in July-August of the 39th threw tanks into the offensive without the support of even the infantry that was part of their formations, and (brigade commanders always, and Komkors "often") without the support of artillery. A similar petition for an attack on July 3, 1939 on Bain-Tsagan took place,

>.

s 259

for example, in September 1936, during MVO maneuvers, when the 5th mechanized corps "broke through enemy defensive lines from the front without artillery support. Losses, - M.N. Tukhachevsky, "should be huge"...13

Ensuring combat operations. We managed to find information about the level of organization of intelligence only for the period of the May battles and only in the presentation of G.K. Zhukov, who took over the 57th Corps immediately after these battles and could not avoid the temptation to exaggerate when describing the mistakes of his predecessors. But, judging by the fact that he was in no hurry to declare that he had corrected these mistakes, there was no condensation. "Due to disorganization in intelligence," Zhukov reported in June to K.E. Voroshilov, "the command of the corps did not have and does not have complete clarity about the enemy." In "Memoirs and Reflections", Georgy Konstantinovich also pointed out the facts of misunderstanding by the "May" commanders and headquarters of the very tasks of reconnaissance: "Reconnaissance was assigned numerous tasks, often impossible and not of fundamental importance. As a result, the efforts of the intelligence agencies were dispersed to the detriment of the main intelligence goals. Finally, from Zhukov's June order it is clear that attacks were practiced without reconnaissance at all!

There is little information about the ability of the Khalkhin-Gol commanders to organize logistic support of hostilities in published sources, but at the beginning of the battles it was practically absent. Corporal Commander Ya.V. Smushkevich on June 8, 1939 reported to K.E. Voroshilov that the command of the 57th corps "and personally Feklenko" "didn't manage the rear at all"⁶, and P.G. Grigorenko, in his memoirs, argued that the supply of the fighting troops improved only after the front group took over his organization.

But obviously the 57th and 35th would have been no better supplied, when, according to the report of the head of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin from | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year and on the tasks for 1936", org.

260

The reduction of the supply of troops in the course of the operation by senior commanders and staffs "was touched upon only" superficially "and when even in the annual report of the advanced CVO (October 11, 1935) it was recognized that" the significance of the operational rear still remains a weak point in the operational training of a significant part of the combined arms commanders and staffs" ⁷. Obviously, the 57th would have been supplied no better than in the 39th and in the 36th - when, according to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. — A.S.]", when in the annual report of the KVO (dated October 4, 1936) it was stated that "in all military branches it is still weak with the organization of the rear for the entire operation", and in the annual report (from 30 September) deployed in the same unprepared theater as the 57th Corps, OKDVA - that "the organization and service of the rear" "remains" "a weak spot in the management" of the corps"⁸. Obviously, the 57th would have been supplied no better than in the 39th even before the start of the purge of the Red Army, when, according to A.I. Egorov of June 27, 1937, the staffs in the Red Army were still "poorly trained in matters of rear"...⁴⁹ The same should be said about the "disorganization in intelligence" manifested in May 1939 at Khalkhin Gol. "That every new maneuver should be supported by well-organized reconnaissance" - about this, according to the same report by A.I. Sedyakin

from | December 1935, in the Red Army "very often" "forgotten" in 35-M50. "[...] Intelligence is literally some kind of bogey of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army," broke out on December 9, 1935, at the Military Council and from the commander of the ZabuVO I.K. Gryaznov, almost all of whose formations (36th and 57th Rifle Divisions and the 6th and 32nd Mechanized (future 6th and 11th Light Tank Brigades) later had to fight at Khalkhin Gol?! "practical skills in organizing short-range reconnaissance and especially reconnaissance of the 'battlefield' were 'weak' 'at all headquarters' even in the advanced KVO - and even according to the greatly embellished annual report of this district of October 4, 1936? They did not know how to organize reconnaissance at that time and all the headquarters of the rifle divisions of the BVO and OKDVA (shtat- "divas-33, -35, -37 and -43) and rifle regiments and battalions illuminated from this side by sources

261

BVO (from the 37th Infantry Division); in OKDVA, as even the "lacquered" annual report of this army of September 30, 1936 admitted, the headquarters of rifle regiments and battalions were also distinguished by "loose skills in organizing and conducting reconnaissance", and tank commanders "organized and conducted reconnaissance, especially combat", was generally a "weak point"⁵³. The fact that "the headquarters have not yet learned how to organize and conduct intelligence skillfully enough" was also recognized in the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937; in the KVO (as stated in the order for district No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937) "the issue of organizing continuous intelligence" also "continued to be" "the weakest point in the training of headquarters" even before the start of the purge of the Red Army ... ⁵⁴

There was also a misunderstanding of intelligence tasks by the staff officers in the "pre-repression" Red Army, only it manifested itself (as far as we were able to establish) not in the burden of intelligence agencies with tasks "not of fundamental importance", but in the vagueness of setting tasks; "Pre-repression" headquarters often, for example, at the famous Kiev maneuvers of 1935 in the regiments of the 43rd Infantry Division of the BVO in March 1936 or in the 110th Infantry Regiment of the 37th Infantry Division of the BVO in October of the same year, demanded not "find out the enemy's forces", but "reconnaissance in such and such a direction", i.e. did not orient scouts to obtain a useful result.

Attacks without reconnaissance in the Red Army were also commonplace even before its purge. Recall that this is how the units of the 32nd Rifle Division and the 8th Mechanized Regiment of the 8th Cavalry Division of the OKDVA attacked during maneuvers in Primorye on March 15, 1936, parts of the 15th Mechanized Brigade of the KVO at the Shepetovka maneuvers 13 September 1936, the "shock" (!) rifle of the 5th rifle Vitebsk Red Banner division named after the Czechoslovak proletariat, the 18th mechanized and 1st heavy tank brigades of the BVO at the Polotsk exercises on October 2-4, 1936. They left their people without reconnaissance on the attack and the commander of a separate cavalry squadron of the 40th rifle division of the OKDVA captain S.A. Bonich in battle near Hunchun on March 25, 1936 and the commander of the 63rd Infantry Regiment of the 21st Infantry Division of the OKDVA, Colonel I.R. Dobysh during the conflict near Turiego Rog on November 27, 1936; without

262

intelligence was preparing to attack the Japanese and the commander of the 4th rifle company of the 63rd regiment, Lieutenant Nemkov, during the incident at Vinokurka on July 6, 1937 ...

Troop management. At the end of May - beginning of June 1939, the Khalkhin-Gol commanders and staffs showed a downright inability to control the troops. In fact, "headquarters did not perform their functions, units and subunits were not assigned specific tasks, they did not orient themselves in the situation." And no wonder: even at the headquarters of the 57th corps, "individual training of staff commanders and the coherence of the headquarters as a whole" turned out to be "unsatisfactory", "the interaction between the departments of the headquarters" was "particularly bad". Therefore, for example, "during May 28, there was an exclusively unorganized battle, controlled only by unit commanders." But often these latter also withdrew from the administration! "Commanders often did not stay in their place, did not lead the troops, but turned into a fighter, taking up a machine gun and leaving their units and subunits to their will ..." ⁵⁷

The situation was slightly better in July. "Management in battle by the headquarters of battalions and regiments is weak, in companies it is even worse," the Deputy Commissar of Magi reported from Khalkhin Gol to Moscow. Kulikz. From the order of the Civil Code given after the July battles. Zhukov, it is clear that the "commander staff" of the 57th Corps did not even know how to "navigate the terrain" - both with a "map, compass", and "without them"!59

At least, at the headquarters of the 1st Army Group, high-quality command and control of troops could not be organized even in August 1939, because they continued to ignore radio communications as "the main means of combat control" and used instead (and other technical means) delegates <communications (in other words, messengers). These delegates "wandered across the endless steppes or perished under Japanese fire", and "the commander's orders either did not reach the unit commanders, or were hopelessly late when the situation required another solution." Ignoring the technical means of communication sometimes disorganized the work of the headquarters itself. "There were cases when there were not enough communications delegates from the units, and then Zhukov sent officers of his

263

headquarters. Sometimes only the commander with his chief of staff remained at the headquarters ... 60

We note here that the level of training of the Khalkhin-Gol headquarters was typical for the then Red Army. "The training and work of military and operational headquarters," noted in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0104 of July 19, 1939, "continue to remain at an exceptionally low level. [...]"

Headquarters as command and control bodies are not trained, they do not know how to organize combat, they cannot cope with the work of commanding troops during combat.

The performers of their duties do not know, they do not have the necessary staff skills, they are not trained to work in difficult conditions. [...]"

Headquarters are not able to organize and ensure command and control of troops in battle with reliable, strong communications.

The radio, the most reliable means of communication, is not used in combat even if other means of communication fail and, as a rule, is inactive.

The work inside the headquarters is not organized. There is no mutual information between departments and divisions of the headquarters. [...]"

The content and technical design of all documentation is exceptionally low."

Let us first dwell on the commanders, more precisely, on the commanders of subunits (in units and formations, the main burden of command and control falls on the headquarters). Their desire, recorded at Khalkhin Gol, to remove themselves from control of the battle and fight as ordinary fighters also cannot be considered a consequence of repression: it was the same in almost all conflicts with the Japanese that took place over the past year and a half before the start of the purge of the Red Army. ! Commander of a consolidated tank platoon sent out | On February 1936, the 2nd tank battalion of the 2nd mechanized brigade in the area of battles near Xianghe, Kuznetsov, immediately after leaving the location of the unit, threw a platoon, sped forward in a car and was stopped only by the head of the armored forces of the Primorsky group M.D. Solomatini! In the future, he also did not show any diligence ... Of the four

264

x medium and senior commanders who participated in the battle on March 29, 1936 near Hunchun, three - the commander of a separate cavalry squadron of the 40th Infantry Division, Captain S.A. Bonich and his platoon commanders, lieutenants Kovalev and Kovrizh-kin, "forgot" to control the fire of their subunits. Both medium commanders who defended Pavlova Hill near Turye Rog on November 26, 1936 - the commander of the 1st Rifle. the howl of a company of the 63rd Infantry Regiment of the 21st Infantry Division

'senior lieutenant P.G. Kochetkov and the commander of the machine-gun platoon of this company, Lieutenant P.M. Presnyakov, - just like their colleagues at Khalkhin-Yul in May 1939, every now and then "took up a machine gun" (whose regular crew had not yet been out of order) and replaced ordinary soldiers. The commander of the 9th rifle company of the same regiment, who attacked the height of Vinokurka on July 5, 1937, Lieutenant Kuzin, who did not control either the fire or the movement of his unit, also replaced the gunner...

Cases of self-removal of the command staff from the management of their units were repeatedly demonstrated by the military exercises of the "pre-repression" years. So, at the March maneuvers of 1936 in Primorye, the battalion commanders of the "14th rifle regiment" (formed from the 77th regiment of the 26th rifle division of the OKDVA) only indicated to the company commanders the direction of attack or areas of defense, and from any leadership that had begun then they eliminated themselves in battle; in defense, the commanders did the same. Judging by the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky on October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army", cases when even the battalion commander "let go of control" in the "Zharsnaya Army" were then generally commonplace.

In May 1939, at Khalkhin Gol, the commanders of not only units, but "M units" were removed from the leadership of the FFA troops, but this also happened in the "pre-repression" Red Army. At the same March 1936 maneuvers in Primorye, the commander of the 8th mechanized regiment of the 8th cavalry division of the OKDVA did not even indicate to the unit commanders the specific objects of attack. And the very movement to attack his BT-5 began when it pleased the commanders of squadrons or even tank commanders!

, More than weak control of the battle on the part of company commanders was also common for "pre-repression"

#265

Red Army. The fact that in a rifle company "fire control" and (as in other units) "interaction of fire and movement" is not worked out is the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Egorov and the head of the 2nd department of the General Staff A.I. Sedyakin was also stated in December 1935. According to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 400115s of May 17, 1936, the training of the "majority" of medium infantry commanders (and, therefore, of the majority of company commanders, who at that time were almost all in the rank of senior lieutenant) remained "weak" even by this time. As the documents of the three largest military districts - KVO, BVO and OKDVA - show, then Soviet commanders demonstrated both illiterate deployment for combat, and the inability to prepare and support an infantry attack with machine-gun fire, organize "interaction of fire and movement", and inability to an understanding of the need to use messengers, observers and signaling equipment in combat control ... All the surviving documents of the same districts, fixing both the loss of company control during the attack, and the inability to control fire and "interaction of fire and movement", and "undeveloped signal control in a company", and the "low level" of "management of the company's battle formations", or even the general "weakness of command staff in commanding subunits" or simply the inability to "manage one's It was also typical in the winter-spring of 1937...

The Khalkhin-Gol command staff did not know how to navigate the terrain - but, as we saw in the chapters | and 3, in the "pre-repression" 1936, even the reconnaissance commanders were not able to do this in the tank units of the advanced KVO, in the advanced BVO, even the command staff of the elite 2nd rifle division was poorly oriented, and the commanders appointed "taiga navigators" of the divisions of the Primorsky OKDVA group, did not know how to go in azimuth! In the last months before the start of the purge of the Red Army, both a significant part of the command staff (including the commander of the reconnaissance company!) of the 207th rifle regiment of the 69th rifle division of the OKDVA stationed in the Amur taiga, and the senior and senior command staff stationed in Po

forestry of the 23rd rifle corps of the BVO, and the command staff of the 3rd and 4th mechanized brigades of the same district ...

Turning to a comparison of the training of headquarters, let's start with the "weak" combat control by the headquarters of battalions and regiments recorded in July 1939 at Khalkhin Gol. The fact that "military headquarters" (i.e., including battalion and regimental ones) are "weak" and "lagging behind" "from the development of events in battle", Deputy People's Commissar of Defense M.N. Tukhachevsky reported to K.E. Voroshilov and December 1, 1935.¹⁶⁶ The materials of inspections of the troops and the annual reports of the formations of the UVO / KVO, BVO and OKDVA that have survived from this year also speak of the same. All the battalion headquarters appearing in these documents (from the 44th and 96th rifle divisions of the UVO, the 27th and 43rd rifle divisions - BVO and the 40th rifle and the 1st and 2nd collective farm rifle divisions - OKDVA) and most of the regimental regiments (from the 27th rifle division of the BVO and the 34th and 3rd collective farm rifle divisions - OKDVA; the only exception was the headquarters of the regiment of the 44th division of the UVO) could not cope with the control of the battle.

The "poor training" of most battalion headquarters was also noted in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. low level" also in the fall of 36-gob7. Weak combat control in that "pre-repression" year was also recorded in 9 out of 10 cases of inspections of the battalion headquarters of another major military district, the BVO, covered by surviving sources, moreover, the battalion headquarters checked in July by the commission of the UBP RKKA in the elite (!) 2- 1st Rifle Division, not only did not control the execution of the issued combat orders, but also did not even know how to organize work at the command post and elementary observation of the battlefield! And the compilers of the fraudulent annual report of the KVO of October 4, 1936, going out of their way to present the headquarters of their formations in a more or less decent form, preferred to simply keep silent about the battalion headquarters ... At least in OKDVA (information on the other two largest districts was not preserved) then the training of regimental headquarters was also weak, not named, but clearly implied in the JUKlads on checking the "headquarters" of the units of the Primorsky group

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∴ 267

in January, the 40th Rifle Division in August and the 35th and 69th in October.

The control of the battle by the battalion and regimental headquarters could not but be "weak" even before the very beginning of the purge of the Red Army: after all, as noted in the directive letter of A.I. Yegorov of June 27, 1937, in the winter and spring of that year, "headquarters of regiments, battalions, and artillery battalions were not put together as battle control bodies!"¹⁶⁸ Documents of the three largest military districts also speak of the same. The headquarters, it was stated in the order of the command troops of the KVO No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937, "poorly prepared to carry out the tasks of managing the battle" (materials of checks of the units of the KVO preserved from the first half of the 37th - from the composition of the 24th and 96th rifle divisions - confirm that this assessment also applied to the headquarters of battalions and regiments). "The skills of organizing and managing the battle in most headquarters are not high," was stated in the materials to the report of the OKDVA headquarters dated May 18, 1937 (documents 40th, 59th, 66th, 69th and 105th rifle divisions confirm that this assessment is also valid for regimental headquarters.), and battalion headquarters work in such a way that command and control at the battalion level is "unsatisfactory". And the "weakness" in combat management, which was different in the first half of the 37th BVO battalion and regimental headquarters, is evident from the fact that, according to the district's annual report of October 15, 1937, all headquarters there still "untimely" brought decisions - the commander was sent to the troops and weakly controlled the execution of orders by the troops ... ⁶⁹

As can be seen from the last three paragraphs, the assessments given in the summer of 1939 to the headquarters of the 57th Corps and the Red Army as a whole and stating the general incapacity of the headquarters as combat control bodies are also applicable to the "pre-repression" times. In the summer of 1939, the Soviet military and operational headquarters "as governing bodies" were "unprepared, they didn't know how to organize a battle, they couldn't cope with the work of commanding troops during the battle" - in a word, "their functions were not

performed", but we have just seen that, according to M.N. Tukhachevsky, the military headquarters in the Red Army were "weak" and "lagged behind" "the development of events in battle" (and therefore could not control it) even by the end of the 35th. And from the report of A.I. His

268

"ditch at the Military Council on December 8 and a directive letter from K.E. Voroshilov dated December 28, 1935, it is clear that "as command and control bodies" they were "not prepared, they did not know how to organize the operation, with the work of command and control in during the operation," in general, "their functions were not performed" then by the operational headquarters. After all, they never achieved "the practical ability to organize in time and" space the necessary interaction of rifle, mechanized and aviation formations in solving the assigned tasks in various conditions of the operation" and to organize communication in mobile army groups. "In a number of districts" they did not even grasp the need for "continuous control" of troops during the operation! and "not coping with the work of command and control of troops during the battle" - in a word, "not performing their functions" military headquarters in the Red Army were in the 36th. The "poor training" of most headquarters "battalions" has already been mentioned, and in the report M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936, "On Combat Training of the Red Army," it was noted that "management of rifle formations is also at an unsatisfactory level; substantiating this thesis, the marshal spoke exclusively about the unsatisfactory work of the headquarters. (Indeed, even in the advanced KVO, the headquarters of all the rifle divisions - the 7th, 46th and 60th, which participated in the Polesye maneuvers at the end of August, dragged out both the preparation of data for making commanding decisions and the registration of combat orders, and bringing them to the troops - in a word, everything that is included in the main functions of the Chitabs.) Among the headquarters of tank formations then, too, there were such things as the headquarters of the 5th Mechanized Fo Corps of the MVO and its brigades, whose work on the September district maneuvers turned out to be "very weak in all parts", or the headquarters of the 8th mechanized brigade of the KVO, which at the Polesye maneuvers "did absolutely nothing for the troops" " ... And from the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss Et On November 10, 1936, it is clear that "as the command and control bodies" were "not prepared, they did not know how to organize the operation, they were not able to manage the troops during the operation

269

operational headquarters. After all, they not only did not link, preparing the operation, along the lines and time of action of various branches of the armed forces, not only did they not plan the organization of the supply of the advancing troops, but also lost control of the troops with the start of the operation!

"Not trained as command and control bodies", "not able to organize battles" and "not coping with the work of commanding troops during the battle", in a word, "not performing their functions", at least, the military headquarters in the Red Army were in the first, "pre-repression" half of the 37th. With regard to the headquarters of battalions and regiments, such a conclusion follows from the fact we noted above of their lack of cohesion "as combat control bodies," and the documents of the three largest military districts allow us to extend this conclusion to the headquarters of formations. Let us once again recall the wording of the order by the command troops of the KVO I.F. Fedko No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937 (headquarters are "poorly trained to carry out battle management tasks"), materials for the report of the OKDVA headquarters dated May 18, 1937 ("the skills of organizing and managing battle in most headquarters are not high") and the fact that by the middle of 1937 the military headquarters of the BVO "untimely" communicated the commander's decision to the troops and did not control the execution of orders by the troops (this is, after all, weak battle management).

The individual training of the headquarters commanders of the 57th corps in the summer of 1939 was "unsatisfactory", but, according to a letter from M.N. Tukhachevsky K.E. Voroshilov from | December 1935, "cadres of staff commanders" in the Red Army were "weak in their training" in the 35th⁷². At the headquarters of the 5th Rifle Corps of the advanced (!) BVO, the commanders in March 1935 did not even have a good command of the skills of graphic work on the map and the military language, but "instead of sparing words, but clear and precise orders, reports, reports, , information" were bred "conversations"⁷³. IN

The annual report of the advanced (!) KVO dated October 4, 1936 openly recognized the need to improve the qualifications of staff officers (taking into account the fact that this document simply shamelessly embellished reality, we can conclude that the training of staff officers of the KVO was also then close to unsatisfactory) .

The same picture is with the equipment of the headquarters service. In the summer of the 39th, in the Soviet headquarters, "the performers of their duties did not

270

they knew, they didn't have the necessary staff skills, they were "not trained" in work in complicated conditions - but "wasn't it the same in the Red Army and in the 35th? Headquarters, recalled February 4, 1935 K.E. Voroshilov, head of the political department of OKDVA L.N. Aronshtam, lacks the skills to perform their functions in practice, the executors do not know "who and to whom passes preliminary orders, who puts the situation on the map, who prepares the messengers at this time, who prepares the signalmen to leave for laying out new lines of communication, who simultaneously 'is preparing instructions for the rear', and so on. The Far Eastern headquarters "at that time had "shortcomings common to the entire Red Army""4, "and indeed, in the spring-summer of 1935, the staff service equipment was weak at the headquarters of all four rifle corps of the advanced KVO and such an elite division of the Red Army as the 44th rifle, and for a long time rehearsing the Kiev maneuvers, the artillery chiefs of both (8th and 17th) rifle corps replaced their staff officers ... The fact that the Red Army had not yet developed a "practical staff worker" was emphasized then by M .N. Tukhachevsky. "A staff commander," he reminded on December 9, 1935, at the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense, "if it smells like a battle, he should immediately worry, check whether the telephones are working, whether the radio is working, whether the orderlies are trained, there are whether the right number of messengers, whether the troops are where he thinks they should be, or are not, what the neighbors are doing, etc. But "all these moments are forgotten in the field""... "Sloppy" "in field work" (as I.K. Gryaznov himself admitted at the Military Council) were in the 35th and the military headquarters of the ZabVO}'5 , almost all of whose formations, we repeat, later had to fight at Khalkhin Gol ...; And in the "pre-repression" 36th? <[...] A lot of time is still wasted on the transmission of orders and reports due to the imperfection of headquarters work, "it was even indicated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. in the annual report of the advanced CVO dated October 4, 1936, it was directly stated that in the district "there is not a single headquarters where the main workers" "would have the full practice of

271

bots!"78 Let us once again recall the 26 hours it took the headquarters of the 7th Rifle Division of the KVO during the Polesye maneuvers to issue and transfer the order for defense to the regiments ...

The staff officers of the Red Army had a poor command of the practical skills of staff service even in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937. Isn't it significant that in the only military district known to us at that time, described in the sources (in this case, in the report of the OKDVA * t headquarters on May 18, 1937) from the side of interest to us now, the military headquarters differed "insufficiently - visibly" organization of work at the command post (CP) and in general "lack of order" in work, and about the only such rifle division of the Moscow Military District (6th), the inspector reported that both the shtadiva and the headquarters of the regiments had "skills in managing - fighting in practice is still not enough "??? Isn't it significant that in the only rifle corps of the BVO, from which documentation was preserved for that period (23rd), during the exercises near Mozyr at the end of February 1937, operational documents were worked out by the headquarters of the corps "slowly and badly", and the order to attack Staff officers wrote to the 52nd Infantry Division for four hours? 80

In the summer of 1939, the Soviet headquarters "did not know how" to "organize and provide command and control of troops in battle with reliable, strong communications" - but the poor ability of staff officers to organize and maintain communications with troops in battle M.N. Tukhachevsky also stated on December 9, 1935, "It turns out,

press, order," he noted then at the Military Council, "and the headquarters is faced with the fact that the radio station has not been deployed, the cables have not been laid in the right way, there is no messenger, etc."8!. The loss of communication with the troops during the usual movement of the headquarters or command post in battle, A.I. noted in the same place on December 8. Yegorov, is a common phenomenon in the Red Army ...

In the summer of 1939, the Soviet headquarters were not able to organize and maintain contact with the troops in battle, but in the "pre-repression" 1936, they often did not strive for this! Let us turn again to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936: "As soon as movement begins, communication is interrupted in most cases, and, unfortunately, this intolerable situation often does not touch anyone, this is treated as something ordinary. [...] In the dynamics of combat

272

, actions, in most cases, communication is disrupted, which indicates an inability to use all means of communication in a planned and correct way"2. At the March maneuvers of the Primorsky OKDVA group, two of the three battalion commanders of the 13th rifle regiment (composed of units of the 105th and 1st collective farm > rifle divisions) did not even try to restore the communication they had been missing for almost the entire duration of the exercises with the headquarters of the regiment ("but no - and it is not necessary"83). The materials of inspections of battalion and regimental headquarters - VOKDVA and BVO (according to the KVO) that have survived from: 36th are "one long list of cases of loss of communication with the troops. "Badly, as even the "lacquered" annual report of the district of October 4, 1936 admitted, the communications service was then led by the chiefs of staff of the KVO regiments ... In the summer of 1939, the Soviet headquarters were not able to organize and maintain contact with the troops in battle, but The staffs participating in the last divisional and corps tactical exercises before the start of the purge of the Red Army, which took place in February-March 1937 in the KVO, BVO and OKDVA, were not able to do this either. In the 105th rifle division of the OKDVA, the headquarters did not organize communications with them at all, and the headquarters of the 72nd rifle regiment of the "strike" of the 24th rifle division of the KVO at the headquarters exercise at the end of January, with a calm soul, switched to a new KL ... until how communications will be deployed there! The unwillingness of Soviet staffs to use radio communications to control troops in battle, noted in the summer of 1939, including at Khalkhin Gol, cannot also be attributed to the consequences of repressions. Also, at the notorious Kiev maneuvers of 1935, with each movement of headquarters, their connection with the troops was lost due to the fact that the staff officers did not use radio stations mounted on cars (and capable of working on the go). Cases of unwillingness to use all available means of communication in the course of a battle, the desire to "base on only one" type of communication (telephone)8* - those. All the same unwillingness to use the radio was also noted in "pre-repression" 1936 even in the units of the forward BVO and the OKDVA, which could join the battle from minute to minute. The commander of the 110th Infantry Regiment of the 37th Infantry Division of the BVO at a tactical exercise in October 1936 used

273

the personnel of his headquarters in the same way as G.K. Zhukov at Khalkhin Gol - as orderlies, i.e. instead of radio communication! In the advanced KVO, according to his report on the Shepetovka maneuvers of September 12-15, 1936, "radio communication did not take its rightful place in the management of units and subunits"85 so much that the headquarters of the 15th mechanized brigade, which had more than one radio station and which was the headquarters of the mobile branch of the armed forces, brought to the units the order to strike the number of the "enemy" division with the help of ... communications delegates! Moreover, as the latter - again, like the Civil Code of Ukraine. Zhukov at Khalkhin Gol - headquarters commanders were used ... In OKDVA, "the use by headquarters of all types of communications," i. First of all, the use of radio, according to the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937, was "insufficient" even on the eve of the purge of the Red Army.

Characteristic of the Soviet headquarters in the summer of 1939, including the headquarters of the 57th special corps, lack of cohesion and lack of mutual information between departments and branches also appeared not after the purge of the Red Army. So, in the OKDVA, the headquarters differed in the poorly organized exchange of information between their subdivisions in the 35th (when even the army report for this year recognized this), and in the 36th (when it was recorded

practically in all the headquarters of units and formations, about the training of which we managed to find reliable information). In the other largest district (KVO), even according to its "lacquered" annual report of October 4, 1936, the coordination and interaction in work between the main departments of the headquarters of the formations was "insufficient" (read: unsatisfactory.) and in 36-m86.

The headquarters of battalions and regiments, as stated in the directive letter of A.I. Yegorov dated June 27, 1937, even before the start of the purge of the Red Army, "did not get together" in the entire Red Army; 7 in the advanced BVO, the headquarters of the mechanized brigades were also insufficiently concentrated at that time, and the statement of the commander of the 21st rifle division, brigade commander I.V. Boryaev at the party meeting of the management and headquarters of the division on February 19, 1937. Even after the head of the 1st part of the staff stated that "the headquarters is not completely knocked together",

274

: and there is no mutual information between the departments, Boryaev nevertheless noted that Shtadiv-21 "undoubtedly stands higher in its work and culture. headquarters" of his regiments "and many others" that he, Boryaev, knows!

The same with the low quality of staff documentation. In the summer of 1939, the "content and technical execution of all documentation" of the Soviet headquarters was "exceptionally low," but in the advanced CVO, the negligence in compiling staff documents was also stated in the 35th - and did not

`believing, but constantly striving to embellish the action

`validity by the district's annual report of October 11, 1935.

: Indeed, the headquarters of the 7th rifle division then made 18 grammatical and 54 professional errors in one document, the headquarters of the "shock" 44th rifle division before the Kiev maneuvers of 1935, even having to draw up an order to break through the fortified zone several days (and not hours, as in the war), compiled it "exceptionally carelessly." And the staff officers of the elite 24th Rifle in the same September 1935, with a calm soul, formulated the further task of the division in the order as follows: "In the future, a further task" ... Mapping the Situation" in January 1936, and in the BVO in July, both poorly designed maps and poorly worked out reports were presented by all battalion headquarters, checked by the Red Army UBP in the "shock" (!) 2nd Infantry Division .. In all the military headquarters of the KVO, BVO and OKDVA (from the composition of the 21st, 24th, 37th, 52nd, 69th and 96th rifle divisions) illuminated from this side, the quality of the headquarters document - tion was low and on the eve of the purge of the Red Army - in February -

Le-June 37th...

B. Artillery

The sources introduced into scientific circulation contain information only about the tactical training of the artillery commanders who fought at Khalkhin Gol. This training turned out to be clearly unsatisfactory. "Artillery," testified V.A. Rookie, non-interactive

275

fought with the infantry, did not provide it with effective support in the offensive"?! "Our artillery is in complete disarray, confusion with fire," said Zhukov, commissar of the 5th Rifle and Machine Gun Brigade, after the July battles, and one of those who had a chance to "interact" with the artillerymen.

But "confusion and 'confusion with fire'" for the Soviet artillery was also characteristic in the 35th. Speaking on December 8, 1935 at the Military Council, A.I. Egorov noted that military divisions and

Artillery groups “have not mastered fire control”³, but the main link in the system of interaction between artillerymen and infantry was precisely the division, in practice this interaction was carried out precisely at the level of the division! In addition, fire control of an artillery battalion and an artillery group “is the basis for fire control of massed artillery”, and without concentrating fire on the strongest centers of resistance, artillery cannot provide infantry with “effective support in the offensive” ...

As can be seen from the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 “On the Combat Training of the Red Army”, “tactical work” of the artillery battalions “together with the infantry” was the “weak side of the training” of the commanders of the Soviet artillery in the 36th⁹⁴. In both artillery regiments of the advanced BVO, for which the corresponding information for that year (33rd and 37th) was preserved, the headquarters of divisions in battle controlled fire “slightly worse” than “satisfactory” or were not knocked together (and , which means that they had to allow all the same “confusion and confusion with fire”). Things should have been the same in the advanced KVO and OKDVA. After all, even the annual report of the KVO dated October 4, 1936, which shamelessly embellished reality, was forced to admit that the commander of the artillery division “cannot yet be recognized as well prepared” (and that, accordingly, the readiness of the divisions “for controlled fire” is rather weak). Fire control of the battalion — and, accordingly, interaction with the infantry — in the 36th did not work out even in the OKDVA ...

As follows from the speech of K.E. Voroshilov at the Military Council on November 27, 1937, “the interaction of artillery with infantry and other branches of the armed forces” in the Red Army “remained weak

276

by” and in the first, “pre-repression” half of the 37th. Com-

, the composition of artillery “of all degrees”, confirms the order of the Command of the KVO No. 0100 of June 22 1937, “did not work out the most important issues of interaction” with infantry, cavalry and tanks. In fact, they signed in the same

, compilers of the OKDVA headquarters report dated May 18, 1937. The headquarters of the artillery divisions, they noted, prepared “unsatisfactory

positively”, and the actions of infantry and tank escort guns

,kov (i.e., first of all, the actions of gun commanders) are generally the weakest point of interaction between military branches...⁹⁷

There is no information about the training of the commanders of the engineering troops and signal troops who fought at Khalkhin Gol in the sources introduced today into scientific circulation.

2. TROOPS

As regards the training of the fighters and subunits who fought at Khalkhin Gol, the above-mentioned sources contain information on only one type of troops—infantry.

A lone infantry fighter at Khalkhin Gol systematically showed inability to conduct close combat. After all, in June and July 1939, the orders of G.K. Zhukov was required to teach the fighter almost all the elements of this fight: “the ability to crawl covertly”, “the technique of running and crawling”, “pumping for an attack”, “quick and decisive attack”, “good possession of a bayonet and a grenade. Judging by the first of these orders, which also set the task of teaching the fighter: “to burrow into the ground at the slightest stop”? was accustomed to “necessity to dig in).

The training of the units, at least in a number of Khalkhin-Gol formations, was frankly unsatisfactory. Thus, the July battles showed that the 603rd Rifle Regiment of the 82nd Rifle Division (the only one of its composition that managed to take part in these battles)

and 5th. The rifle-machine-gun brigade is "absolutely not knocked together and" not trained", and in addition they are also "unstable"! On the night of

277

On July 11-12, 1939, two battalions of the 603rd regiment twice left their positions without orders; "The regiment even tried to rebel," and on July 13, in a panic, they ran away from the Japanese company and threw down almost all their weapons. After they managed to stop it, it turned out to have only 4 heavy and 3 light machine guns (out of 54 and 87, respectively, laid down by the state)! local conflict deserves comparison with sabotage. Before being sent to Khalkhin Gol, in June 1939, the 82nd was mobilized, i.e. replenished to wartime staff with conscripts assigned to it, as a result of which a small number of its regular Red Army soldiers were dissolved in a mass of conscripts, many of whom had never received military training at all. According to the information of the 82nd writer K.M. Simonov, they "fell into this division without having begun to learn anything yet." They were even taught to "wield a rifle" "already on the way to Khalkhin Gol, in the carriage"!102

But after all, the infantry of the Red Army did not know how to conduct close combat even before the repressions! Thus, of the six rifle divisions of the UVO / KVO, BVO and OKDVA (21st, 27th, 37th, 40th, 44th and 51st), for which the materials of checks in March-June In 1935, their fighters in tactical exercises, in four "the technique of crossing and crawling" and "the ability to crawl covertly" turned out to be weak, and in the fifth (27th, in which close combat was generally reduced to "unbelting"!03) were completely absent. According to the report of the Political Directorate of the KVO dated May 5, 1936, the technique of defection in this advanced (!) District was not mastered even then, and even by the end of the 36th, "questions of close combat" (as even the annual report of the KVO from October 4, 1936) were only "under development" there!4 -th, 48th and 81st), the technique of running and crawling was poorly worked out in four, and the attack roll was poorly worked out in two. "Shock" (!) 2nd rifle at the Belarusian maneuvers of 1936 instead of

278

close combat generally demonstrated the same "unbelting" as the 27th in March 1935 ...

"Strong skills in rushing, crawling" infantry soldier of the Red Army, as can be seen from the directive letter of A.I. Egorova dated June 27, 1937, and did not have it in the last months ^{start} before the purge of the Red Army; He "didn't work out" the bayonet fight either! 05 And indeed, in both rifle divisions of the KVO, about the training of a single infantryman in which information was preserved at that time (24th and 96th), files

that was exactly how it was then ("ineptly" throwing grenades there). The infantrymen of the BVO did not then have the "necessary skills in movement and rushes" either; it is also indicative that in the only rifle corps of this district, from which the documentation for 1937 (23rd) has been preserved, "indicated weakly on ^{place} in the preparation of the fighter was a bayonet battle. And the report ° of the OKDVA headquarters from May 18, 1937 that the fighters of the Far Eastern infantry "completely lack" any ki and practical dexterity ^{"navy-} in the art of close "combat" - both in work with a bayonet and grenade, and in a throw to attack, and in a battle in a trench, etc.!%.

Self-digging among the Red Army infantrymen was also not held in high esteem even before the purge of the Red Army. That "a shovel during an offensive is often used poorly" - this was also noted in the speech of A.I. Yegorova at the Military Council on December 8, 1935!97; at the Kiev maneuvers of 1935, self-digging was neglected even in the elite 24th rifle division ... Of the five rifle divisions of the advanced BVO, information about the infantry training of which was preserved in 1936 (2nd, 33rd, 37th, A8-yi 81st), the fighters were not accustomed to dig in on the battlefield in three, and in the "pre-repression" first half of 1937 they did not have the "necessary skills" in self-digging

infantrymen of this entire district (this indication of the BVO annual report of October 15, 1937 is confirmed, as we saw in Chapter 3, by orders for the 23rd Rifle Corps - the only

venue in the district, from which the documentation for the 'specified period' has been preserved). "Rarely and clumsily" was the shovel used then in the advanced KVO! 6? (This is evidence of the order No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937, by the commanders of the district, again confirms the orders for both rifle divisions of the KVO, from which the documentation for the first half of 1937 has been preserved - the 24th and 96th) .

279

The ugly training of the assigned composition of rifle divisions also distinguished the "pre-repression" Red Army. This was shown, for example, by the trial mobilization of the secondary 129th Rifle Division and several rifle regiments, carried out in May-June 1937, deployed from the frame, respectively, of the 61st Rifle Division of the Volga Military District and the 8th Rifle Division. BVI. Those of the recruits infused into this cadre who, like those who replenished the 82nd division in the summer of 1939, underwent only "non-military" training (i.e., did not serve even in the variable composition of territorial units), it is exactly the same, as in 1939, "almost did not differ from the untrained", and "the rest of the soldiers" "forgotten a lot" ... The training of assigned junior command personnel in the 129th division "almost did not differ from document. - A.S.] "training of ordinary Red Army soldiers," who received training in the personnel units. In the regiments deployed from the 8th division, it was also "mostly unsatisfactory" - so much so that, according to the conclusion of the chairman of the verification commission, the head of the combat training department of the Red Army infantry inspection, Colonel K.A. Kovalenko, "did not ensure the organization and conduct of modern combat by rifle units"...110

The soldiers of the assigned staff of the 6th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District, even having passed the training camp on June 6-20, 1937, not only poorly worked out observation of the enemy, self-digging, camouflage and application to the terrain in offensive combat and bayonet fighting techniques, but and did not firmly know their place in the order of battle of the squad in the offensive. And this despite the fact that only 5 percent of them did not have military training!!! After the gathering that took place on the same days, the infantry clerks of the 55th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District looked the same, although the percentage of "non-military personnel" among them did not exceed 5.8. <[...] For the most part, the rank and file has poor military training, - concluded Colonel Svechin, who checked the 55th assistant to the head of the 3rd department of the UBP RKKA. - There is no knowledge of the material part of the weapon, drill bearing, the ability to apply to the terrain, knowledge of the duties of a fighter in battle, etc. "12,

The soldiers of the 603rd regiment of the 82nd division in the July battles at Khalkhin Gol showed, as we saw, a complete absence

280

'disciplines and military spirit' - but just as little they resembled soldiers in the "pre-repression" 1935 (when the 603rd regiment was still the 246th). Speaking on December 8, 1935 at the Military Council, the commander of the troops of the Ural Military District

, which included the 82nd division, I.I. Garkavy bluntly signed that his troops were in fact not a regular army, he admitted, it was still necessary to instill in them a fighting spirit, to instill combat bearing,

strong internal order and discipline! 3

- Lack of concentration and lack of training of personnel riflemen - such as the Khalkhin-Gol 5th rifle-machine-gun brigade - was also encountered in the "pre-repression" Red Army. So, having inspected a number of rifle divisions of the OKDVA in October 1936, brigade commander K.D. Golubev from the UBP RKKA stated that the 39th "on the whole is, in terms of combat, a satisfactorily put together and combat-ready 'union only in terms of training training units and

headquarters", the 40th also "is a formation satisfactorily photographed in combat terms only in part of the headquarters and training battalions, a tank battalion, a communications battalion, and a reconnaissance battalion", the 92nd "is combat-ready only by its first echelons" (training units - mi), and the 59th, even these units - engaged in the summer not in construction (like the rest), but in combat training - are "UNFIGHTABLE" (which means that the division as a whole is also incapable of combat). And in the same month, Brigade Commander A.A. Korobkov concluded that, for the time being, she too "cannot be a full-fledged 'combat unit'"⁴. The documents and facts analyzed by us above confirm the correctness of V.A. A recruit who wrote that KALKHIN GOL's "victory, about which we shouted to the whole world of Ir, was a Pyrrhic victory", that "we won not by reduction, but by numerical superiority" - primarily in tanks and Vrtillery! / 5. (Another argument in favor of such a conclusion is the ratio of combat losses: if the Japanese, according to the data, lost killed, died from wounds and wounded

281

mi 17,895 (according to other sources, 17,857) people, then the Soviet troops - 23,662; 9471 were killed and died from wounds and (51!) diseases among the Japanese, and 9571116 among the Soviet side.) However, almost all these facts and documents were introduced into scientific circulation (V.G. Krasnov, V.O. Daines and B V. Sokolov) only in the last decade and the traditional assessment of the actions of the Soviet troops at Khalkhin Gol as brilliant (or, at least, not worthy of serious reproaches) has not been shaken until now. And since the actions were considered brilliant, the question of the impact of the repressions of 1937-1938 on them was not raised. But one way or another, from what is stated in this section, it is clear that this influence was zero, that the training of the Soviet troops who fought in the summer of 1939 at Khalkhin Gol was the same as the training of the "pre-repression" Red Army (in any case, not worse)...

Concluding this thesis, let us offer, as a visual illustration of it, an excerpt from the report of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army V.N. Levichev on the results of his inspection in October 1934 of the 36th Infantry Division - the one that in 1939 fought at Khalkhin Gol longer than all other formations. Two staff games, held with its command staff on October 26 and 27, 1934, showed that even division commander-36 M.S. Khozin could not figure out the "situation of the unfolding battle". ("Undoubtedly," Levichev noted, "here comes the habit of the scheme, of tradition, of a simplified form.") In the same way, "the rest" of the commanding staff of the division—"not excluding academicians who have just graduated [graduates of the Military Academy of the Red Army named after M.V. Frunze. — A.S.] — "in both games, he showed at least a lack of skills in the ability to assess the situation in accordance with the actual situation, in the ability to formulate tasks for his units, etc. The answers in the overwhelming majority of cases were fuzzy, unclear, ornate [...]" The written orders written by the commanders "by the most important decision of the parties" finally "confirmed" the "completely insufficient tactical development of the command staff". "It would still be forgivable," the inspector emphasized, "if people acted better on the field with troops, but, taking into account the maneuvers, we have to conclude that, tactically, the teams

282

Other cadres of the 36th (rifle) battalion are far from up to the mark" of modern requirements (and this despite the fact that they "possess" an appropriate general development, were on all kinds of "courses" ...). then the commanders of the regiments Znamerovsky and (to a lesser degree) TV Davyldov...!

By the middle of the 37th, a lot could have changed for the better, let us still allow ourselves to doubt that the "pre-repression" commanders of the regiments of the 36th division would have acted on Zhalkhin-Gol better than their successor, the commander of the 149th th 'fleet regiment (until 1939 - the 108th rifle regiment) I.M. Re-Mizov, and that the commanders, who in the autumn of 1934 possessed "completely insufficient tactical development," would have acted at Khalkhin Gol better than their successors who showed lack of initiative there ...

NOTES

1 Krasnov V.G. Unknown Zhukov. Laurels and thorns of the commander. Documentation. Opinions. Reflections. M., 2000; Daines V.O. Zhukov. M., 2005. 2 Cited. by: Daines V.O. Decree. op. P. 93. 3 Quoted from: Ibid. P. 112. 4 Ibid. P. 98. 5 Cited. by: There. pp. 106, 107. \$ On the occasion of the 110th anniversary of the birth of Major General M.A. Kuznetsova // Military Historical Archive. 2006. No. 10. P. 134. ©; 7 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 12 (1). M., 1993. S. 84. 8 Russian State Military Archive (hereinafter - RGVA). F.31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 171; F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 4. 9 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 41. L. 38. No. 7am. F. 9. He. 36. D. 1759. L. 70. !! 7am same. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12v. 3} 12 Ibid., F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 117. ". (3 Ibid. L. 116. 14 Ibid. L. 166. 15 Ibid. F. 62. Rev. 3. D. 40. L. 90. 16 Ibid. F. 31983. Inventory 2. D. 213. Sheet 64. 17 Ibid. D. 203. L. 61; F. 9. Inventory 36. D. 2611. Sheet 249 06 . (1 rev.); F. 33879. "p. 1.D. 614. L. 85 rev. (the second of two sheets of this case, having the number 5); F. 37464. Op. 1.D. 26. L. 10. 18 Quoted from: Daines V. O. Op. cit., p. 107. * 9 Quoted from: Ibid., p. 105. --, 2 Zheltov I., Pavlov I., Pavlov M. Decree. op. S. 42.

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283

21 Raryatinsky M., Kolomiets M. Light tanks BT-2 and BT-5 // Armor collection. 1996. No. 1. S. 25

22 Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. M., 1971. S. 151-152. The cited text of the first edition of Zhukov's memoirs (we quote it from an additional edition of this edition released in 1971) was also preserved in the significantly supplemented (according to the author's manuscript) tenth edition (Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and Reflections. 10-s ed. Moscow, 1990, v. 1, p. 246).

23 Op. by: Daines V.O. Decree. op. P. 95. According to Daines, this report is dated June 9, however, the 1st light tank went into its first battle only on July 3. And from the further text of the report it is clear that we are talking about the July "Bain-Tsagansky massacre": "about half of the BT tanks" in the 11th light tank was put out of action precisely as a result of the attack on July 3 (see note 27 to this chapter). In addition, it was Colonel I.M. Afonin was the first Soviet commander to discover that the Japanese had crossed the Khalkhin Gol and occupied Mount Bain Tsagan. Accordingly, use him as an informant in preparation for an attack on the "powerful anti-tank defense" and Zhukov and the commander of the 11th light tank brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev (according to the report, Afonin informed Yakovlev directly) had a reason precisely in July, on the eve of the Bain-Tsagan battle.

24 Simonov K.M. Biotraffic Notes by G.K. Zhukova // Military Historical Journal. 1987. No. 6. S. 49.

25 See: Kondratiev V. Khalkhin-Gol. War in the air. M., 2002. S. 19.

26 Simonov KM. Notes to the biography of EK. Zhukov. S. 49.

27 Baryatinsky M., Kolomiets M. Light tanks BT-2 and BT-5. S. 25.

28 Kolomiets M.V. Armor on wheels. History of the Soviet armored car 1925-1945. M., 2007. S. 271-272.

29 Op. by: Daines V.O. Decree. op. S. 106.

30 On the occasion of the 110th anniversary of the birth of Major General M.A. Kuznetsova. pp. 134-135.

31 Op. Quoted from: Baryatinsky M., Kolomiets M. Light tank BT-7 // Brons collection. 1996. No. 5. S. 19.

32 RGVA. F.O 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 325.

33 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 18v.

U There. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 583. L.7.

35 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 60.

36 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611.L. 249 vol. (1 rev.).

37 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 27.

33 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 16.

39 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12v., 11.

4% Ibid. F. 40334. Op. 1. D. 204. L. 58.

41 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 24v.

42 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 331.

43 Cit. Quoted from: Sokolov B. Mikhail Tukhachevsky. The life and death of a red marshal. Smolensk, 1999, p. 344.

44 Op. by: Daines V.O. Decree. op. S. 97.

284

No.". 45 Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and reflections. M., 1971. S. 156-157. ' . 46 Quoted from: Daines V.O. Decree. Op. P. 95. 47 RGVA. F. 9 Collection 29, file 213, sheet 357, 40. 48 Ibid., F. 31983, list 2, file 202, sheet 12, fund 9, list 36, file 1759, sheet 67 F. 33879. Inventory 1. D. 583. Sheet 6. 49 Ibid. F. 31983. Inventory 2. D. 203. L. 60. 9 Ibid. F. 9. Inv. 29. File 213. Sheet 363. ,51 Ibid. F. 4. Inventory 16. D. 19. Sheet 83. 52 Ibid. F. 9. Inventory 36. 54 Ibid. D. 584. Ibid. F. 33879. Inv. 1. D. 583. L. 9, 11. . 36. D. 2611. Sheet 249 rev. (1 L 26v., F. 9. Inventory D. 1759. L. 73. :... 83 rev.) 55 Quoted from: Savin A. S., Vartanov V. N. Far away by the river...) // Voennno-izzericheskij zhurnal, anniversary 1989, No. 9, pp. 67. : 56 Quoted from: Daines V.O. Decree cited, pp. 94-95, 93. 57 Quoted from: Savin A S., Vartanov V. N. Op. op. P. 67. 58 Quoted from: Daines V. O. Op. op. p. 105. 5 Quoted from: Ibid., p. 111. 60 K 110 anniversary of the birth of Major-General M.A. Kuznetsov, 5C, 135. 61 Russian archive, Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). pp. 110-111. 62 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 33. 63 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19.L.7; F.9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 362. 6 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 40. L. 49. 65 Ibid. F. 900. Op. 1. D. 269. L. 170; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 169; `D:26l. L. 75; F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 12. L. 276. < 66 7am same. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 325. 67 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 40. L. 49; F. 33879. Op. 1. D, 583.L.7. 68 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 60. 8 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 vol.); D. 2529. L. 152; "F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 620. L. 3. e @ The same. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 16; F. 62. Op. 3. D. 41. L. 38. }. 7 Quot. lo: Sokolov B. Mikhail Tukhachevsky. S. 344; RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2. 213. L. 70. 7? RGVA. F. 9. Ol. 29. D. 213. L. 325. 73 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 174. 74 Ibid. D. 185. L. 18, 22. 75 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 120. >" 18 Ibid. L. 83. # _P Ibid. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34v. vol 7: Same. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 147. ^_ 79 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 27; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 246. L. 17. 80 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1.D. 26.L. 39. 81 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 121. 32 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 11 ib. "83 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 588. L. 226. No. 84 7am. F. 37464. Inv. 1. D. 12. L. 48, 67.

#285

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86 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 72.

87 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 60.

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194 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 87.

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110 7am same. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 246. L. 98, 62, 99, 63, 60.

11 7am same. L. 32.

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113 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19.L.71.

14 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 582. L. 6, 17, 31-32, 50, 60.

115 On the occasion of the 110th anniversary of the birth of Major General M.A. Kuznetsova. S. 135.

116 Calculated from: Sokolov B. Unknown Zhukov: a portrait without retouching in the mirror of the era. Mn., 2000. S. 140, 141; The seal of secrecy has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, combat actions and military conflicts. Statistical research. M., 1993. S. 79; Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. Statistical research. M., 2001. S. 177. In the last two editions, the number of Soviet wounded (15 25] people) includes those who died from wounds in hospitals (together with those who died there from diseases, 1,160 such people were recruited).

17 RGVA. F. 31983. Og. 2. D. 200. L. 8-6 (sheets of the case are numbered in descending order).

Chapter 5

IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST POLAND (September-October 1939)

- This campaign began on September 17, 1939 with the invasion of the BOVO and KOVO zoisks into Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, which belonged to Poland. Consolidated in:

_ - 3rd, 11th, 4th. and the 10th Army, a cavalry-mechanized group and a separate (up to 21 September) 23rd Rifle Corps of the Belorussian Front and

- Shepetovskaya, Volochisk and Kamenetz-Podolsk army groups (on September 18-24 they were renamed into the Northern, Eastern and Southern army groups, and on September 24-28 - into the 5th, 6th and 12th armies). Ukrainian Front (on September 28, a cavalry army group was allocated from the 12th Army),

these troops received the task of striking at the Polish troops, defeating them and reaching certain lines. However, in the east of Poland, which with | September waged war with Germany, no significant military forces were deployed, and the Polish troops retreating here from the west were demoralized by the rapid capture of half of the country by the Germans. Some Polish officers were disoriented by the fact that there was no formal declaration of war by the USSR; Finally, the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, Marshal E. Rydz-Smigly, issued late in the evening of September 17, directed the Polish troops not to repulse the Soviet invasion, but to retreat to Romania and Hungary. Therefore, organized resistance on a scale of the whole

287

theater of operations carried out according to a single plan and under a single leadership, the Soviet troops did not meet. Most of the Polish troops that came into contact with them surrendered without a fight, and the Polish campaign of the Red Army in 1939 was reduced to marches, the reception of prisoners of war and only episodic battles - with the aim of defeating the garrisons of cities and fortified areas that still resisted and suppressing attempts separate Polish groupings to break into Romania, Hungary, Lithuania and the central regions of Poland ... The most serious battles unfolded mainly at the junction of the Ukrainian and Belorussian fronts, in northern Volhynia, Polissya and Podlasie - in the Sarnensky fortified area (September 19-20), near Navuz (Navoz, north of Lutsk, September 21-22), behind the Sikorsky fort of the Brest Fortress (September 22 and 26), near Shatsk (east of Vlodava, September 28-29), north and northeast of Parchev (September 29-30) and near Vytychno in the Vlodava region (October 1). In the main part of the Byelorussian Front, Vilna (September 18-19) and Grodno (September 20-22) were taken only after stubborn battles, and in the main part of the Ukrainian Front, battles near Sutkovitsa (north of Sambir) in Galicia (September 27) became noticeable. - October) and in the area of Janowa (Januwa Lubelski) in the Lublin region (September 30 - October 1). The presence of Polish forces in front of the troops of the Belarussian and Ukrainian fronts was recorded until October 7, 1939 |

Documents and facts introduced by now into scientific circulation by domestic researchers contain very little material for assessing the training of soldiers and units participating in the Polish campaign, and from commanders and headquarters, they cover primarily

tank. True, tankers (and half of the tank formations of the Red Army - two tank corps and 12 separate tank brigades) were involved in actions against Poland in this campaign, perhaps, played the main role. One way or another, certain conclusions can be drawn from published materials.

288

1. COMMANDERS AND HEADQUARTERS (combined arms, infantry and tank)

Operational-tactical thinking. It is impossible not to pay attention to the resolute and enterprising - in the spirit of "war of engines" - actions of a number of formation commanders. So, on September 17, trying to pre-empt the Poles in the occupation of the Baranovichi fortified area, but experiencing a lack of fuel, the commander of the 29th light tank brigade of the 4th Army of the Belorussian Front, brigade commander S.M. Krivoshein ordered the third companies of his tank battalions to give all available gasoline to the first and second companies, and with the remaining two-company battalions, he nevertheless made a 40-kilometer throw and occupied Baranovichi. On September 18, a similar decision was made by the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Corps of the Volochisk Army Group of the Ukrainian Front, Army Commander of the 2nd Rank O.I. Gorodovikov. Faced not only with a shortage of gasoline for the tanks, but also with the need to rest the cavalry, he arranged for the transfer of all remaining fuel to two of his six tank units - the 32nd tank regiment of the 5th cavalry division and the combined tank battalion 24 th light tank brigade, - put dismounted cavalrymen on the armor of their BT-2, BT-5 and BT-7, and with the help of this impromptu "motorized detachment" he nevertheless began to fulfill the order he received to advance with a forced march to Lvov. On September 20, a similar order - to drain all the remaining gasoline into tanks 43 out of 234 of his BT-7s and, thanks to this, still fulfill the order to throw from Volkovysk to Sokulka - was given by brigade commander A.V. Kurkin is the commander of the 2nd light tank brigade of the 15th tank corps of the cavalry-mechanized group of the Belorussian Front... The Polish campaign was minimized by the absence of serious resistance from the enemy. (This was taken into account, in particular, by the commander of the 6th cavalry corps of the same cavalry-mechanized troupe, division commander A.I. Eremenko, when he formed his rather weak "motorized detachments" already in the evening of the first day of the campaign.)

30 - 2255 289

At the same time, in a real combat situation, Soviet commanders too often demonstrated very weak tactical thinking. Enough. to analyze (according to M.I. Meltyukhov!) their actions in the largest field battles with the Polish troops, which took place at the turn of September and October in Polesie and Podlachia. So, on September 27, the 52nd Rifle Division of the 5th Army of the Ukrainian Front was moving from Malorita (southeast of Brest) to Vlodava with the task of preventing the breakthrough of the Polish opsrativnoy group "Polesie" to the left bank of the Western Bug?. Consequently, division commander-52 Colonel I.N. Russiyanov had to be guided by a meeting with large forces of an active enemy - and keep the division in the appropriate grouping. However, in the head of the forces moving towards Vlodava, there was ... the 28th separate engineer battalion. Being fired on the outskirts of the city on September 27, the sappers, of course, could not replace the infantry and began to retreat. If the battalion had run into larger and more active forces (like those that encountered the 52nd division the next day in the Shatsk area), it would certainly have been defeated ...

The commanders of the 143rd Rifle Division of the Corps of the 4th Army of the Belorussian Front, advancing to the right of the 52nd, from Koden (south of Brest) to Parchev, had to be ready to fight against a numerous and combat-like enemy. However, when, on the night of September 29, her reconnaissance talion collided near Gura Pukhova and Yablonya (northeast of Parchev) with the Poles who had artillery (i.e., obviously serious), the division commander-143 brigade commander D.P. Safonov began to commit his troops to the battle in parts - first he sent to help the scouts ... a rifle company and a platoon of 45-mm guns of the anti-tank division, and then, when the reconnaissance battalion was attacked by another

one Polish detachment from the 60th Infantry Division of the Polesie group, which was breaking through to the Vistula, was the 1st Battalion of the 635th Rifle Regiment with the 1st Battalion of the 287th Artillery. Commander-635 Major N.A. acted in the same way. Shvarev. As a result, the battle dragged on until the night of September 30, and it was still possible to dislodge the enemy from Yablony only after the concentration of all the available forces of the 635th regiment...

290

The commander of the 52nd division of the 253rd rifle regiment of the 45th rifle division of the 5th Army of the Ukrainian Front, moved near Vlodava to help, on the morning of October 1, received from his reconnaissance very complete data on the organization of the defense of the town of Vytychno, occupied by units of the Border Protection Corps from the group of General V. Orlik-Rückemann. Nevertheless, he not only did not send his 2nd battalion around the defenders (which at the same time would cut off their path to join the Polish troops in the Warsaw area), he did not just attack them head-on, but moved him directly into the "fire bag", arranged between the town and the eastern shore of Lake Vitytsk! Only after the failure of the attack (which obviously accounted for most of the 132 killed and wounded that the 45th division lost that day near Vytychno³) and the withdrawal of the Poles in front of the 1st battalion from Vytychno to the west, the 2nd was sent to cut across the retreating ...

Well, and the command of the 151st Rifle Regiment of the 8th Rifle Division of the 4th Army of the Belorussian Front, which "organized" the assault on the Sikorsky Fort of the Brest Fortress on September 22, did not think at all about their actions. It simply time after time, without any artillery and engineering training, threw the infantry into the attack on the ramparts of the fort. And this despite the fact that the "Sikorsky" (the former Russian "Count Berg") not only stood in an open area, well shot by the Poles defending it from the marching battalion of the 82nd Infantry Regiment, but was also surrounded by a moat of 8-10-meters deep!

Were there too many examples of the weakness of tactical thinking in just a few battles that took place over the course of ten days in one area?

As for the initiative and decisive actions of the commanders of formations, they took place in the Belorussian district even before the start of mass repressions; however, it cannot be said that this was a typical occurrence. At a military game held on the 20th of March 1935 in Bobruisk by A.I. Sedyakin with the commanders of six formations of the BVO (5th Rifle Corps, 4th and 8th Rifle and 4th Cavalry Divisions and the 3rd and 4th Mechanized Brigades), the decisions of five of them (all

291

except for commander-5 S.E. Gribov) were distinguished by "insufficient originality and courage in tactical maneuver". It is difficult to say to which link those "commanders" belonged, whose "initiative decisions" Sedyakin, according to him, observed at district maneuvers and corps exercises that took place in the BVO in September 1935. But it is significant that even in October 1936, at a large tactical exercise near Polotsk, of the two commanders of mechanized brigades, one - Kombrig-16 Colonel S.N. Amosov - acted indecisively and that even in the first days of June 1937 in the 23rd Rifle Corps, the only BVO formation illuminated by sources from this side, the senior and senior command staff (i.e., division commanders) in the classroom with troops and headquarters exits in the field showed "lack of decisiveness and diligence [...] in case of surprises (the bridge was torn, the column approached the infected area)"⁶, those. in a situation similar to the one in which on September 17, 1939, brigade commander S.M. Krivoshein...

In the Kiev district, according to even its mercilessly "varnished" reality annual reports on the results of combat training (hereinafter such documents will be referred to as annual reports) dated October 11, 1935 and October 4, 1936, "some" (in fact, perhaps many) senior commanders did not have "sufficient skill" (in fact, they probably did not know how at all) to take into account, when planning an operation, such factors as

space, time and availability of forces and means". In other words, in the "pre-repression" CVO, "some" (and perhaps many) top commanders would not have been able to accept the decision taken on September 18, 1939 by the commander of the 2nd rank O.I. Gorodovikov, who just took into account:

— and space (145 km distance from Tarnopol to Lvov);

- and time (Lviv was ordered to take possession already on the night of September 19);

- and the availability of forces and means (lack of gasoline and the fact that the tanks BT-2 and BT-5 could have enough for no more than 200 km even with a full refueling) ...

As you can see, in a number of cases, the commanders of the formations in September 1939 thought even better than their "dorepres

292

"Zionic" predecessors! In any case, by the autumn of 1939, the operational-tactical thinking of the higher command staff of the Belorussian and Kyiv districts by the autumn of 1939 had by no means undergone a regression compared to the "pre-repression" period.

If division commander-52 I.N. Russiyanov in September 1939 simply thoughtlessly led his division forward scattered in front of the line of an active enemy, then even then he had predecessors also in the "pre-repression" BVO. Didn't the 5th and 21st mechanized brigades attack just as thoughtlessly exactly three years earlier, at the White Russian maneuvers of 1936? Moving behind enemy lines, they did not even really organize reconnaissance, outposts and elementary observation - in a word, they went "blindly", demonstrated "indiscriminate, little realized in terms of tactical meaning, forward movement" ... Aesli Russiyanov was aware of the increased danger of a collision with an active enemy, but could not psychologically reorganize and give appropriate orders, then his behavior was generally typical for the command staff of the "pre-repression" BVO! After all, according to the annual report of the BVO on October 15, 1937, the "common weak point" of its commanders "continued [\$1s! — A.S.] stay" "slow decision-making"...9

The sluggishness of the divisional commander-143 D.P. Safonov and regiment commander-635 N.A. Shvarev, who, faced with an active one, even bypassing them! the enemy, introduced their forces into battle in parts among the senior and senior command staff of the BVO was also distributed before the purge of the Red Army. For higher education in 1935, it was generally typical! After all, "insufficient courage in tactical maneuver" commanders of formations - participants in the war game mentioned above

'showed in exactly the same situation in which Safonov and Shvarev found themselves in September 1939 - "in conditions of scarce information about the general situation", "high activity of the enemy, with a delay in the deployment of a significant part" of their troops and under the threat " coverage on one of the flanks "!!! At the only publicized war game held with the commanders of the BVO troops in 1936 (at the end of March, under the leadership of the assistant commander of the 43rd Infantry Division, Colonel D.D. Tom and in the presence of the head of the 3 th department of the General

293

headquarters of the Red Army brigade commander P.D. Mamonov), the decisions of the players (the chiefs of staff of the regiments of the 43rd division) also turned out to be "extremely cautious" ...!

The surviving sources do not allow us to establish whether the "pre-repression" commanders of the Kiev district regiments preferred frontal strikes to flank ones, as the commander of the 253rd Rifle Regiment (former 131st Rifle Regiment of the 44th Rifle Division) did on October 1, 1939 near Vytychno. IN). But for battalion commanders, such behavior was typical even before the purge of the Red Army. It is hardly a coincidence that, better than others, the 286th Infantry Regiment of the 96th Infantry Division, which was covered by "pre-repression" sources, did not show "desire to maneuver on the enemy's flank" even in April 1935 (during the inspection of the division visions of the 2nd department

Headquarters of the Red Army), nor in February 1937 (during battalion exercises and tactical exercises of the 17th Rifle Corps; "the desire to attack on the flank" was not found there by the battalion commanders of other parts of the 17th Corps, including And from the "shock" (!) 24th Infantry Division) ... 13

The "pre-repression" commanders were also capable of a frankly idiotic decision to take a long-term fortification by a frontal attack of infantry without artillery and engineering training in the Belorussian district. Attacking the Polotsk fortified area on October 4, 1936 at a large tactical exercise near Polotsk, the commanders of the 5th and 43rd rifle divisions acted in exactly the same way as the commanders of the 8th in September 1939 in the Brest Fortress, threw infantry on embrasures of concrete pillboxes, without waiting (after all, the deputy head of the Combat Training Directorate of the Red Army (UBP RKKA), brigade commander M.N. Gerasimov, who observed this picture, noted "an indifferent attitude to enemy fire"! 4) their suppression by artillery and smoke screens. The commander of the 2nd rifle company of the 13th rifle regiment of the "shock" (!) 5th division, Senior Lieutenant Abdulin, in this insanity, went so far as to order the company ... with a shout of "Hurrah!" rush to the concrete box with hostility!

Interaction. At the end of the Polish campaign, I had to admit that many commanders of tank formations were "unable to organize interaction

294

„,tive with rifle formations! "5. Part of the commanders of formations - both tank and combined arms - did not attach any importance to the need for interaction between tanks and infantry and artillery. Thus, on September 20, the commander of the 27th light tank brigade of the 15th tank

of the Cavalry Mechanized Group (KMG) of the Belorussian Front, Colonel I.I. Yushchuk tried to take the city without waiting for the infantry and artillery, using only 48 BT-7 tanks. The tankers broke through to the center of Grodno, but, met there by anti-tank guns not suppressed by the absent Soviet artillery and "butilliers" (throwers of Molotov cocktails) not destroyed by the absent Soviet infantry, they were forced to retreat beyond the Neman, to the southern part of the city. Yes, and this last one was held only thanks to the approach of two battalions of the 119th rifle regiment [3rd rifle division of the 5th rifle corps, which was part of the same KMG A to capture (September 22) the entire city - only after approaching and entering into the battle of six more infantry battalions (the 20th motorized rifle brigade of the 15th tank corps and two battalions of the 101st rifle regiment of the 4th rifle division of the 5th rifle corps) and several artillery batteries ...

The blame for the lack of elementary interaction between the combat arms at the beginning of the battles for Grodno also falls on the commander of the 15th tank corps, commander M.P. Petrov, who received an order from the KMG command to take Grodno in cooperation with motorized detachments of the 4th and 13th rifle divisions (i.e. with the four rifle battalions of the 101st and 119th rifle regiments mentioned above), but who failed to coordinate the actions of his tank brigades and these motorized detachments.

Commander of the mobile group of the 3rd Army of the Belorussian Front, combined arms commander brigade commander P.N. Although on September 18, Akhlyustin formed a motorized group consisting of 700 horsemen of the 24th Cavalry Division mounted on trucks to support Colonel Lomako's tank group sent to Vilna, sent tanks and armored vehicles without waiting for the motorized group to march, without infantry! Motogroup

295

approached Vilna only around noon on September 19, when Lomako's advance detachment - tanks of the 25th light tank brigade - had been fighting in the city for more than six hours. Due to the lack of infantry, it was only with great difficulty, only after more than two hours of battle and the loss of four T-26s, and only with the support of the 8th Tank Regiment that had fought its way towards the 1st Army, was he able to capture

The green bridge across which lay the path to the center of Vilna and which was covered by only three anti-tank guns...

From tanks alone (tank battalions of the 2nd and 100th rifle divisions and an armored company of the reconnaissance battalion of the 2nd division)! On September 19, the advanced detachment of the 16th Rifle Corps [1st Army of the Belorussian Front. Without infantry and artillery, these several dozens of T-26s and T-37s with great difficulty, only after a two-hour battle and with the support of armed local Belarusians, managed to defeat the Polish squad with a strength of only 200

Human...

There were, however, examples to the contrary. So, commander of the 2nd cavalry O.I. Gorodovikov put 600 dismounted cavalymen (that is, although formal, but the equivalent of a rifle battalion) on the armor of the tanks he moved against Lvov on September 18), brigade commander of the 2nd light tank A.V. Kurkin attached to the tank battalion he had thrown out on Sokulka on September 20 a motorized rifle company and a platoon of anti-tank guns. And the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps of the 11th Army, Divisional Commander Ya.T. Cherevichenko, who received the order to take Vilna on September 18, included in the motorized mechanized group formed by him to carry out this task not only the 6th light tank brigade! and a combined tank brigade from the 7th and 8th tank regiments, respectively, of the 7th and 36th cavalry divisions, but also two dismounted and truck-mounted cavalry regiments, as well as two rifle battalions as a tank assault force. In Vilna, the Soviet tankers were met by the same "bottles" and the same anti-tank guns as in Grodno, but if during the capture of Grodno 16 (according to other sources - 19) Soviet tanks and 4 armored vehicles were hit and burned!9, then in the battles for Vilna, the motorized mechanized group of the 3rd cavalry corps

296

, which had the same BT-7 and even worse armored BT-5 and BT-2) lost only 5 tanks and 4 armored vehicles...20

However, according to the report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Egorov at the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense (hereinafter referred to as the Military Council) on December 8, 1935 and the report of the Chief of the 2nd Department of the General Staff of the RKKA A.I. Sedyakin from | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year and on the tasks for 1936", "the practical ability to organize the necessary interaction in time and space" of rifle and mechanized formations, "to maintain the interaction" of mechanized formations "with other branches of the military" and the combined arms and armored commanders did not have even in the 35th ?!. In the KVO in September of that year, the commander of the "long-range" tank group could not achieve interaction with the rifle formation (17th rifle corps) even at the long-rehearsed Kyiv maneuvers. The headquarters of the 27th Rifle Division of the BVO in the spring of 1935 did not attach any importance to the interaction of infantry, tanks and artillery even after the start of the battle, just like the headquarters of the 16th Rifle Corps of the Belorussian Front in September 1939 (only there was not a fight, but an operation)! - didn't organize it at all. But the tactical exercise of the 27th near Lepel on March 17, 1935 is the only divisional exercise of 1935 in the BVO and KVO, covered in detail by surviving sources! If we are faced with an unwillingness to organize the interaction of military branches in the first case that came across to us, then is it not reasonable to assume that in the 35th this unwillingness in the Belorussian district was a typical phenomenon - the same "typical" as in September 39th? ?

Many senior commanders and headquarters of the YRKKA did not have the ability to organize the interaction of rifle and tank formations even in the 36th - when, as summed up by the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 1937", "in many cases" not even an elementary plan "linked in terms of frontiers and time" was developed for such interaction.

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p 297

ny were "not able" to organize interaction with the infantry and artillery - but in the 36th they did not want to do this at all! Indeed, as follows from the report of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army", the commanders of mechanized brigades and mechanized corps that year always threw tanks into battle without infantry support, and almost always without artillery support (only commanders of mechanized corps sometimes allowed an exception). The "post-repression" administration of the 15th Tank Corps in September 1939 did not organize interaction with rifle formations in the operational rear of the Poles, but the "pre-repression" administration in September 1936, at the MVO maneuvers (when the corps was called another 5th mechanized), did not do more elementary things. Even when breaking through the prepared defenses of the "enemy", it did not provide the tanks (the same BT-7s as in 1939) with either infantry or even artillery support!

In the case of the KVO, the inability of commanders of tank formations of the 1936 model to organize interaction "with rifle troops" is actually indicated even by the district's annual report of October 4, 1936. As it delicately says, the commanders of "motorized units" (so in the KVO they still called tank troops at that time) "still remain not completely finalized" "questions of interaction both among themselves and with rifle troops"?³. Since this report simply has no equal in the ability to portray black and white, these questions were, it seems, worked out just badly ...

According to the evidence, as we have seen, the objective order of the new commander of the troops of the KVO I.F. Fedko No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937, "to specifically organize the interaction of various branches of the troops in a difficult combat situation" (namely, this was typical for September 1939, when tanks broke through to the operational rear of the enemy) "command staff "of the Kiev district" did not know how "and on the eve of the purge of the Red Army; "headquarters of all military branches" then were also "poorly prepared to carry out the tasks of [...] organizing the interaction of military branches"?⁴. Then turn out to be the commander of the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO A.N. Bo

298

risenko in place of the commander of the 15th tank MP. Petrov, he would obviously have established the interaction of tank formations with rifle formations no better than that one. Indeed, during both 1936 (when Borisenko did not conduct a single corps or brigade exercise) and the first half of 1937, interaction with rifle formations and artillery in the 45th mechanized corps "was not practiced at all"...²⁵ | Ensuring combat operations. One of the most characteristic features of the Polish campaign of the Red Army was the permanent shortage of fuel for the advancing tank formations, due to the fact that many of the commanders of these latter were "incapable" of "arranging the work of the rear"²⁶. Thus, the 24th light tank brigade of the Volochisk Army Group of the Ukrainian Front, which crossed the border with 213 tanks, by the evening of the first day of the campaign, was able to allocate only about 90 BT-7s for the attack on Tarnopol: the rest were already without fuel! On the evening of September 18, having finally been refueled, they also pulled up to Tarno Pole, but again only about 80 tanks were allocated to fulfill the newly received order to occupy Lvov - the rest again did not have enough gasoline! In the 10th heavy tank brigade from Tarnopol to Lvov, for the same reason, only 33 out of 138 T-28s were then able to move; BT-7 and T-26, and the 38th light tank brigade of the same Volochisk group entered the Unterbergen area (near Lvov) on September 19 with only 30 out of 141 T-26s, and even those "were completely without fuel"? In the Shepetovskaya army group of the Ukrainian Front, the lack of fuel on the very first day slowed down the pace of the offensive of the 36th light tank brigade, and in Kamenetz-Podolsk - the 26th light tank brigade. And the 25th tank corps of the Kamenetz-Podolsky group did not remain, moving along the Carpathian region, without fuel only because it captured 380 tons of Polish gasoline in different places, "which [and. - A.S.] On the Belorussian front, they could not allow the corps to to organize the supply even of the front-line mobile group - the horse- carry out the received orders ... ²⁸ . mechanized "lowered group". The tankers of her 6th Cavalry Corps experienced a shortage of gasoline throughout the entire March of Western Belorussia, and in the 15th Tank Corps there were 299

On September 19, it got to the point that all (!) of his tanks stood between Slonim and Volkovysk without fuel - about 450 vehicles! At the same time, the front commander, commander of the 2nd rank, M.P. Kovalev openly admitted his inability to organize the supply of troops, declaring "that he can send fuel only by plane", but "who will organize it". "It's good that there was no one to fight with," Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny (who at the end of the cavalry organized, helping out the front headquarters, the supply of the 15th tank fuel by air) ... 29

In general, the combined arms headquarters and commanders were no less to blame for the interruptions in gasoline. One of the latter is the commander of the 24th Cavalry Division of the 3rd Army of the Belorussian Front, brigade commander P.N. Akhlyustin simply refused to take into account the fact that tanks cannot operate without fuel! Leading a mobile army group, he twice (September 17 and 18) deprived the mobility of the 22nd light tank brigade, which was part of this group, each time refusing to let its rear column pass in front of the columns of his cavalry ...

But the situation in which the 15th Panzer Corps found itself on September 19, 1939 would inevitably have arisen in the "prosperous", "pre-repression" 1935! "We were convinced during the exercises," noted V.N. Levichev, that the mechanized brigades and mechanized corps, which achieved huge success in the conditions of the game in terms of invading the operational depth of the enemy, were left without fuel on the third day"³⁰. This is exactly what happened in 1939: September 19 was the third day of the Polish campaign of the Red Army, and the 15th tank to this day "achieved tremendous success in the sense of invading the operational depth of the enemy" ... The fact that the "rear" was even then "The weakest link in the training of troops", we also read in the annual report of the political directorate of the BVO dated October 21, 1935, and the head of the armored forces of the KVO N.G. Ignatov, having touched upon the problem of logistical support for tank units and formations at an army conference of Stakhanovite tankers on January 20, 1936, stated that in the Kiev district "this issue" not only "has not yet been worked out", but also, "in fact,

300

It is still not entirely clear that at a staff game recently held under the leadership of the district commander himself, Commander of the 1st rank I.E. Yakira, even "bringing a barrel of gasoline to a certain part" turned out to be a problem!³¹ Helplessly asking "who organizes" the only understandable understanding of the front command, the delivery of fuel by air, was, therefore, just right for the "outstanding commander" Yakir, and not only M.P. Kovalev... The situation in which the 15th Tank Corps and other tank formations of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts found themselves in September 1939 would inevitably arise in 1936, when, in organizing operations, the Soviet command, in the words directives of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936, also did not "plan the rear" and made decisions on forced marches and "long-term use of mechanized units behind enemy lines" without taking into account the possibilities of material support for these actions - "easily and simply"! ³² Thus, in September 1939, who did not want to "plan the rear" of his tank units, brigade commander P.N. Akhlyustin had predecessors in the "pre-repression" period too... In the KVO, even the compilers of the "varnished" annual report of October 4, 1936, directly admitted to Moscow that "in all branches of the military, it is still weak with the organization of the rear on the whole operation!"³³ And in the 15th mechanized brigade of the KVO, the future 38th light tank brigade, the one that, due to a lack of gasoline, did not reach Lvov on September 19, 1939, 'In 1936 (as revealed in September at the Shepetovka maneuvers by the intermediary brigade commander N.I. Zhivin) "required improvement" and "everything in general "issues of rear management" ³ "... Thus, the 25th tank corps would have to rely only on captured fuel, and the 10th heavy tank and 24th and 38th light tank brigades would have been forced to carry out combat missions with only part of the forces and under the previous, "pre-repression"

command...

Troop management. At the end of the Polish campaign, it was concluded that many commanders of tank formations generally "do not cope with their duties"

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301

And they are "poorly oriented in topography"³⁵. In other words, it was also about the poor command of the technique of command and control. In particular, on September 17, 1939, the command of the 25th tank corps of the Kamenetz-Podolsky group of the Ukrainian Front organized the movement of its brigades so ineptly that the corps not only failed to complete the task of the day, but also slowed down the advance of other tank formations: its columns crossed the roads, through which fuel was brought to the neighbors...

In the few major battles of the Polish campaign, it turned out that in a real battle, infantry and combined arms commanders often also fail to manage troops. So, the headquarters of the 52nd Infantry Division of the 5th Army of the Ukrainian Front on September 28 moved divided into echelons - which disorganized the control of the units. Therefore, when the 411th tank battalion of the division in the Shatsk area (east of Vlodava) was suddenly attacked by the fields of kami from the "Sarny" regiment of the Border Guard Corps (KOP), he could not contact the staff and, being left to himself, withdrew and left Shatsk. Moreover, during the battles that began near Shatsk and continued on September 29 with units of the KOP from the group of General V. Orlik-Ryu Kemann, "division divisions often had no contact with each other and were practically not controlled in any way"³⁶... On the 29th, during the attack on the positions of the 60th Infantry Division of the Poles near Milyanovo (north of Parchev), the commander of the 487th Infantry Regiment of the 143rd Infantry Division of the 4th Army of the Belorussian Front lost contact with the artillery battalion assigned to him and therefore, he could not support his 2nd battalion, which found itself in a difficult situation, with fire. As a result, the latter was forced to withdraw, and the 3rd battalion also retreated after it (so as not to be isolated) - and the offensive of the 487th regiment failed ...

Cases of inept organization of communications, as can be deduced even from the rather scant information on the actions of troops in the Polish campaign, cited by domestic authors, were generally quite common. An obvious problem was the establishment of communication with neighbors, without which the actions of the connections became inconsistent, fragmented. It cost only the 2nd light tank

302

brigade to turn around when crossing the border on September 17 on a relatively wide front, as its battalions immediately lost contact with each other! On the night of September 18, the 24th light tank brigade attacked the western outskirts of Tarnopol without establishing contact with other formations of the 2nd cavalry corps, although the purpose of the attack was precisely to support these latter. "It's good that there was no one to fight there..." Radio communications were obviously neglected: otherwise it is impossible to explain why, for example, the order given at 9.00 on September 18 by the headquarters of the 3rd Army of the Belorussian Front mobile group of the army brigade commander P.N. Akhlyustin received only at... 22.00. (The command of the 3rd Army generally worked extremely slowly at that time: it received the order from the front headquarters to take Vilna as early as 3.55; thus, to make a decision on the nomination of the Akhlyustin group and issue the corresponding order with the commander of the 3rd commander V. It took I. Kuznetsov and his staff about five hours! True, in order to make a decision, it was necessary first to contact the formations and find out their condition and capabilities, but if it took so much time, then our conclusion about the inability of Shtarm-3 to organize communication becomes only more justified. ..) The order of the headquarters of the Ukrainian Front, given on the evening of September 17 to the commander of the Shepetovskaya army group, was also not transmitted by radio, but was delivered from Proskurov to Rovno by car by the headquarters commander ...

We could not find information about whether the "pre-repression" commanders of tank formations knew the topography, but the fact that they are poorly able to "organize uninterrupted" command and control of troops was also stated in the report of A.I. Sedyakin of December 1, 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ..." ³⁷ Yevdokimov, who at the Shepetovka maneuvers in September 1936 did not even try to find out how the battle of his battalions was unfolding. If so "managed"

the oldest commander of the mechanized brigade in the Red Army (comrade Evdokimov), in a temper, threw I.E. Yakir during the analysis of maneuvers, "to

303

commands a brigade for as many years as we have tanks in general"38), then what was the level of the less experienced?

Commander of the 25th Tank Corps, Colonel I.O. Yarkin in September 1939 moved his columns across the supply routes of other formations, but could one expect better leadership from his "pre-repression" predecessor (under which the corps was also called the 45th mechanized), divisional commander A .N. Borisenko? In his letter to I.V. Stadin dated August 6, 1937, the former head of the armored forces of the KVO, brigade commander N.G. Ignatov emphasized that "in his preparation and softness, Comrade. Borisenko was not suitable for such work. This was not a commander of a corps, and even a mechanized corps, but a weak-willed and without knowledge manager of the corps, which I repeatedly reported to the enemy of the people, Yakir. Head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army I.A. Khalepsky, Ignatov continued, also "observed with indignation the work of the corps command during exercises and maneuvers"33. True, the purpose of the author of the letter was to refute the accusations of "smearing over" the eyewash that flourished in Borisenko's corps, and in an effort to justify himself, he could invent anything. But, I think, one can still believe him - and not only because of the call to witness Khalepsky, who has not yet been arrested. In order to justify himself, Ignatov would have had enough of the reminders he cited about how he presented the 45th mechanized corps with "failed" for combat training and reports about flaws in the combat training of its units. The fact that the corps commander should be responsible for these shortcomings was clear and so. There was also no reason to "drown" him in order to show his trustworthiness: "an enemy of the people" "comrade. Borisenko has not yet been announced. And yet, Ignatov first of all emphasized that "all the evil was, of course, in the command of the corps" ... 40

And the inability to keep in touch? The loss of communication between the advancing battalions of the 2nd light tank brigade (formerly the 5th mechanized brigade of the BVO) could easily have occurred in 1935. After all, such communication was carried out with the help of radio, and what did one of the battalion commanders of the 5th mechanized brigade say at a party meeting on January 16, 1935? "We are doing radio work poorly"... *! The loss of communication with neighbors in the brigade could easily have occurred in 1936, when (as

304

Communications Department of the BVO) the commanders of the tank units of the Belorussian District "in the bulk" "have not yet mastered" the tank radio station (and the worst of all was the practical skills of working on it) ... 42

In September 1939, the command of the 24th light tank brigade (the former 12th mechanized brigade of the KVO) failed to establish contact with neighboring formations, but it could have done this in the "pre-repression" 1936, when even the compilers of the "lacquered" annual report

Did the KVO admit that the headquarters of their formations "do not always correctly use", depending on the situation, various means of communication? And when the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 directly noted that, "as a rule, the communication of interaction (communication between formations) in the process of combat

_and especially there is no operation, and the authorities still do not understand that without communications, constantly and completely uninterruptedly operating, there is no interaction of combat forces and cannot be"?43

September 29, 1939 commander of the 487th Infantry Regiment

The 143rd Infantry Division of the Belorussian Front lost contact with the artillery division during the offensive, but didn't the "pre-repression" commanders of the regiments and battalions of the Belorussian District lose it (and, moreover, almost always!)? As we have shown in chapter |, from the context, in

which contains the following statement of the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937, it is clear that the described situation had new , place before the mass repressions that began in June: "Organization of interaction at the beginning of the battle, the commanders learned, but with the development of the battle in depth, as a rule, everything is torn, the infantry is forced to fight only by its own means or to stop it in order to restore the amplification" temporarily broken connection with the means interacting with it, (In the battle of September 29, 1939, the 2nd battalion of the 487th regiment, as we have seen, chose the second of these options: not being supported by artillery and being shot down by the fire of Polish howitzers and machine guns, it retreated ...)

The headquarters of the 3rd Army and the Ukrainian Front in September 39th did not know how to use radio communications to transmit orders, but, according to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No.

305

did not know how to "plannedly and correctly use all means of communication" even then. For this reason, the directive noted, during operations "in the dynamics of hostilities, in most cases, communication is disrupted"...45

The commander and headquarters of the 3rd Army of the Belorussian Front in September 39th worked extremely slowly, but, according to the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937, "slow decision-making" and "untimely bringing" them to the troops "continued remain" a "common weak point" of commanders and staffs since the "pre-repression" times"...

2. TROOPS (foot soldiers)

On the eve of the campaign in Poland, the troops of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian fronts were replenished with a large number of fighters called up from the reserve, and in the newly formed rifle divisions, this little or no trained contingent was in general in the majority. As a result, according to the reports of a number of commanders participating in the Polish campaign, individual units were an "uncontrollable crowd", and the combat capability of the troops was "lowered". In not many serious field battles of the Polish campaign of the Red Army, which took place in late September - early October 1939 in Polesie and Podlyashya, the poor training of fighters and units of the Soviet infantry manifested itself quite noticeably. Thus, during a clash on September 28 between the 58th Rifle Regiment and the reconnaissance battalion of the 52nd Rifle Division of the 5th Army of the Ukrainian Front with units of the Polesye KOL brigade and the KLECK battalion from the Polesye task force between the Western Bug and Lake Pulemetskoye (east of Vlodava), the Red Army "called up for mobilization" began to simply "scatter through the forest." True, about a hundred conscripts managed to repel the onslaught of the Poles, but other battles that took place on September 28-29 in the Vlodava-Shatsk region showed that, on the whole, the personnel of the 52nd division still "turned out to be not ready for fierce enemy resistance"...

The 143rd Rifle Division of the 4th Army of the Belorussian Front in the battles it conducted on September 29-30 in the Parchev area with the 60th Infantry Division Poles

306

managed (according to Polish data) to lose 200 Red Army soldiers as prisoners. In the context of a victorious campaign, such losses can only be explained by the poor training of the fighters (surrender due to unwillingness to fight is difficult to assume: after all, it was clear to everyone that in the coming days the campaign would end with a complete defeat of the Poles and those who surrendered to them would again be in power Bolsheviks, who, of course, will not hesitate to subject the "traitors" to repression⁵¹). The poor training of the fighters of the 143rd is also visible from the fact that the scouts of the 2nd battalion of the 487th rifle regiment advancing on Parchev on September 29 could not notice the enemy until he began to shoot the Soviet chains almost point-blank!

In the previous chapter, we already cited facts showing that the extremely weak training of the assigned staff of rifle units (including in the Belarussian district) also took place before the mass repressions. Moreover, many parts of the "uncontrollable crowd"

"Pre-repression" KVO and BVO were, and not being diluted by mobilized! "Instances of too much concentration of battle formations" of the infantry of the KVO * !, recognized even by the annual report of this district of October 11, 1935 and which took place even at the ostentatious Kiev maneuvers of 1935, just meant that during the attack Poorly trained fighters turn into an "uncontrollable crowd" - spontaneously huddle together. VBVO is still crowded in the 36th, "crowds from departments" ?? (i.e., straying, regardless of commands, into an "uncontrollable crowd") attacked not only the soldiers of the "private" 37th and 81st, but also the "shock" of the 2nd rifle division, including those on the banner nasty Belarusian maneuvers in 1936!

The poor training of reconnaissance infantrymen in the Belorussian district was also common even before the start of the purge of the Red Army. As the commission of the UBP RKKA revealed, by July 1936 the rifle units specially trained for reconnaissance (one rifle platoon in each battalion and the 9th rifle company in each regiment) were unsatisfactorily trained even in the elite division of the BVO - the 2nd gunnery! And on October 3, 1936, a platoon of the 5th rifle company sent to reconnaissance at large tactical exercises near Polotsk

307

The 128th Infantry Regiment of the 43rd Infantry Division "saw out" as follows: reconnaissance patrols were not sent out, there was no guard, "most of the soldiers were asleep" and the observation was carried out by one single person - the squad leader? In the same way, the platoon of the 2nd rifle company of the 127th rifle regiment of the same division "led reconnaissance" ...

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Thus, in the Polish campaign of 1939, the commanders, staffs and troops of the Red Army showed themselves no worse than in the "pre-repression" period. They made the same miscalculations as before the repressions in the organization and management of military operations, they demonstrated the same flaws in combat training.

NOTES

} Meltyukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939. M., 2001. S. 344-349.

2? Beshanov V. Red Blitzkrieg. M., 2006. S. 191.

3 Calculated according to: Meltyukhov M.I. Decree. op. S. 347.

4 Russian State Military Archive (hereinafter - RGVA). F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 171; F. 9. Ol. 29. D. 213. L.4.

5 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 405.

6 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 72.

7 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 40; Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 70.

8 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 58, 45.

9 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 152.

10 Stepanov A. Red Army Air Force in the Polish campaign of 1939 // History of Aviation. 2001. No. 1. S. 13.

1! RGVA. F. 31983. Ol. 2. D. 196. L. 171, 172.

12 Ibid. D. 214. L. 102.

13 7am same. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 12; F. 900. Op. 1.D. 269. L. 51.

4 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 87.

15 Cit. by: Svirin M.N. Armor shield of Stalin. History of the Soviet tank. 1937-1943. M., 2006. S. 108.

16 Light tanks and armored vehicles of the Red Army. 1931-1939. Part 2. M., 1996. P. 32. The corresponding section of this work is entirely based on the richly documented research of J. Magnusky and M.V. Kolomiets (Marlies K!);, Koopies M. Stegmopu Yi2Kiek. Umgisyael 1939. ZomesYus \o)5Karalsegpe \m Ro|se. V arzha\ a, 1994).

"7 Meltyukhov M.I. Decree. Op. C, 308. True, in the journal of combat operations of the 15th tank corps (see: Baryatinsky M., Kolomiets M. Legky

308

tank BT-7 // Armor collection. 1996. No. 5. S. 21) it appears that in the battles for Grodno, the "mechanical group" of the 16th rifle, in which only one tank burned down (and a maximum of several were hit), lost as many as 135 killed and wounded. Such casualties could only be suffered if the motorcycle group also included rifle units. But most likely the magazine simply summed up here the losses of the motorized group of the 16th corps and motorized detachments of the 4th 13th rifle divisions of the 5th corps, which consisted of two infantry battalions each. . 18 This formation should not be confused with the 6th Tank-Flight Brigadier that fought at Khalkhin Gol. Just before the start of the Polish "campaign" the "Khalkhin-Gol" 6th brigade (previously called the 6th mechanized brigade) was renamed the 8th, and the number 6 was transferred to the former 21st mechanized brigade of the Belorussian district. 19 Calculated according to: Baryatinsky M., Kolomiets M. Light tank BT-7 // ` Armor collection. 1996. No. 5. S. 21; Light tanks and armored vehicles of the Red Army. Part 2. S. 27; Meltyukhov M.I. Decree. op. P. 312. The sources cited in these works (the combat journal of the 15th Tank Corps and the memoirs of the former commander of the 6th Cavalry Corps A.I. Ersmenko, whose motorized detachment also got involved in the battles for Grodno) contain data on 16 burned and wrecked tanks, but on p. 313 works of M.I. Meltyukhov 'given the final figure of 19 such machines. 20 Meltyukhov M.I. Decree. op. S. 307. 21 RGVA. FO. 4. Op. 16. D. 19.L. 16; F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 378. 22 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 11. 23 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 70-71. 24 Ibid. D. 2611.L. 249 vol. (1 rev.). 25 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937 Documents and materials. M. 2006. S. 221. to 26 Citation. by: Svirin M.N. Decree. op. P. 108. 27 Light tanks and armored vehicles of the Red Army. Part 2. S. 30-33. 28 Quoted from: Ibid. P. 35. 29 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 12 (1). Moscow, 1993, p. 273 Budyonny spoke of the "5[th] mechanized [corps]": in 1934-1938. The 15th Panzer was called that way, and not everyone had time to get used to the new name (which the corps wore for only about a year before it was disbanded in November 1939). th 30 RGVA. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 142. 31 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 129; F. 9. He. 29. D. 268. L. 133. 32 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12, 11. 33 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 67. 34 Ibid. F. 25880. Op. 4. D. 80. L. 471. 35 Quoted from: Svirin M.N. Decree. op. P. 108. 36 Meltyukhov M.I. Decree. op. S. 345. 37 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 378. 38 Ibid. F. 25880. Op. 4. D. 80. L. 495. 39 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 197-198.

309

40 7am same. L. 197.

41 7am same. D. 1560. L. 147.

42 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 133.

43 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 72; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 11.

44 Ibid. F. 9. Ol. 36. D. 2529. L. 151.

45 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 1.

% Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 152.

47 Op. lo: Parsadanova V.S. Poltsa, Germany and the USSR between August 23 and September 28, 1939 // Questions of history. 1997. No. 7. S. 29.

48 Melyunokhov M.I. Decree. op. S. 345.

49 Stepanov A. Decree. op. S. 13.

5% True, from the memoirs of A. Epler, then commander of the 60th division, one can conclude that at least about 50 of these 200 Red Army men taken on September 29 near Yablon surrendered for ideological reasons: according to Epler, they asked to enlist them in the ranks of the Polish troops and fought in these ranks "to the end, being faithful and devoted comrades" (Quoted from: Beshanov V. Decree. cit. P. 196). But perhaps they decided to join the Poles only when they found out that the 60th division was going to attack the Germans, and yet they had to surrender because of their inability to fight?

51 RGVA. F. 9. Ol. 29. D. 213. L. 53.

52 Ibid. F. 31983. Ol. 2. D. 213. L. 47.

53 Ibid. L. 94.

Chapter 6

IN THE WAR WITH FINLAND (November 1939 - March 1940)

The invasion of Soviet troops into Finland, which began on November 30, 1939, was, as is known, planned in advance. _In accordance with this plan, the main Soviet grouping - the 7th Army - struck between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, i.e. on the Karelian Isthmus, in the directions to Vyborg and Kexholm. The 8th Army, advancing in the Ladoga and Central Karelia, between the Ladoga and Onega lakes, was to go to the rear of the line of fortifications that blocked the Karelian Isthmus (known in our country as the "Mannerheim Line"). Deployed in North Karelia, between Lake Onega and the Arctic Circle, the 9th Army, advancing in three groups in a westerly direction, was to go: to the Gulf of Bothnia and interrupt communication between Finland and Sweden, through which the Finns could receive military materials from other countries. Cut off Finland from the outside world, capturing the port of Petsamo and then advancing through Lapland all the way to the same Gulf of Bothnia, "was also the 14th Army deployed between the Arctic Circle and the Barents Sea.

During December 1939, however, the Finns managed to stop the Soviet offensive in all directions. The 7th Army ran into the Isthmus occupied by the Finnish Army, the main defensive line of the Mannerheim Line. Unsuccessful attempts to break through it - especially stubborn in the Summa region and on the Taipalen-yoki River - continued

311

until December 28 (on the 25th of the troops operating in the Keksholm direction, they formed the 13th army). True, the counterattack launched by the 23rd Finns also failed, but north of Lake Ladoga they seized the initiative. By December 25, their 4th Army Corps and a group of Colonel P. Talvel stopped two of the six rifle divisions of the 8th Army (18th at Lemetti and 168th at Kittel), the other two (56th at Kollaa and 155th near Ilomantsi) were stopped and slightly pushed back, and two (75th and 139th) groups of Talvel in the battle of December 12-23 at Tolvajärvi were defeated and driven back. Of the four rifle divisions of the 9th Army, by December 28, one (44th near Suomussalmi) was stopped by units of the 9th Infantry Division from the Northern Finland group, the other (122nd Joutisjärvi and Pelkosenniemi) Lapland a group of Finns stopped and pushed back, and two more (the 54th in the Kuhmo region and the 163rd in the battle of December 11-28 near Suomussalmi - Juntusrant) were defeated and driven back (the first - by the brigail of Lieutenant Colonel A. Vuokko from the group " Northern

Finland", and the second - by the group of Colonel H. Siilasvuo, transformed during the fighting into the 9th Infantry Division)!. Impressed by these failures, on December 19, Moscow ordered the troops of the 14th Army advancing from Petsamo to Rovaniemi to go on the defensive.

In January 1940, the situation of the Soviet troops worsened even more. In the first days of this month, the 4th Army Corps of the Finns surrounded (in the area of Lemetti-Uoma-Kittel, near the northeastern coast of Lake Ladoga) the entire left-flank grouping of the 8th Army - the 18th and 168th rifle divisions and the 34th light tank brigade, and the Finnish 9th Infantry Division (in the Suomussalmi-Raate area) - the 44th Rifle Division of the 9th Army. By January 7, the 44th managed to break out of the "cauldron", but at the same time lost all heavy weapons, suffered huge losses and completely lost its combat capability ... An attempt to encircle (in the Vitavara-Khapovara area) and the right-flank grouping of the 8th Army - the 75th and 139th rifle divisions - undertaken at the same time by the Talvela group, failed; at the end of January, the Soviet troops at Vitavara even pressed the enemy somewhat. But at the same time, the units of the 9th division of the Finns transferred to the south were surrounded and dismembered (in the Kuhmo area)

312

one more division of the Soviet 9th Army - the 54th Rifle

division ... In mid-January, the Finns began a systematic dismemberment and liquidation of the encircled grouping of the 8th Army, and forming the outer front of the encirclement, they reached the approaches to the main supply base of this army - Pitkäranta.

In the meantime, the Soviet troops were preparing to resume the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, where the 7th and 3rd armies were merged on January 8, 1940 into the Northwestern Front. The attempts made by the 7th Army in the first days of February to improve their positions made it possible to penetrate into the Finns' defenses only in the sector of the 100th Rifle Division. However, during the general offensive of the North-Western Front, which began on February 11, 1940, in the center of Karperesheika, on the Muolajärvi-Karhula front, the 50th Rifle Corps of the 7th Army, with the support of the 20th Heavy Tank and The 4th Light Tank Brigade managed to break through the main strip of the Mannerheim Line in the Summa-Lyakhde area. Other corps of the 7th Army succeeded only in penetrating into this zone, and the shock group of the 13th Army, in front of which there was still only the forward zone of the "Mannerheim Line", broke through only this advanced one. Nevertheless, the breakthrough of the 50th Corps forced the Finns to retreat on February 17-19 from the main to the second defensive zone along the entire front of the 7th Army. After a short operational pause on February 26-29, the 9th also broke through the second lane, and the strike force [of the 3rd Army] broke through both the main and the second. And, finally, in early March, the 7th Army, having overcome the third (rear) defensive "Mannerheim Line" along the WUSSU, and part of the forces bypassing it on the ice of the Zyborg Bay, reached Vyborg and captured a bridgehead on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay. At the same time, the advance of the 13th Army from the line of the Vuoksa River to Kexholm bogged down.

7 To the north of Lake Ladoga, the Soviet side was never able to achieve a turning point in the course of hostilities. The attempts made in February 1940 by the southern group of the 8th Army (reorganized on February 12 into the 15th Army) and the group of Major Kutuzov and the "ski brigade" of Colonel V.D. Valley to release the 18th, 54th and 168th divisions and the 34th light tank brigade

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313

failed, and during February the 18th division and the 34th brigade were practically annihilated. At the beginning of March, the Finns also systematically began to destroy the 54th division, which was saved only by the offensive of the Rebol'sk operational group of the 9th Army (which pulled back part of the Finnish forces) and the conclusion of a peace treaty on March 13 ... Just before the cessation of hostilities actions, in early March, it was possible to somewhat alleviate the situation of the 168th division, cleansing the Finns

several islands on Lake Ladoga and thus securing the lines of communications that were pressed against the lake on the 168th route.

At the same beginning of March 1940, the troops of the 8th and 15th armies went on the offensive in the directions of Loimola and Sortavala, but only managed to push the enemy back a few kilometers. And only the 52nd Rifle Division of the 14th Army, which resumed the attack on Rovaniemi in those days and practically did not meet enemy resistance, advanced 150 km deep into Finland by March 7 and captured Nautsi.

The loss of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus and the general depletion of the human and material resources of small Finland forced the Finns to agree to Soviet peace terms, and on March 13, 1940, hostilities ended.

Is the level of training of Soviet commanders, staffs and troops participating in the Finnish campaign covered in sufficient detail by the published documents of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Headquarters of the Main Military Council and the front and army command? materials of the meeting of the command staff of the Red Army under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on April 14–17, 1940; Voronov (dated] April 1940) and People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov (undated) on the results of the Finnish campaign, as well as the order of the new People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko No. 120 of May 16, 1940. Material for analysis is also provided by the facts revealed by P.A. Pharmacist (most of which was introduced into scientific circulation by B.V. Sokolov)³.

314

5. 1. COMMANDERS AND HEADQUARTERS

5 "A. Combined arms, infantry and tank

). Operational-tactical thinking. It must be noted that the Soviet high command was fully imbued with the "maneuverable thinking" that is in keeping with the nature of modern warfare. And People's Commissar K.E. Voroshilov, and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Commander of the 1st rank B.M. Shaloshnikov, and the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District (LVO), commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskov demanded "not to push the enemy back with ineffective frontal strikes, but to bypass him (by resorting to force maneuvers for this), wedged into the gaps between his groupings and go to his rear - not at all being delayed due to individual pockets of resistance. , which is enough 'only to block part of the forces*. To act on the flank and rear, to surround and destroy ("rather than squeeze out and drive away") the living quarters were also demanded by the successive commanders of the 9th Army commanders M.P. Dukhanov and V.I. Chuikov; the idea of encircling the opposing enemy grouping was laid down in the "howl plan for the February offensive and the commander [of the 3rd Army, commander of the 2nd rank V.D. Grendal^o. -

Already in December 1939, some of the commanders of formations and units also tried to carry out detour maneuvers: in the 7th Army, the commanders of the 168th and 245th rifle regiments (from the composition of the 24th and 123rd rifle divisions, respectively).); in the 8th - division commander-56 (or the commander of his 37th rifle regiment), division commander-139, division commander-155, commanders of the 118th and 337th mountain rifle regiments of the 54th division; in the 9th - division commander-44. If we believe the statement of Divisional Commander-122 at the April meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, "as a rule", "never hit in the forehead" and the 122nd division of the 9th Army; \$ to develop actions on the flanks of the Finns was also demanded by the commander of the 47th rifle corps of the same army, commander I.F. Dashichev...

a At the same time, the order of the commander of the North-Western Yuront, commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko on the results of the dead days of the February offensive on the Karelian

315

maneuvers. True, in February, divisional and regimental commanders often "did not have any opportunity to maneuver because of the deep snow [the snow cover outside the roads was already much thicker than in December. – /4.S.], swamps and extensive minefields"". But some of the commanders of formations did not really differ in "maneuverable thinking". So, in December 1939, the 163rd Rifle Division of the 9th Army attacked only in the forehead, although the depth of the snow cover did not at all prevent its units from retreating in columns on the ice of Lake Kyantajärvi ... On December 9, the 8th Army directly ordered its 139th division to attack the Finnish positions near Tolvajärvi from the front, and not to develop the success of the detachment that had already bypassed these positions from the flank ... And, finally, there is no doubt the effect of "maneuvering thinking" among the bulk of the junior and middle and a significant part of the senior command staff. There is little direct evidence of this at our disposal; Thus, it is known that the headquarters of battalions and regiments of the 155th Rifle Division in December 1939 "under various pretexts evaded the use of flank and bypass maneuvers"* (although the actions of the bypass detachments created in the 436th and 659th m rifle regiments by order of divisional commander-155, showed that such maneuvers were quite feasible in those conditions), that the commander of the 3rd battalion of the 305th rifle regiment of the 44th rifle division tried to solve the task with exclusively frontal strikes and regiment commander-305 himself, that the average commanders of the 17th separate ski battalion of the 9th army in January 1940, "having vaguely found out where the enemy was, climbed into his forehead" ?. But it is also known that the junior, middle and part of the senior command staff of the Red Army, who participated in the Finnish campaign, were distinguished by their lack of initiative and inability to make decisions in a combat situation - qualities in no way compatible with "maneuvering thinking"! "Most of the paints are for one template," noted a white émigré who was talking to Soviet commanders who were captured by the Finnish. officer of the Russian army A. Mayevsky. "... Some kind of automata, not people, with an eternal fear of any responsibility, with limited official thinking, with some kind of wildly scholastic understanding of their service" 9. Mo

316

point out that a kind of natural furor took place here, that the most likely to be taken prisoner and should be those who did not know how to think and make decisions adequate to the situation. However, analytical materials of Soviet origin confirm that this was supposedly a common picture for the Red Army. So, the lack of initiative of junior and middle commanders was also stated by the chief of staff of the 1st rifle corps (the same one to which the battalion Chshtabists of the 155th division, who were afraid of detours, belonged), Major S.P. Ivanov. "Commanders encounter great difficulties in battle because of their poor knowledge of our military laws-regulations and poor knowledge of military history," wrote about the middle and senior commanders of the infantry and artillery who participated in the Finnish war, the chief of artillery of the Red Army N.N. Voronov. Since knowledge of regulations and military history just provides the commander with a basis for making decisions appropriate to the situation, we actually have an indication of the inability to make adequate decisions. Voronov pointed out even more clearly that this vice was also characteristic of junior infantry commanders: "It is rare to hear commands from a junior commander in battle. The junior commander, 'having fallen into such a difficult winter situation, quickly put out and gets lost among his subordinates [...]' P. The commander of the 14th Army commander V.A. Frolov...

7. And the Finns were struck by the fact that at the beginning of the war the inability to make a decision appropriate to the situation was also demonstrated by the highest command staff of the Red Army, who stubbornly refrained from the initial decision and continued to throw their formations over and over again into the failing Ztaka near Summa and on Taipalen-yoki.

in the V8th Army, "the defensive battle suffered from poor organization of the fire system";¹³ in other words, the command staff demonstrated a lack of understanding of the nature of modern defense, Zogo, that its strength lies in its fire.

\ It is impossible not to note the cases of frank tactical illiteracy of the senior and top command staff.
Yes, in

p 317

fallen in the encirclement of the 18th Rifle Division and the 34th Light Tank Brigade, the commanders and staffs illiterately organized the defense - their troops dug in where they were caught by the encirclement, not trying to take more advantageous positions (and, in particular, to occupy or hold command heights). The headquarters of the 8th and 9th armies, planning their offensive operations in Finland in the autumn of 1939, gave the troops an absolutely unrealistic rate of advance. "On average," noted Major S.G. Chernov from the operational department of the headquarters of the LVO, - the pace of the operation is planned to be 22 km per day, at a time when their troops were moving to the border 12-16 km per day with a large stretch of units and a backlog of equipment (mainly artillery). How can you plan such a pace on enemy territory?! [...] When planning, apparently, the enemy was not taken into account at all and off-road was also not taken into account [...]» 14, More than twice as high as those that were actually achieved, and the pace planned by staff officers 8th army. And the 9th tank battalion of the 13th light tank brigade and the 217th separate tank battalion were thrown into the attack by the command right on ... stone gouges, in which passages had not been made ...

What has worsened here in comparison with the "pre-repression" period?

As for "maneuverable thinking", we dare to assert that there are clearer and more correct directives than the high command of the Red Army during the Finnish campaign (K.E. Voroshilov, B.M. Shaposhnikov and K.A. Meretskov), here no one could give, and therefore the notorious M.N. Tukhachevsky, I.E. Yakir, I.P. Uborevich and others like them ...

At the level of unit commanders, by the end of 1939, not only was it not worse than before the repressions, but almost better! Let us recall how in the "pre-repression" March of 1935, out of six verified commanders of BVO formations, the district where, according to K.E. Voroshilov, the "most qualified, better trained" commanders of the Red Army served! - "a significant tendency" "to frontal maneuver and insufficient

318

Brigality and courage in a tactical maneuver" were demonstrated by five 5. Recall how in October 1936, at the "Polotsk exercises in the same BVO, a detour maneuver for a long time did not hesitate to use not just the commander of the mechanized ry of the advanced district, but the well-known combat theorist The maneuvers of tank (i.e., mobile!) Troops - brigade commander 46 S. N. Amosov And in December 1939 in the 8th and 9th armies, as we have seen, resorted to at least half of the ten division commanders (published sources and literature do not cover the decisions of Goa out of these ten). Before the commander of his 305th regiment did not hit the enemy in the forehead, but bypass him from the flank), even the commander of the 44th brigade commander A.I. who did not fully correspond to their "posts and did not have the necessary knowledge and experience" ...! 6 Among the unit commanders, "maneuverable thinking" in the Finnish war was also clearly rooted no worse than before the repressions. Some commanders and chiefs of staff of the regiments in December 1939 sought to bypass the enemy, others did not want to do this, but the same picture is shown to us by the "pre-repressive" 1935, when, for example, the commanders of the 79th and: 80 th rifle regiments of the 27th rifle division of the BVO and their zhollegs from the OKDVA relied (albeit often without taking into account the situation and terrain) on "bold maneuver, bypassing and encircling the enemy", and the commanders of the regiments of the LVO "Maneuverable" thinking has not been mastered. ("The possibilities that exist in military units in terms of mobility, flexibility, maneuverability, etc.," admitted on December 8, 1935, "at the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense (hereinafter – Military Fovet) by the command troops of the LVO'B. M. Shaposhnikov, - completely

and are not used nearby by command personnel [...] 7.) Compared to the 35th, the situation has even improved in the VLVO: in those divisions of the 8th m of the 9th army, which were part of 1935-1939. in this Yukrug - the 18th, 54th (until July 1, 1936 - Murmansk Rifle) and 56th - in December 39th, at least three out of ten commanders of rifle regiments (information about the decisions of the OS -

| 319

could not be found) they were already striving to solve the problem with the help of bypassing the enemy, by maneuver ...

As for the middle and significant part of the senior commanders (i.e. commanders of platoons, companies, battalions and staff officers of the battalion and regimental level), they did not differ in "maneuverable" thinking and the initiative necessary for its development, as in Finnish war, and in the "pre-repression" period. Neither in the Ukrainian (UVO), nor in the Moscow (MVO), nor in the Leningrad districts, stated on December 9, 1935 at the Military Council, Deputy Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tukhachevsky, "initiative, independence, wedging into the flanks of the rear of the enemy" among the commanders of battalions, companies and platoons "are not to the extent necessary. [...] They are simply afraid of detachments [but, without breaking away from neighboring units, it is impossible to bypass and surround the enemy. — A.S.]. "Troops," echoed the commander of the OKDVA, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher, "they do not show the necessary initiative, speed of action on the part of battalion commanders, company commanders and platoon commanders"! "The desire to envelop, bypass, encircle the enemy" clearly did not show then either the middle or the senior command staff of the BVO: the commanders of the units, tested on March 17, 1935 at a tactical exercise in the 27th Infantry Division, did not have this desire; In the 43rd Rifle Corps, tested in September, "initiative, decisiveness, prudent audacity" among platoon and company commanders also showed "insufficient...19

From the directive of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated June 29, 1936, it is clear that the average command staff of the Soviet infantry was distinguished by lack of initiative even in the 36th. Judging by the OKDVA (to which far from the worst command cadres were sent), the senior commanders who commanded rifle battalions were no more enterprising than in the Finnish one that year in the Red Army. Indeed, in OKDVA, the lack of initiative was noted that year in literally all the battalion commanders tested in tactical exercises. The unwillingness of their subunit commanders and battalion and regimental headquarters to hit the enemy in parts (i.e., unwillingness to take the initiative) was recognized then even by the compilers of the report of this army on the results of combat

320

training in the 1935/36 academic year (dated September 30, 1936; in the future, such documents will be referred to as annual reports) ... Obviously, the same picture was in the Red Army and in the first, "pre-repression" half of the 37th. It is no coincidence that the average commanders and battalion commanders lack "the desire to find a flank. the enemy, to attack on the flank and destroy the enemy, "closing his retreat" was then revealed in both rifle divisions of the KVO (24th and 96th), the actions of the commanders of which in tactical exercises were covered by surviving sources?0. It is no coincidence that the absence of initiative among the middle and senior command staff is also evidenced by the documents of a number of then formations of such a large military district as OKDVA ...

In the "pre-repression" times, the junior infantry commanders were no more enterprising, no smarter than in Finnish times. The junior commander, stated in his report of October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army" M.N. Tukhachevsky, "weakly leads his unit in battle, does not dare to take the initiative, [...] does not wedged into the gap formed in the battle formation against [the enemy] and% p."21. In the platoon of the 5th Infantry Regiment of the "shock" (!) 2nd Infantry Division of the advanced (!) BVO, the squad commanders did not even show initiative in the opening of fire, and the detached, checked at the same time in the 243rd rifle regiment of the neighboring 81st rifle division, "reacted little" "to sudden counterattacks by small enemy units"?2, i.e. just what was characteristic of the Finnish campaign! «Tactical training

junior commander, "was indicated in the directive letter of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Egorova dated June 27, 1937, "suffers from the same shortcomings as the training of the middle and senior commanders" ... 23, only Edno is known: according to the observations of the chief of the UBP of the Red Army, commander of the 2nd rank A.I. Sedyakin, in the 24th rifle division of the KVO In August 1936, middle and junior commanders were "so

11 - 2255 321

they are dynamically active, enterprising and act competently, consciously, and in an original way"? 4). But there were exceptions in the Finnish war: for example, on December 2, 1939, the 3rd battalion of the 68th rifle regiment of the 70th rifle division of the December - a battalion of the 596th rifle regiment of the 122nd rifle division of the 9th army near Joutisjarvi ...

The general inability to make decisions appropriate to the situation, and senior, and middle, and junior commanders of the Soviet infantry also differed before the purge of the Red Army. So, in 1936, this inability was widespread even in the advanced BVO: in four of the five (2nd, 37th, 43rd, 48th and 81st) rifle divisions illuminated from this side zii, there were also the organization of attacks "according to a template, without taking into account the situation and terrain", and "uncertainty in a situation requiring cunning, resourcefulness and initiative", and "insufficiently quick response to enemy actions"...25 V In the 5th Infantry Division of the BVO, this inability went as far as sending a company into a bayonet attack on ... a concrete pillbox, and in the 1st Special and 66th Infantry Divisions of the OKDVA - to the absence of a reaction to a unit hit by a dagger or even more destructive flanking machine-gun fire. Even in the first half of 1937, the inability to quickly understand the situation and make an adequate decision was a "common weak point" of the middle and senior command staff (and, therefore, of the younger one who "suffered from the same shortcomings") and (according to the annual report of the district dated October 15, 1937) in BVO?5, and (judging by the documents of its units and formations) VOKDVA, and MVO, where in the first division, then checked on this account by the Red Army UBP (6th Infantry), even "indicating targets "to defeat by fire, the commanders of the units waited" from the senior commander "...27

Unfortunately, we cannot say whether the highest command staff of the "pre-repression" Red Army showed the ability to act in accordance with the current situation. Indeed, on the maneuvers of those years, where all actions were, as a rule, scheduled in advance, he did not have to deal with such a collapse of his original plans as under Summa and on Taipalen-yoki in December 1939. On the other hand, this circumstance did not allow him to train in search

322

a quick way out of the newly formed situation, which does not at all testify in favor of the assumption of greater flexibility of his operational-tactical thinking. Character-

_teren case that took place on the famous Belarusian

. maneuvers in 1936. The commander of the defending 37th Rifle

; DIVISIONS of the "red" commander I.S. Konev unexpectedly received a trump card that one can only dream of in a war: his troops captured the order, from which it became clear the direction of the "blue" strike. The interception of such an order by a real enemy, emphasized then the head of the UBP of the Red Army, commander of the 2nd rank A.I. Sedyakin, would certainly have led to the failure of the offensive of the "blue" - "especially against the modern German division"? But Konev did not react in any way to the changed situation - he did not concentrate anti-tank artillery on the threatened sector, nor conduct counter-barrage preparations ... Why? The outcome of the collision by the "scenario" of maneuvers is predetermined!

As for the poor organization of the fire system in the defense (i.e., misunderstanding of the nature of modern defense), it is known that the commanders of the 27th Infantry Division of the BVO were distinguished by this in the spring of 1935, the commanders of the 77th Infantry Regiment 26 of the OKDVA Rifle Division on March 1936, and the commanders of the 6th Rifle Division of the Moscow Military District - just before the start of mass repressions: "having not even studied" the "principles" (!) of defensive combat, he was at the training camp of Division 6 - June 20, 1937 did not even strive - exactly like his

, colleagues from the 18th Infantry Division and the 34th Light Tank Brigade in January 1940! - bring the "occupied defense area" "in a defensive state" ... 29

Cases when tanks were thrown into the attack on undestroyed

Nadolby, in the documents of the "pre-repression" years are not described, but the sending of infantry of the 5th and 43rd rifle divisions in an attack on unsuppressed concrete pillboxes at the Polotsk exercises on October 4, 1936 (see about this in the previous chapter) to stop the idiocy of those who three years later gave the order to the 9th and 217th tank battalions. It is worth it and the decision to throw the Saber Squadrons in a frontal attack on ... tanks, which was a military game that took place on the 20th of March 1935 under the leadership of the head of the 2nd department of the Red Army Headquarters A.I. Se

g 323

Dyakin in Bobruisk, received the commander of the 4th Cavalry Division of the BVO G.K. Zhukov...

Well, the unwillingness to take into account the conditions of the terrain and the strength of the enemy's resistance in operational plans in the "pre-repression" Soviet headquarters was the same common thing as in the headquarters of 1939. According to the report of the chief of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the RKKAAA.I. Sedyakin from | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year and on tasks for 1936" and a directive letter to K.E. Voroshilov dated December 28, 1935, "with deviations from the probable conditions of the WAR", only "surfacely touching" on the issues of engineering support for combat operations and preparation of communication lines and not really grasping the need for "correct accounting of the terrain and actions of the enemy", operations the Red Army planned even then³⁰. "Instances of inability" to set tasks for the troops, "according to the terrain, meteorological conditions, space and time," was also stated by the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. ". And these cases "were met" obviously often: after all, even the annual report of the CVO of October 4, 1936, which shamelessly glossed over its shortcomings, admitted that "sufficient ability" to take into account spatial and temporal factors when developing an operation plan for "some" then there were no top commanders even in this advanced district ... 31

Interaction. "Combined-arms commanders," stated the order of the commander of the North-Western Front, commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko No. 0028 of January 26, 1940, "do not know how to properly organize the interaction of infantry, engineering troops, artillery and tanks"³². What was behind this general formulation can be partly judged from the startling confession made at the April meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks by the former commander of the 13th Army, Army Commander 2nd Rank V.D. Grendal. In the Taipalen sector, he noted, only during the positional war (which began there at the end of December 1939) "did they come to the conclusion that throwing tanks at an unsuppressed anti-tank system

324

{anti-tank defense. - /S.] is impossible, since the tanks suffered heavy losses, just as it is impossible to throw infantry at an unsuppressed system of small arms and machine gun fire "Z33. In other words, the organization of interaction between the military branches did not before this "discovery of America" was such that the goals reach its goal (or, perhaps, was completely ignored).

By the beginning of the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line, the situation had only slightly improved. "If a corps is a division in the link," it was stated in the order of the commander of the North-Western

Front No. 04606 of February 9, 1940, - the issues of interaction during the attack of artillery, infantry, aviation and tanks are resolved basically correctly, then in the link of the regiment - battalion - company they still do not know how to carry out this interaction"³⁴. The situation was the same in the 8th Army (commanders of rifle battalions, the commander of the 473rd howitzer artillery regiment of this army, Major N.V. Mukhin, noted at the April meeting, "could not set the tasks of artillery correctly"³⁵). But practical work on organizing the interaction of military branches in battle was then carried out precisely at the battalion and company levels! (Speaking at the April meeting, the commander of the 8th Army, commander of the 2nd rank, G.M. Stern, pointed out that "the main work on organizing interaction, primarily with artillery, and in some cases with tanks, is now ending" "not in a battalion and division, but in a rifle company and battery"; the same was clear from the speeches of the senior commanders of the 7th Army - the chief of artillery of this last commander M.A. Parsegov, the commander of the 50th rifle corps commander F.D. Gorelenko, commander of the 19th rifle corps brigade commander S.I. Oborin and commanders of the 70th and 123rd rifle divisions commander M.P. Kirponos and brigade commander F.F. Alabushev⁵.)

Worse, both battalion commanders and commanders during the entire Finnish campaign did not want to organize the interaction of infantry and artillery at all - they did not organize support for their units with fire from 45-mm battalion and "anti-tank and 76-mm regimental guns. Nothing helped here - not the order of the People's Commissar of Defense to the commanders of the troops of the LVO and the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies No. 0315 / op "of December 7, 1939 on the prohibition of the actions of companies and battalions

325

new without accompaniment by 45-mm and 76-mm guns, neither containing the same requirement the operational directives of the Headquarters of the main command to commanders-8 and -9 of December 10, nor the directive of the Headquarters to all four commanders No. 0418 of December 12, nor the directive of the Headquarters to the commander -8 No. 01199 dated January 18, 1940 ... In the 8th Army, without the support of battalion and regimental guns, the infantry attacked in January; in the 7th and 13th armies, infantry escort by these guns (as well as separate 76-mm cannons of divisional artillery) was "almost absent" in early February³⁷, and later too. "A general complaint against company and battalion commanders for not setting clear combat missions for the battalion and regimental artillery assigned to them," summed up N.N. Voronov³⁸. "Here, for example," he described at the April meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, "[...] gun commander comrade. Egorov, who fired from a 45-mm cannon at a height of 65.5 [in the sector of the 123rd Infantry Division of the 7th Army. — A.S.] along the gaps of an armored concrete bunker from a distance of 70 m, he told me that for three months not a single infantry commander had set a task for him. When he came to the company commander and asked the task himself, he was answered: "I'm tired of you, open fire on the forest"...³⁹ The same was done with anti-tank artillery equipped with the same "forty-fives". "The battery commander must demand that he be assigned a task," the nachart of the 19th rifle corps S.I., who spoke to Voronov, was indignant. Oborin. "After all, what it comes down to here: anti-tank artillery is an indispensable weapon of battle, and as a result, we had to take the most stringent measures in order to use it" "0,

However, something elementary for the 30s. 20th century the position that "the basis of all issues is the interaction of all branches of the armed forces in battle", a position that (as the commander of the 2nd rank V.N. Kurdyumov recalled at the April meeting), by 1940 was "well set out in our charters and checked on the combat experience of recent wars" *! - this situation in the Finnish war was often ignored by commanders of a higher level than the company and battalion level! After all, the above-mentioned directive of the Headquarters No. 0418 of December 12, 1939,

326

which demanded "to pay special attention to the fact that 'the advance of our infantry must be carried out under the cover of artillery fire'", separated this problem from the problem of using battalion and regimental artillery and emphasized the need to support divisional infantry as well, and "where possible" - and 1 [52 mm hull

artillery"? This means that without artillery support, the infantry was then thrown into battle by the commanders of divisions and corps.

This conclusion is also confirmed by the practice of using separate ski battalions in the 8th and 9th armies in January-February 1940. These formations, which did not have any artillery, were assigned the same tasks as "normal infantry units", and they were thrown into battle against the enemy, having some fortifications and supplies. at least small-caliber artillery." In other words, the infantry was again sent into battle without the support of artillery — and this was done by the commanders from the division and above: after all, the "skibats" were at their disposal. It is known that the Military Council of the 9th Army also considered it possible to use skiers in this way (i.e., in particular, Commander-9 Army Corps Commander V.I. Chuikov and Chief of Staff of the Army Divisional Commander D.N. Nikishev), who even designed the formation - the formation of entire ski brigades without a single gun.

_ Obviously, those also belonged to the highest command staff, as I.V. Stalin, "philosophers who said that all artillery should be left in the rear, put the division on skis and use it as shooters." "You understand? The Finns are fortified, they have heavy machine guns, they have 37-mm guns, they have 3-inch guns, - the leader, forced to explain the truisms, was indignant. — [...] Until the artillery is brought up, defend yourself. There is nothing to meddle without artillery, give a lift, then pokes your head """. In any case, the commander of the 15th army, commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev and the brigade commander K.A., who led the left-flank group of this army. Koroteev differed little from such "philosophers". The first of them, organizing the offensives undertaken on February 10-24, 1940 on the islands of Maximan-saari and Petya-saari, on Lake Ladoga, did not put into action a significant part of the artillery and wasps

327

he put down infantry without the support of even 76-mm regimental guns, believing that "under the conditions of the Finnish theater" with its forests and deep snow, regimental artillery directly accompanying the infantry "is hardly applicable"⁵. (But by that time it was already quite clear that "the regimental gun turned out to be quite suitable for the conditions of the Finnish theater." "Regimental artillery is mobile, and it justified itself," the commander of the 122nd Infantry Division of the 9th Army Colonel P. S. Shevchenko "Regimental artillery is valuable, and it has fully justified itself," the commander of the 100th Rifle Division of the 7th Army, brigade commander A.N. Yermakov⁶. - the cavalry division, which on February 10, 1940 tried to release the troops encircled near Lemetti, without waiting for the approach of its artillery regiment, was apparently also forced to go into battle without artillery by Kovalev (then still commanding the southern group of the 8th Army) ... Koroteev, during the offensive on February 15 on Maximan Saari and Petya Saari, answered the commander of the 204th Airborne Brigade, who asked him to support him with artillery, literally the following: "Stop sucking artillery, make your way with your fire" (and this despite the fact that the state brigade had only 12 45-mm cannons and 18 50-mm mortars!)⁴⁷.

"[...] For all the time of continuous offensive battles waged by our division and our battalion, there was not a single artillery preparation before the offensive," recalled the battalion signalman in the 278th rifle regiment of the 17th rifle division. 13th Army A.I. Villager⁸, The blame for this lay on the commanders not lower than the regimental ...

At the beginning of the war, they also did not consider it necessary to organize the interaction of military branches during the capture of pillboxes. "There were ATTEMPTS," noted at the April meeting the chief of engineers of the North-Western Front, brigade commander A.F. Khrenov, "reinforced concrete fortifications can be captured either by infantry alone, or by sappers, or by tanks [...]"⁹. But after all, the decision to capture at least one pillbox was made at a higher level than the commander of a company or battalion...

The unwillingness to give

328

subordinates time to organize this interaction.

"Combined-arms commanders," said the former commander-13 V.D. at the April meeting. Grendal, - artillery is often rushed in the sense of readiness dates. [...] From

this land will not fail if we put it off for one day and the Finns do not run away. And how it all ends, if the interaction of the parts is not established, everything that is needed is not fixed properly, we know." At least in the 8th Army, at the beginning of the war, combined arms, infantry and tank commanders were subjected to the same pressure from above. "Given the short daylight hours in Finland in December," it was noted in the report of Shtarm-8 to the Chief of the General Staff on the conclusions from the experience of military operations (hereinafter - the report of the 8th Army), "it must be admitted that there was always a real shortage of infantry with artillery, since this would require organizing interaction all day, and advancing the very next day. But this was impossible, since the higher authorities (the army, the corps) were constantly reproached for the slow advance and demanded an acceleration of the pace. [...] The requirement for a speedy pace of advance actually ruled out artillery preparation. [...] Demands for speed of advance and incessant reproaches at a slow pace also interfered with the establishment of interaction between infantry and tanks", as well as between tanks and artillery and sappers...51

When preparing an offensive under conditions of positional defense, as was the case before the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line, the March offensive on the islands of Maximan-saari and Petya-Saari, and the March offensive near Loimola, by the end of the war it was still possible to bring the organization of interaction between military branches to a level ensuring the achievement of offensive goals or at least some progress. But in the course of maneuverable combat operations (when there were no weeks or even days to work out the interaction), this level was still low. After all, as can be understood from the speech of N.N. Voronov, complaints about the unwillingness of the commanders of rifle companies and battalions to organize proper interaction with regimental artillery took place throughout the war. From the one who summed up the Finnish campaign under

329

Kazah People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko No. 120 of May 16, 1940, it is clear that there were no changes for the better here and in the regimental level, and at the level of formations, the skills acquired by the beginning of the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" could not be consolidated. "The senior and senior command staff," the final assessment contained in the order read, "weakly organized interaction, [...] clumsily set tasks for artillery, tanks, and especially aviation" -2. Kurdyumov: "[...] Staffs do not have the skills and ability to organize the interaction of military branches on the battlefield"...53 (It is possible that these final assessments were influenced by the actions of the troops who arrived at the front after the breakthrough " of the Mannerheim Line" - who had not gone through the school of preparation for its breakthrough. Thus, in the 7th Army, without proper support from artillery and tanks, the 95th Rifle Division, av9 infantry, artillery, tanks and sappers were not yet there even two days before the end of the war, on March 11.)

However, at the level of formations, the interaction of the combat arms in the Red Army was "weakly organized" in the 35th. Let us recall the conclusion of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Egorov, reported by him at a meeting of the Military Council on December 8, 1935: "the practical ability to organize in time and space the necessary interaction of rifle, mechanized and aviation formations in solving assigned tasks" has yet to be achieved." In June 1935, the headquarters of the advanced (!) KVO of the 6th Rifle Corps and the 51st Rifle Division did not even know how to establish the interaction of infantry with artillery (what one had to be able to do back in the First World War!), and the headquarters of the 17th rifle corps at the September Kiev maneuvers could not achieve interaction with the "long-range tank group" even after almost a month of preparation ... The headquarters of the 27th rifle division of the advanced BVO in the spring, and the headquarters of the formations Primorsky group OKDVA even in autumn

In 1935, after the start of the battle, the interaction between infantry, tanks and artillery ceased to be organized at all ...

330

Obviously no better than in December 1939, things were here in 1936 as well. All the headquarters of the formations of the three largest military districts, about which information has been preserved on this account (the headquarters of the 15th rifle corps of the KVO and the 34th, 35th and 69th rifle divisions of the OKDVA), then the interaction of the military branches was poorly organized. In the third such district - the BVO - the commander of the 27th rifle division, brigade commander P.M. Filatov on October 3, 1936, at a large tactical exercise near Polotsk, launched a counterattack with the forces of rifle battalions alone, sending them into battle without the support of a separate tank battalion of the division and "almost without artillery support"³⁵.

Clearly, the situation here was not better than in December 1939 even before the start of the mass repressions. Evidence of order No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937 by the commanding troops of the KVO ("command personnel [...] are not able to specifically organize the interaction of various types of troops in a difficult combat situation", "headquarters of all types of troops" "are poorly prepared to carry out tasks on [...] the organization of interaction between military branches"), as well as the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937 (characterizing, as we showed in chapter I, the "pre-repression" situation) and the report of the OKDVA headquarters on the results of the combat training in December 1936 - April 1937. (dated May 18, 1937; hereinafter - the report of the OKDVA headquarters dated May 18, 1937), according to which their command staff did not know how to organize the interaction of military branches during the battle - these evidence should also be extended to the division-corps link. Firstly, because the compilers of these documents did not stipulate otherwise, and secondly, because all the headquarters of the then rifle divisions of the OKDVA (shtadivs-21, -35 and -105; according to the corps and headquarters of the BVO formations) no information left "poorly organized the combined arms [i.e. based on the interaction of various branches of the armed forces. — A.S.] combat and badly managed the assigned special units"...⁵⁷

Clearly, no better than their successors at the beginning of February 1940 organized the interaction of military branches and "pre-repression" commanders and headquarters of rifle regiments. After all, in the three largest military districts they are not right

331

lyalsya with this task in all the cases covered by surviving sources! In the 79th and 80th rifle regiments of the 27th rifle division of the BVO in March, and in the units of the Primorsky OKDVA group even in the autumn of 1935, the headquarters did not organize the interaction of the combat arms at all during the battle; in the 153rd rifle regiment of the 51st rifle division of the KVO in June 1935, they did not know how to organize interaction with artillery; the commander of the 118th and chief of staff of the 119th rifle regiments of the 40th rifle division of the OKDVA in January 1936 failed to link the actions of infantry and tanks, even solving a tactical briefing ... The evidence given in the previous paragraph is evidence of the inability of the commanders of the KVO, BVO and OKDVA to organize the interaction of military branches, even immediately before the start of the purge of the Red Army, should (unless they claim otherwise) also apply to the regimental level. This is supported by the fact of the inept use by the headquarters of the rifle regiments of the 92nd and 105th rifle divisions of the OKDVA, reflected by the surviving sources, of artillery and tanks attached to them during the March 1937 maneuvers.

In February 1940, the commanders of rifle battalions and companies "were not yet able to carry out the interaction of the military branches," but they did not know how to do this in 1935 either. Infantry battalions, it was indicated in a letter to M.N. Tukhachevsky K.E. Voroshilov dated December 1, 1935, "still have not mastered the ability to organize interaction with artillery and tanks on the ground"? (Let us recall that in those years the center of gravity of practical work on the organization of interaction between military branches was precisely in the battalion, that real interaction can be established only by linking all its issues on the ground). Back in September 1935, the battalion commanders were not always able to clarify on the ground the issues of interaction with the commanders of artillery battalions even at the ostentatious Kyiv maneuvers and even in the "shock" 44th rifle division ...

As it is clear from Tukhachevsky's report of October 7, 1936 "On Combat Training of the Red Army", in a situation close to combat (i.e. without rehearsing their actions in advance and acting in unfamiliar terrain), the interaction of the armed forces, the commanders of rifle battalions is bad, "often" simply illiterately organized in the 36th. So it was then

332

even in the advanced CVO: the annual report of this district of October 4, 1936, which godlessly "varnished" reality, admitted that Tukhachevsky's instructions on "issues of organizing and conducting combat by the battalion" (translated into Russian, this means, I.E. Yakir's battalion commanders were doing very badly with the interaction of military branches: after all, in the directive of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated June 29, 1936, it was emphasized that it was "in the battalion level that complex interaction is coordinated and organized various branches of the military ...")⁶⁰. So it was in the advanced BVO: in both of its divisions, about which information was preserved on this score (2nd and 37th rifle divisions), the commanders of both battalions and companies in 1936 weakly linked their actions with artillery and tanks (not being able, in particular, to properly set a task for them). So it was in OKDVA, which was already starting to fight: 8 out of 11 battalion and detachment exercises in 1936, covered by sources, the organization of interaction between the combat arms turned out to be poor.

The same is true just before the start of the purge of the Red Army. "The interaction of the headquarters of rifle battalions with the headquarters of artillery battalions (supporting) has not been worked out," A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937⁶¹. The organization of interaction between the combat arms in the link "battalion - division", stated in the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937, "remains unsatisfactory"; From the documentation of a number of the then Far Eastern divisions (21st, 59th, 66th and 69th) it is clear that things were not much better at the company level. Obviously the same picture was then in the other two largest districts. After all, the above assessments of the order by the commanding troops of the KVO No. 0100 of June 22, 1937, and the annual report of the BVO of October 15, 1937, stating the inability of the command staff to organize the interaction of military branches, should (since they do not state the opposite) also apply to the link "company - battalion" ...

The direct unwillingness of the commanders of rifle subunits to Yurganize the interaction of the combat arms was also encountered before the purge of the Red Army. In one of the two divisions of the BVO at that time illuminated from this side - the 37th Rifle Division - during tactical exercises in October 1936, the commanders of both battalions and companies - exactly like their colleagues in

333

Finnish war! - they forgot to set tasks for the artillery that supported them during the battle (and in the 110th Infantry Regiment they did not set tasks before the battle either ...). The battalion commanders of the 1st Pacific Rifle Division of the OKDVA in an experimental exercise in June 1936 used the battalion and regimental artillery attached to them "absolutely insufficient"; one of them did not organize interaction with the divisional one at all...⁶³ In the OKDVA, according to the report of its headquarters dated May 18, 1937, the commanders of rifle battalions (unlike, however, commanders of companies) did not set tasks for the artillerymen during the battle yet and in the spring of 1937. During the March maneuvers in the 40th Rifle Division, the battalion commanders "considered a burden" attached to them!⁶⁴

The direct unwillingness of the commanders of formations and units to organize the interaction of military branches was also widespread in the "pre-repression" Red Army. Recall again:

- about the commander of the 17th Infantry Division of the MVO G.I. Bondar, who left in September 1935; at the exercises of the 3rd Rifle Corps near Gorokhovets, their units went on the offensive without any artillery preparation;

- about "some" (in the words of K.E. Voroshilov) combined arms commanders [only divisions and corps were considered combined arms formations], who "forgot" to set artillery tasks during the battle even at the long rehearsed Kiev maneuvers of 1935 .;⁶⁵

- and, finally, that, according to the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On combat training of the Red Army", the commanders of mechanized brigades and mechanized corps then threw their tanks at the anti-tank defense without the support of infantry and constantly!) artilleryb6.

In December 1939, the commanders of formations (or units) of the 13th Army did not understand that it was impossible to throw infantry "on an unsuppressed system of small arms and machine gun fire", but in the BVO they did not understand this in October 1936, when in large tactical exercises near Polotsk, the pshota of the 5th and 43rd rifle divisions were sent to the pillboxes of the Polotsk fortified area, which were not suppressed by artillery and sappers were not blinded by smoke screens.

334

As for the unwillingness to give subordinate commanders time to organize the interaction of the military branches, then it was common in the Red Army even before its purge. As we have shown in Chapter 1, the situation described on November 21, 1937 at the Military Council by the commander of the BVO troops, commander of the 1st rank I.P. Belov ("It is generally accepted that, since a unit has approached the line from which you can rush to the attack or go on the offensive, then [...] everything immediately

forward. It is considered a bad commander that one who hesitated a little. Everyone forgets that in any conditions the battle must be organized [i.e. that the interaction of military branches should also be organized. - A.S.] "67), was common even before the mass movements of the command staff in the summer and autumn of the 37th.

In conclusion, we note that the unsuccessful attempts to break through the "Mannerheim Line" in December 1939, which failed primarily due to the poor organization of interaction between the military branches, are also not something characteristic only of the "post-repression" Red Army. The interaction of the military branches was also not the best during the assault on the Polotsk fortified area, carried out by the 5th and 43rd rifle divisions of the BVO on October 4, 1936, during large tactical exercises near Polotsk. About any interaction between the infantry and the artillery, in the report of the deputy head of the UBP of the Red Army, brigade commander M.N. Gerasimov is not mentioned; Interaction was not always carried out with the sappers, who placed smoke screens in front of the attacking infantry. The interaction noted in the report with the T-28 tanks from the 1st heavy tank brigade and the T-26 tanks from separate tank battalions of the divisions was reduced to sending part of the rifle platoons to them and behind them, contact with which was immediately lost. . The main forces of the rifle battalions and companies marched openly against the pillboxes and (judging by the "indifference to enemy fire" mentioned by Gerasimov) marched without waiting for their suppression⁸. "With "big interruptions"" interaction of infantry, tanks and "artillery" was also carried out during the assault by the 52nd rifle division in the last days of February 1937 at the tactical exercises of the 23rd rifle corps of the BVO of the Mozyr fortified area.

335

In general (to use the wording of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 120 of May 16, 1940), the "senior and senior command staff" of the Red Army "poorly organized the interaction" of the military branches even before mass repressions.

Ensuring combat operations. "The intelligence service," stated the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 120 dated May 16, 1940, "was organized and carried out extremely unsatisfactorily"⁰. At the beginning of the war, reconnaissance was simply not organized! It is not for nothing that in the directive to the commanders of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies No. 0418 dated December 12, 1939, the Headquarters of the High Command spoke about elementary things - about WHAT "everyone is obliged to organize and conduct reconnaissance - cue commander who received a combat mission, "and demanded" all military operations and troop movements must be preceded by well-organized intelligence in advance ... '! However, the disease turned out to be too advanced. In Directive No. 0608 of December 21, the Stavka had to state that there was still no "proper reconnaissance" in the troops of all armies (just as there was no "direct guard" and "attention to guarding the flanks"), and in Directive No. 0673 of 24

December - that in the 7th Army the infantry still "does not conduct reconnaissance, is not guarded." The situation was the same in the 9th (where the commander V.I. Chuikov on December 23 was again forced to demand "always conduct continuous reconnaissance and security" and where the operational (!) Department of the army headquarters "was interested only in its own troops, and as for the enemy, he was completely uninterested in him. Slightly better then was the situation in the 8th Army, where "reconnaissance was carried out irregularly and was often organized in violation of elementary rules"???

The speeches of the participants in the April meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the April report by N.N. Voronov confirm that such a situation (when intelligence is either not organized at all or organized very poorly) persisted until the very end of the war, i.e. confirm the validity of the final assessment given in Order No. 120. "We need to turn the brains of our big and small commanders to intelligence, force them to engage in intelligence," the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff was indignant at the meeting

336

ba division commander I.I. Proskurov. "Thousands of letters," he continued, "say that intelligence officers, including the chiefs of two [as in the text of the publication; should be: "second", Te. reconnaissance. - 4.S.] departments [headquarters. - 4.S.] corps and divisions, do anything, but not reconnaissance"; regimental reconnaissance companies are not used, divisional reconnaissance battalions are used as regular infantry. However, there are no "trained personnel of scouts..." "Staff commanders were poorly trained in organizing and conducting reconnaissance, interviewing prisoners and other types of collecting information about the enemy," summed up N.N. Voronov; The same was reported at the meeting by a member of the Military Council of the 15th Army, Corps Commissar N.N. Vashugin: "Our intelligence was poorly organized, there were no well-trained intelligence officers [...]."
<[...] We are poorly organizing reconnaissance," confirmed, referring to his entire 7th army, the commander of the 123rd rifle division, brigade commander F.F. Alabushev, whose formation could not break through the "line: Mannerheim" for a long time, including due to the lack of proper reconnaissance of the enemy's front line? What this "weak organization" specifically meant can be judged, for example, by the testimony of P. Shilov, a former soldier of the 17th separate ski battalion of the 9th army. "What to reconnoiter, where, at what distance, the commanders did not explain," he recalled how in January 1940 he went on his first reconnaissance. The next morning, "the commanders, having no intelligence", "not knowing the strength and exact location of the enemy," nevertheless moved the battalion on the offensive, during which it encountered such a defensive firepower that it was almost destroyed. ..74 As for the logistic support of the troops, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 120 dated May 16, 1940 stated that "the command and staffs of all levels poorly organized and ineptly managed the work of the rear" 5. It is known, in particular (from the order of the Stavka Main Military Council No. 01084 dated January 12, 1940) that the commanders of the 8th and 9th armies, division commander I.N. Khabarov and commander M.P. Dukhanov "failed" to "organize the rear of the army" (which th Army at the beginning of the WAR "in fact [...] was completely unorganized", confirms the report of this army)". It is also known that at least a significant part of the 9th Army command staff during

337

generally did not attach serious importance to the organization of supplying the troops with everything necessary! "In operations," stated in the order of the new Commander-9 V.I. Chuikov dated December 23, 1939, "we had many cases ... of idiotic carelessness, inability and unwillingness to organize a battle properly and to provide this battle with all kinds of supplies"".

However, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Commander of the !-th rank G.I. At the April meeting, Zhulik openly admitted that the inability or even unwillingness of the Soviet command staff to organize intelligence did not appear after the repressions of 1937-1938: "For the 22nd year in the Red Army we are talking about intelligence"78, "Common for all chiefs and headquarters and extremely dangerous. a breakthrough is a weakness of intelligence," was also stated in the report of the head of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin from | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...", and speaking on December 9 of the same year at

military district I.K. Gryaznov simply broke through: "Intelligence is literally some kind of bogey of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army... Indeed, documents covering the situation in the three largest military districts show that Sedyakin's assessment was still too soft, that intelligence in the "pre-repression" 1935 was exactly the same as in the Finnish war! - was not just "weak", but quite often was not organized at all. That their commanders "forget" to conduct reconnaissance continuously - this was then recognized by the annual reports (!) And the KVO, and the Primorsky OKDVA group, and the armored troops of the OKDVA, and the 34th rifle division of the Amur group OKDVA (respectively from 11, 11, 19 and October 6, 1935); subordinates A.I. Sedyakin stated the same for the BVO; there were cases of unwillingness of the command staff to organize reconnaissance in half of those units of the UVO / KVO and BVO, for which the materials of their checks in the spring and summer of 1935 by Moscow inspectors were preserved (in the 151st 153rd rifle regiments of the 51st rifle division and in one of the regiments 27th Infantry During the exercises of the 51st in early June 1935, because of this, they did not know that the "enemy" secretly retreated to the second line of defense, and within two hours about

338

led artillery preparation but to an empty place, firing one and a half ammunition into the wind ...).

According to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss "On the results of operational training for 1936 and on the tasks for 1937" and Order of the People's Commissar No. 00105 "On the results of combat training for 1936 and tasks for 1937" (respectively dated November 3, 1936), intelligence was "the weakest link in all types of combat training", "a weak point in the training of most units and formations" and in 36-m80. The "weak" or "unsatisfactory" organization of reconnaissance, the ato and its complete absence, are also noted in many materials of inspections of units and subunits of the BVO and OKDVA that have survived from this year; The fact that the organization and conduct of reconnaissance is a "weak point" of the tank commanders of the OKDVA was even recognized by the annual report of this army of September 30, 1936,⁸¹ Av KVO - again, according to its own annual report of October 4, 1936. ! - "shortcomings in the organization and conduct of reconnaissance" were then such that situations often arose during the exercises like the one that the 17th ski battalion got into in January 1940, when nothing was known about the enemy until fell under his machine-gun fire ... ⁸²

In conditions close to combat, reconnaissance in the 36th was not organized even more often. "Intelligence still has not taken root in everyone from top to bottom," stated, after observing the Polessye maneuvers of the KVO at the end of August 1936, the head of the UBP of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin. He assessed the reconnaissance of the tank formations that participated in the Shepetov and Belorussian maneuvers in September as "weak" and "incapacitated." one and only on October 2, and in two (1st heavy tank and 18th mechanized brigades) it was not carried out at all. The organization of reconnaissance was often ignored in both divisions of the OKDVA, brought out for the March maneuvers in Primorye - where the troops, as in the Finnish war, acted in a poorly visible wooded area ...

Well, in a real combat situation, reconnaissance that year was not organized even more often than during maneuvers! So it was, by

339

in at least two of the three border conflicts of the 36th in the Far East — near Khunchun on March 25 and near Turiego Rog on November 27 (where, as we remember, even the commander of the 63rd Infantry Regiment, Colonel I .R. Dobysh and the commander of a separate cavalry squadron of the 40th Infantry Division - that is, the reconnaissance unit! - Captain S.A. Bonich ...).

Judging by the three largest districts, things were no better than in the Finnish war in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937. The conclusion of the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937, according to which this army does not know how to "sufficiently skillfully organize and conduct reconnaissance" ⁸⁴, is fully confirmed by sources covering its specific units and formations. That,

that "the organization of continuous reconnaissance is a weak point," was also indicated in the order of the command troops of the KVO No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937; We read the same thing in the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937: "intelligence issues continue to remain a bottleneck"...85

The unwillingness of the command staff to organize combat guards (and, in particular, the protection of the flanks) was also a common occurrence even before the purge of the Red Army (including in a situation as close as possible to combat, during exercises and maneuvers). In the 35th (as is clear from the report of A.I. Sedyakin dated | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ..."), neglect of the protection of the flanks was generally typical for the entire Red Army, and in the 36th (according to the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army") - for all its tank troops! In September 1936, even the airborne detachment thrown into the rear of the "enemy" during the Shepetovka maneuvers of the KVO did not pay attention to "protecting its open flanks"; 86 in October, at the Polotsk exercises in the BVO, the command staff of almost all the advancing formations (5th and 43rd rifle divisions and the 18th mechanized brigade) completely forgot about the need to protect their flanks. In units of the 23rd Rifle Corps of the BVO, they forgot to send out side guards during tactical exercises near Mozyr in February 1937, and in the 92nd Rifle Division of the OKDVA, and during exercises in Primorye in March 1937. And the guards on the march

340

in the last "pre-repression" spring "quite often" they did not organize in the entire Special Far Eastern ...
87

In December 1939, the inattention of the commanders of the 44th Infantry Division to the protection of their open flanks turned into an exit of the enemy to the rear of the division and its encirclement, but the 43rd Infantry Division and the 87th Infantry Regiment of the 29th Infantry Division were still surrounded for this reason. in "pre-repression" September 1935, at the exercises of the 4th rifle corps of the BVO near Polotsk and Drissa and the 11th rifle corps of the same district near Dorogobuzh. And for the same reason, the "enemy" of the 18th mechanized brigade of the BVO was able to go to the rear for the same reason in October of the "pre-repression" 1936, at large tactical exercises near Polotsk ...

The reconnaissance battalions of rifle divisions in the Finnish war were used as ordinary linear units - but the division headquarters did exactly the same in August 1936 at the Polesye maneuvers of the KVO. Judging by the fact that by June of that year even the reconnaissance battalion of the "shock" 44th rifle division had not worked out the organization of reconnaissance, such an attitude of headquarters towards reconnaissance units was then typical for the entire Kiev district ... the only headquarters of the OKDVA division, for which the materials of inspections for 1936 (shtadiv-35) have been preserved, and from the report of the OKDVA headquarters dated May 1, 1937, it is clear that the "still inept" use of reconnaissance units for this army was typical and on the eve of the purge of the Red Army.

The reconnaissance of rifle regiments in the Finnish war was also not used for its intended purpose, but, as we have just seen, even in the OKDVA, which had already begun to fight, they were not able to use them even in the "pre-repression" spring of 1937 (during the exercises of the 92nd rifle division in March this year, once buckets - just like reconnaissance battalions in the Finnish war - were thrown into battle like ordinary rifle units).

During the Finnish war, the Red Army did not have "trained intelligence personnel", but in such an important strategic grouping of the Red Army as the KVO, there were none in 1935-1936! The reconnaissance commanders, checked in December of the 35th in units of the 8th Rifle Corps of the KVO, are not

341

whether to act proactively in a difficult situation, or to draw conclusions from the intelligence obtained, and in 1936 the situation here was such that even the compilers of the district's annual report of October 4, 1936, did not dare to hide the truth from Moscow, who admitted that "on today's

day at the headquarters of divisions, at the headquarters of corps, and even at the headquarters of armies, there are no qualified scouts”⁸⁸.

“Staff commanders” in the Finnish war “were poorly prepared for organizing and conducting reconnaissance, interviewing prisoners and other types of collecting information about the enemy,” but in the “pre-repression” period, the staff officers of such largest and strategically important groups of the Red Army were assessed in the same way, like KVO and OKDVA. So, in June 1935, intelligence, according to Moscow inspectors, was “the weakest area in the training of headquarters” of the troops of the 6th rifle corps of the KVO; at the March maneuvers of 1936 in the Primorsky OKDVA group, it turned out that “the organization of intelligence is the weak point of the headquarters” of the “5th Rifle Division” formed for these exercises ⁹. In all divisional and corps headquarters of OKDVA, illuminated by sources from this side (in the -20, shtadive-34 and shtadive-35), they also didn’t know how to organize reconnaissance in 1936, but about “loose skills in organizing and conducting reconnaissance”, which were then characteristic of the headquarters of the Far Eastern rifle regiments and battalions, they were forced to even the compilers of the OKDVA annual report of September 30, 1936, who shamelessly lied in their favor, reported. “Practical skills in organizing close-range reconnaissance and especially battlefield reconnaissance are weak at all headquarters,” the compilers of the annual report of the KVO of October 4, 1936 admitted. , also striving to “cover over” their shortcomings.

The fact that the Far Eastern "headquarters have not yet learned how to skillfully organize and conduct reconnaissance" was also recognized in the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937, but that "the question of organizing continuous reconnaissance" "continues to be" "the weakest point in training of headquarters" and the CVO, it was also stated in the order for this district No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937⁹¹,

Among the reasons that did not allow the 7th Army (and, in particular, its 43rd Rifle Division) to break through the “Man

342

Nerheim" in December 1939, there was also a lack of proper reconnaissance of the front edge of the fortified areas. But for sure

In the same way, without revealing either the location of the pillboxes or the fire system, the 43rd division attacked the fortified area in October 1936, at the Polotsk exercises of the BVO! Next to it, in the same way, without reconnaissance, the 5th rifle division and the 1st heavy tank brigade advanced, and the 52nd rifle division of the BVO, in the same way, blindly, stormed the fortified area during the exercises (only not Polotsk anymore). , but Mozyrsky) and in the "pre-repression" February 1937 ... The continuity of intelligence in preparing to break through the defensive zone was not achieved then - according to the annual report of the same district of October 4, 1936 - and in the advanced KVO.

Due to the lack of proper reconnaissance, in January 1940, the 17th ski battalion was almost completely mowed down by fire, but units of the 27th Infantry Division of the BVO fell under the "destructive (spruce) fire of the defense [ons]" for this reason. not yet March 17, 1935 at tactical exercises near Lepel ... ??

The commanders of the 8th and 9th armies "failed" to "organize the rear of the army" - but they clearly would not have been able to do this in the 35th. After all, as noted in the report of A.I. Sedyakin of December 1, 1935 “On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...”, working out the planning of army operations that year, the issues of preparing communications in the rear of the army and organizing the supply of troops were touched only “superficially”. “Organization of an uninterrupted supply of troops” during the operation was also indicated in the directive letter to K.E. Voroshilov dated December 28, 1935, “in a number of districts and fleets” “did not receive proper study and assimilation”³. Among these districts was even the advanced Kiev district, which itself admitted in its annual report of October 1, 1935 that “the importance of the operational rear still remains a weak point in the operational training of a significant part of the combined arms commanders and staffs” ... 7%

The army commanders would not have been able to "organize the rear of the army" even in the 36th. Let us recall the tongue-tied but exhaustive conclusion of the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No.

preparation for 1936...": "There is no planning for the rear"... The annual report of the KVO (dated October 4

343

1936) again admitted that "in all military branches it is still weak with the organization of the rear for the entire operation ... 95

As for the "inability and unwillingness" of the commanders to provide combat with "all types of supplies" revealed in December 1939 in the 9th Army, then in one of the two divisions of the 9th, which existed even before the purge of the Red Army, the 44th In February 1936, the commanders paid insufficient attention to the organization of the rear as well (this was shown by an inspection of the 132nd Infantry Regiment @ M. Kondrusev - "according to the statement of Comrade Yakir, the best regiment commander in the district" ... 96). And in the 1935th, the indicated "inability and unwillingness" were inherent in the commanders of the entire Red Army! "The most important decisions of the command," he stated in his report dated | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ..." A.I. Sedyakin, - especially in the crisis stages of the battle, organically with the organization of the rear is very rarely associated "; "in the dynamics of combat, the control of the rear is easily disturbed and stopped" 7. Materials of Moscow's spring-summer inspections of units and formations of the two largest military districts - UVO/KVO and BVO - fully confirm this assessment. And the fact that "headquarters have not learned how to manage the rear", and commanders "forget" to give appropriate orders to rear services in the third such district - OKDVA, was also recognized by the annual reports of this army and its Primorsky group of October 21 and 11, 1935.

respectively.

At least in the largest districts, the same picture was in 1936. Recall that the 44th Rifle Division - where the command staff then did little to deal with rear issues - was an elite, "strike" division. We also read about the fact that when organizing a battle the command staff "lost the rear", we also read in the report on the inspection in July 1936 by the commission of the UBP RKKA of another such division - the 2nd rifle division. What then was the situation in the rest? The fact that in the OKDVA the organization of the rear "remained" then a "weak point in the management" of corps and divisions, and the headquarters of rifle regiments and battalions "rarely" took into account questions of the rear, was even admitted by the "varnished" annual report of this army dated 30 September 1936¹⁶⁰...

From the directive letter of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, it is clear that the Soviet staffs were "poorly trained on rear issues" even in the first, "pre-repression"

344

At the end of 1937,¹⁰¹ "No matter how much we raised questions about the rear for five years in a row, the rear remains a dark place even today for our commanders of all ranks," admitted on November 21, 1937 at the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense. and command troops of the Moscow Military District Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budenny¹⁰². In both rifle divisions of the then BVO (37th and 52nd) illuminated by sources, the commanders did not know how to organize logistic support for hostilities at all; in the only rifle regiment of the then OKDVA (62nd) characterized by sources from this side, he, as in the Finnish war in the 9th Army, did not want to organize the supply of troops at all; tankers of the KVO in tactical exercises "rear work" then also "did not take into account"...¹⁰³

Thus (again we use the wording of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 120 of May 16, 1940), "the command and staffs of all levels poorly organized and ineptly managed the work of the rear" not only in the Finnish war, but also before the purge of the Red Army. |

Troop management. It was indicated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 120, "characterized by haste, lack of thought, lack of study and analysis of the situation, foreseeing the subsequent development of events and preparation for them. Often there was excessive interference of senior bosses in the work of junior ones. Senior commanders, being carried away by individual episodes, missed the "management of a part or a unit as a whole"! 4. There is no doubt that these assessments refer to commanders (all the more so since the work of staffs is described separately in the order); documents known to us from the Headquarters of the High Command, the Command of the LVO and the Command of the North-Western Front show that they also concerned the commanders of formations,

and group leaders. Thus, from the directive by the commanders of the LVO to commanders-7, -8, -9 and -14 No. 015 / op dated December 6, 1939, it is clear that, at least at the beginning of the - yakh" was distinguished by the "lack of study and analysis of the situation" mentioned in order No. 120 (and, therefore, "lack of foresight of the subsequent development of events and training

345

to them") — and the resulting "ill-conceived" decisions. For example, in one of the orders for the 8th Army, "tasks were set for the formations, and the position of some formations was not known to those constituting and signing this order"; "a similar situation" was then in the 19th Rifle Corps of the 7th Army...! 95 fortified positions: when attacking with forcing river barriers, etc." army commanders should "demand and achieve" "from the entire command staff" (i.e., including formation commanders) "advance and clear planning of the upcoming battle"!06 Among those who practiced "unnecessary interference of senior commanders in the work of the juniors," turned out to be the commander-15 M.P. Kovalev tried to direct the actions of the battalions over the head of the commanders of corps, divisions and regiments. (However, as early as the beginning of February 1940, in the 7th and 13th armies, "senior commanders" also went to the other extreme — "weakly directed the actions of their subordinates and often did not influence the course of the battle at all"!97.) And even during the February offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, the commanders of corps and divisions "often" controlled not from their command post (which was either not created at all, or was so poorly provided with means of communication that it did not fulfill its purpose) , and from the command or observation posts (CP and NP) of the commanders of their units, "wandering" "from one place to another", i.e., "being carried away by individual episodes, they lost control of the formation as a whole." The inability of "all combined-arms commanders" (i.e., commanders of formations) to "completely and correctly use their headquarters in command and control of troops" noted at the beginning of the war, as well as the cave method of "management" should have led to the same result. In battle, practiced by the commander of one of the divisions of the 14th Army, to go "ahead of the battle order" of the attackers! (Back in 1916, even unit commanders were forbidden to do this!) ...

From the above-cited order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 120 and the directive of the Headquarters of the High Command No. 0418 of December 12, 1939, it is clear that many of the miscalculations.

346

allowed when commanding troops by commanders of formations (unwillingness to clearly plan a battle, "completely and correctly" use headquarters, loss of control of a formation or unit as a whole due to unwillingness to control in one's command post), were also characteristic of unit commanders. In the 14th Army, regimental commanders were likened to divisional commanders and - in an effort to personally lead the attack.

"Most of the middle command staff and part of the senior command staff [i.e. most commanders of platoons, companies and battalions. - A.S.], - noted N.N. Voronov, "turned out to be undereducated in the war and without proper practical experience"!99 [i.e. and without experience in command and control]. True, a significant (if not large) part of the commanders of these units who participated in the Finnish war were called up from the reserve. According to Voronov, the commanders and battalion commanders from the reserve commanders turned out to be frankly "poorly trained"; former commander-13 V.D. Grendal described their training as "extremely weak", and the headquarters of the 8th Army in the report of this latter - as "unsatisfactory" and led "often" "almost to a complete lack of control"!0; According to the same report, regular middle commanders coped "not badly" with the command of companies and battalions, but the command skills of those who had just graduated from the school, the commander of the 75th rifle division of the 8th army, brigade commander S.I. Nedvigin and the former commander of the special ski detachment of the 9th Army, Colonel H.-U.D. Mamsurov was criticized at the April meeting to the nines. "{...} The exactingness of such a commander," noted the first of them, "is extremely low, he has almost no statutory knowledge. Therefore, during the battle

it turned out that our average commander — lieutenant, junior lieutenant quickly merged with the entire Red Army mass and lost the face of the commander [i.e. they did not know how to manage the unit and did not manage it. — A.S.]. I Mamsurov reported the same thing: "I had 10 lieutenants from the Tambov school. I must say that these people were not commanders. They couldn't even be fighters."

The fact that the ability to manage a unit could not be generally good even among regular middle commanders is also evidenced by a number of impartial assessments, from

347

worn to the command staff in general. So, at the April meeting under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the commander of the 142nd rifle division (which was part of the 7th and then the 13th army), brigade commander P.S. Pshennikov pointed out the inability of commanders, especially medium ones, to control the fire and movement of units (the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 120 also mentioned the inability to ensure the infantry's offensive with heavy machine gun fire), the commander of the 86th Infantry Division of the 7th Army brigade commander Yu.V. . Nfvoselsky - again, by no means stipulating that he means only the command staff of the reserve! - on the inability to give the right commands ("Commanders give a pointless command "Follow me forward, instead of saying: "Ivanov, move, crawl there, do that"), military commissar of the Red Army Communications Directorate, brigade commissar K .X. Muravyov claims that platoon, company and battalion commanders are "not trained" in the use of such controls as small radios and light signals and ignore them. N.N. Voronov, in his April report, noted the weak field skills of the commander: "the ability to navigate in the forest, lead units in azimuth, conduct an offensive through a swamp or ice, conduct reconnaissance, be able to draw up a truthful report in combat conditions, etc." He was echoed by the speakers at the April meeting of the divisional commander 123 F.F. Alabushev, who pointed out that the command staff "was TOTALLY BAD" AND WITH "orientation on the ground" in general, and the division commander-142 P.S. Pshennikov, who stated that among the commanders of his division (he used the term "commanding staff", which is more familiar to veterans of the Red Army), "it turned out that only 17% knew the compass, the map and were able to walk in azimuth"...) 112,

Act on the acceptance of the People's Commissariat of Defense by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko (noting the "low level of training of the middle command personnel in the "platoon-company link"!)3) and People's Commissar's Order No. Company and platoon commanders also did not have "commanding skills", "as a rule", they also did not stipulate that they mean only reserve commanders. (This latter - who "was exceptionally badly prepared and often completely unable to fulfill his duties" - was specially mentioned in Order No. 120! 14.)

348

Junior command staff, i.e. section commanders and assistant platoon commanders are characterized by all our sources in the same way. "Called up from the reserve", stated "N.N. Voronov, "everyone forgot and most of them completely lost the appearance of a junior commander"; the junior commanding officers, on the whole, were no better able to manage the unit. "You can rarely hear the commands and orders of a junior commander in battle," noted the same Voronov; commanders of departments, summed up the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. Mandir skills", "as a rule", not 120, "who have. Divisional Commander - 86 Yu.V. Novoselsky responded even sharper: "[... | We don't have a "detached commander," we don't have a head of our own section. In fact, the former commander-13 V.D. also stated the same thing. Grendal: "Essentially, junior commanders are former ordinary soldiers"; that the junior commander is not "the owner of his unit," the division commander-75 S.I. made it clear. Nedvigin! 5.

The degree of ability to control the troops, which was shown by the staffs participating in the Finnish war, was most clearly described by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense G.I. Kulik: "Our headquarters work very poorly [...] Starting from the army headquarters, the division headquarters, the headquarters

'the corps, the headquarters of the regiment - worked badly!'¹⁶, And the most complete - N.N. Voronov: "Most of the headquarters went to war insufficiently prepared because of the not entirely successful selection of headquarters commanders, their low military staff training. [As one can conclude from the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 120, which concluded that in terms of "selection and training of personnel" the headquarters "did not meet the requirements for them", this level of preparedness was maintained until the end of the war. - A.S.]. Staff culture was low. It was difficult and painful for the headquarters to organize the control of the battle, the management of the work of the rear; compiling combat documents took a lot of time, the quality of combat documents was low. [...] The weak point in the work of the Itabs was the calculation of time, the calculations in time often did not correspond to life, because of this, orders that were impossible for the troops to be carried out were published! 7.

Order No. 120 of the People's Commissar of Defense supplements these conclusions with indications that the headquarters also poorly informed

349

the higher command about the course of hostilities ("documents were late, compiled carelessly, did not reflect the actual situation at the front", "sometimes there were direct lies in reports and reports"), poorly organized the creation, work and transfer of command posts and made poor use of communications, "especially radio". N.N. Voronov emphasized the inability to use another means - communications delegates (pointing out that "the staffs, accustomed to keeping in touch by telephone, and sometimes by radio, when they refused to work, did not find means and opportunities for communication with units!"¹⁹), but documents of the main, front and army command and the speeches of the participants in the April meeting do not confirm this, but confirm what was said in order No. 120, that the worst situation was with radio communications. Thus, according to the report of the 8th Army, at the beginning of the war, both the army and divisional headquarters used, in addition to the telephone, both the service of communications delegates and "personal communication", but not the radio (the 18th Infantry Division even "abandoned radio station on its own territory"); in the 15th Army, the headquarters of divisions and corps acted in exactly the same way at the end of the war!²⁰. Judging by the directive of the command troops of the LVO No. 015/op dated December 6, 1939, stating that "troops still use only wire communications"!¹? 1, in the first days of the campaign this was a common phenomenon in all armies; little has changed by the end of the fighting. "I must say that they were simply ignored," A.I. Zaporozhets, - and in some places they were thrown on the road. [...] They were very poorly used, I myself saw a lot of radio stations lying on the road." It was precisely because of the non-use of the radio (and not the communication delegates) that most often the situation was characterized by Zaporozhets: "when the wires break, for some reason there is no other connection" (it is characteristic that during Zaporozhets's speech someone emphasized: "The radio stations worked well." The commander of the 70th Rifle Division of the 7th Army, Commander M.P. Kirponos!²².

350

It is precisely the refusal to use radio communications that should first of all explain the inability noted by the sources of the headquarters of the armies and corps to organize an uninterrupted

° communication with the troops (and thanks to this to be aware of all changes in the situation). Judging by the order of the commanders of the LVO to commander-7 No. 016/op dated December 8, 1939, which demanded "especially

'regiments and divisions'¹²³, this defect was also characteristic of the staff

"Bov divisions and regiments.

* - Otherwise, other sources confirm and supplement

nyat conclusions N.N. Voronov and Order No. 120. Thus, the overall poor training of staff officers was such that in the 8th Army, not only in the headquarters of regiments and divisions, "a significant number of posts were occupied by reserve commanders who were completely inexperienced in staff matters," but also the army headquarters Consisted of "randomly appointed commanders who do not have the proper experience and knowledge." As a result, "in the headquarters of all levels" (i.e., in the army) "there were no

, practical skills in staff work, which led to a slowdown

. the pace of work, due to the slow transmission of orders and reports", and the staffs themselves were not knocked together!24. From the report of K.E. Voroshilov about the results of the war, it is clear that the same

` the situation was in other army headquarters: "Headquarters, formed

_named during the war, from the highest to divisional inclusive, with few exceptions, were weakly

: Prepared and could not skillfully and fully hand

lead the troops entrusted to them [...]"125. And indeed,

On January 212, 1940, the Headquarters of the Main Military Council stated that in the 7th and 9th armies the service of not only corps and divisional, but also army headquarters was not organized;

' on the lack of cohesion of the headquarters of the 9th army (in which even the

The political and intelligence departments worked in full

, isolation from each other!) indicate other documents; Not

,knocked together (again, like the headquarters of their corps and di-

`Viziy) was Shtarm-15.

; Low staff culture was also characteristic even

for army headquarters. So, at the headquarters of the 15th army, "operational

'nye documents were drawn up badly", operational and various

`Intelligence reports were "verbose, vague,

"The position of the troops in them was often not accurate." And in

351

13th Army, said at the April meeting a member of its Military Council A.I. Zaporozhets, "as soon as the headquarters writes a summary, it's ridiculous to read it directly [...] In general, it must be said directly that our reports are nothing but squalor!"25.

The inability to manage from the command post - at least in the 7th and 13th armies - was (as can be seen from the directive of the command troops of the North-Western Front No. 4703 of February 27, 1940) characteristic not only of the commanders of and for their headquarters, it even went as far as a direct rejection of the organization of the CP!

What has changed here in comparison with the "pre-repression" times?

In the winter of 1939/40, command and control of troops was characterized by "haste, ill-conceivedness, lack of study and analysis of the situation, foreseeing the subsequent development of events and preparing for them, but wasn't the OKDVA commanders who participated in the con-

conflict on March 25, 1936 at Hunchun? The commander of a separate cavalry squadron of the 40th Infantry Division, Captain S.A. Bonich, without any reconnaissance, on the move, without fire support, threw the squadron into the attack in cavalry formation ... to a height from which heavy machine-gun fire was fired and in front of which lay rugged terrain! And the commander of the 11th rifle company of the 118th rifle regiment of the 40th division, senior lieutenant Koksharov, just as "hurriedly, ill-considered", without "foreseeing the subsequent development of events" ordered the company, which was in a hurry to help the detachment fighting, to take up pulling the regimental battery out of the mud (thus leaving the combatants without the support of the heavy machine guns available in the company)...

But wasn't it "hurriedly" and "ill-conceived", without "anticipating the subsequent development of events and preparing for NIM" that the commander of the 8th Horse Artillery Regiment of the 8th Cavalry Division, Colonel V.N. Matveev and the commander of the 175th Infantry Regiment of the 59th Infantry Division, Major Zvik, who received on November 27, 1936 an order from the headquarters of the Primorsky OKDVA Group to send an artillery battalion and a rifle battalion, respectively, to the conflict area near Turiegi Rog? Matveev, understaffing you

352

, the 1st division, divided by him at the expense of other divisions, organized the matter in such a way that, despite the presence in the regiment of 411 fighters called up in the fall of 1934 - in the spring of 1936, in conjunction

the division of the division going into battle of 380 fighters and commanders turned out to be 146 completely untrained Red Army soldiers

. autumn draft 1936! Secondly, he sent a division, dressed according to his order in Hungarian coats and boots, and did not receive an emergency supply of food in their hands - without convoys, in which there were sheepskin coats,

felt boots, food and camp kitchens. Because of the robe

, the information of the regiment commander of the convoys came out only two hours and fifty minutes after leaving division, and this delay proved fatal for the latter. It rained on the way,

- so it got colder and a strong snowstorm began - during the attacks, as in the course of the entire more than 11-hour march, people did not receive food, their resistance to cold turned out to be lowered. As a result, before entering the battle, the division lost 19% of its personnel who were out of action (4 Red Army soldiers died from hypothermia, and another 69 people got frostbite) and arrived at their destination incapable of combat. Major Zvik, who promised the commander of the 1st battalion he was sending to Turiegi Rog "to give everything that the battalion lacks", sent the latter without adding anything (and possibly without even trying to do so): 30% of the soldiers of the battalion had torn shoes, and in the battery of regimental artillery attached to the battalion, 25-30 Red Army men were without gloves and winter footcloths. As a result, having fallen into the same snowstorm as the horse artillerymen, the battalion lost 106 people with frostbite and also became incapacitated...127

In the hostilities of 1936 - the first half of 1937, the commanders of the formations did not have a chance to participate, but

_NIYAH "haste and thoughtlessness" in the "pre-repression" of the Red Army - exactly as in the Finnish campaign - they also showed. Again we will quote the commander of the 1st rank I.P. Belova: "Our commanders, from large to small, have not mastered the sense of the measure of time required by a small subunit, unit and formation to organize a battle. It is generally accepted that, since a unit has approached the line from which you can rush to the attack or go on the offensive,

12 - 2255 353

means [...] all forward immediately. It is considered a bad commander that one who hesitated a little. Everyone forgets that in any conditions the battle must be organized. From here, yes, how

as a rule, all fleeting forms of combat in all branches of the armed forces take place in conditions of chaos and confusion!

The inability of "all combined-arms commanders" to "completely and correctly use their headquarters in command and control of troops" in the Red Army was often encountered in the 36th, when the headquarters was ignored (as noted in his report of October 7, 1936 "On Combat Training Red Army" M.N. Tukhachevsky) many commanders of rifle battalions; when one of the three commanders of the rifle regiments of the BVO, whose actions in tactical exercises were covered by sources, did the same (commander of the 110th regiment of the 37th rifle division) ...

Complete or partial self-removal of senior commanders from directing the battle was also encountered in the "pre-repression" Red Army - for example, during the maneuvers of the Primorsky OKDVA group in March 1936, this is exactly how the battalion commanders of the "14th Rifle Regiment" behaved (that is, the 77th Infantry Regiment of the 26th Infantry Division), which reduced the control of the battle to indicating to the company sectors of defense or directions of attack, and the commander of the 8th Mechanized Regiment of the 8th Cavalry Division (who did not indicate this either), but to Shepetov - in the KVO maneuvers in September 1936 - the commander of the 17th mechanized brigade (who was not interested in how the battle of his units was going). It seems that the commander in 1935-1937 behaved in the same way. 45th mechanized corps KVO A.N. Borisenko, who was characterized as "not a commander of a corps, even mechanized, i.e. shock. - /S.] of the corps, but a weak-willed and without knowledge manager of the corps "...129

"Most of the middle command staff and part of the senior command staff", i.e. Most of the commanders of platoons, companies and battalions, during the Finnish war, "turned out to be undereducated and without proper practical experience" - but the Deputy Chief of the 2nd Department of the Staff of the Red Army S.N. As far back as March 1935, Bogomyagkov emphasized that in the Red Army "it is very rare to find platoon commanders and company commanders with 2 years of experience in the infantry"³⁰. In the Kharkov Military District (KhVO) as of October 5, 1935, 30% of the commanders of rifle and machine-gun companies and rifle battalions were in positions less than a year

354

and another 27% — less than two years!³¹. And by the beginning of the purge of the Red Army, the picture became even worse. In the 21st Rifle Division of the OKDVA, by the end of 1936, 70% of the company commanders were "poorly trained" lieutenants put on the company directly "from the school bench"; On April 26, 1937, one of the commanders of the 117th Infantry Regiment of the 39th Infantry Division of the same army emphasized the same thing: of the 40th Rifle Division of the OKDVA in 1937, "the rejuvenation (and liquefaction) of the command staff" reached the point that 77% (7 out of 9) of the battalion commanders were in their positions for less than a year, 67% (30 out of 45) of the commanders companies and 95% (17 out of 18) of assistant chiefs of staffs of regiments and chiefs of staffs of battalions! Lieutenant P. I. Saransky, whose total command experience by that time was less than 5 years, and no later than the spring of 1937, lieutenant I. N. Khoroshkevich, who was promoted to commander of the Red Army only in January, began to command the 2nd rifle company 1936... And here is the order for the 156th rifle regiment of the 52nd rifle division of the BVO dated November 23, 1936: a large number of commanders are not prepared for work in their positions; among them are commanders of semi-companies, and commanders of machine-gun companies of companies of heavy weapons, and employees of battalion and regimental headquarters...¹³⁵

The command staff of the reserve in the Finnish war "was prepared exceptionally badly and often could not perform their duties at all" - but the commander of the BVO troops, commander of the 1st rank I.P. As early as December 9, 1935, Uborevich was forced to report to the Military Council that the commanders of the reserve, even after retraining at the training camp, "give very weak indicators. This can be said decisively about all reserve commanders, "and 25% of the command staff intended for the formation of units of the second stage in wartime, "militarily" are simply "good for nothing"¹³⁶. ("Almost all units note the low level of military training of the initial personnel of the reserve," confirms the summary of the BVO political department dated November 4, 1935!¹³⁷)

355

command staff of the reserve, assigned to the units of the 37th Infantry Division of the BVO and intended for the formation of units of the second stage. Those who did not have the experience of the First World War and the Civil War showed not only the inability to interact with other branches of the military, not only "especially weak" knowledge of the fire business. (and hence the inability to control fire), but also "poorly developed commanding volitional qualities". In other words, they did not know how to control their units. (This was said bluntly about battalion commanders: "For the most part, they are poorly trained, there is no practical experience [...] of command"!38.) "Weak" "skills for independent work" were shown at training camps years, and reserve commanders assigned to the 296th rifle regiment of the 99th rifle division of the KVO!

And here are the results of checks on the training of reserve officers carried out by the Red Army UBP just before the start and at the time of the start of mass repressions.

Observing the progress of the collection of reserve servicemen assigned to form secondary units to the 8th Infantry Division of the BVO, Colonel K.A. By June 1937, Kovalenko concluded that the "degree of training" of the middle command staff was "mostly unsatisfactory" so much that it "does not ensure the organization and conduct of modern combat by rifle subunits" (for example, platoon commanders in the defense were not able not only to organize fire system, but also to set tasks for squad commanders).

Reporting on the results of the gathering of assigned personnel of the 55th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District, which took place on June 1–9, 1937, Colonel Svechin, assistant chief of the 3rd branch of the Red Army UBP, noted that the reserve command staff was "the weakest place of collection", that his preparedness was "weak that he lacks leadership skills.

On June 6-13, 1937, the collection of assigned staff of units of the 6th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District showed the head of the 3rd department of the UBP of the Red Army, commander M.A. Reuters that the preparedness of the reserve officers "taking into account modern

356

requirements remains weak", that "the methods of controlling the combat of their unit" are "poorly" mastered by this commanding staff. And Colonel P.I. Vorobyov stated that the reserve commanders were not able to control the fire.

The gathering of the secondary 129th Infantry Division, which took place on June 28-July 5, 1937, in the Volga Military District (PriVO), REVEALED THAT "THE TRAINING OF THE BASIC MASS OF THE COMMAND STRUCTURE IS VERY LOW", that in an offensive battle these commanders called up from the reserve are generally do not manage their departments.

And only the command staff, called to assemble the secondary 126th rifle division (formed from the cadre of the 1st rifle division of the Moscow Military District) on April 26 - May 5, 1937, showed, apparently, a more decent, close to "udov" - lethargic "learning. In any case, M.A. Reiter, although he did not call this training (like that of fighters and junior commanders) "quite satisfactory", although he noted that part of the middle commanders should be passed through advanced training courses, using the terms "weak", "poor" or "unsatisfactory" did not use...140 in the report.

In the winter of 1939/40, the unit commanders, in fact, "did not command" these latter, but (as M.N. Tukhachevsky stated in his report of October 7, 1936 "On Combat Training of the Red Army" battalions "released control from their hands" in the 36th!41. In the OKDVA, at the March maneuvers of that year in Primorye, command and control platoons, commanders, and battalions often lost control (the last two categories of commanders often withdrew themselves from

management); did not lead his unit and the commander of the exiled | February 1936 to the conflict area near Xianghe of the consolidated tank platoon of the 2nd tank battalion of the 2nd mechanized brigade; not so much led as fought as ordinary soldiers and both middle commanders who defended Pavlova hill on November 26, 1936 during the conflict near Turiego Rog - the commander of the 1st rifle company of the 63rd rifle regiment of the 21st rifle division, Senior Lieutenant P. G. Co.

357

chetsov and the commander of the machine-gun platoon of this company, Lieutenant P.M. Presnyakov...

The fact that "the commander does not firmly manage and command the unit [in the documents of the high command of the Red Army of those years, in order to save space, the term "units" could replace the expression "units and subdivisions". - A.S.] in a tactical situation," A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937¹⁴². "Weakness of the command Fostav in the management of units"¹⁴³, and even a complete loss of command of companies and battalions was recorded then in all the rifle divisions of the advanced KVO and BVO covered by sources (24th, 37th, 45th th, 52nd, 96th and 100th), and in two of the three OKDVA rifle regiments (61st, 62nd and 63rd), whose documents we studied in detail. Lieutenant Kuzin, one of the two company commanders who had a chance to fight the Japanese at the height of Vinokurka on July 5-6, 1937, did not command as much as a substitute for ordinary soldiers ...

In the winter of 1939/40, the overall extremely low training of the middle infantry commanders was revealed - but, according to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. "pre-repression" year...¹⁴⁴

The inability of unit commanders to control fire and movement (and, in particular, to provide infantry attack with heavy machine gun fire) was typical of the Red Army in 1935 (commands of formations checked in the spring of that year by the 2nd department of the Red Army Headquarters in the advanced (!) UVO and BVO, did not know the commands given during fire control, and sometimes reduced the "control" of movement to giving the command "Forward"), and in 1936:

- when the commanders did not have "sufficiently strong skills in conscious fire control" - as even the fraudulent annual report of this district of October 4, 1936 was forced to admit - even in the advanced KVO;¹⁴⁵

- when neither in the advanced BVO, nor in the OKDVA, which was already starting to fight, the commanders and battalion commanders were able to use easel machine guns to prepare and support an infantry attack;

- when of the four squadron and platoon commanders who participated on March 25, 1936 in the battle with the Japanese near Khun

358

Chun, three (the commander of a separate cavalry squadron of the 40th rifle division of the OKDVA captain S.A. Bonich and his platoon commanders lieutenants Kovalev and Kovrizhkin) did not control fire at all,

and in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937:

- when in the BVO "management of the combat formations of a platoon

and the company still remained at a low level "%, and in both rifle units, for which the materials of testing them in tactical exercises were preserved (in the 11 | 156th rifle regiments, respectively, the 37th and 52nd rifle divisions), the commanders of the subdivisions were also unable to control fire (not even knowing the appropriate commands), did not prepare and did not support the infantry attack with machine-gun fire, and

— when in the OKDVA the subunit commanders were still notable for their “weak training” in fire control and the interaction of fire and movement!⁴⁷ and when one of the two company commanders who fought near Vinokurka did not control fire at all.

Former battalion signalman of the 278th Infantry Regiment of the 17th Infantry Division of the 13th Army A.I. The villager told in his memoirs about the commander who raised the vataku fighters to the Finnish pillbox, without waiting for the machine gunners to provide the attack with fire on the embrasure of the pillbox. But did not the company commander of the 13th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division of the BVO act in the same way in the “pre-repression” October 1936 at the Polotsk exercises, senior lieutenant Abdulin, who, in order to capture one of the pillboxes of the Polotsk fortified area, ordered the company to rush to him with bayonets?

The unwillingness of unit commanders to use small radios and light signals in the most important groupings of the Red Army was common in 1936 (when the commanders could not use company radio stations even in the “shock” 44th rifle division of the advanced KVO)), and in the “pre-repression” half of 1937 (when commanders of platoons and companies ignored signals, and even all technical means of communication, was noted in three of the four rifle divisions of the KVO covered by sources - the 24th, 45th and 96th - and when the OKDVA commanders did not have “the necessary knowledge and practical skills in using various means of communication at various stages of the battle”! 4) ...

359

Poor field training of unit commanders in the Red Army was also a reality even before the purge. So, in 1936, even the commanders of the elite formation of the advanced BVO - the 2nd Infantry Division, were poorly oriented on the ground, and in the OKDVA stationed among virgin forests, even the commanders who were destined for the role of divisional commanders were not able to move in azimuth. taiga navigators”, i.e. guides through the forest! The commanders of tank subunits consistently demonstrated their poor ability to identify themselves from a tank at that time, for example, at the Belorussian and Shepetovka maneuvers, at the June experimental exercise in Primorye... A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937; “very weak topographical training” then possessed even the commanders of the units of both divisions of the advanced KVO (shock, 24th and 96th) checked on this account ... 149

In the winter [1939/40, the commanders of subunits were poorly able to conduct reconnaissance, but how did they “conduct” it in “pre-repression” October 1936, at large tactical exercises near Polotsk, the commanders of platoons and companies of the 5th and 43rd rifle divisions of the BVO? Some of them (like commanders of platoons and commanders of the 13th rifle regiment of the 5th division) turned out to be “low initiative” and “were not able to receive any information”!⁵⁰, while others (like the commander of a platoon of the 2nd rifle company of the 127th rifle regiment of the 43rd division, lieutenant Malyshko) did nothing at all in reconnaissance ...

In the winter of 1939/40, unit commanders often did not know how to “compile a truthful report in combat conditions”, but even by the time the purge of the Red Army began, by July 1937, “not everyone” was able to “formulate a report during the battle” of the commanders who were then tested in two divisions of the advanced (!) KVO - the “shock” 24th and 96th! 71.

The lack of a clear command language among unit commanders (which was recalled in April 1940 by Divisional Commander 86) in the Red Army was also common in the first, “pre-repression” half of 1937 (instead of the statutory commands and standard wording of the report, the commanders, noted in AI Egorov's directive letter dated June 27, 1937, demonstrates “the desire for narrative speech”...!⁵²).

360

And the commanders of tank units sometimes managed the latter even better than their “pre-repression” predecessors! So, in the 20th heavy tank brigade “to control tanks during the battle, the commanders actively used the radio”!⁵³, while in 1936 (as M.N. . Tukhachevsky) “battalion commanders,

commanders and command platoons constantly took off their headphones (radio) in a combat situation "and even in the advanced BVO the commanders of tank units" in the bulk have not yet mastered the tank radio!

Junior commanders in the Finnish war "as a rule" did not have "commanding skills", but in one of the three reports of the military districts we found for the "pre-repression" year of 1935 - the report of the North Caucasus District - it is stated that The same is true: junior command personnel have no firm skills either in the use of certain battle formations, depending on the situation, or in fire and movement control. Junior commanders do not know how to organize the interaction of fire and movement, "they don't know how to give an order, [...] they don't know how to control the fire of their squad"!55, we also read in the materials of inspections of both OKDVA rifle divisions, from which such materials for 1935 survived - 21st and 26th...

The fact that the junior commander of the Red Army "weakly leads his unit in battle", M.N. Tukhachevsky also noted in his report of October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army"!156 (even in the elite 44th Rifle Division of the KVO, squad commanders were not able to set a task for their machine gunner then). It was the same before the start of the purge of the Red Army. After all, as noted in the directive letter of A.I. Egorova of June 27, 1937, "the tactical training of the junior commander suffered" "the same shortcomings as the training of the middle and senior commanders"!57 (and the middle and senior, as we remember, "unsteadily managed and commanded the unit in a tactical situation").

The junior commanders, called up for the Finnish war from the reserve, "forgot everything and for the most part completely lost the appearance of a junior commander" - but the "lack of command language and exactingness"!58 (that is, the absence of the "appearance of a junior commander") was revealed and at junior command staff of the reserve,

361

called up for training at the 37th Infantry Division of the BVO in "pre-repression" June 1936.

The same was shown by almost all checks on the training of the junior command staff of the reserve, carried out by the UBP of the Red Army before and at the beginning of mass repressions.

At the gathering of assigned personnel of the units of the 8th Infantry Division of the BVO by June 3, 1937, it turned out that this training was "mostly unsatisfactory" so much that "it does not ensure the organization and conduct of modern combat by rifle units."

During the collection of assigned personnel of the units of the 55th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District on June 1-9, 1937, it turned out that the junior command staff of the reserve is able to cope with the role of commander ONLY "with proper instruction and guidance" (read: under guardianship or even replacing him with a middle Komsosta- PTO).

The collection of assigned personnel of the units of the 6th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District on June 6-13, 1937 showed the head of the 3rd department of the UBP RKKA divisional commander M.A. Reuters the same as the Finnish war - N.N. Voronov that a significant part of the junior command staff of the reserve lost their knowledge and that, even after learning more at the training camp, this command staff "fuzzily" managed the squad in battle and did not know how to set a specific task for the machine gunner, grenade launcher, sniper (i.e. "the appearance of the young our commander "I could not accept to the end).

Absolutely the same as N.N. Voronov after the Finnish war, the authors of the report on the collection of the secondary 129th rifle division in the PriVO on June 28 - July 5, 1937 also stated: - A.S.] Red Army soldiers who received training in personnel units. The junior commanding officers cannot cope with their duties."

And only after the last April 26 - May 5, 1937 in the Moscow Military District secondary collection. 126th Infantry Division M.A. Reuters was able to state that the junior commanders of the reserve "in the main

his mass is prepared quite satisfactorily" (although he still clearly lacks commanding skills: "commands are given sluggishly")¹⁵⁹,

362

"The staffs work very poorly for us," G.I. summed up in April 1940. Kulik, but about the same thing (that the military headquarters are "weak" and "lag behind the development of events in battle [they do not provide adequate command and control of the troops. - A.S]") was also said in the letter of M.N. Tukhachevsky K.E. Voroshilov from | December 1935¹⁶⁰. In the documents of the headquarters of the only rifle corps of the advanced (!) KVO, from which at least some headquarters documentation for 1935 has been preserved, on the 15th, we quickly come across a statement by Chief of Staff P.I. Lyapin that "it is impossible to fight with such a headquarters" (made in a frank atmosphere of a party meeting) ... 161 terrain" (similar in its unsuitability for military operations to the Finnish theater!) "divisional headquarters could not cope"...¹⁶²

The same and on the 36th: from the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On combat training of the Red Army" it followed that the management of rifle formations "is still at an unsatisfactory level" precisely through the fault of headquarters!¹⁶³ In the advanced CVO - and according to the recognition of its own annual report of October 4, 1936! - the headquarters of the rifle divisions then controlled the battle "somewhat weaker" than "not bad" (i.e., not bad), and the headquarters of the tank formations, it happened, "simply lagged behind their troops", those. generally lost control!¹⁶⁴ The directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss dated November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 ..." testifies to the level of operational headquarters: "Control authorities have not yet learned how to properly organize control in mobile phases operations "...¹⁶⁵

The headquarters of rifle regiments and battalions in the Red Army, as noted in the directive letter of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, "how the combat command and control organs were not put together" (and, therefore, he was not able to manage the battle) even before the start of the purge of the Red Army. According to the district's annual report dated October 15, 1937, in the advanced BVO at that time there were "indistinctly put together" (and, judging by the surviving information about specific formations, "they were not able to organize and ensure the implementation of the commander's decision") and headquarters of tank parts and connections. In the advanced KVO, what do you mean

363

elk in the order of his command troops No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937, in general, "headquarters of all military branches" were "weakly prepared to carry out combat control tasks"! In the third most important strategic grouping of the Red Army - OKDVA, military headquarters, according to the conclusion of the order of V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year, they worked "satisfactorily" only "in an uncomplicated situation", and in conditions of "significant saturation of the troops with technical means" (that is, in conditions common for combat in the late 30s.) "they coped with their task poorly." At the same time, the headquarters of the battalions, as the OKDVA pitab report of May 18, 1937, makes clear, "unsatisfactorily" managed under all conditions! ⁶⁶,

Accordingly, even before its purge, the Red Army was distinguished by the general poor training of the staff officers. In May 1940, Order No. 120 of the People's Commissar of Defense concluded that, in terms of "selection and training of personnel," the headquarters "did not meet the requirements for them," but M.N. Tukhachevsky stated this in a letter to K.E. Voroshilov from | December 1935: "The cadres of staff commanders are weak in their training!"¹⁶⁷. The "weak training" of most of the headquarters of the rifle battalions was also stated by the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 400115s of May 17, 1936, and this training, even according to the annual report of the army of September 30, 1936, which mercilessly embellished the reality of reality, was then "at a very low level" ("mostly unsatisfactory" admitted the report and the training of the headquarters of their tank units) ... ¹⁶⁸ |

The staff officers of the reserve during the Finnish war showed themselves to be "completely inexperienced in the staff business", but wouldn't it be the same if this war had started in the "pre-repression" 1936? After all, even then (as

stated on December 7, 1936, the chief of staff of the KVO division commander V.P. Butyrsky) reserve commanders, assigned to the headquarters of divisions, regiments and battalions formed in wartime, "did not correspond to their purpose"...169 And just before the start of mass repressions? Most of the checks on the training of staff officers of the reserve, carried out at that time by the UBP of the Red Army, showed the same thing. So, the conclusion of the head of the 3rd department of the UBP RKKA divisional commander M.A. Reiter, made by him after

364

held on April 26-May 5 in the Moscow Military District, the assembly of the second-order 126th rifle division: "The training of command and control bodies is weak - they are not coherent and command and control of the division does not exist." A "considerable" part of the reserve staff commanders who left on June 1-9 for the recruitment of the assigned staff of the 55th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District, as Reiter's assistant Colonel Svechin stated, "has no skills in staff service technique." And only the assembly of the third-order 122nd Rifle Division, which took place on June 5-16 in the same Moscow Military District, showed that only the headquarters of the battalions were not knocked together!

Not only N.N. Voronov in April 1940, but also M.N. Tukhachevsky in "pre-repression" December 1935, at the Military Council: "We need to develop a practical staff worker. The staff commander, if it smells of fighting, should immediately get worried, check whether the telephones are working, whether the radio is working, whether the orderlies are trained, whether the required number of messengers are available, whether the troops are where he thinks they should be. be, or not be found, what the neighbors are doing, etc. It would seem that our commanders have combat experience, but for some reason all these moments are forgotten in the field! Almost all surviving On the 35th, materials of inspections of the troops of the advanced (!) UVO / KVO. All the surviving annual reports of formations and associations of OKDVA, which was on the verge of war, had to report the same thing: staff officers spend too much time transmitting orders, they forget to control execution, documents are worked out slowly and indistinctly, in a combat situation in headquarters there is a lot of fuss due to the lack of practical skills and automatism in the performance of their functions ...

The same willows 36th. <[...] A lot of time is still lost on the transmission of orders and reports, due to the imperfection of headquarters work, "the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 172. Staff officers' practical skills

365

even in the battalions of the 2nd rifle division of the BVO, and the headquarters of the 16th rifle corps of the same advanced district managed to be late with the preparation of a combat order even at pre-rehearsed Belarusian maneuvers! The recognition of the annual report of the most important strategic grouping of the Red Army - the KVO - should be highlighted in italics: "Today we do not have a single headquarters where the main workers would have two or three years of experience and would have full work practice"! 73. (Recall that at the Polesie maneuvers of the KVO in August 1936, the headquarters of regiments and divisions were distinguished by such "under-learning" "in control technique" that they dragged out absolutely everything they did, sometimes spending 4 hours on drawing up a division order, and on compiling and bringing to the regiments - 26 (!) Hours! "4.)

It was the same in the first, "pre-repression" half of the 37th. So, according to the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937, the "common weak point" of the headquarters there "continued to be" the "untimely communication" of the commander's decisions to the troops! (all testifying to the same weakness of the practical skills of staff work). By June 10, 1937, the divisional and regimental headquarters of the 6th Infantry Division of the Moscow Military District had "virtually [highlighted by me. —

A.S.]” was “still not enough”, and the battalion was not knocked together at all ... 176 At that time, the commanders of the OKDVA military headquarters were also lacking skills in command and control - “working clumsily at command posts, and in tank headquarters it was badly prepared by radio communication, i.e. poorly able to use the main means of control of the tank headquarters - the radio station. A clear idea of what practical command and control skills the Far Eastern staff officers had at that time can be drawn from the fact that the headquarters of the 21st Rifle Division was by no means the worst in it, which:

— did not achieve “constant knowledge of the situation and information about the enemy”;

— did not show “sufficient ingenuity in using means of communication to transmit orders”;

- Documents released late, verbose and generally poorly worked out;

- Only “periodically” led the operational

map (!); 366

— “forgot” to inform the higher headquarters, neighbors and own units about the situation and finally

— was “completely not knocked together”!77.

The lack of concentration of headquarters in the Red Army was also a reality even in the 36th. Let us again quote the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936: “Interaction between all links in the governing bodies has not been sufficiently worked out!” practically all battalion and regimental and divisional headquarters, the materials of inspections of which have been preserved, one of the two headquarters of the mechanized brigades (shtabrig-23) and three of the five headquarters of the corps ({shtakors-20, -26 and -43), and in the forward The CVO - and, according to his own annual report of October 4, 1936, which was by no means distinguished by frankness! - all headquarters in general (“coordination and interaction in work between the main departments of headquarters are insufficient”! 79) ...

The inability to organize uninterrupted communication with the troops for the Soviet headquarters was also typical in the 35th (including the notorious Kyiv maneuvers). Even in the 36th, even the headquarters of formations and formations were distinguished by them (“In the dynamics of hostilities, in most cases, communication is disrupted,” it was stated in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 “On the results of operational training for 1936 ... ” - which indicates the inability to plan and correctly use all means of communication”; “as a rule, the communication of interaction (communication between formations) in the process of combat and especially the operation is absent [...] As soon as movement begins - communication in most cases it is interrupted, and, unfortunately, this intolerable situation often does not touch anyone, it is treated as something ordinary [...]”180).

Troop headquarters OKDVA uninterrupted. they were not able to ensure communication with the troops even in the first, “pre-repression” half of 1937 (in particular, at the March divisional and corps exercises); the headquarters of that of the then rifle corps of the BVO, on which only information was preserved, were not able to achieve this - on the 23rd ...

The famous Kyiv maneuvers of 1935 were also distinguished by the reluctance of headquarters to use radio communications, where “radio means

367

wa, working on the move, were not used! 1. In December 1939 (according to what was said at the April meeting by the military commissar of the Communications Department of the Red Army K.Kh. Muravyov) due to

reluctance to use the radio, having gone on the offensive, the 20th heavy tank brigade lost contact with the command, but this was only a repetition of what happened in September 1935, at the Kiev maneuvers. Having entered the gap, the battalion of T-28 tanks (the 9th heavy one was also founded in such a way) then also "disappeared" for a long time, since it did not maintain contact with either the infantry or the high command ...

The reluctance of the headquarters to use radio communication was typical in the 36th, when, in particular, in the forward BVO it was recorded at the only regimental and almost all battalion headquarters, the inspection materials of which were preserved, when even the staff connections. According to the report of the district on the September Shepetovka maneuvers, "radio communication did not take its rightful place in the management of units and subunits"¹⁸² even in tank ones, i.e. mobile troops! In the "pre-repression" January of 1937, even the headquarters of the best (72nd rifle) regiment of the "shock" 24th rifle division preferred to use instead of radio messengers in the KVO - one of the three then regimental headquarters of this district, which are covered by sources. The indication of the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937 to NATO that "the use by the headquarters of all types of means of communication is still not enough"! ⁸³ there was no radio communication, let us conclude that the radio was ignored even in these two large districts ...

In February 1940, the headquarters often poorly equipped the command post with communications equipment, but the headquarters of the best regiment of the elite division of the advanced KVO - the 72nd rifle regiment of the 24th rifle division - demonstrated a similar inability to manage from the command post in the "pre-repression" January 1937- go. In general, he tried to control from such a command post, on which no means of communication had yet been deployed!

From the directive of the commander of the North-Western Front No. 4703 of February 27, 1940, which demanded that the headquarters

368

"ensure their commanders the ability to continuously control the battle"¹⁸⁴, one can understand that the continuity of control during the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" could not be achieved. But it was exactly the same exactly three years before, during the assault by the 52nd rifle division on the exercises of the 23rd rifle corps of the BVO in the last days of February 1937 of the Mozyr fortified area: "control in the offensive zone inside the UR [fortified area . — A.S.]" "carried out with great interruptions"¹⁸⁵.

Staff culture in the Finnish war "was at a low level" - but the same picture is shown to us in 1935. As the spring-summer inspections of Moscow inspectors showed, this culture was then low even in all the headquarters of the rifle corps of the advanced UVO / KVO. At the headquarters of the "strike" 44th Rifle Division of the KVO, even in September, having much more time to prepare an order to break through the enemy's defensive line than in a real combat situation, they drew up this order "exceptionally carelessly" ... ¹⁸⁶ And in the corps and At the divisional headquarters of the 5th Rifle Corps of the advanced BVO, the commanders in March 1935 did not even have strong skills in staff graphics, and instead of "orders, reports, reports" they conducted "conversations"! ¹⁸⁷

The reports compiled in February-March 1940 at the headquarters of the 15th Army were "verbiageous, non-specific", but in the large headquarters of the advanced KVO "verbosity" was "common" and in September 1935, at the Kiev maneuvers ¹⁸⁸.

The staff culture in the Red Army in 1936 was such that the chiefs of staffs of the regiments of the 40th Infantry Division of the OKLVA, which had already begun to fight, did not know the conventional signs with which the situation is plotted on the map, and the inability to keep a working map Staff officers demonstrated even in the "shock" 2nd Infantry Division of the advanced BVO.

The staff culture in the Red Army and in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937 was such that in two of the three regimental headquarters of the advanced

KVO (72nd Rifle Regiment of the 24th and 287th Rifle Regiment of the 96th Rifle Division) reports were unclear, and work maps were kept poorly and that in all

369

divisional headquarters of the OKDVA covered by sources, the quality of headquarters documentation was low.

In 1935, the military headquarters of the OKDVA "forgot" to inform the higher headquarters about the situation. And in 1936, as can be concluded from the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On combat training of the Red Army", the headquarters did not cope with their role of informers throughout the Red Army: their reports were always late (and indeed, in the documents of the only corps headquarters of the KVO covered by sources - in protocol of the party meeting of the headquarters of the 15th Rifle Corps dated December 22, 1936 - even then we stumble upon a confession from the chief of staff: "[...] We are weakly organizing [...] information"! 89).

The headquarters that went to the Finnish war were distinguished by their inability to calculate the time required for the troops to organize a battle, but in 1935 the headquarters were not able to do this in the 18th rifle corps of the OKDVA, and in the 27th rifle division of the advanced BVO; godlessly "varnishing" reality the annual report of the KVO dated October 1, 1935, and he agreed that "calculations: time, space, terrain" "quickly and correctly" are able to "perform not all staff commanders yet"!30. And in the 36th, as it is clear from the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936, the inability or unwillingness of the headquarters to "calculate the time for making a decision, draw it up and bring it to the executors" was characteristic of the entire Red Army! on the organization of the battle, M.N. Tukhachevsky confirmed in his report of October 7 "On combat training of the Red Army", neither regimental, nor divisional, nor corps headquarters are left to the performers ...).

The "poor preparedness" of the headquarters of the newly formed formations and associations in wartime was also not a consequence of the purge of the Red Army. Newly formed in 1939-1940. army headquarters "were poorly trained and could not lead the troops in a qualified and complete manner" - but the meetings of the directorates of six combined arms and one cavalry army held in 1935 showed the same thing: "Wartime army directorates, in their readiness, are still are at a low level, especially the reserve officers assigned to these departments "...192

370

B. Artillery

Shooting and artillery training. "We need our commanding staff to be able to shoot better in difficult conditions, with a large displacement, in a forest area [...]," said at the April meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the head of artillery of the 8th Army brigade commander ON THE. Cry! 93. This problem partially followed from another one, which was pointed out by V.D. Grendal: "In the artillery, the reconnaissance and surveillance service is very poorly placed [...]." ("Reconnaissance of targets," confirms the report of the 8th Army, "was carried out unsatisfactorily due to both the lack of reconnaissance equipment and practical skills in observing targets (inability to choose NP [observation post. - / A.S.] in the forest, lack of a surveillance system, etc.)")!194. "We felt extremely acutely that sometimes our artillery commanders do not know how to navigate the terrain," the commander of the 473rd howitzer artillery regiment of the 8th Army, Major N.V. Mukhin! 35.

But shooting in difficult conditions (and, in particular, in a wooded area) was bad for Soviet artillery commanders in 1935: after all, then, according to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Egorov, did not know enough about the theory of shooting, and without it it is impossible to learn how to shoot in difficult conditions.

Even in 1936 the artillerymen of the Red Army did not know how to shoot in difficult conditions (and, in particular, in the forest). After all, difficult conditions usually mean that the target is poorly or not observed at all - so you have to shoot at it on the map, using a topographic basis. And the question of "preparation of the topographic base", stated in his report of October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army" M.N. Tukhachevsky, in the artillery of the Red Army is "practically" still "not allowed"! In addition, when shooting in conditions of poor visibility, one has to apply the analytical method of data preparation - AIMV 36th

371

even those commanders who were nominated to participate in the All-Army shooting and artillery competitions of battery commanders of ground and anti-aircraft artillery did not possess ... The political administration of such an advanced district as the KVO, in its report to Moscow of May 5, 1936, directly admitted that WHAT "shooting under difficult conditions gives mostly unsatisfactory results"!197

In the OKDVA, which not only represented one of the three largest groups of the Red Army, but was also preparing to fight in the same wooded area in which they later fought with the Finns, the artillery commanders "got lost", shooting in difficult conditions, and in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937. Shooting at unobserved targets to kill them, as V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year, they didn't work out at all !! 98 Before the start of the purge of the Red Army, the artillery commanders of the advanced KVO were not able to shoot in difficult conditions: as established in June 1937 by the new commanders of the KVO I.F. . Fedko, they were "trained" to fire only "on perfectly visible targets"...199

In the winter of 1939/40, in the artillery of the 8th Army, "reconnaissance of targets was carried out unsatisfactorily", but in 1935 it (as N.M. Rogovsky, inspector of the Red Army artillery reported at the Military Council on December 8 of that year) was Red Army! Artillerymen of the advanced KVO "issues of organizing and conducting reconnaissance in the process of combat by all means in unfamiliar terrain" "were not worked out" even by the beginning of the purge of the Red Army? 00. According to the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937, there was "bad" "with artillery observation and reconnaissance", including reconnaissance of unobserved targets:201 since these flaws in the training of the artillerymen of the district were evident in the 36th, we can conclude that the same was true at the beginning of the mass repressions.

In the winter of 1939/40, the artillery commanders of the 8th Army lacked "practical skills in observing targets" - but things were exactly the same here before the purge of the Red Army (and not in one operational formation, but in the entire Red Army) . This can be seen at least from the remark made by N.N. Voronov on the Military

372

Veteran under the People's Commissar of Defense on November 22, 1937: "Artillerymen are still [highlighted by me. — A.S.] they don't know how to observe [...]>202.

_ In the winter of 1939/40 in the 8th Army, the artillery commanders were not able to choose NP in the forest - but in the "pre-repression" first half of 1937 in the advanced KVO and BVO, they did not know how to choose places for NI at all (disposing them or too - who is far from the targets or so that they were perfectly visible to the enemy) ...

In the winter of 1939/40, in the 8th Army, many artillery commanders did not know how to navigate the terrain - but in OKDVA such cases were noted in June 1936.

Tactical learning. "In tactical matters, comrade. Stalin," acknowledged at the April meeting the head of artillery of the 19th Rifle Corps brigade commander S.I. Oborin, "We are still rather weak"? 03. Judging by the subsequent speeches of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and the head of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army G.I. Kulik (<[...] Artillerymen [...] must know infantry tactics, but they do not know") and the head of artillery of the Red Army N.N. Voronov ("Some of the artillerymen also have swagger, it must be beaten out and forced in order to

in addition to artillery, the artilleryman taught and knew combined arms business”), and also by order of the People’s Commissar of Defense No. 120 (who noted about artillery only that it “had a number of shortcomings in matters of interaction with infantry”)24, this well-known tactical “weakness” artillery commanders was determined primarily by the insufficient ability to organize interaction with the infantry. (At least in the 8th Army, even the regimental artillery, which was directly intended to support the infantry, suffered from this - it neglected direct fire; it was not able to interact with the infantry there and the anti-tank artillery was preparing to fire only at armored objects.) However, in the act reception of the People’s Commissariat of Defense by Marshal Timoshenko, it was also noted that “artillery is not able to support tanks”205,

In addition (as N.A. Klich pointed out at the April meeting), “the commanders of the artillery headquarters were unsatisfactorily prepared. Artillery headquarters are

373

were knocked together”206 (the staffs of the chiefs of artillery of the division, who fell under the reduction in 1939, had, in essence, to be re-staffed before the war). During the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line, this affected the fire control of artillery groups. “The command and control of artillery,” it was said in the directive of the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front No. 4703 of February 27, 1940, “in a number of cases, it is only formally centralized, but in fact it turns out to be a simple distribution among [rifle. — A.S.] shelves. Nachartkors and nachartdivs often sit without communication with art groups and cannot direct their fire. Because of this, in necessary cases, fire maneuver is not used, the fire of the entire artillery of the corps is not concentrated on important tactical or dangerous areas - usually each artillery group supports only its own part ”? 07,

In the winter of 1939/40, artillery commanders “in tactical matters” were on the whole “still rather weak” - but the assessment of the annual report of the BVO dated October 5, 1937, according to which, the artillery commanders of even this district “in tactical relation” “not prepared enough”208, could have been done before the start of the purge of the Red Army: tactical training of those BVO artillery commanders for whom relevant information was preserved (staff officers of the 33rd and 37th artillery regiments and commanders of the 160th artillery regiment Mozyr UR - soon reorganized into the 52nd artillery regiment of the 52nd rifle division), fluctuated between satisfactory and unsatisfactory (in the 33rd artillery regiment headquarters of divisions were not knocked together, and the headquarters of the regiment could only work in a simple environment) and in 1936 So, at least, it should have been “insufficient” in the first half of 1937... And the tactical training of the then commander of the OKDVA artillery, as recognized in April 1937 at the headquarters of this army itself or in its apparatus nacharta, in general “should be considered unsatisfactory”...209

In the winter of 1939/40, the artillery commanders “had a number of shortcomings in matters of interaction with the infantry,” but in 1936 THESE “shortcomings” seemed to be even more! “The weak side of the training of artillery [Illerian] divisions,” he emphasized in his report of October 7, 1936 “On combat training

374

Tovka of the Red Army “M.N. Tukhachevsky, “one should admit that their tactical work together with the infantry was completely insufficient”210 (we recall that the main practical work on organizing interaction with the infantry should then have been carried out precisely at the level of the division) ... The picture was no better here and in “pre-repression” first half- > not 1937. Recall the conclusion of K.E. Voroshilov at the Military Council on November 27, 1937: “The interaction of artillery with infantry and other branches of the military remains [highlighted by me. — A.S] weak”? (The artillery “commanders of all degrees did not work out the most important issues of interaction with the infantry,” - it is directly noted in the order of the command troops of the KVO No. 0100 of June 22, 1937212.)

In the winter of 1939/40, part of the artillery commanders did not know the tactics of the infantry with which they had to interact, but in the “pre-repression” 1935, in

to join the OKDVA battle, even the commanders of the artillery headquarters knew little of this tactic. "The ignorance of the composition [as in the document] was repeatedly noted. — 4.S.] artillery of the system for constructing machine-gun fire in the defense," wrote V.N. Kozlovsky in the materials prepared by him on October 14, 1935 for the annual report? 13.

In the winter of 1939/40, in the 8th Army, the regimental artillery was not able to support the infantry with direct fire, but in both divisions of the OKDVA (21st and 40th rifle divisions)-illuminated from this side by sources, it was not able to do this even in "pre-repression" 1935. After all, direct-fire fire implies the advancement of individual guns into the battle formations of the attacking infantry, and in these formations the commanders of regimental artillery guns "were not able to control and conduct combat with a separate gun operating with infantry"? In the advanced CVO - even according to its annual report of October 4, 1936! - "tactical use of battalion and regimental guns" was "poorly worked out" both in the 36th, and in the OKDVA - and in the first, "pre-repression" half of the 37th, when (as stated in the order of the commander of the Primorsky group of this army commander of the 2nd rank I.F. Fedko No. 048 dated February 16, 1937) the commanders of regimental artillery guns were still "weak

375

knowledge of the issues of combat use of a separate weapon in various types of infantry combat"?15.

In the winter of 1939/40, in the 8th Army, anti-tank artillery was not able to switch to infantry support - but in the OKDVA (judging by its divisions, which are illuminated from this side by sources), it was not able to do this in 1935 either. For such a "switchover", the commanders of 45-mm anti-tank guns operating in infantry combat formations must take the initiative - the 21st and 26th rifle divisions of the OKDVA in the 35th "initiative and ability to command" they do not have was; to quickly and correctly respond to the data of the simplest "tactical situation", to take "a justified commander's decision" "on the basis of the situation", they "were not able to"... anti-tank guns in OKDVA were "weak" also in the "pre-repression" winter of the 37th?16.

In the winter of 1939/40, the artillery "could not support tanks" - but from day to day, the OKDVA, which was preparing to enter the battle, "due soldering in the joint work of artillery and tanks"217 through the fault of the artillerymen (and according to the recognition of the OKDVA commander V.N. . Kozlovsky) was not in 1935 either. According to the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937, the actions of the escort guns for tanks and infantry, even before the beginning of the purge of the Red Army, were the weakest point of interaction between the combat arms there. In the advanced KVO, the artillery was not able to support the tanks in time (organizing interaction with them too slowly) and in September 1936, at the Shepetovka maneuvers, and immediately before the start of mass repressions, the commanders of the KVO artillery, as we saw above, in general "did not work out the main issues of interaction" with tanks ...

The winter of 1939/40 showed the unsatisfactory training of the commanders of the artillery staffs - but in the advanced KVO it was such in 1935, when even at the long and carefully rehearsed Kiev maneuvers, the chiefs of artillery of both maneuvering rifle corps (8th and 17th th) had to replace their staff officers. And the OKDVA charter on October 14, 1935 noted that artillery

376

The Russian headquarters in this army are staffed by commanders with a "small tactical outlook"...218

In the winter of 1939/40, "artillery headquarters were not knocked together", but at least in half of the rifle corps of the advanced KVO (in the 8th and 17th) they were not knocked together in the "pre-repression" 1935 (after all even at the Kiev maneuvers, they delayed the release of "documents necessary for the battle"219). And the headquarters of the chiefs of artillery divisions (and not just one district, but throughout the Red Army) were, as testified in his report of October 7, 1936 "On

combat training of the Red Army "M.N. Tukhachevsky, are "weak" even in 36-m220, In OKDVA — as the report of its headquarters of May 18, 1937 admitted — almost all artillery headquarters (both divisions, and regiments, and artillery groups, and 11 out of 13 headquarters of infantry charters divisions) were prepared unsatisfactorily on the eve of the purge of the Red Army.

As can be understood from the speech of N.A. The cry, the unsatisfactory training of the commanders of the artillery headquarters and the lack of compactness of these latter were to a large extent determined by the fact that on the eve of the war, quite a few reserve commanders had to be poured into the staffs reduced shortly before. But these commanders would inevitably lower the level of readiness of the artillery command and control bodies even before the purge of the Red Army. Thus, the assembly of the secondary 129th Rifle Division, held in the PriVO on June 28-July 5, 1937, showed that the commanders of the artillery "headquarters were completely unprepared; battalion headquarters cannot control fire.

Fire control of the artillery group even in the advanced KVO and BVO - and even according to their own reports to Moscow in the annual reports of the KVO and the political department of the BVO dated !| and October 21, 1935 respectively! - was mastered no more than "satisfactorily" and in the 35th (and, at least, in the KVO for the same reason as on the North-Western Front in the winter of 1940, i.e. because of the "only satisfactory" OS - warfare by artillery headquarters of radio communications? 22). According to the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army", the issue of controlling mass fire (i.e., the fire of artillery groups) "was not resolved in practice and the 36th. In the advanced BVO "technique and practice

377

turning massed fire" was "unfinished"?23 even on the eve of mass repressions: after all, the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937, which we have quoted, paints a picture that was in this district (see above) and in the 35th ...

The "Mannerheim Line" would not have been possible to break through without the massive use of RGK artillery, but in the 36th (according to the same report of Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army"), the use of this artillery by senior artillery commanders was still practiced worse than massaging fire...

We also note several general assessments of the training of the artillery commanders who participated in the Finnish campaign. Nachartkor-19 S.I. Oborin made it clear that, on the whole, this training was at least satisfactory: if, he pointed out, the commanding staff of the infantry was "poorly prepared, especially" in spare parts, then this "cannot be said with regard to artillery. Here we have a completely different situation"?24 True, the command staff of the reserve was assessed as unsatisfactory. "(...) We don't have a good platoon commander from the reserve, which we should have," said commander of the 7th Army commander M.A. Parsegov at the April meeting? "The career junior commander," N.N. Voronov noted in his report on the results of the war, "had mediocre training," while the one called up from the reserve "lost his knowledge"?26.

But no better (if not worse) artillery commanders were trained in the 36th, when, according to the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On combat training of the Red Army", the commanders of fire platoons "sharply lagged behind in their fire training", the quality of firing conducted by the commanders of batteries and divisions was only satisfactory, and the practice in cooperation with the infantry there were very few of them ("which significantly reduces the value of artillery fire training")?27.

Reserve artillery commanders (and by no means only platoon commanders) also aroused criticism and repressions of the Red Army. "The training of the commanders and commanders of the reserve cannot be considered satisfactory," —

378

Major A.N. Yudin-28. During the assembly of the second-order 129th Rifle Division, which took place in the PriVO on June 28-July 5, 1937, it turned out that the artillery commanders called up from the reserve "in the bulk cannot command a unit"-223,

Junior commanders of the artillery, as noted in the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On combat training of the Red Army", "dramatically lagged behind in his fire training" and 36th-30. The protocol of the party meeting of the 174th rifle regiment of the 58th rifle division of the KVO dated April 11, 1936 even contains a statement that the junior artillery commanders ... "do not know how to set the sight and level"!-31 In OKDVA, According to the report of its headquarters dated May 18, 1937, the junior commanding staff of the artillery was poorly trained on the eve of the purge of the Red Army, both in terms of small arms artillery and in tactical terms.

So far, no information has been found on the "pre-repression" level of training of junior reserve artillery commanders.

Information about the training of the commanders of the engineering troops who participated in the Finnish campaign is not contained in published sources.

B. Signal Corps Commanders

Commissar of the Communications Department of the Red Army Brigadier Commissar K.Kh. Muravyov (who went through the Finnish campaign as the chief of communications of the 8th Army) at the April meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks described the preparedness of the career signal commanders as "satisfactory", and those called up from the reserve as "poor"-232.

We do not have information about the "pre-repression" training of signalmen commanders in the reserve, but, as for personnel, then:

- in OKDVA (information on the other two largest districts was not found), their proficiency was only satisfactory

379

the 35th;

—that in the 36th, in the three largest military districts, this training, as we saw in Chapter 3, was even unsatisfactory;

- that, at least in the OKDVA (according to the report of the headquarters of this army of May 18, 1937), it did not meet the requirements of modern warfare (that is, it was actually unsatisfactory) even before the start of the purge of the Red Army.

In other words, by the winter of 1939/40, the training of the career commanders of the communications troops was at least as good as in the "pre-repression" period (and perhaps even better).

2. TROOPS A. Foot soldiers

Tactical training. "Single training of an infantry fighter," summed up N.N. Voronov, "in terms of tactical and shooting, it turned out to be at a low level" (former commander-13 V.D. Grendal fully and completely agreed with this opinion at the April meeting)-233. It was precisely because of this low solitary training that the Soviet infantry "did not know how" (as noted in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 120) "to conduct close combat"-34. And indeed, as can be seen from the same report by Voronov, the infantryman who participated in the Finnish war was not taught to crawl, run over, neglected self-digging and disguise (P.S. 1st Army A.I. Zaporozhets claimed that the fighter did not know how to disguise himself), he did not know how to fight in the trenches and the forest.

He was also not trained to advance behind a tank and (which all our sources especially highlight) behind a barrage of fire, at the minimum allowable distance from bursts of his artillery shells.

The poor training of a single soldier led to the poor preparedness of small units (squads and platoons), which, in turn, led to the poor preparedness of such units as companies and battalions. Not possessing many of the skills necessary in combat, the fighter felt

Not

380

confidently and began, as N.N. Voronov, "involuntarily strive to act as a team"?35, i.e., to put it simply, huddle closer to others. As a result, P.S. Pshennikov, the unit, "having begun to advance in regular battle formations, during the offensive rolls up into a fist, which is easy for the enemy to shoot"? constantly, and the Finns were so amazed at such a low level of training of the Red Army - thanks to which "Finnish shooters disabled hundreds of enemy soldiers huddling together" - that they called the Soviet infantry a "mobile zoo" ...238

Commander-15 V.N. Kurdyumov at the April meeting also pointed out the inability of infantry units to apply themselves to the terrain.

Particularly ugly was the preparedness of the fighters called up from the reserve (many of whom had never received military training at all). As many participants in the April meeting pointed out, "did the stock arrive almost completely untrained," or even completely "untrained"?33. Checking the status and progress of combat training, carried out at the beginning of February 1940 in the 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 68th, 78th, [13th and 114th reserve rifle regiments of the LVO, - found that the fighters not only "do not know firmly their duties in various types of combat and military service (especially in security))", but also "have not been taught the correct technique of actions in battle (running, crawling, using shelters and camouflage)"240 .

A common place in Soviet and Finnish sources is a statement of the inability of the Soviet infantry to fight on skis.

However, about the "underestimation" of the individual training of an infantryman – an underestimation that "goes along the entire line from bottom to top" and leads to the fact that during maneuvers the fighter "turns out to be incompetent in combat operations", i.e. in fact, about the same low level of training of a single fighter, pompolit of the 3rd rifle corps of the MVO T.K. Govorukhin reported back in September 1935?4!. At the same time, he referred to the lowered

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381

from above, the calculation of time for preparing a fighter; it means that not only the Moscow district should have been distinguished by a low level of solitary training of an infantryman.

The "weak training of a single soldier" of the Soviet infantry was directly stated both in the 36th (in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 400115s of May 17, 1936242), and in the "pre-repression" first half of the 37th. "A single fighter," A.I. Yegorova dated June 27, 1937, "does not have Yaver skills in running, crawling, in choosing a place for shooting, observation, etc."243. As we could see in the previous chapters, such a picture was then also in the three largest military districts (about the "unsatisfactory single training of a fighter" of one of them - OKDVA - then even its command spoke directly and more than once? 4 ") .

Close combat even in the advanced KVO - and according to even his "lacquered" annual report of October 4, 1936! - "was" "only in the development stage" and in the 36th. "Weak close combat skills" - and again according to the annual report of this army itself dated September 30, 1936.

— the infantrymen of the OKDVA, which was already starting to fight, were also different then?⁴⁵ “Unbelting” instead of close combat was consistently demonstrated at “pre-repression” tactical exercises by the infantry of the forward BVO – and the 27th Rifle Division at the Lepel exercise in March 1935, and the elite 2nd Rifle Division at the Belarusian maneuvers in September 1936 th, and, apparently, all the rest (after all, the “training of divisions” of the BVO, noted A.I. Sedyakin, who observed the Belarusian maneuvers, “is very uniform”).

In OKDVA, the “complete absence” of “skills and practical skills in the art of close combat” was also stated just before the start of mass repressions, in the report of the army headquarters dated May 18, 1937²⁴⁶,

The inability to use crossings and crawls in the attack in the Red Army was a common occurrence even in 1935, when it was recorded in half of the rifle divisions of the three largest military districts, the materials of the then checks of tactical training of which were preserved (in the 21st , 27th and 37th). By May 36, the technique of defections (as Moscow admitted in its report of May 5, 1936

382

the political administration of the district) did not work properly in the entire Lered (!) KVO, by July - in two of the three rifle divisions of the advanced BVO (in the 2nd and 33rd) checked by the UBP of the Red Army at that time (in the 2nd and 33rd), as the beginning of the purge of the Red Army (as we already seen from A.I. Egorov's directive letter dated June 27, 1937) - throughout the Red Army ...

As for the unwillingness or inability to disguise and dig in, then 0 THAT “camouflage and a shovel during an offensive” by fighters “are often used weakly”, A.I. Egorov reported to the Military Council as early as December 8 [1935]. Judging by the general apologetic tone of the report, the word “often”

was inserted only so that the assessment does not sound too harsh. Indeed, in the spring of the 35th, poor camouflage of fighters on the battlefield was evident in 4 out of 6 divisions of the UVO / KVO, BVO and OKDVA, for which the materials of tactical training checks were preserved (in the 21st, 27th, 37th and 40th), and in the fall - in 2 out of 3 rifle divisions of the BVO (in the 29th and 43rd) checked then by the 2nd department of the Headquarters of the Red Army and in both OKDVA formations (18th rifle corps and 34th rifle division divisions), from which annual reports for 1935 have been preserved. And self-digging during the offensive was neglected - at least in the 24th Infantry Division, which was considered one of the best in the Red Army - even at the “exemplary” Kyiv maneuvers of 1935.

On May 36, “sufficient camouflage” was not able to achieve an advanced KVO in the entire infantry; in its 15th Rifle Corps, deployed for the Polessye maneuvers, the camouflage turned out to be “weak” in August as well, and only in the 100th Rifle Division during the September Shepetovka maneuvers did it turn out to be “good”...²⁴⁷ In the advanced BVO, back in the summer— in the fall of 1936, the fighters were poorly camouflaged in 3 of the 5 rifle divisions for which the relevant information was preserved (in the 2nd, 33rd and 37th; in all three they still did not want to dig in), and OKDVA - in 4 of? (in the 66th, 69th, 104th and 105th).

According to the directive letter of A.I. Egorov of June 27, 1937, “camouflage and self-entrenching” in the infantry of the Red Army were “weak” even before the start of mass repressions?⁴⁸.

An attack in the forest, even in the Primorsky OKDVA group stationed in a wooded area, was (as it follows

383

from the order of the group commander I.F. Fedko No. 0517 dated November 15, 1935) was poorly worked out in the 35th.

The fighters of the OKDVA, which was already starting to fight with the Japanese, were not able to fight in a trench (as the report of the army headquarters of May 8, 1937 concluded) even before the start of the purge of the Red Army.

As for the ability to attack behind a tank, the infantry of the 5th and 43rd rifle divisions of the BVO at the Polotsk exercises on October 4, 1936 did this "excellently" - but in the KVO "constantly and closely interact" with tanks (and that means not to break away from them in the attack). the infantrymen (as summed up by the order of the command troops of the KVO No. 0100 of June 22, 1937) did not know how even on the eve of the purge of the Red Army ... 249

As for the poor training of the infantry subunits and the congestion of the combat formations of the attacking infantry due to it, "weak discipline in the combat formations, a large concentration of them" in the Red Army also occurred in the 35th. Reporting on this on December 8, 1935 at the Military Council, A.I. Egorov again used the word "sometimes", but, as we have already noted more than once, his report was clearly characterized by a desire to soften the conclusions. The fact that they had (and not "sometimes", but "often"!)" "cases of too much concentration of battle formations" was admitted then even by the compilers of the essentially fraudulent annual report of the CVO dated [October 1, 1935. (and this district, we recall, went to the advanced) ... 250

In the winter of 1939/40, the Finns could "disable hundreds of crowded" Red Army soldiers – but such an opportunity would have been presented to them (whether it was not an exercise, but a war) at the much-praised Kiev maneuvers of 1935, where "there was an accumulation of significant infantry groups, well observed defending for | !/, — 2 kilometers"?!. As noted on a similar occasion at the April meeting of 1940, I.V. Stalin, here "every Finn, Tatar, Chinese will shoot [as in the text. - A.S.] "...252

The "crowding of combat formations" of the attacking infantry, according to the delicate expression of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 of November 3, 1936, "still took place" in the "pre-repression" 36-m253. In fact, it was very common at that time: even in the forward BVO, it was recorded in 3 out of 5 rifle divisions, the materials of checks of tactical training of which were preserved that year (in the 2nd,

384

37th and 81st), av OKDVA - vZiz? 7 (in the 59th, 69th and 92nd). At the March maneuvers in Primorye (as even the OKDVA report for the winter training period of the 1935/36 academic year of May 17, 1936 acknowledged!) "The units of other divisions of V.K. Blyukher, and the "shock" 2nd Rifle Division of the BVO attacked with "thick "crowds from squads"" even at the "exemplary" Belarusian maneuvers of 193625...

The infantry of the two largest military districts (as it is clear from the BVO annual report of October 15 and the report of the OKDVA headquarters of May 18, 1937) lack of education, insufficient training of small infantry units (which also affected the concentration of larger ones), and therefore the inevitable while the crowding of battle formations! - distinguished in the first, "pre-repression" half of the 37th. Obviously, the situation was the same then in the third most important grouping of the Red Army - the KVO. After all, both of his then rifle divisions were distinguished by the lack of perfection (and, therefore, crowding) of battle formations, the training of which is covered in detail by sources (24th and 96th).

About the fact that in the Soviet infantry it is "not always satisfactory" to apply combat formations to the terrain, A.I. Etorov also reported back on December 8, 1935. We have already written many times above what the clause "not always" really meant - and in fact, in the spring of the 35th of the 6 rifle divisions of the UVO / KVO, BVO and OKDVA, the materials of checks of the then tactical training of which were preserved, the inability of both single fighters and subunits to apply to the terrain was revealed in 4 (in the 21st, 27th, 37th and 40th) ... In the "pre-repression" 36th, there was no application to the terrain of any kind among the OKDVA infantrymen who participated in the March maneuvers in Primorye, and among the infantrymen of the 5th and 43rd rifle divisions of the BVO, who carried out on October 4, 1936. at the large tactical exercises near Polotsk, the same task of attacking a fortified area as the troops who fought three years later on the Karelian Isthmus ...

In the winter of 1939/40, the ability of infantrymen to fight on skis turned out to be useless, but did they really have this ability before the start of the purge of the Red Army? "I am the answer

13 - 2255 385

I declare unequivocally, - reported on November 23, 1937 to the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense, the inspector of physical training and sports of the Red Army, divisional commissar A.A. Tarasov, - that since 1932 [but not since the summer of 1937! — A.S.] the districts stopped doing tactical training on skis [...]. "Ski training," he noted, "for the last 2-3 years [i.e. just in the "pre-repression" period. - A.S.] was reduced mainly to skiing, to the fulfillment of the TRP standards, and when one of the divisions in one of the big tactical exercises poked its head into a march on skis, it turned out to be an embarrassment [...] The organizers of this march did not know the experience action on skis. People were little educated and trained in skiing"?55.

Fire training. As we have already seen, N.N. Voronov also assessed the shooting skills of the Soviet infantryman as "low". Firstly, this latter had little or no knowledge of the material part of the weapon and did not possess shooting skills. "We had to train fighters during the war to master the easel machine gun, hand grenade, light machine gun," former Commander-13 V.D. reported at the April meeting. Grendal; Red Army soldiers, A.I., a member of the Military Council of the 13th Army, confirmed there. Zaporozhets, "were poorly trained in shooting from hand weapons, from machine guns, they did not know the material part"? 56. It was precisely this picture that was revealed by an inspection of seven reserve rifle regiments of the LVO conducted in early February 1940: firing techniques from rifles and light machine guns were "learned poorly and incorrectly" (light machine gunners did not even know how to "use stops"), "easel machine gunners are poorly trained in shooting techniques...257 After such evidence, the case described by Finnish officers ceases to seem incredible, when almost all of the 12 heavy machine guns left from the Soviet battalion who died on the night of February 28, 1940 on the Karelian Isthmus, turned out to be covered with ... factory grease?58, i.e. incapable of firing!

Secondly, the Soviet infantryman of the times of the Finnish campaign was not trained as an independent shooter: he did not know how to conduct surveillance and independently search for

386

set goals. "In this regard, in the battles it was revealed that the infantry did not use their weapons or used very little"259.

As in the case of tactical training, the fighters called from stock.

However, in the "pre-repression" 1935 in the three largest military districts (KVO, BVO and OKDVA), the individual shooting skills of an infantryman, even according to the fraudulent annual reports of these districts, were only mediocre. As we have shown in chapters | and 3, this means that in reality (in view of the eyewash practiced then in the troops during firing and falsification of their results), it was frankly unsatisfactory, i.e. no better than in the Finnish war ... According to the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army", only "satisfactory" (i.e., taking into account the above correction, low) the individual shooting skills of an infantryman were in the Red Army and in the "pre-repression" 1936?60. (The fact that in the OKDVA, which was already starting to fight, "the bulk of the fighters in terms of fire" was then "worked out completely unsatisfactorily", the sources are compiled at the headquarters of the named army "Preliminary outlines of the main tasks for combat training of the OKDVA for 1937" - speak directly? 6!.)

The fire training of the infantry (and hence the individual shooting skills of an infantryman) of the advanced KVO and BVO was, according to their headquarters, "low" even in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937262.

In the winter of 1939/40, the infantrymen did not know the material part of small arms, but in the 8th Infantry Division of the forward (!) BVO, checked on this score by the 2nd Department of the Headquarters of the Red Army, many Red Army soldiers did not know how to disassemble a rifle and even after more than three months of study at the regimental school, they did not know the materiel of an easel machine gun in March 1935. Of the two rifle divisions of the advanced KVO, from which the documentation for 1936 has been preserved, in one (45th) "small arms were poorly known in units" even in that year? 63. In both rifle divisions of the KVO (24th and 96th)

387

and the only rifle regiment of the BVO (109th), about which relevant information has been preserved for that period, the fighters knew the materiel of an easel machine gun on the eve, and at the time of the beginning of the purge of the Red Army, in June - mid-July 1937. However, "unsatisfactory knowledge of the materiel of one's weapons," as established in June by the new commanders of the district, I.F. Fedko, it was then typical for the entire KVO infantry ... 264

In February 1940, in the spare parts of the LVO, shooting techniques from rifles and light machine guns were "learned badly and incorrectly," but in both rifle divisions of the advanced BVO illuminated from this side (and in the semi-territorial 37th, and in the "shock" personnel 2-J) they were poorly able to prepare for shooting from a rifle and DP and fire a shot even in the "pre-repression" 1936. And in the OKDVA in the spring of that year, as even the army's report for the winter training period of the 1935/36 academic year dated May 17, 1936, was forced to report in detail, the fighters did not master the techniques of firing from a light machine gun everywhere!

In both rifle divisions of the KVO (24th and 96th) and in all four rifle regiments of the BVO (109th, 1190th, 111th and 156th), the degree of proficiency in the technique of firing from rifles and light machine guns in which this period is covered by sources, they did not know how to properly prepare weapons for firing in the "pre-repression" first half of 1937. And back in March 1937, the 32nd Rifle Division of the OKDVA sent to support the border guards (i.e., in order to join the battle at any moment) and such companies, where some of the soldiers not only did not know the device of the rifle, but in general couldn't shoot! (However, even at the beginning of the purge of the Red Army there were fighters who did not even know how to load a rifle in one of the four regiments of the BVO named above - the 109th ...)

The light machine gunners of the spare parts tested in February 1940 did not know how to "use stops" (without which aimed shooting with bursts from a light machine gun becomes impossible), but in the spring of "pre-repression" 1936, these stops (bipods) should be correctly installed did not know how in the whole OKDVA. In one of the two rifle regiments of the BVO (109th and 110th), about the possession of the technique of firing from light machine guns in which information was preserved during this period, use

388

They didn't know how to focus even in the "pre-repression" winter of 1937, and in the 18th rifle corps of the OKDVA, which ended up in the border conflict zone on the Amur in the summer of 1937, also by this time ...

In February 1940, in the spare parts of the LVO, easel machine gunners in "shooting technique" were "poorly trained" - but in the spring of "pre-repression" 1935, the fighters of the personnel and frontier (!) of the 96th Infantry Division of the advanced (!) UVO / KVO, and in the 23rd Infantry Regiment of the 8th Infantry Division of the Advanced BVO, even those who studied for three and a half months in the regimental school? (which, by definition, was supposed to instill more durable skills than the reserve regiment).

In the "pre-repression" 1936, however, the fighters had poor skills in shooting from an easel machine gun in both BVO rifle divisions illuminated from this side (including the elite 2nd!), And in all rifle divisions tested on this account OKDVA (in the 21st, 26th, 32nd, 39th, 40th and 59th) ...

In both rifle divisions of the KVO (24th and 96th) and the only rifle regiment of the BVO (109th), the degree of mastery of the technique of shooting from an easel machine gun in which springs illuminate during this period, the soldiers were unable to prepare "maximum" to shooting even the day before, and at the time of the beginning of the purge of the Red Army, in June - mid-July 1937 ...

As for the killers-infantrymen of the OKDVA, as noted in the certificate compiled by the headquarters of this army on the state of its combat training by July 15, 1937, by the time the mass repressions began, "unsteady" and "superficial" were "basic practical skills when shooting" from all types of small arms²⁶⁶

The inability to observe the battlefield and find targets in the Soviet infantry was also widespread in 1935 (out of 6 rifle divisions of the UVO / KVO, BVO and OKDVA, the materials of spring-summer inspections of whose skills were preserved, it was revealed in two - 21st and 51st, and even in the fall they distinguished the infantry of the entire Primorsky group and the 34th rifle division of the Amur group OKDVA). In OKDVA

389

"for an independent, proactive solution of fire missions" the fighter was not ready in May 1936, and in the KVO - as can be concluded even from the annual report of this district of October 4, 1936, which is not inclined to admit its failures - "a completely conscious and independent shooter" failed to "educate" by the fall of this year?⁵⁷ And by the time the mass repressions began, as we have already seen from A.I. Egorova dated June 27, 1937, "solid skills" in observing the battlefield, choosing a place for shooting "and so on." infantrymen did not have in the entire Red Army? ⁶⁸.

As we have already shown in Chapter 4, the level of training of reserve infantrymen was also low even before the purge of the Red Army.

B. Tankers

There is very little information about the training of tank fighters and tank units in published sources and literature. It is known (apparently from the reports of the respective formations on their participation in the Finnish campaign) that the personnel of the 1st and 34th light tank brigades were well prepared by the beginning of the war and that "were especially well trained" mechanics-drivers of the 1st brigade? ⁶⁹. Nevertheless, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 120 noted, the tanks "had a number of shortcomings in their combat training, especially in matters of interaction with the infantry and ensuring its success in battle." Undoubtedly, another remark of the same order also applies to the tankers: "In all branches, the surveillance service was especially badly placed"? ⁷⁰. "[...] When I asked dozens of crews," testified in December 1940, the former head of the tank troops of the 7th Army, Major General of the tank troops B.G. Vershinin, "what they saw on the battlefield and where they were located enemy firing points, they could not tell.

But even if the reports of the two brigades exaggerated the degree of training of their tankers, a regression compared to the "pre-repression" time (when the 1st light tank brigade was still the 19th mechanized brigade of the 7th mechanized

390

the 34th light tank corps - by the 14th mechanized brigade of the 5th mechanized corps of the MVO} we still will not find. In December of the "pre-repression" 1934, the training of the crews of the 19th mechanized brigade was frankly unsatisfactory: as it is clear from the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. -5 and leave it, and tower commanders - to clean and care for cannons, machine guns and optical sights and load shells and machine gun magazines into the tank so that: not to damage the ammo rack. An inspection of the combat training of the 7th mechanized corps, carried out on August 8-11, 1935, showed that the state of armament in the 19th

improved, and the "mechanic drivers" worked accurately and completely mastered the tank - but, as we saw from the reports, it was no worse in November 1939. In reality, it could have been worse, but by no means worse than by June of the "pre-repression" 1936, when Moscow inspectors found the tanks of the entire 7th mechanized corps in an "unsatisfactory" condition?⁷² the fault of those who drove and served them, which means that the drivers of the 19th mechanized brigade could not have been trained "especially well" then ... As for the preparedness of the crews of the 14th mechanized brigade, in 1936 14- I not only ended up (together with my entire 5th mechanized corps) in the same order of the people's commissar No. state), but also acted on the September MVO maneuvers in such a way that K.E. Voroshilov "gave a low assessment of the preparedness of the 5th mechanized] corps and especially the 14th mechanized b[rigade)". Could the training of her then crews be "good" if | On October 1936, the training battalion of the brigade (which trained driver mechanics and tower commanders for it) completed the training program in park service by only 64.7%, in fire training - by 52.8%, in technical training - by 48.1 %, and tactically by 10.5%.

391

nicheski" lagged behind their advancing infantry. And at the Polessye maneuvers held in August 1936 in the KVO, it turned out that the individual tank battalions of the divisions participating in them (the 7th, 46th and 60th rifle divisions) were not trained at all to interact with the infantry!⁷⁴ to a letter to A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, the interaction with other branches of the troops of the Red Army tankers did not work out enough even by the beginning of mass repressions. In OKDVA; as the headquarters of this army itself admitted, such interaction was then worked out very poorly, and in the KVO (as can be seen from the order No. they did not know how to solve tactical problems in cooperation with the infantry ...

We are not talking about the fact that the tank crews of the elite 44th Rifle Division of the KVO (from its separate tank battalion and tanket battalion of its 132nd Rifle Regiment) in the spring of "pre-repression" 1935 showed "a complete lack of understanding on issues combined-arms combat"⁷⁵ (that is, on issues of interaction with the infantry, for which, by the way, these battalions were intended)...

Well, as for the "surveillance service", in at least two of the three largest military districts - KVO and OKDVA - "issues of observation from a tank in the process of battle" were also "poorly worked out" in the 35th (this is recognized or even the annual report of the armored troops of the OKDVA of October 19, 1935 and the "lacquered" annual report of the KVO of October 11!)? According to the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army", tank crews "exceedingly badly" observed from the tank 36th? ⁷⁷ (I.E. . Yakir), and according to the directive letter of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937 - and on the eve of the purge of the Red Army.

B. Gunners

"Regular artillery fighters," N.N. summed up in April 1940. Voronov, - they knew their elementary duties quite satisfactorily by the beginning of the war "- although,

392

of course, they still needed a lot of things "to study and know a lot about the details of our complex equipment, to be able to squeeze everything out of equipment in battle"⁷⁸.

However, before the purge of the Red Army, the training of ordinary artillerymen was not only no better, but almost worse. We do not have general estimates of its level, similar to the one given above, but is it not indicative that OKDVA documents for 1935 and 1936 are devoted to it. almost exclusively one criticism (on insufficiently clear implementation

numbers of the gun crew of their duties, about the "inaccurate and slow" work of the crews, about their inability to quickly and accurately hit fast-moving targets, about only "satisfactory" or even "unsatisfactory" care for the material part, about the inability of gunners (!) to read goniometer readings, bad riding, etc.)? Isn't it significant that in the only rifle division of the KVO, from which at least some information about its ordinary artillerymen for 1936 has been preserved - the "shock" (!) 44th, the soldiers of the 44th artillery regiment "have their elementary duties "performed by no means" satisfactorily"? (The riders did not know how to stay in the saddle and control the horses, the observers spoiled many optical instruments, and the gun crews brought their 76.2-mm cannons and 122-mm howitzers not only to a dirty, but also to a rusty state.)

Even in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937, in the two largest military districts, artillerymen not only had to (as in the Finnish war) "learn and know a lot about the details of our complex equipment." They also had to learn what Finnish "knew quite satisfactorily" – "their elementary duties"! By June 1937, the KVO artillerymen had not only "unsatisfactory knowledge of the material part of their weapons", but also (at least in the regimental artillery) "the solitary skills of a soldier-artilleryman have not been worked out" (it is hardly a coincidence that in the only rifle division of the KVO at that time, for which information about the training of artillerymen was preserved - the 45th - this was exactly the case)?? °. Well, what about the fact that in OKDVA "in all parts of the single training" of a fighter

393

"missed", in April 1937 was directly recognized even in the headquarters of this army (or the apparatus of its chief of artillery)?

As noted by the commanders of the North-Western Front, at the beginning of February 1940, artillery observers accompanied the attacking "Mannerheim Line" infantry inseparably, but in the "pre-repression" 1936 (as noted in his report of October 7 of that year "On Combat Training Red Army" M.N. Tukhachevsky) artillery OSP (departments of communication with the infantry) lagged behind the infantry "too often"28! rifle division of the BVO in February 1937, at the tactical exercises of the 23rd rifle corps, Mozyr fortified area ...

G. Signalers

There is no information about the training of fighters and units of engineering troops in published sources. As for the communications troops, at the April meeting of 1940, the military commissar of the Communications Directorate of the Red Army K.Kh. Muravyov (former communications chief of the 8th Army) stated that the career signalmen who participated in the Finnish campaign were "satisfactorily trained", and the "reserve" had "bad training", but that in the first days the work of all signalmen "was unsatisfactory"? 2, Presumably, these estimates also applied to the rank and file ... At the same meeting, the head of artillery of the 19th rifle corps of the 7th army, S.I. Oborin complained about the poor training of radio operators of artillery units, and in the 8th Army during the war it turned out that signalmen did not have practical skills "in laying communication lines in a wooded swampy area"283,

However, in the "pre-repression" 1936, the training of Soviet career signalmen could not even be called satisfactory! As noted in his report of October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army" M.N. Tukhachevsky, they transmitted information with distortions; as we have seen in chapters | and 3, in one of the three largest military districts (OKDVA) their training was satisfactory, but in another

394

(BVO) - just ugly. Judging by the 44th rifle division and a separate communications battalion of the 15th rifle corps (for which only information about the training of ordinary signalmen in 1936 has been preserved), the signalmen of the third such

districts - KVO. The radio operators of the communications battalion of the 15th corps, as the Polesye maneuvers showed, "poorly mastered the technique", the telegraph operators of its headquarters company fulfilled the standards for transmission time by a miserable 30%⁷⁸⁴ even in the fall, and the radio operators of the 44th division not only they did not know the radio station well, but they also allowed too high a percentage of distortion during transmission ...

The training of career signalmen in the Red Army could not be called satisfactory even in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937, when in a directive letter from A.I. Egorov of June 27, 1937, stated the same thing as nine months earlier in the report of Tukhachevsky, when in the OKDVA, as the analysis of the report of her headquarters of May 18, 1937 and the report of the signal troops of her Primorsky group for the winter the training period of the 1936/37 academic year of April 24, 1937, the proficiency of ordinary signalmen fluctuated in general between satisfactory and unsatisfactory, and in the KVO it was frankly unsatisfactory ("Radio operators work poorly in networks," stated the order of the KVO command troops No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937 - Morse operators [telegraphers who worked on Morse devices. - A.S.] and radio operators have a lot of distortions [during transmission. - A.S.] "285).

As for the training of artillery radio operators, in one of the largest groupings, the Soviet troops - the Primorsky OKDVA group - it was insufficient even in the 35th (this is according to the annual report of the group dated October 11, 1935; in reality, apparently, frankly bad : it was not in vain that the gunners then had to base fire control on a wire connection). In one of the two artillery units of the advanced KVO, about the training of signalmen in the "pre-repression" period, at least some information was preserved - in the 44th artillery regiment of the "shock" (!) 44th rifle division, radio operators were trained just as unsatisfactory as their colleagues from [the 9th corps in the Finnish war, and in January 36th; slightly better was their training in September (when the percentage of

395

distortion was still "great", and knowledge of materiel was poor). And in the other part - the 17th Corps Artillery Regiment - the radio operators were trained for "bad" and in the "pre-repression" March of 1937 (when they had "an unacceptably high percentage of distortion" and slow transmission rates) ... 26 According to - a couple of the signal troops of the Primorsky OKDVA group during the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year of April 24, 1937, even on the eve of mass repressions, the radio operators of most of the artillery regiments of the OKDVA were also trained for "failure".

In the winter of 1939/40, in the 8th Army, signal linemen did not have practical skills "in laying communication lines in a wooded and swampy area," but linemen of rifle regiments stationed in the Amur taiga of the 69th OKDVA rifle division there were no skills even in the "pre-repression" April 1937. And the linemen of the 23rd Rifle Corps of the BVO, stationed in the wooded and swampy Polesie, also at the time of the arrest of Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Uborevich, by the end of May 1937 ...

And only the training of reserve signalmen in the "pre-repression" Red Army was perhaps higher than in the Finnish war. Having visited the gathering of the secondary 126th Rifle Division and the gathering of the assigned staff of the 6th Rifle Division, which took place in the Moscow Military District on April 26-May 5 and June 6-13, 1937, respectively, the head of the 3rd department of the UBP RKKA divisional commander M.A. Reuters both times noted the "quite satisfactory" training of ordinary signalmen⁷⁸⁷. And only at the assembly of the secondary 129th Infantry Division, held on June 28 - July 5, 1937, in the PriVO, it was discovered that the radio operators in all units did not know how to work on the radio and that in general, until the level of signalmen's training improved, the division could not be considered combat-ready ... (It seems However, it is strange that the Red Army reserve soldiers turned out to be better trained than the conscripts in the three largest military districts; there are even suspicions that the verification was superficial. However, we have nothing to confirm these suspicions yet.)

Thus, in the Finnish war, the training of the commanders, staffs and troops of the Red Army was no worse than in the "previous

396

repressive period. Therefore, one cannot attribute the failures of the Soviet troops to the fact, for example, that of the 52 division commanders who participated in the Finnish campaign, for which there is relevant information, 32 commanded only battalions back in 1937, and only five by the beginning war led the division for more than a year. "What did that mean? That, - says P.A. Aptekar, that for the most part they could not organize the battle of their formations, especially in difficult natural and climatic conditions. Having risen several steps up the ranks, yesterday's company and battalion commanders simply could not replenish their military knowledge in such a short time and continued to lead a division and corps in the same way as a company. [...] As a result of this - numerous frontal attacks on the fortified positions of the enemy on the Karelian Isthmus, in Karelia and the Arctic" 88. But after all, according to M.N. Tukhachevsky, the management of rifle formations in the Red Army "was at an unsatisfactory level" in 1936 as well! 9 commanders of formations also showed in March 1935, while in Karelia in December 1939 division commander-44 A.I. Vinogradov, who by June 1937 commanded only a battalion, nevertheless sought to outflank the enemy ...

NOTES

1 The names of associations and formations of the Finnish army, for the most part differing from those used in domestic military history literature, are given according to the work of the Finnish researcher O. Manninen (Winter War 1939-1940. Book 1. Political History. M., 1998. S. 142-175).

2? Secrets and lessons of the winter war. 1939-1940. Based on documents from declassified archives. SPb., 2000.

3 Pharmacist P. Soviet-Finnish wars. M., 2004; Sokolov B. Secrets of the Finnish War. M. 2000.

4 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. pp. 122, 124, 125, 130, 149, 160, 201, 249, 310, 357.

5 Ibid. pp. 204, 210, 218, 322.

6 Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 2. I.V. Stalin and the Finnish campaign. (Transcript of the meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks). M., 1998. S. 117.

397

7 Sokolov B. Secrets of the Finnish War. S. 256.

8 Ibid. S. 159.

9 Shilov P. Then there was no fashion to reward. The story of the scout of the 17th separate ski battalion // Motherland. 1995. No. 12. S. 68.

10 Quoted. by: Sokolov B. Decree. op. S. 378.

And Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 410.

12 Ibid. S. 407.

13 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 394

14 Op. Quoted from: Pharmacist L. Decree. op. S. 165.

15 Russian State Military Archive (hereinafter - RGVA). F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 171; F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 4.

16 Dudorova O. Unknown pages of the "winter war" // Military-historical journal. 1991. No. 9. P. 13. Compare: P. 19. An attempt to outflank the enemy, who was defending in front of the 305th regiment, made on December 25, 1939 by the forces of the 1st Battalion subordinate to the commander of the 305th regiment. talon of the 25th Infantry Regiment, was carried out clearly on the initiative of the division commander-44 (and not the commander-305). After all, from December 22, the division commander himself directly supervised the actions of the 305th.

17 RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 151; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 573. L. 5; F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 72.

18 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 116, 166-167.

19 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 205.

20 7am same. F. 900. Op. 1.D. 269. L. 51.

21 7am same. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 30.

22 Vol. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 39.

23 Ibid. D. 203. L. 59.

24 Ibid. D. 213. L. 64.

25 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 57; D. 11. L. 63; F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 56-55 (sheets of the case are numbered in descending order).

26 Ibid. F.9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 152.

27 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 246. L. 19 and rev.

28 Ibid. D. 213. L. 48.

29 Ibid. D. 246. L. 17, 26.

30 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. D. 357; F. 62. Op. 3. D. 41.L. 38.

31 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 70.

32 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 311.

33 Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 228.

4 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 326.

35 Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 50.

36 Ibid. pp. 166, 19, 32, 37, 46, 87.

37 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 326.

38 Ibid. S. 410.

39 Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 262.

4% Ibid. S. 38.

41 Ibid. pp. 126, 127.

4? Secrets and lessons of the winter war..S. 183.

43 Ibid. S. 244.

398

44 Winter War 1939-1940, Book. 2. S. 109.

45 Ibid. S. 123. Compare: S. 197.

46 Ibid. pp. 232, 119, 225.

47 Op. by: Pharmacist P. Decree. op. S. 218.

48 Derevenets A. Through two wars. Notes of a soldier // Through two wars, through two archipelagos... Memoirs of Soviet prisoners of war and Ostovtsy. M., 2007. S. 67.

49 Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 2. P. 14.

56 Ibid. S. 235.

5! Secrets and lessons of the winter war. pp. 388, 390.

52 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). M., 1994. S. 135.

53 Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 125.

54 RGVA. F. 4. Ol. 16. D. 19. L. 16.

55 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 91.

56 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611.L. 249 vol. (1 rev.).

57 Ibid. F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 7. L. 6 rev.; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 614. L. 89v. (the second of two sheets of this case, having the number 89).

58 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 325.

59 Ibid. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 32-33.

69 Ibid. D. 1759. L. 87; F. 62. Op. 3. D. 40. L. 90v.

61 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 60.

62 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 27; D. 614. L. 38; F. 1293. Op. 3. D. 12. L. 275; F. 36393. Op. 1.D. 54. L. 76; D. 55. L. 15.

63 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 222.

64 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 39. D. 41. L. 79.

65 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19.L. 331.

66 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 37-38. .

67 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 18. D. 54. L. 36-37. In the text of this speech, published in the collection "The Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937 Documents and materials" (M., 2006, p. 43), the last of the phrases we quoted was omitted.

68 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 89-86 (sheets of the file are numbered in descending order). .

69 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1.D. 26. L. 38-39.

76 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). S. 135.

7 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 182.

72 Ibid. pp. 207, 212, 210, 393; Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 103.

73 Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 210, 211, 216, 48, 149; Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 412.

74 Shilov P. Then there was no fashion to reward. S. 66.

75 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). S. 135.

76 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. pp. 282, 387.

77 Ibid. S. 210.

78 Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 255.

79 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213.L. 361; F. 4. Ol. 16. D. 19.L. 83.

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80 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12v.; F. 4. Op. 13a. D. 422.

L. 34 about.

81 7am same. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 583. L.9.

82 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 83.

83 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 58, 67, 61; D. 215. L. 34.

84 Ibid. F. 33879. Ol. 1. D. 584. L. 26v.

85 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 vol.); D. 2529. L. 153.

86 Ibid. F. 25880. Op. 4. D. 80. L. 588.

87 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 24.

88 Ibid.; F.9. Ol. 36. D. 2611. L. 73.

89 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 36. L. 18; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 588. L. 49. % Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 11; F. 9. Op. 36.D. 1759. L. 73. Ya Ibid, F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 26v.; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611.

L. 249 about. (1 rev.).

92 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 75v.

93 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 357; F. 62. Op. 3. D. 41.L. 38.

I am there. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 40.

95 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 71. % Ibid. F. 4. Op. 19. D. 18. L. 56.

97 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 362.

% Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 573. L. 8; D. 574. L. 20-21.

% 7am same. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 55.

109 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 6, 11.

191 7am same. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 60.

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153 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 250 (2). 164 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). P. 135. 195 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. pp. 352, 183; Winter War 1939—

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106 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 326.

197 Ibid. S. 183.

108 Ibid. S. 152.

109 Ibid. S. 409.

110 7am same. pp. 409, 393; Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 236.

11 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 393; Winter war 1939-1940. 2. S. 69, 246.

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13 Did the USSR launch a preemptive strike? // Military history

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14 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). P. 135. 115 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 407; Russian archive. Great Ote

honest. T. 13 (2-1). S. 135; Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 56, 236,

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116 Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 255.

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117 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 412; Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). S. 135.

118 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2--1). S. 135.

119 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 412.

120 Ibid. S. 387; Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 84, 125.

121 Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 241.

122 Ibid., p. 34.

123 Secrets and lessons of the winter war. S. 160.

124 Ibid. pp. 392-393.

125 "We did not imagine ... all the difficulties associated with this war." Report of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov on the results of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. // Military history magazine. 1993. No. 5. S. 48.

° 126 Winter War 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 125, 241.

127 RGVA. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 178.L. 495-505; D. 714. L. 19-20; F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 54. L. 109.

128 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 18. D. 54. L. 36. In the text of this speech, published in the collection "The Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, November 1937. Documents and Materials" (M., 2006. P. 43), the last one of the phrases we quoted has been omitted.

129 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D.2611.L. 197-198.

130 RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 152.

131 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 114.

132 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 50. L. 12v.; D. 52. L. 10.

134 Op. 10: Milbach V.S. Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (Red Banner Far Eastern Front). Political repressions of the commanding staff, 1937-1938. SPb., 2007. S. 183. .

135 RGVA. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 184.

136 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 86.

137 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1413. L. 365.

138 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1.D. 11. L. 125.

130 Ibid., F. 900. Op. 1.D. 367. L. 164.

140 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 246. L. 63, 60, 9, 29-28 (sheets of the file are numbered in descending order), 18, 99, 95, 53.

141 7am same. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 33.

142 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 62.

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144 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 40. L. 49.

145 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 88.

146 Ibid. D. 2529. L. 169.

147 Vol. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 28v.-29.

148 Vol. L. 24 about.

149 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 62; F. 900. Op. 1. D. 269. L. 171.

150 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 95.

151 Ibid. F. 900. Op. 1. D. 269. L. 171.

152 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 61.

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154 RGVA. FO. 9, Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 35; F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 133.

155 Vol. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 151v.

156 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 30.

157 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 1. D. 203. L. 59.

158 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 126.

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194 Ibid. S. 234; Secrets and lessons of the winter war, S. 394.

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202 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937, p. 165.

203 Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 2. P. 38.

24 Ibid. pp. 257, 267; Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). S. 135.

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206 Winter war 1939-1940. Book. 2. S. 73.

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404

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Chapter 7

IN THE LAST PRE-WAR MONTHS (August 1940 - May 1941)

We can judge the level of training of the commanders, staffs and troops of the Red Army during this period from such published sources as those devoted to the results of the inspection of troops in a number of districts or the state of combat training of individual branches of the military and categories of command personnel, orders of the People's Commissar of Defense and materials of the meeting of the top leadership - the commanding staff of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940

1. COMMANDERS AND HEADQUARTERS

A. Combined arms, infantry and tank

Operational-tactical thinking. The level at which the commanders of formations and formations were here in the last pre-war year is described in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503138/op dated January 25, 1941 "On the results and tasks of the operational training of the senior command staff of the Red Army." "The experience of recent wars, campaigns, field trips and exercises," noted the compilers of this document, showed that "the highest command staff" (under it were understood precisely the commanders, the chiefs of staff were then specially characterized):

— Decisions "often" are made "hurriedly, without a deep analysis of the situation";

— "not always" is able to give "a clear and well-thought-out formulation of the general concept and idea of the solution";

406

- "not always" is able to determine the "center of effort" at various stages of the operation;

— "far from always" concentrates forces on the direction of the main strike;

- "thinks little about how to ensure the surprise of actions";

— "often does not show [...] perseverance and perseverance in implementing the decision" and

— "disregarding the issues of calculating time and space, combat and material support of the operation"!

As for the commanders of units and subunits, some light on the level of their tactical thinking is shed by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0306 dated November 6, 1940 on the results of the autumn review exercises in 6 of the 17 then military districts and fronts - in the Baltic Special (PribOVO), Odessa (OdVO), Transcaucasian (ZakVO), Siberian (SibVO) and Transbaikalian (ZabVO) districts and in the Far Eastern Front (FEF). "Infantry commanders," it noted, "are not able to quickly assess the situation and clearly set tasks on the ground"². "Many commanders act according to a pattern," added Colonel-General G.M. Stern, especially in squads and platoons. Weak initiative and weak independence, especially [...] when squads and platoons do not operate as part of higher units." And the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army K.A. Meretskov noted that at the tactical exercise that took place between Di on September 7, 1940 near Brest, the commanders of units of the 125th rifle regiment of the 6th rifle division of the Western Special Military District (ZOVO; since July 11, 1940, was called Belarusian special) used flank strikes "only after the intervention of the higher authorities"³.

The conclusion about the "hasty, without a deep analysis of the situation" decision-making was clearly inspired by the experience not of "field trips and exercises" in 1940, but of "the last wars and campaigns" - and above all the Finnish war. After all, the formulation of this conclusion is like two drops of water similar to the one we quoted

407

in the previous chapter, the wording of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 120 of May 16, 1940 on the results of the Finnish campaign. And in general, hasty decisions are more characteristic of a more nervous situation in wartime.

As for the ability to "clearly and thoughtfully formulate the general plan and idea of a solution", then it was "not always" met among the highest command staff of the Red Army even in 1935. Checking in March of this year the level of operational-tactical thinking of seven commanders of BVO formations, employees of the 2nd department of the Headquarters of the Red Army discovered that one of them (commander of the 27th rifle division K.P. Podlas), in order to save time on organization of the battle, makes decisions only in the scope of the immediate task of the formation, and leaves the decision on the subsequent task "for later" (that is, it does not isolate the main idea of the battle or operation as a whole). And the report on the results of the combat training of the KVO troops for 1935 (dated October 11; in the future, such documents will be referred to as annual reports), in essence, stated the same thing as the directive of January 25, 1941: decisions by commanders of formations taken "not always firmly and confidently, hence the ambiguity of the wording of decisions". And this is in the advanced district! Yes, and according to the document, whose compilers tried in every possible way to gloss over the failures and shortcomings!

If in the autumn of 1940 the principle of concentration of forces in the direction of the main attack was observed by the highest command personnel of the Red Army "by no means always", then in the "pre-repression" 1936 it seems to have never been observed! After all, stating the "existing" "desire to be "strong" everywhere", the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 and on tasks for 1937", no reservations like "sometimes", "often", "in some cases", etc. didn't do...5

The commanders of the Red Army formations also allowed inattention to the achievement of surprise in 1936, when, for example, during the March maneuvers in Primorye, the actions of the troops of two maneuvering divisions "flowed in the majority straightforwardly in the open, without any plans or attempts to deceive, mislead the enemy and thereby put him in a disadvantageous position", and when on

408

September Belarusian maneuvers, commander of the 37th rifle division I.S. Konev, having learned from the captured order about the direction of the "enemy's" strike, did not use the chance to confuse the latter's plans with counter-barrage preparations.

The lack of "persistence and perseverance in carrying out a decision" among the top command staff of the Red Army was also encountered in 1935. The fact that the commanders of formations "not always" manage to avoid "unsteadiness" in carrying out their decisions was admitted then even by the compilers of the annual report of the CVO of October 11, 1935, which mercilessly varnished the reality.

The unwillingness to take into account the factors of time and space when making a decision was also demonstrated by the highest command staff of the Red Army before the mass repressions. So, in the 35th, even the annual reports of the KVO and OKDVA of October 11 and 21, 1935, respectively, were forced to admit that their commanders of formations had this defect. According to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936, "cases of inability to implement the decision made correctly by setting tasks corresponding to the solution to subordinate units, in accordance with the terrain, meteorological conditions, space and time", among the highest command staff The Red Army "met" in 36-m8. (For example, "commanders of all ranks" — those and division commanders — acted in this way during the March maneuvers of 1936 in the Primorskaya Group OKDVA °.) And on November 21, 1937, at the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense (hereinafter - Military Council) commander of the BVO troops, commander of the 1st rank I.P. Belov recalled that when making a decision, commanders of all levels everywhere "forget" to give their subordinates time to organize the battle. As we have shown in Chapter 1, such a practice could have developed only before the start of the purge of the Red Army...

Failure to take into account, when making a decision, the possibilities of material support for the operation for the top command staff of the Red Army was also typical in the 36th. Solutions for complex regroupings, forced marches, and even the long-term use of mechanized units, cavalry units and airborne troops behind enemy lines, "stated the directive of the Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss

409

dated November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 ...", are adopted without taking into account the possibilities of material support for these actions - "easy and simple" ...! 0 (One example of this is the same March maneuvers in Primorye).

The inability to quickly assess the situation (i.e., quickly make a decision appropriate to it) distinguished the command staff of the Soviet infantry in 1935, when "all the conclusions" of Japanese officers probationary in the Red Army were "permeated" with "characteristic indications" on "inability" of the commanders of the Red Army "to make a decision in a timely manner in the event of a rapid change in the situation." The inability to quickly assess the situation for the commanders of the Soviet infantry was clearly characteristic:

— and in 1936 — when the "insufficiently quick response" of the unit commanders "to these situations" was recorded even in three of the five rifle divisions of the forward BVO, the training of the commanders of which is covered by the surviving sources — in the "shock" (!) 2- th, 37th and 81st!2;

- and the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937 - when, according to the district's annual report of October 15, 1937, "slow decision-making" "continued to be" a "common weak point" of the command staff of the BVO!3 and when, judging by the documents 21 1st, 40th and 59th rifle divisions, many commanders of the other largest grouping of the Red Army - OKDVA - were slowly sorting out the situation.

The craving of infantry commanders for actions according to the template in the OKDVA (from which the Far Eastern Fleet, which differed in 1940 with this thrust) was deployed, was also a reality in 1935 - when from the two rifle divisions of the OKDVA, the actions of the commanders of which in tactical exercises and in deciding tactical tasks are illuminated by the sources we have - on the 21st and 40th, it was noted in one, i.e. in 50% of those included in the sample, and in 1936 - when in the 1st special and 66th rifle divisions to the mandirs did not change the direction of the attack even when their units stumbled upon a lead-spewing bunker or fell under flank fire from "entire groups of heavy machine guns"! th rifle company of the 63rd rifle regiment in the same way led

410

a company in a frontal attack even after the Japanese opened machine-gun fire on it from the flanks ...

In the autumn of 1940, G.M. Stern noted the "weak initiative and weak independence" of the commanders of the Far Eastern Fleet units (especially squads and platoons) - but the fact that the Far Eastern "troops do not show the necessary initiative, speed of action on the part of battalion commanders, company commanders and platoon commanders" (and as it became clear from his subsequent words, also the commanders of the departments), the commander of the OKDVA, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher also stated on December 10, 1935, in a speech at the Military Council ... 15 The lack of "the ability to show bold initiative", the lack of "initiative and determination" for the commanders of the Far Eastern infantry were typical in 1936, when they were detected during all checks the tactical training of the rifle battalions organized by the headquarters of the OKDVA and its Primorsky group, and when at the March maneuvers in Primorye "independent, strong-willed" commander's decisions were noted "few"! Indirectly, noting the lack of desire on the part of the commanders of the infantry units to beat the enemy in parts, this lack of initiative of their command staff was recognized by the annual report of the OKDVA dated September 30, 1936. The fact that their command staff did not show initiative in a number of rifle divisions of the OKDVA also complained on the eve of the purge of the Red Army, in the spring.

1937; The lack of initiative was also shown by both commanders of rifle companies that participated in the conflict on July 5-6, 1937 with the Japanese at Vinokurka (lieutenants Kuzin and Nemkov)... As we could see in the previous chapters, the lack of initiative of the commanders of infantry units in the "pre-repression" period, the entire Red Army in general was distinguished.

The preference of infantry unit commanders for frontal attacks over flank ones in the Red Army was widespread even in 1935. "I observed three districts - Ukrainian, Moscow, Leningrad," said on December 9, 1935, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tukhachevsky. And everywhere, the commanders of platoons, companies and battalions "do not have to the extent that it is necessary", "wedging into the flank and rear of the enemy"! Having checked in the spring of the 35th at the tactical exercises of commanders

411

units of the 27th and 96th rifle divisions, respectively, BVO and UVO (future KVO), employees of the 2nd department of the Headquarters of the Red Army also did not record "the desire to maneuver on the flank of the enemy", but the 21st rifle division (as the headquarters of the Primorsky Group OKDVA, which checked it in May), "many commanders of squads and platoons" did not "know" at all that "attacks on the flank" were necessary in an offensive battle ... 18 In the 66th rifle division of the same army, the squad commanders platoons and companies demonstrated this ignorance even in August 1936, and in both rifle divisions of the KVO, for which detailed information for the first half of 1937 (in the 24th and 96th) was preserved, the lack of to find the enemy's flank, to attack on the flank" was also recorded during tactical exercises in "pre-repression" February 1937!9. The commander from the 63rd Infantry Regiment of the 21st Infantry Division of the OKDVA, who fought on July 5, 1937 with the Japanese at Vinokurka (Lieutenant Kuzin), did not make "bold attempts to cover the flanks" of the enemy. As can be seen from the example of the 21st and 96th divisions, the neglect of flank attacks in the "pre-repression" Red Army was a chronic disease...

Thus, from the shortcomings of the operational-tactical thinking of the command staff of the Red Army in late 1940 - early 1941. In the "pre-repression" period (1935 — the first half of 1937), the sources we found did not record only the inability of the highest command staff to determine the "center of effort" at various stages of the operation.

The interaction of military branches. We remember that the main practical work on the implementation of such interaction was to be carried out by the commanders of rifle battalions. However, as it was made clear, speaking at the December meeting, Inspector General of the Infantry of the Red Army, Lieutenant General A.K. Smirnov and Commander of the 6th Army of the Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO), Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko, by the end of 1940, the Soviet infantry battalion commander was not yet a "sufficiently developed commander" to competently "link his work" with artillerymen and tankmen, was he still "illiterate" in this respect, and "sometimes an illiterate commander"? (generally,

412

could not really call the interaction of the armed forces). In fact, the head of the Combat Training Directorate of the Red Army (UBP KA) Lieutenant General V.N. Kurdyumov: "In organizing the interaction of military branches on the ground [and it was the infantry battalions that should have been involved in this. - A.S.] achieved [only. - A.S.] initial successes? Order No. 0306 of the People's Commissar of Defense dated November 6, 1940 speaks more clearly about this: an inspection of the troops of five districts and the Far Eastern Fleet showed that "infantry commanders" "have no skills in organizing the interaction of infantry, artillery and tanks"?2.

Above the battalion levels, the main work on organizing the interaction of the combat arms is carried out by headquarters. Order No. 0306 spoke about them no less sharply: "The organization of interaction between military branches is a weak point for all headquarters"...23 And the directive of the People's Commissar No. May and

front-line administrations simply “do not know how to organize the interaction of combat arms”, “especially during a battle and an operation [and not just before their start. — A.S.]”²⁴. (S.K. Timoshenko also emphasized the latter circumstance in his closing speech at the December meeting on December 31, 1940: the highest command staff and headquarters of formations need to work out the interaction of military branches “not only on the battlefield” (combat operations on which take place in for several hours), “but also on the scale of a battle, operation and a number of operations over a long period of time (days, weeks)”²⁵.)

By the end of 1940, the interaction between the tanks, motorized infantry and artillery that were part of the mechanized corps and tank divisions had not been worked out at all. “In this regard,” pointed out at the December meeting the head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GABTU KA), Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Ya.N. Fedorenko, there are only “ATTIES”, “ONLY 03-acquaintance, there is still no combat interaction and cohesion in these matters”²⁶.

The conclusions of the November Order No. 0306 and the January Directive No. 503138/op were repeated by the Directive of the Commissar of Defense No. 34678 of May 17, 1941

413

districts, associations, formations, units for the summer period of 1941 “:” In all links [i.e. and in subdivisions, and in parts, and in formations. — A.S.] issues of organization of interaction [...] during the battle are worked out superficially, interaction between combined arms headquarters [i.e. formation headquarters. - / A.S.] and special branches of the armed forces. In particular, “the interaction in battle of motorized mechanized troops with sapper units, artillery and aviation has not been worked out”²⁷.

And again: the inability of the infantry battalion commanders to organize the interaction of the combat arms was a characteristic feature of the Red Army in the “pre-repression” period as well! For the umpteenth time, we will quote the letter of M.N. Tukhachevsky K.E. Voroshilov from | December 1935: “Battalions [Mikhail Nikolaevich until the end of his life wrote this word in accordance with the pre-revolutionary spelling. — /AS] have not yet mastered the ability to organize interaction with artillery and tanks on the ground”?

In December 1940, the head of the UBP KA V.N. Kurdyumov noted that “in the organization of interaction between military branches on the ground [which had to be dealt with by the commanders of rifle battalions. - A.S.] achieved [only. - 4.S.] initial successes”, but M.N. Tukhachevsky stated the same thing in 1936, in his report of October 7 of that year “On the combat training of the Red Army”: in driving a rifle battalion in cooperation with other branches of the military, successes were achieved only “initial and fragile”! The Deputy People's Commissar explained that battalion commanders could organize interaction between the branches of the armed forces only during exercises rehearsed in advance; without rehearsals (or in an unfamiliar area) THEIR ACTIONS “deteriorate sharply and often look illiterate” (i.e., exactly as, according to Commander-6 I.N. Muzychenko, they looked in 1940 -m!) ²³. Almost all the battalion exercises of 1936, in the two largest military districts, illuminated by surviving sources (according to the KVO, such sources were not preserved), Tukhachevsky's assessment is fully confirmed.

414

As can be seen from the order by the command troops of the KVO, commander of the 2nd rank I.F. Fedko No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937 (stating that the entire “command staff” “does not know how to specifically organize the interaction of various types of troops in a difficult combat situation”³⁹) and from the report of the OKDVA headquarters on the results of combat training in December 1936 - April 1937 (dated May 18, 1937; hereinafter - the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 16, 1937) the infantry battalion commanders of these two largest military districts were not able to organize the interaction of military branches even in the first, “pre-repression” half of 1937. Without a doubt, this was the case then in the entire Red A

The inability of headquarters at all levels to organize the interaction of military branches in battle and operation, noted in November 1940 and January 1941, also took place in the 35th. "In a number of districts and fleets," was indicated in the directive letter to K.E. Voroshilov dated December 28, 1935, such a "main and decisive issue in every operation" as "the ability to organize the interaction of all forces and means" "did not receive proper study and assimilation"³¹. The military headquarters of the 6th Rifle Corps, the only of the then headquarters of the advanced (!) KVO, which are illuminated from this side by sources, the cell of 1935 did not even know how to establish interaction between the infantry and artillery (not to mention the recently appeared tanks)... And in the advanced BVO (as commander I.P. Uborevich himself acknowledged in his order No. a link in the training of commanders" — and "especially in the interaction of infantry, tanks and artillery on the scale of a company and a battalion"...³²

The inability of headquarters to organize the interaction of military branches in battle and operation was also evident in 1936. As noted in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 ground troops in many cases was absent" even "an action plan linked by lines and time"³³ the military branches in that year were poorly organized by the headquarters; regimental headquarters (according to Godot

415

report of the OKDVA itself dated September 30, 1936) achieved progress here only in two of the 14 rifle divisions - in the 21st and partly in the 12th (and indeed, the only specific chief of staff of the OKDVA regiment mentioned in this connection - Uzhakin from the 1st 19th Rifle Regiment of the 40th Rifle Division failed to link the actions of the infantry and tanks, even in January 1936 when he decided on a tactical issue..). The headquarters of the Far Eastern tank units "for coordinating actions with other branches of the military" - as even the annual report of the OKDVA armored forces themselves admitted - were also "poorly prepared"³⁴. The headquarters of the rifle battalions of OKDVA could not then well link the actions of different types of troops; because, as recognized by the annual

the report of this army, their training in general "remained on it outside" ... ³⁵ In the documents of that the only

rifle corps of the advanced KVO, from which they were preserved for 1936 (on the 15th), we even come across a remark: «[...] We poorly organize the interaction of all branches of the military [...]» - made at the party meeting on December 22, 1936 by the chief of staff himself, Colonel P.I. Lyapin...³⁶

True, the headquarters of the 2nd Rifle Division of the BVO, checked in July 1936 by the commission of the Combat Training Directorate of the Red Army (UBP RKKA), carried out the interaction of the combat arms competently. But in another advanced district, the KVO, even before the start of the purge of the Red Army, "headquarters of all military branches" "to carry out tasks for [...] organizing interaction between military branches" were "weakly prepared"³⁷ (as we saw in chapter 1, the assessments of the order of the new commanding troops of the KVO commander of the 2nd rank I.F. Fedko No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937, who stated this fact, can be considered quite objective) ... As it appears from:

— the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937 (stating that the battalion headquarters are not able to maintain interaction between the combat arms during the battle);

— and materials of inspections in May or early June 1937 at the headquarters exercises of the headquarters of the 35th and 105th rifle divisions (which "poorly organized the combined-arms [i.e., based on the interaction of different types of troops. — A.S.] combat and badly managed the attached special [i.e. artillery and tank. - A.S.] units»³⁸),

416

it was the same then in the other largest district - OKDVA. And the fact that "the interaction of the headquarters of rifle battalions with the headquarters of artillery divisions" in those last months before the start of mass repressions was "not worked out" throughout the Red Army - this was directly stated in the directive letter of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937.

The inability of commanders and staffs to maintain interaction between the combat arms after the start of a battle or operation was also characteristic of the Red Army in 1935. According to the report of A.I. Yegorov at the Military Council on December 8, 1935, "the practical ability to organize in time and space the necessary interaction of rifle, mechanized and aviation formations in solving assigned tasks, in various conditions of operation" commanders and headquarters had yet to achieve". As for the battle, the head of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin in his report dated | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year and on the tasks for 1936" only very carefully indicated that "continuity [...] of interaction between military branches in mobile forms of combat" is still far from real perfection! The reality, however, was clearly sadder. So, in the Primorsky OKDVA group - as even the annual report of this group from | October 1935! — the indicated "continuity" was not something "far from real perfection", but was absent altogether: after the start of the battle and the completion of the immediate task, the interaction ceased ... At the Kiev maneuvers of 1935 — despite the fact that the headquarters and carefully worked out their actions on them - in the same way, after the start of the battle, the interaction between the long-range tank group and the 17th rifle corps advancing behind it disappeared ... And the headquarters of the 27th rifle division of the BVO, as it turned out on March 17, 1935 during a tactical exercise near Lepel, not only "couldn't" "organize the interaction of the combat arms" "during the battle and operation", but generally ceased to organize it after the start of the battle!

The interaction of the combat arms during the beginning of the battle or operation through the fault of the commanders and headquarters disappeared in the 36th. After all, as noted in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense

14 - 2255 417

No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 ...", "in the dynamics of hostilities, in most cases, communication was broken"; "as soon as the movement starts, communication in most cases is interrupted [...]"⁴² (and without communication, there is no interaction). The same is true at the tactical level: in one of the two rifle divisions of the advanced (!) BVO, for which the relevant information has been preserved (in the 37th), the infantry commanders "forgot" during the battle to set artillery tasks...

As we showed in chapter |, in the advanced BVO such a situation (when "when the battle develops in depth" in the interaction of military branches, "as a rule, everything breaks" "3) persisted in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937 th (this is also confirmed by the experience of the assault on the Mozyr fortified area during the February tactical exercises of the 23rd Rifle Corps). And the fact that it was then preserved in another largest grouping of the Red Army - OKDVA, was directly indicated by the report of the headquarters of this army of May 18, 1937: when the battle moves into the depths of the enemy's defense, the interaction of the combat arms is due to the fault of not having the appropriate skills or simply not wishing to maintain the interaction of the command staff — "drastically loses its clarity and timeliness in time and space"...⁴⁴

The interaction of tanks, motorized infantry and artillery in tank formations was not worked out not only by the end of 1940, but also by the end of 1936, when, as noted in the report of October 7 of that year "On combat training of the Red Army" M.N. Tukhachevsky, the commanders of the mechanized brigades and corps did not consider it necessary to support the attack of their tanks with the motorized infantry available in the brigade and corps, and the commanders with the artillery of the mechanized corps (artillery battalion of the rifle and machine-gun brigade).

The "undeveloped" interaction of tank units with engineering units, artillery and aviation in one of the largest groupings of the Red Army, OKDVA, noted in May 1941, was

came true in 1935, when even in the annual report of the armored forces of this army dated October 19, 1935, it was admitted that "cases of poor organization of interaction between tanks and artillery and combat aircraft are very frequent"⁵. From the report of the chief of artillery of the KVO N.M. Bean

418

ditch about the Kyiv maneuvers of September 25, 1935, it is clear that the tank commanders of this advanced (!) District did not know how to interact with artillery at that time: after all, even after

In the Kyiv maneuvers that had been rehearsed for a long time, the artillerymen declared the need "now" to "thoroughly stage" "with the headquarters and commanders of tank [new] divisions" "the study of the fundamentals [! - A.S.] interaction with artillery"⁴⁶ And from a similar report of the head of the communications troops of the KVO Yu.I. Ignatovich, it can be concluded that the tank headquarters of this district were not able to establish clear interaction with aviation: in the 45th mechanized corps, it appears in the draft of this document, "clear work has not yet been achieved by radio with reinforcement aviation [assault and light bomber . - / A.S.] and providing [destructive. - A.S.] in the air "...⁴⁷

According to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 ...", "a clear development of the interaction of air

, there were no forces with ground troops, especially with mechanized ones," and there were no willows of the 36th "⁸. On famous Belarusian maneuvers, the interaction of the 5th and 21st mechanized brigades rushing to the operational rear of the "enemy" with strike aircraft was, according to the head of the UBP of the Red Army, commander of the 2nd rank A.I. Sedyakin, "weakly"; at the same September 1936 maneuvers of the Moscow Military District, the headquarters of the task force commander B.S. Gorbachev did not organize air support for the actions of the 5th mechanized corps at all, and the headquarters of the mechanized corps itself did not organize the interaction of tanks with artillery and sapper units; all the tank commanders and staffs that participated in the March maneuvers in the Primorsky OKDVA group also did not establish interaction with artillery ...

In the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO - one of four such formations then available in the Red Army - interaction with artillery and aviation "was not practiced at all" even in the first, "pre-repression" half of the 37th. In another important grouping of Soviet troops (BVO), "the interaction of tanks with artillery", as follows from the annual report of this district of October 15, 1937, was then "learned only" when solving one specific problem.

419

dachas (when breaking through a pre-prepared defense). And in the third (OKDVA) tank commanders - as V.K. concluded the order. Blucher on the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year - in general, they achieved "very weak" success in organizing interaction with other branches of the military ... ⁵⁰

Ensuring combat operations. Reconnaissance and protection of "all types", noted at the December meeting the head of the UBP spacecraft V.N. Kurdyumov, are "the weakest point in the training of command personnel"?!. "At all headquarters," Order No. 0306 of November 6, 1940, of the Commissar of Defense of November 6, 1940, on the results of the inspection of five districts and the Far Eastern Fleet, concretizes this assessment, "reconnaissance and observation of the battlefield are poorly organized. The headquarters data received from intelligence are not able to generalize and do not draw proper conclusions. And the "infantry commanders" "do not know how to organize reconnaissance and observation of the battlefield"⁵². The latter was also confirmed by tactical exercises that took place between August 28 and September 7, 1940 in the 6th, 13th and 42nd rifle ZOVO divisions: the commanders of the advancing units did not send forward reconnaissance patrols and did not even organize surveillance of the flanks (not to mention their protection). At least in the 125th Rifle Regiment of the 6th Division they attacked blindly even in the foreground of the "enemy" defense saturated with obstacles - they sent reconnaissance, but they were not interested in the results of its work ...

Command troops of the Far Eastern Front EM. Stern on. At the December meeting, he also spoke about the case of ignoring reconnaissance by tank commanders: the 45th Tank Regiment of the 31st Cavalry Division of the 1st Red Banner Army of the Far Eastern Fleet attacked in one of the exercises, "not knowing the terrain", and "half of the tanks were planted in the gorge in front of the front the edge of defense "...53

As for the logistical support of hostilities, it was stated in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503138 / op dated January 25, 1941, military headquarters and army and front departments "did not firmly master the art of providing the operation with material and technical resources and skillfully organizing the army and front-line rear"54. "About the rear," he pointed out on the December meeting

420

the body of the commander of the MVO troops, Lieutenant General I.G. Zakharkin, - they remember only when. give in the order when they execute the order scheme"; there is no real management of the work of the rear...55

And again nothing new! On the ability of commanders and staffs to organize reconnaissance, the predecessor V.N. Kurdyumova, head of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin spoke about the same as Kurdyumov in 1935, when he wrote in his report of December 1, 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ..." about "common for all commanders and headquarters and an extremely dangerous breakthrough is the weakness of intelligence"56. And the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 generally used almost the same expressions as Kurdyumov in December 1940: "Reconnaissance and support is the weakest link in all types of combat training"...57

The "poor" organization of reconnaissance by military headquarters noted by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0306 of November 6, 1940 was noted everywhere in 1935, including the 51st Rifle Division of the KVO, which in the fall of 1940 was part of the described Order No. 0306 OdVO. E.S. Kazansky concluded that reconnaissance "is the weakest area in the training of headquarters" and that in the 151st and 153rd rifle regiments it is not organized at all ... "Continuity and purposefulness" of intelligence was not achieved then even by proven The 2nd Department of the Headquarters of the Red Army, the military headquarters of the BVO (some of which were included in 1940 in the PribOVO, characterized by order No. 0306). And according to the annual reports of the KVO, the Primorsky group of the OKDVA and the 34th rifle division of the Priamurskaya group of the OKDVA (dated 11, Pi October 1935, respectively) - and the commanders and headquarters of the KVO (part of the formations of which turned out to be in 1940- m as part of the OdVO) and OKDVA (the predecessor of the Far Eastern Federal District, which was included in order No. 0306) ... 59

At the headquarters of the advanced KVO, reconnaissance in the 36th was organized so "skillfully" that the compilers of the fraudulent annual report of this district of October 4, 1936 did not even re

421

they kept silent about the cases when during the exercises the "enemy" could not be detected until the moment he approached the distance of machine-gun fire, and also about the fact that reconnaissance was carried out intermittently before the offensive. (At the Polessye maneuvers of the KVO in August 1936, the headquarters of divisions did not organize reconnaissance at all; the headquarters of mechanized brigades and tank battalions often did the same at the September Shepetov maneuvers.) including, according to the confessions of the annual reports of the OKDVA themselves and its 20th Rifle Corps, and at the headquarters of battalions, regiments, and both OKDVA formations illuminated from this side by sources (the 35th Rifle Division and the 20th Rifle Corps)69. The headquarters of the 14th Infantry Regiment (77th Infantry Regiment of the 26th Infantry Division) and the 8th Mechanized Regiment did not organize reconnaissance at all during the March exercises of 1936 in Primorye ... In all formations covered from this side by sources BVO (5th, 33rd, 37th and 43rd rifle divisions and 18th mechanized and 1st heavy tank brigades)

headquarters in 1936, as a rule, either set non-specific tasks for intelligence, or did not set any at all!

In the advanced KVO (as the order of its command troops No. 0100 of June 22, 1937 concluded) "the issue of organizing continuous reconnaissance" "continued to be" "the weakest point in the training of headquarters" even before the start of the purge of the Red Army. The fact that the military "headquarters have not yet learned how to organize and conduct reconnaissance skillfully enough" was then recognized in the report of the OKDVA headquarters dated May 18, 1937⁶². And in the only rifle corps of the then BVO illuminated by sources - the 23rd - on the corps - in the exercises at the end of February 1937, the headquarters could not even specifically set the task of reconnaissance of the Mozyr fortified area, which the corps was to storm ...

In the autumn of 1940, in Odessa, four other districts, and in the Far Eastern Fleet, the "data obtained from intelligence" military headquarters "couldn't generalize and didn't draw" the "proper conclusions" from them, and in the predecessor of the Far Eastern Fleet, OKDVA, they "couldn't draw thoughtful and in-depth analysis of intelligence data" and "very often" made of them "incorrect or at best

422

case inaccurate conclusions "and in 1935. And in the Kiev district (part of whose troops became part of the Odessa district in 1940), the headquarters "slowly and insufficiently skillfully" processed intelligence data in 1936 (in both cases we have recognition of the annual reports of the districts themselves!)⁶³.

The inability of infantry commanders to organize

"reconnaissance and surveillance is also recorded many times

sources and in the "pre-repression" period. So, even the compilers of the "ceremonial" annual report of the KVO of October 11, 1935 "Weak", "unsatisfactory", or even did not organize reconnaissance at all and the commanders of all rifle battalions of the OKDVA, the results of inspections of which at tactical exercises in 1936 were covered by sources⁶⁴, and the commanders of all such battalions of the BVO (from the 37th Infantry Division) during the battle, they stopped setting reconnaissance tasks. The commanders of companies and platoons of the forward battalion of the 13th rifle regiment of the 5th rifle division did not cope with the organization of reconnaissance of the fortified area at the large tactical exercises of the BVO near Polotsk in October 1936 ... In the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937, they illiterately set reconnaissance tasks, and all the infantry commanders of the KVO (from the 24th and 96th rifle divisions) illuminated from this side by sources, failed to properly organize reconnaissance and two of the three commanders of battalions and companies participating in border conflict on July 5-6, 1937 near Vinokurka, - commander of the 2nd battalion of the 63rd rifle regiment of the 21st rifle division of the OKDVA captain V.O. Koshcheev and the commander of his 4th rifle company, Lieutenant Nemkov ...

Driving infantry units on the offensive without reconnaissance in the BVO (future ZOVO) was also noted in March 1935 (at the Lepel exercise of the 27th rifle division), and in October 1936 - in the 5th and 43rd rifle divisions. divisions at large tactical exercises near Polotsk. The 2nd rifle company of the 127th rifle regiment of the 43rd division, advancing on October 4, 1936, as well as the 125th regiment of the 6th division in September 1940, in the foreground of the fortified area, I will stumble in the same way

423

landed on barriers that were not detected by reconnaissance and "would have been actually destroyed"...⁵⁵ Neither were the commanders of companies and battalions, withdrawn in March 1936 for maneuvers by the Primorsky OKDVA group, in an offensive battle.

Disinterest in obtaining data from intelligence among the command staff of the Red Army was also encountered even before its purge. How can one conclude from the speech of the military commander

MVO Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny at the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense on November 21, 1937, at least in this district and in the 36th, there was a typical situation when "intelligence is organized, sent out, and as soon as it left, they forgot about it. No one is interested in anyone, no one demands anything from her.

The organization of monitoring the flanks in the Red Army, according to the report of the head of the 2nd department [of the Red Army General Staff A.I. Sedyakin from | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...", and the 35th was often neglected. In the BVO (the future ZOVO, in which this was noted in August-September 1940), even in October 1936, for example, the commanders of units of the 109th and 111th rifle regiments of the 37th rifle division on viewing exercises and units of the 5th and 43rd divisions at large tactical exercises near Polotsk.

The inability of commanders and staffs to organize guards in the Red Army was also recorded at the maneuvers of the Primorsky OKDVA group in March 1936 (where on the march in the valleys the guards did not illuminate not only the opposite slopes, but also the crests of the ridges bordering the valley), and at the Polotsk exercises of the BVO in October of the same year, and at the exercises of the 23rd Rifle Corps of the BVO near Mozyr in "pre-repression" February 1937 (where side guards were not posted at all) ...

Reconnaissance of the area by tank commanders, as can be seen from the report of the same A.I. Sedyakin "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ...", was often not carried out even in the 35th. There was no "disregard for the systematic study of the terrain" on which the tanks would operate (according to the diplomatic expression of the compilers of the district's annual report dated October 11

424

rya 1935) was "completely obsolete" even in the advanced and more tank-filled KVO...⁵⁷ In 1940, in the Far East, half of the vehicles of the 45th During the maneuvers of the Primorsky OKDVA group in the unexplored floodplain of the Chakhezu River, 90% of the tanks of the 2nd mechanized brigade were "planted" in the same way...⁶⁸

By the end of 1940, the military headquarters and directorates of the armies and fronts were poorly able to "provide the operation with material and technical resources" and "organize the army and front rear", but the same picture was here in the 35th. "In a number of districts," stated K.E. Voroshilov dated December 28, 1935, "the organization of uninterrupted supply of troops" during the operation "did not receive proper study and assimilation." "We were convinced during the exercises," V.N. Levichev, - that the mechanized brigades and mechanized corps, which reached in the conditions [military. - A.S.] games of great success in the sense of invading the operational depth of the enemy, on the third day they were left without fuel. ("This question," admitted N.G. Ignatov, head of the armored forces of the KVO N.G. Ignatov, admitted on January 20, 1936, "has not been worked out for us and, in fact, we still do not quite clearly understand ... 70) About the fact that" in the dynamics of the battle, the control of the rear is easily disturbed and terminated, "wrote in his report of December 1, 1935" On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ... "and A.I. Sedyakin... And the compilers of the annual report (dated October 11, 1935) of such an important grouping of the Red Army as the OKDVA were forced to admit - although they tried to hide their failures as much as possible - that their military headquarters were generally "have not learned to manage the rear"!⁷²

The inability to "provide the operation with material and technical resources" and "organize the army and front-line rear" also distinguished the Soviet headquarters in the 36th. "There is no planning for the rear," was noted in tongue-tied but unambiguous terms in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 "On the results of operational training for 1936 ..."; "the rear operates on its own, the troops on their own, and as a result, even during maneuvers, people do not receive

425

food by the day"...?

„ desperately embellishing the reality of the annual report of the CVO of October 4, 1936; The fact that the "organization of the rear" "remains" a "weak point in the management" of their formations, did not dare to hide the compilers of the OKDVA annual report of September 30 ... 74

According to the directive letter of the chief A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937, the staffs "were poorly trained on rear issues" even on the eve of the purge of the Red Army"5.

In 1940, Soviet commanders and staffs took into account logistics issues only formally, only to comply with the scheme for drawing up a combat order, but in OKDVA, according to the annual reports of this army itself, they did so in 1935 and 1936. m, when, having made a decision and signed an order, they "forgot" to give the necessary orders to the rear...

Moreover, if in 1940 commanders and staffs at least remembered, when making a decision, the need for logistic support, then in 1935 they often did not think about the rear at all! "The most important decisions of the command," he pointed out in his report from | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ..." A.I. Sedyakin, - especially in the crisis stages of the battle, organically with the organization of the rear is very rarely associated. "The significance of the operational rear," was also recognized by the compilers of the "lacquered" annual report of the KVO of October 11, 1935, "still remains a weak point in the operational training of a significant part of the combined arms commanders and staffs"...?6 The same and 36 -m, when in the OKDVA the headquarters of the formations often forgot about rear issues, making decisions during the battle, and the headquarters of the regiments and battalions, as a rule, before the battle, when commanders did the same at the March maneuvers in Primorye, when they were characterized with this On the other hand, the commanders and staff officers of the BVO (from units of the 2nd and 37th rifle divisions) also usually "missed" and "forgotten" logistics issues ..."7 In the 45th mechanized corps of the KVO, "the work of rear " in tactical classes was "not taken into account" in the first, "pre-repression", half of 193778.

426

Troop management. At levels below the battalion, it was carried out directly by unit commanders - but the commanders of squads, platoons and companies, noted at the December meeting the head of the UBP KA V.N. Kurdyumov, "as a rule, they don't have commanding skills." And indeed, the autumn inspection of five districts and the Far Eastern Fleet revealed that "the control of a platoon and company in an offensive battle has not been mastered"80. The same was revealed during the inspection of the combat training of the 6th, 13th and 42nd rifle divisions of the ZOVO on August 28-September 7, 1940 (which showed, by the way, that even the battalion commanders lack command and control skills): commanders and The battalion commanders did not know how to choose places for their command posts, usually located directly in battle formations, from where they could not observe their entire unit ("company commander," S.K. Timoshenko blamed at the analysis of the exercises of the 6th division on September 7 - as a rule, it is in front"81), the unit commanders also did not know how to use the communication service (and they didn't establish it at all), and they di

During the autumn inspection of five districts and the Far Eastern Fleet, it was revealed that the commanders of infantry subunits also lack "skills in organizing the interaction of fire and movement"; The same was shown by the September exercises of the 6th and 13th divisions of the ZOVO, where heavy machine guns, being in the combat formations of the advancing infantry, "continuously changed positions and actually did not support" the infantry with fire82. At the very least, the commanders of the departments - and not in a number of districts, but throughout the Red Army - did not know how to control the movement as such. ("Our misfortune," noted the inspector general of the infantry A.K. Smirnov at the December meeting, "is that our squad leader ... is not accustomed ... to keep" the prescribed intervals between the fighters in the chain3.) In addition, pointed out at the same meeting (referring to the same unit commanders) K.A. Meretskov, "the majority of the command personnel are not able to organize fire control in various types of combat"84.

In the five districts and the Far Eastern Fleet inspected in the autumn of 1940, "insufficiently firm control" of a tank platoon was also found.

427

As for the proficiency of such command and control bodies as the litabs, an inspection in the autumn of 1940 of five districts and the Far East Fleet showed:

— THAT "training of headquarters of corps and divisions is weak" (judging by the fact that the training of the headquarters of the 2nd, 6th, 13th, 27th and 42nd th rifle, 29th motorized and 4th tank divisions, 1st rifle and 6th mechanized corps "required further hard work to improve them", and the headquarters of the 14th mechanized corps and its divisions "had weak - buoy training "even by the summer of 1941, it was the same in the ZOVO; adjusted for the interest of the source of information - by the castle troops of the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant General I.T. Zakharkin, who reported at the December meeting on the" satisfactory "learning of his divisional and corps headquarters — we can assume that the situation was the same in the Moscow district);

— THAT "the headquarters of tank formations and units are also "weakly prepared and not coordinated" and

- That "the headquarters of rifle regiments and battalions are especially poorly prepared" (at the December meeting, the same was reported by the Zamkomtroj of the Moscow Military District I.G. Zakharkin and the commando troops of the Volga Military District (PriVO) Lieutenant General V.F. A. K. Smirnov stated that "most of our headquarters, up to and including the regimental headquarters, represent" people who "to a certain extent" are only "more or less qualified assistants of their commander [i.e. that battalion and regimental headquarters are not trained in the entire Red Army; in the rifle battalions of the ZOVO, as a rule, there were no headquarters at all.

These general assessments were specified by the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503138 / op dated January 25, 1941, which noted that "military headquarters, army and front departments":

- poorly put together, unsatisfactorily organize the interaction between their departments, departments and employees;

— "have not mastered the high culture of staff service", operational documents are prepared slowly and of poor quality (because of which "combat orders, operational, intelligence

428

vatelynye and rear reports, as a rule, are late, and their content does not meet the requirements ");

- "do not have solid skills in preparing certificates and calculations necessary for the commander to make a decision" (developing them "slowly" and "inaccurately");

— "they organize control only in a stable position, but they are not able to ensure the continuity of control during the operation and restore it in case of violation";

"They neglect control over the execution of orders and inform higher headquarters and neighbors about the situation."

Let's return now to the commanders. By the end of 1940, Soviet detachments, platoons and companies "as a rule" did not possess "commanding skills", but, according to the testimony of the deputy chief in charge of combat training of the 2nd department of the Headquarters / General Staff of the Red Army S.N. . Bogomyagkov, the inability of the commanders of departments, platoons and companies to manage their units distinguished the Red Army in the 35th. "It is necessary in 36 to drag the lower link by the ears: commanders, platoon commanders, commanders," he wrote on September 22, 1935 on the margins of the report on the results of the inspection

43rd Infantry Division of the BVO, after reading about the case when the company commander could not implement his decision due to the inability to manage the unit. "These most important issues concern the entire army," he bluntly noted a few days later about everything that was revealed in the 43rd division (including about the "undeveloped" command language among the commanders of squads, platoons and companies) ... 88

According to the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army", the commanders of rifle squads "weakly led in battle" their units and 36-m89.

"The commander does not firmly manage and command the unit in a tactical situation," A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937. Since the leaders of the Red Army of those years sometimes used the term "unit" to designate a unit (the same Tukhachevsky formulated his assessment stated by us in the previous paragraph as follows: the junior commander "weakly leads his unit in battle"),

429

This section of Egorov's letter, from where the quoted phrase is taken, is devoted not only to the senior, but also to the middle command staff, it can be assumed that the phrase also applied to the unit commanders (and perhaps exclusively to them). Consequently, the "commanding skills" of the platoon and company commanders were weak even on the eve of the purge of the Red Army. As we showed in Chapter 6, the sources covering the then level of training of the commanders of the three largest military districts - KVO, BVO and OKDVA - fully confirm this.

The commanding skills were then also weak among the squad commanders: as indicated in the letter to A.I. Yegorov of June 27, "the tactical training of a junior commander suffers from the same shortcomings as the training of a middle and senior commander."

In the autumn of 1940, the Red Army "had not mastered command and control of a platoon and a company in an offensive battle," but in the advanced (!) BVO they had not mastered it until the purge of the Red Army - when the 27th Rifle Division at the Lepel exercise in March 1935, and in the 43rd Rifle at a tactical exercise near Idritsa in September 1935, and in the "shock" (!) 2nd Rifle at the Belorussian maneuvers of 1936, the commanders of advancing platoons and companies were the latter, in fact, they didn't control at all when "the main (and almost only)" command they uttered was "loud "Forward", repeated by everyone from the battalion commander to the squad leader" ... 72 Control of the advancing platoon and company then was not "mastered" and in the entire Red Army: after all, the above-mentioned message about the inability of the company commander of the 43rd division to control his unit in an offensive battle, the deputy head of the 2nd department of the Red Army Headquarters S.N. Bogomyagkov commented on September 22, 1935 with the words: "This is a common misfortune"...93

The inability of the commanders to manage platoons and companies in an offensive battle was also manifested in the maneuvers that took place in March 1936 in the Primorsky OKDVA group. And in the BVO, as it is clear from the annual report of this district of October 15, 1937, "the command and control of the battle formations of a platoon and company" remained "at a low level" even before the start of mass repressions."

430

In the autumn of 1940, in the ZOVO, the control of the rifle battalion by the battalion commanders was "not worked out"? - not "for the BVO (the future ZOVO) was also characteristic in 1935. And in 1936 - as follows from the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7 of that year "On Combat Training of the Red Army" — the inability of at least some of the infantry battalion commanders (those who "let go of their control" during exercises) to manage the battalion was a problem for the entire Red Army. The management of a rifle battalion throughout the Red Army was "not worked out" even before the start of the purge of the Red Army: after all, as we showed above, the conclusion of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937 that "the commander does not firmly manage and command the unit in a tactical situation" also applies to unit commanders.

In the autumn of 1940, in the ZOVO, company and battalion commanders tried to control directly from the battle formations (not only losing the ability to control effectively, but also needlessly endangering themselves), but in the 110th rifle regiment of the 37th rifle division - one of the eight regiments of the BVO, about the training of the commanders of which in the 36th, specific information was preserved - they did so in October 1936. ("They'll kill them in the first battle," remarked the commander of the 23rd Rifle Corps, divisional commander K.P. Podlas, who was observing their actions at a tactical exercise ...97). Just like the company commanders of the 125th ZOVO regiment in September 1940, in front of their fighters, came the 9th commander of the 63rd rifle regiment of the OKDVA, which fought on July 5, 1937 with the Japanese at Vino Kurka.

In the autumn of 1940, in the ZOVO, the commanders of platoons, companies and battalions did not train and did not know how to use the signal service and did not use signaling - but, respectively, in 50% and 100% of the rifle divisions of the BVO (future ZOVO) illuminated from these sides by sources, these vices existed in 1936. True, in the first case, only two (2nd and 81st) divisions were included in the sample, and in the second, only one (37th) division, but, I think, the result can still be considered indicative - by analogy with the other two largest districts. Indeed, in 1935, control cells (i.e., liaison) were not ready

431

vili, and the signaling was ignored in both OKDVA formations illuminated from this side (the 18th rifle corps and the 34th rifle division). In the KVO in 1936, control cells were poorly trained in both of its rifle divisions (44th and 45th), for which at least some information was preserved for that year. Of the four rifle divisions of the KVO, about the training of the then commanders of which at least something is known, in two, covered by sources better than others (24th and 96th), "signal control in a platoon and company" was "not worked out" even at the time of the start of mass repressions, by July 1937 ... And in two of the same OKDVA rifle divisions (21st and 40th) even then the control cells (i.e., the "communication service") were poorly prepared ...

In the autumn of 1940, in the PribOVO, OdVO, ZakVO, Siberian Military District, ZabVO and Far Eastern Fleet, the commanders of infantry units were not able to organize the interaction of fire and movement, but, as noted on September 22, 1935, the deputy head of the 2nd department of the Headquarters of the Red Army S.N. Bogomyagkov, "the lack of development of the interaction of fire and movement" through the fault of "company, platoon commander, commander squad" was a "common misfortune" of the Red Army and the 35th ... 99

As we showed in chapter 6, in the three largest military districts. - KVO, BVO and OKDVA - the commanders of infantry subunits, as a rule, could not cope with the organization of the interaction of fire and movement even in the 36th. Even in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937, this organization was not given to the commanders of units of both rifle regiments of the BVO (111th and 156th), about the tactical training of the then command staff of which information has been preserved; According to the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937, the command staff of the Special Far Eastern ...100

In September 1940, the commanders of machine-gun units of the 6th and 13th rifle divisions of the ZOVO were unable to organize fire support for an infantry attack, placing machine guns in infantry combat formations and forcing them to change positions every now and then, but the commanders of machine-gun platoons of the 1109th riflemen - the first regiment of the 37th Infantry Division of the BVO (future ZOVO)

432

they acted just as illiterately in tactical exercises in October 1936. They also drove their "maxims" inside the battle formation of the advancing company - so that the machine guns could not support it with fire either before the attack or during the attack. And in 1935, the commanders of the pulzvods and pulrots left the infantry without fire support even on the famous, "exemplary"

Kyiv maneuvers! True, there they made another mistake - they were late in moving their machine guns forward during an infantry attack - but the result was the same ...

By the end of 1940, the commanders of rifle squads were not able to maintain the intervals between the fighters in the chain, but in the advanced (!) BVO they were not able to do this in 1936 (when even at the "exemplary" Belarusian maneuvers, the commanders of the advancing squads "they were not able to keep the fighters "within a reasonable framework of an organized battle formation for the attack" and "crowds" were obtained from the squads! 0!). ,

By the end of 1940, the "majority" of the commanders of infantry units did not know how to organize fire control "in various types of combat", but, according to the report of the head of the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin dated December 1, 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ..", the unit commanders did not know how to control fire and the 35th. "Fire control in a platoon, rifle company has not been worked out," confirmed A.I. Egorov; !0?2 The same is evidenced by the results of checks in the spring and autumn of the 35th troops of the two most advanced military districts (UVO / KVO and BVO) and the only surviving report of the rifle division OKDVA (34th) for 1935.

As we saw in Chapter 1, in the three largest military districts infantry commanders were almost universally unable to control fire even in the 36th. The fact that the commanding officers of the infantry of the KVO "do not have enough strong skills in conscious control of fire" did not dare to admit at that time even such fraudsters as the compilers of the annual report of this district of October 4, 1936!¹⁰³

Even in the last months before the beginning of the purge of the Red Army, the inability of the commanders of the infantry units of the

433

firing was also evident in both rifle regiments of the BVO (111th and 156th), the tactical training of the commanders of which in the first half of 1937 is covered by sources, and (see Chapter 6) in the huge and in some places already fighting with the Japanese OKDVA ...

In the autumn of 1940, tank platoon commanders "unsteadily" managed their units, but, according to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. m!¹⁰⁴.

Well, what about headquarters? From the directive of the People's Commissar No. 503138 / op of January 25, 1941, it is clear that the army departments were then poorly prepared, but the same was true in the 35th. "Army departments of wartime [during peacetime did not contain them then. - A.S.], - was indicated in the directive letter to K.E. Voroshilov dated December 28, 1935, - in terms of their preparedness, they are at a low level ... "¹⁰⁵

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0306 dated November 6, 1940 (confirmed in this part and by the directive of the People's Commissar No. headquarters are "still weak", that "cadres of staff commanders are weak in their training", Deputy People's Commissar of Defense M.N. Tukhachevsky wrote to K.E. Voroshilov and a year and a half before the purge of the army, | December 1935!¹⁰⁶ Since further the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 stated that "the authorities have not yet learned how to properly organize control in the mobile phases of the operation", maintain contact with the troops and establish interaction inside the headquarters! ⁰⁷, insofar as the training of the military headquarters of the Red Army was weak even in the 36th ... At least in the huge OKDVA, as noted in the order of V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year, "in the situation of a significant saturation of the troops with technical means" (i.e., in an environment typical of modern combat), "headquarters coped with their task poorly" even in recent months before the start of mass repressions ¹⁰⁸

In the autumn of 1940, the training of the headquarters of rifle corps and divisions was "weak", but in all divisions and corps no

434

advanced (!) UVO / KVO and BVO, for which the relevant information has been preserved (27th, 44th and 51st rifle divisions and 6th, 8th 15th rifle corps), this training, as we saw in chapter I, was still weak in the 35th, when these headquarters had poor command of the technique of staff service and / or poorly coped with command and control. About shtakor-15, the only one from which the protocols of party meetings, these frank conversations about the state of affairs, were preserved, his chief on December 22, 1935 declared that "it is impossible to fight with such a headquarters" ... 109 Training was also weak that year headquarters of divisions of another important grouping of the Red Army - OKDVA. After all, the annual report of this army of October 21, 1935, and he admitted that "in the mountainous wooded area" (in which the Far East had to fight), the headquarters of its divisions "cannot cope" with control ...!10

From the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army" it follows that it was precisely through the fault of the headquarters that the management of rifle formations was "at an unsatisfactory level" even in the 36th !!. The fact that their divisions in battle are managed "somewhat weaker" than "not bad" (i.e., rather badly) was indicated even by the compilers of the annual report of the KVO of October 4, 1936, who tried in every possible way to cover up the shortcomings!!

In the autumn of 1940, the headquarters of tank formations and units were prepared "weakly" and "not coordinated", but if it had been otherwise in 1935-1936, the compilers of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 of November 3, 1936 would have emphasized that "in

control and communication requests both inside a tank battalion [i.e. tank unit. - A.S.]", "did within the mechanized unit" all year "remained unfinished"?!!3 Indeed, on

September maneuvers of 1936 in the Moscow Military District "very weak in all parts" was the work of the headquarters and the 5th mechanized corps and both tank formations of the latter (13th and 14th mechanized brigades)!4. "The training of the headquarters of the mechanical units and especially the tank battalions of rifle divisions is mostly unsatisfactory," the OKDVA headquarters (the predecessor of the Far Eastern Fleet, where in the autumn of 1940 was the same most)!15.

435

As for "lack of coherence", in the leading and having a quarter of all the then mechanized brigades of the Red Army BVO, the concentration of headquarters of tank formations was, according to the annual report of this district of October 15, 1937, "fuzzy" and by the time the purge of the RKKACH began6 ,

By the autumn of 1940, the newly formed headquarters of the 6th mechanized corps and its 4th tank division were found "especially weakly" knocked together in the ZOVO! 7, but the "insufficient" crowding of the headquarters of the newly formed tank formations (10th, 16th, 18th and 21st mechanized and 1st heavy tank brigade) in the BVO (future ZOVO) was noted and in 1936! (The difference in the degree of criticality of the assessments can be easily explained by the fact that the inspection of the People's Commissariat of Defense stated that "special weakness" was noted, while the political department of the district itself reported on the "insufficiency" in its annual report of October 5, 1936).

At the beginning of 1941, the headquarters of the 22nd and 30th tank divisions of the 14th ZOVO mechanized corps were "poorly" trained, but in "pre-repression" January 1937, the headquarters of the 8th mechanized brigade (which was renamed in 1939 into the 29th light tank division and on the basis of which the 22nd tank division was formed in 1941) and its units were, according to the conclusion of the regimental commissar K. Byshevsky, who examined the brigade, were "not prepared" at all (what at the end of August 1936, the headquarters of the 8th mechanized brigade "did nothing at all for the troops", was also revealed by the head of the RKKA UBP A.I. Sedyakin ...)!19. And the headquarters of the 4th mechanized brigade (which in 1939 was renamed the 32nd light tank brigade and on the basis of which the 30th

tank division) and its units, as it is clear from the report prepared by the political department of the brigade for the brigade party meeting on April 21, 1937, "they did not know how to organize and ensure the implementation of the commander's decision" even before the start of the purge of the Red Army!²⁰.

In the autumn of 1940, the training of the headquarters of rifle regiments and battalions was "particularly poor", but in most regimental and all battalion headquarters of the UVO / KVO, BVO and OKDVA, for which the relevant information was preserved (and these are the headquarters of 79- th, 80th, 153rd and 8th and 9th collective farm rifle regiments, regiments of the 40th and 44th rifle

436

divisions, three of the nine battalion headquarters of the 79th, 132nd and 286th rifle regiments and the battalion headquarters of the 40th and 1st and 2nd collective farm rifle divisions and the 22nd rifle regiment), it was like this (or approaching this) and in the spring and summer of 1935, when the battalion headquarters were not able to control the troops at all, and most of the regimental regiments carried out the decisions of the command with great difficulty or did not organize the battle at all and did not manage the battle. In the BVO, according to the 2nd Department of the General Staff of the Red Army, the headquarters of the battalions were "especially weak" and by the end of 1935; however, summed up on December 9, 1935 at the Military Council, M.N. Tukhachevsky, "the situation is bad" with battalions everywhere...¹²¹

The "poor training" of most of the headquarters of rifle battalions was also stated by the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 400115s of May 17, 1936¹²². Of the ten specific battalion headquarters of the advanced (!) BVO, the verification materials of which were preserved in the TOM "pre-repression" year (from the 4th, 5th, 109th, 111th, 143rd and 241st th rifle regiments), poor command and control was recorded in nine! The fact that in some places the OKDVA, which was already at war, the training of the headquarters of the rifle battalions was then "at a very low level", was recognized even by the compilers of the annual report of this army of September 30, 1936, who tried to hide as much of their failures as possible, but that in the 37th rifle division of the BVO, the battalion headquarters was "a weak link in the general system of training headquarters" - even the compilers of the annual report of the division from | October 1936!¹²³

Since, as stated in the directive letter of the head A.I. Egorov of June 27, 1937, "headquarters of regiments, battalions" "as the organs of control of the battle were not put together", battalion and regimental headquarters in the Red Army were weak even in the last months before the start of the purge of the Red Army. As can be concluded from the report of the headquarters of the OKDVA dated May 18, 1937, the management of rifle battalions in it was then "unsatisfactory" precisely because of the battalion headquarters; that "the training of battalion headquarters is especially at a low level", we also read in the documents of that time of the only one of the KVO corps (17th), from which they survived ... ¹²⁴

437

In the autumn of 1940, the ZOVO rifle battalions, as a rule, did not have headquarters at all, but at least one large military district, which had almost no rifle battalion headquarters, was in the USSR in 1936: in the then OKDVA, these headquarters were in most cases consisted of one chief of staff ...

By the beginning of 1941, the headquarters were distinguished by poor crowding, but judging by the fact that:

- at the beginning of 1935, it was not clear at the military headquarters of the OKDVA, "who and to whom is transmitting preliminary orders, who puts the situation on the map, who is preparing messengers at this time, who is preparing signalmen to go out to lay new communication lines, who at the same time prepares instructions on the rear and a number of other simultaneously prepared data on the organization of the battle, and

- "shortcomings" in the "training of command and control bodies in OKDVA formations" were then "common for the entire Red Army."¹²⁵

The military headquarters in the Red Army were poorly formed even at the beginning of the 1935th. (It is significant that among those for whom we have direct indications of their "lack of coherence" was then the headquarters of the frontier (!) 8th rifle corps of the forward (!) KVO, and in the forward BVO, military headquarters - as stated in the report of the political department of this district of October 1, 1935 on the results of district maneuvers - they were distinguished by "insufficient organization and clarity in command and control" even in the autumn of that year!²⁶.)

The staffs in the Red Army were also poorly put together in 1936, when the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936 directly stated that "interaction between all links in the governing bodies has not been sufficiently worked out"... ²⁷ "The lack of coordination and interaction in the work between the main headquarters departments" of their formations was recognized even by the compilers of the "ceremonial" annual report of the KVO dated October 4, 1936! ²⁸, and OKDVA that year, at least 60% of rifle headquarters were poorly corps (shtakors-20, -26 and -43), half of the headquarters of mechanized brigades (shtabrig-23), as well as all divisional and regimental headquarters, on the training of which specific information was found.

438

As we have already seen, according to the directive letter of A.I. Egorov of June 27, 1937, the headquarters of rifle battalions and regiments in the Red Army were not put together even before the start of mass repressions. |

By the beginning of 1941, the headquarters "did not master the high culture of staff service", but, according to A.I. Yegorov, the staff officers' lack of specific practical skills for performing their functions was included in the list of "shortcomings" common to the entire Red Army in the "training of command and control bodies in formations" even at the beginning of 1935!²⁹. And indeed, in the spring and summer of that year, "the culture of staff service" was "not mastered" at all the headquarters of the rifle corps of the forward CMD, and at the headquarters of the 5th rifle corps of the forward BVO, checked by Moscow, and at all the headquarters of divisions and brigades of these districts (4th, 8th, 27th, 44th and 51st rifle divisions and the 4th mechanized brigade). According to the annual report of the Primorsky OKDVA group dated October 11, 1935, the lack of practical skills and automatism in the performance of their functions for the employees of its military headquarters were also characteristic by autumn.

There was clearly no "high culture of staff service" in the Red Army even in the 36th, when even in the advanced KVO, as this district itself reported to Moscow on October 4, 1936, there was "not a single headquarters where the main workers" "would have full work practice"! (And indeed, all the military headquarters of the KVO, which participated in the Polessye maneuvers in August, demonstrated to the head of the UBI of the Red Army, A.I. Sedyakin, "undereducation in control technique")!³⁰. In the military headquarters of the OKDVA, as even the report of the headquarters of this army admitted dated May 18, 1937, "order and strict discipline in work" were "absent" in the last months before the start of the purge of the Red Army; At that time, two of the three military headquarters of the advanced KVO (headquarters of the 72nd and 287th rifle regiments) that were covered by the sources were also distinguished by a lack of staff culture ... ³¹

By the beginning of 1941, the headquarters were slowly and poorly preparing operational documents (including combat orders), but in all corps, divisional, brigade and battalion and in half of the regimental headquarters of the UVO / KVO and BVO, for which the corresponding information for

439

spring - summer of 1935 (at the headquarters of the 6th, 8th and 15th rifle corps, 5th, 27th, 43rd, 44th and 51st rifle divisions, 4th mechanized brigade and its tank battalions, the 79th, 80th and 153rd rifle regiments and in three of the nine battalion headquarters of the 79th, 132nd and 286th rifle regiments) combat documents and orders were also prepared and issued too slowly (or quickly, but of poor quality), or even they were not prepared at all and were not given. And the fact that negligence was often allowed in the documents issued by the military headquarters of the UVO / KVO at that time, we even read in the "ceremonial" annual report of the KVO dated October 11, 1935 (in

translated into Russian, this means that the documents at the headquarters of this advanced district were prepared of poor quality - and not often, but as a rule. In fact, at the beginning of September, even in the "shock" divisions of the KVO - the 24th and 44th rifle divisions - the staffs, having plenty of time, drew up orders for the offensive "exceptionally carelessly"¹³? or even illiterate). The slowness and / or lack of clarity in the issuance of documents by their military headquarters and the transmission of orders was then recognized by the annual reports of the OKDVA, its 18th and Special Rifle Corps and its armored forces (respectively dated October 21, 10, 17 and 19, 1935) .

Not the best picture was in the 36th. "[...] A lot of time is still wasted on the transmission of orders and reports due to the imperfection of staff work," stated the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 of November 3, 1936, summing up the results of the academic year¹³. The headquarters of the 16th rifle corps of the advanced BVO managed to be late with the preparation of the order to attack even at the Belarusian maneuvers of 1936, for which they had been preparing for a whole month! The preparation of combat orders and bringing them to the troops was delayed (sometimes spending up to 26 hours on both!) and all the headquarters of divisions and regiments of the advanced KVO, which participated in August 1936 in the Polesye maneuvers; with the delivery of orders to the units, the headquarters of the KVO mechanized brigades (as well as their tank battalions), which were withdrawn in September for the Shepetovka maneuvers, were often late ...

The military headquarters of the BVO were also distinguished by the "untimely" communication of commander's decisions to the troops in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937!¹⁴.

440

By the beginning of 1941, the staffs "did not have solid skills in preparing information and calculations necessary for the commander to make a decision" (developing them "slowly" and "inaccurately"), but in the advanced KVO staff officers were not able to "quickly and correctly produce the necessary calculations" and in the "pre-repression" 1935 (after all, even the compilers of the annual report of this district, who were trying to rub Moscow points, were forced to admit then that "not all staff commanders are able to do this ...!" ³⁵). The same picture was in this district in 1936, when the preparation of data for the commander there was dragged out by absolutely all regimental and divisional headquarters, brought out for the August Polesye maneuvers ...

By the beginning of 1941, the headquarters were not able to ensure the continuity of control - but, according to the directive letter of K.E. Voroshilov dated December 28, 1935, at least "in a number of districts" the problem of "continuity of control" during the operation "did not receive proper study and assimilation" in the "Pre-repression" 35th. Head of the 2nd Department of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin in a report from | December 1935 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for the 1935 academic year ..." stated that "still far from real perfection" and "continuity of control" "in mobile forms of combat" (i.e. that control during the battle was then often lost). Military headquarters, confirmed in a letter dated the same date K.E. Voroshilov M.N. Tukhachevsky, "lag behind the development of events in battle!"³⁶. The inability of the headquarters of formations to ensure "continuity of control in mountainous wooded areas" was then recognized by the annual report of the OKDVA stationed among the mountains and taiga! in fact, this happened even at the carefully rehearsed Kiev maneuvers) ...

Headquarters in the Red Army did not ensure continuity of command even in 1936: after all, as noted in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936, they did not then - why "in the dynamics of hostilities, in most cases, communication is broken!"³⁸. Two of the three regimental headquarters of the KVO, about which information has been preserved for the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937 (72nd and 286th

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441

rifle regiments) they were not able to ensure continuity of command even then; the situation was the same in the military headquarters of the only BVO corps illuminated by sources (23rd

rifle)...

By the beginning of 1941, the headquarters neglected control and information, but in such a grouping of the Red Army as the OKDVA, which was almost in a combat position, they did this in 1935 as well. From the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army" it is clear that the headquarters of units and formations did not cope with the task of informing the higher command in time (and did not cope precisely because of underestimation of its importance) and the 36th. Two of the three regimental headquarters of the advanced KVO, about which information was preserved for the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937 (72nd and 287th rifle regiments), could not cope with it, and "lack of clear control over the implementation of the order of the "In these last months before the start of the purge of the Red Army, it was characteristic of all the headquarters of the advanced BVO ... 139

B. Artillery

Shooting and artillery training. In November 1940-January 1941, after checking the commanders of 24 artillery regiments of the Leningrad (LVO), Baltic Special, Western Special, Odessa, North Caucasus (SKVO) and Transcaucasian military districts, the Artillery Inspectorate of the Red Army revealed that the commanders and fire platoons, and batteries, and divisions "poorly" know the theory of shooting and the rules of shooting. In 15 artillery regiments out of '24, the commanders received from her in small arms and artillery training "bad", and in the remaining nine - "mediocre". True, most of the artillery commanders who participated in the September tactical exercises in the ZOVO (from the 6th, 13th and 42nd rifle divisions) "showed, on the whole, quite good preparation for the production" of even "complex firing", but the other part - from the 131st light artillery regiment of the 6th division and two of the nine batteries of the 108th light artillery regiment of the 42nd division - turned out to be "not prepared to perform combat missions" at all !!, At the December meeting "low" or even a "very low degree" of small arms and artillery

442

the training of their artillery commanders was also recognized by the commander of the Far Eastern Front G.M. Stern and the head of artillery of the Far Eastern Fleet, Lieutenant General of Artillery N.A. Cryl2,

As you can see, the shooting and artillery training of the commanders of the Soviet artillery in late 1940 - early 1941 was weak. The speeches of the participants of the December meeting make it possible to clarify what lay behind this assessment. If by simple firing, stated the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army K.A. Meretskov, artillery mastered "satisfactorily", then firing in difficult conditions (at night, in smoke and in general "in conditions of reduced visibility") "in most artillery units have not been worked out"; "shooting at moving targets and for self-defense" "in most units" were worked out "poorly", remote shooting was not mastered. The same was said by G.M. Stern and N.A. Cry - many battery commanders who had "failed" in small arms and artillery training. "They know how to shoot," Stern noted, "but in simple conditions, as part of artillery groups, as part of regiments [i.e. where "the battery commander is a simple technical executor" of the instructions of the artillery staffs. - A.S.], but in combat [which often turn out to be difficult. — A.S.] conditions shoot very weakly [...]". "Our battery commanders will, of course, shoot," Klich pointed out more diplomatically, "they will carry out fire missions in a simple environment, but [...] for our commanders, the solution of complex shooting tasks by the rational use of ammunition [i.e. e. aimed fire, not area fire. — A.S.] is a very difficult matter. And not always in a difficult combat situation and when firing in difficult conditions (such as: shooting in the mountains, shooting with large displacements, etc.) - battery commanders will perform as needed. The reason for this was a poor knowledge of the theory of shooting, which did not allow to justify the application of the rules of shooting, and therefore "consciously solve fire problems"! 43.

But the knowledge of the command staff of the Soviet artillery of the theory of shooting, as stated on December 8, 1935 at the Military Council by A.I. Egorov, was "insufficient to justify

443

rules of firing" and in the 35th!144 Judging by two of the three largest military districts (BVO and OKDVA; materials on the KVO have not been preserved), it was the same in the 36th. In two of the three field artillery regiments of the BVO (5th, 33rd and 37th), the materials of checks of the training of command personnel for that year were preserved, the commanders differed either in insufficient ability to apply the analytical method of sighting (i.e., the weakness of theoretical training), or poor knowledge of the rules of shooting < i.e. the same shortcomings as the commanders of 24 artillery regiments, checked (including in the former BVO - ZOVO) at the end of the 40th - the beginning of the 41st. And in the report of the assistant chief of the 2nd division of the headquarters of the OKDVA, Major V. Nesterov, dated November 8, 1936, "On the preparation of OKDVA artillery in [1936], it was directly indicated that the artillery commanders of this army "poorly know the theory shooting 145

Accordingly, firing in difficult conditions (at night, in smoke, and in general "in conditions of reduced visibility") to Soviet artillery commanders should not have been given even to the 35th. They should not have been given to them in the 36th (when, as noted in the report of October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army" M.N. Tukhachevsky, "in all parts" could not be resolved in practice the question of preparing a topographical basis for firing at an invisible target! and when to apply the analytical method of data preparation necessary for such firing, even some of the best battery commanders — those who were sent to the All-Army rifle and artillery competitions — could not apply). And they didn't! The fact that "shooting under difficult conditions, for the most part, give unsatisfactory results," was admitted then (in a report to Moscow of May 5, 1936) even the political department of the advanced KVO! As I found out in June 1937, the new commanders of the KVO I.F. Fedko, only in simple conditions ("on perfectly visible targets" and during daylight hours) they knew how to shoot even by the beginning of the purge of the Red Army...147

At the end of 1940, the artillery commanders of the DAF did not know how to shoot in difficult conditions - but, according to the "Materials for the Combat Training of Artillery" compiled in April 1937 at the OKDVA headquarters or the apparatus of its nachart, and the order of V.K. . Blucher on the results of the winter period of study of the 1936/37 academic year, only in simple conditions, "lost

444

in difficult situations (bad observation, a christening fan, detachment of one shell, etc.)", the commanders of the Far Eastern artillery could fire even on the eve of the purge of the Red Army. Lacking (with the exception of a "small number" of individuals) the analytical method of data preparation, he is just like the 1940 ewconia! — didn't practice shooting at unobserved targets, nor shooting at night...148

Due to the poor knowledge of the theory of shooting, the general level of shooting and artillery training of the Soviet artillery commanders was also generally unsatisfactory in the "pre-repression" period. True, from the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army" we can conclude that in the 36th it turned out to be satisfactory: the commanders of batteries and divisions, according to Tukhachevsky, then fired "satisfactorily", and "sharply lagged behind in their firing training" only commanders of fire platoons1%. But here it is necessary to make an allowance for the fraud that was then widespread in the artillery of the Red Army (see Chapter 3}). Of the five artillery regiments of the OKDVA (12th, 40th, 59th, 69th and In 1936, we have the materials of checks on the training of which we have at our disposal, in four riflemen and artillerymen the training of command personnel turned out to be precisely unsatisfactory (and only in one - the 12th - it was recognized as good) ... -

At the end of 1940, the level of rifle and artillery training of the Far Eastern Fleet artillery commanders was "low" (moreover, "many of the battery commanders" also had "unsatisfactory grades" here)!50, but the same was also stated by the order of V.K. Blucher on the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year: "Most of the command staff (including battery commanders) are poorly prepared in terms of shooting!"51.

Tactical learning. The autumn inspection of the PribOVO, OdVO, ZakVO, SibVO, ZabVO and Far Eastern Fleet revealed that the headquarters of the artillery units are the organizers of the "artillery battle in the interests of

combined-arms combat" - "poorly prepared and not coordinated." (Things were the same then in the Moscow Military District - the chief of artillery of which, Major General of Artillery I.A. Ustinov, at a December meeting before

445

He claimed that the headquarters of his artillery regiments were not good at processing data on the situation and, therefore, were delaying the preparation of documents necessary for the regiment commander to make a decision.) and in relation to the headquarters of artillery battalions!52,

As noted at the December meeting, the Inspector General of Artillery of the Red Army, Lieutenant General of Artillery M.A. Parsegov, "inadequately trained tactically" were then and in general all "artillery commanders of all degrees". (NachartDVF N.A. Klich emphasized that "rational and correct resolution of tactical tasks to support infantry and tanks" was also not possible for him, even the commander of the division, which in the conditions of the Far East was the main tactical unit of artillery.) Accordingly, "management of a massive fire" in the artillery of the Red Army was not "achieved" then either, and the divisional artillery was "not proactive enough and not creative" in helping the infantry!53,

M.A. Parsegov also pointed to the "completely unsatisfactory" organization of artillery reconnaissance and the lack of "surveillance skills" among artillery commanders "in order to constantly look for the enemy." Due to the lack of experience in observing targets and the weak organization of reconnaissance, the head of artillery of the KOVO, Lieutenant General of Artillery N.D., who spoke for Parsegov, emphasized. Yakovlev, battery commanders who are "not given targets" have to "switch to area shooting"...154

At the end of 1940 - beginning of 1941, the headquarters of artillery regiments and artillery divisions were poorly trained and not cohesive, but in such a large military district as OKDVA, they were poorly trained in 1935 as well. After all, their then commanders not only could not organize artillery support for a counterattack, but also did not know the elementary tactics of the infantry (which they had to support or which they had to help defeat with fire from their units or subunits)! In one of the two corps of the advanced KVO checked at the same time (6th and 8th riflemen

446

vyh) poorly trained artillery staffs were recognized directly ... In the advanced BVO they were the same in 1936. In both of the then field artillery regiments of this district (33rd and 37th) illuminated from this side, the headquarters of the divisions were either poorly assembled, or (like the headquarters of the 33rd artillery regiment - the only headquarters of the artillery regiment of the BVO, about which information has been preserved for this year) did not know how to control fire during the battle ...

In all three major military districts, the readiness of the headquarters of artillery divisions and artillery regiments was weak even immediately before the start of the purge of the Red Army, by June 1937. For the BVO (the future ZOVO and part of the PribOVO, in which this was also noted in 1940-1941), this is evident from how the annual report of the district of October 15, 1937 makes clear (see Chapter 6), in its artillery At that time, "the technique and practice of concentrating massed fire was not fully developed", and for the KVO - from the order of the district commanders No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937, stating that in artillery "training in fire control is weak"!55. And the report of the headquarters of this army of May 18, 1937 directly admitted the unsatisfactory training of the headquarters and artillery divisions and artillery regiments of the OKDVA!

At the end of the 1940s, the tactical training of the commanders of the Soviet artillery was "insufficient", but, as is clear from the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 "On Combat Training of the Red Army", the tactical training of Soviet "artillery commanders of all degrees" was weak even in the 36th (when, in particular, "tactical work of division commanders together with infantry" was "completely insufficient", the headquarters of artillery chiefs of rifle divisions are "weak", and the use of senior artillery chiefs of RGK artillery is not

worked out)!⁵⁶. In OKDVA, according to the "Materials for combat training of artillery" compiled in April 1937 at the headquarters of the OKDVA or the apparatus of its nacharta, the tactical training of artillery commanders "should be considered unsatisfactory" even on the eve of the purge of the RKKAER. For the first half of the 37th it is necessary to extend the assessment given by the annual report of the BVO of October 15 [1937: "The command staff of the artillery is not tactically prepared enough"! After all, all the shortcomings listed in support of this assessment (weak

447

working out interaction with other branches of the military and concentrating fire, poor observation and reconnaissance) among the BVO artillery commanders were encountered - as we saw in chapter | — back in 1936... On the eve of the purge of the Red Army, the tactical training of artillery commanders of the third largest military district (KVO) was at least insufficient. After all, as the order of the command troops of the KVO No. 0100 of June 22, 1937 stated, by that time they not only distinguished themselves by "poor training in fire control", but also "did not work out" even the "most important issues of interaction" with other branches of the military. ...159

By the end of 1940, the commanders of the artillery battalions of the Far Eastern Fleet were not able to competently solve "tactical tasks to support infantry and tanks" - but they clearly did not know how to do this:

- and in 1936 - when the command staff of even those artillery units of the OKDVA that had served a special camp duty, "did not achieve great success" in tactical training (and, in particular, did not work out the fire control of the division); 160

"And in the "pre-repression" spring of 1937, when the entire command staff of the Far Eastern artillery was distinguished by "unsatisfactory" tactical training.

Control of massed fire in the Soviet artillery was clearly not achieved even in the 35th, when even the advanced KVO and BVO reported to Moscow (in the annual reports of the KVO of October 1 and the political directorate of the BVO of October 21, 1935) that fire control of an artillery group (which "there is a basis for controlling the fire of massed artillery") they only worked out "satisfactorily"!⁸ (corrected for the characteristics of the source - most likely unsatisfactory) ... Control of massive artillery fire was not achieved even on the 36th. "Practically," M.N. Tukhachevsky, "this important issue in all parts has not yet been resolved and fixed"...¹⁶² In the advanced BVO, "the technique and practice of concentrating massive fire" was (as we showed in Chapter 6) "underdeveloped" and by the time the mass repressions began ; At that time, they could not manage massed fire either in the advanced KVO (as we saw, in it, in general, there was "poor training in fire control" of artillery), and in OKDVA (where there were unsatisfactory

448

massively prepared fire control bodies - artillery headquarters).

By the end of 1940, the Soviet divisional artillery was not sufficiently proactive in assisting the infantry, but it was clearly the same in 1936 (when it conducted very few tactical exercises jointly with the infantry).

At the end of the 40th, the organization of reconnaissance in the Soviet artillery was "completely unsatisfactory", but (as N.M. Rogovsky, inspector of artillery of the Red Army N.M. Rogovsky, directly stated on December 9, 1935 at the Military Council), it was exactly the same in the 35th. In the advanced BVO, artillery reconnaissance (as we tried to justify above) was poorly organized even by the time the purge of the Red Army began (during the tactical exercises of the 23rd Rifle Corps near Mozyr in February 1937, it was sometimes not carried out at all ...). Things were exactly the same then in the advanced KVO. At the end of the 40th, artillery reconnaissance was poorly organized there and "did not give targets" to the battery commanders - but from the order of the KVO command troops No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937, we see that

unfamiliar terrain [i.e. in the conditions in which it is necessary to operate in a war. - A.S.] "in this district were not worked out and by the beginning of the purge of the Red Army 163 -

At the end of 1940, the commanders of the Soviet artillery did not have "observation skills", but they were still missing from them and cleaning up the Red Army! Let us recall the statement made on November 21, 1937 by N.N. Voronov: "Artillerymen are still [emphasis added by me. — A.S.] they don't know how to observe"...164

Technical training. It is known to us only for the Far Eastern Fleet. "I have to report," the GM said bluntly at the December meeting. Stern, about the very superficial knowledge of the materiel of artillery and shells, even by the senior command staff"!165.

But in the "pre-repression" 1936, the situation here was not only no better, but almost worse! "Assimilation of materiel is weak; knowledge of shells and fuses - unsatisfactory

15 - 2255 449

But; [...] the care of the materiel and the exploitation of the materiel is unsatisfactory," Major V. Nesterov from the OKDVA headquarters characterized the Far Eastern artillery commanders in a report dated November 8, 1936 "On the preparation of OKDVA artillery in 1936"; 166 This army had to report the same thing (in the annual report of September 30, 1936) to Moscow! No better than by the end of 1940, things were here on the eve of the purge of the Red Army. "The technical training of the command [command] staff and, first of all, knowledge of their materiel," Blucher's staff officers stated in April 1937 in "Materials for Combat Training of Artillery", "better than last year, but still weak"! 57.

B. Commanders of the engineering troops

Published sources contain almost no information about their learning. Of these, it is only known that the autumn inspection of five districts and the Far Eastern Fleet revealed the "insufficient literacy" of the commanders of the engineering units "in tactical terms" 168.

But in OKDVA (we have no information on other districts), the tactical literacy of the command staff of the engineering troops was insufficient even in the 35th (moreover, this is established not according to the materials of Moscow's inspections, but according to the annual report of the OKDVA "engineering troops" themselves dated October 8, 1935 G., who admitted that his command staff did not sufficiently master the skills of managing their units in conditions of maneuverable combat and did not show flexibility and efficiency in assisting other branches of the military). It is also indicative that in the "pre-repression" 1936, the commanders of the only engineering unit of the three largest military districts covered from this side by our sources - the 44th engineer battalion of the 44th rifle division of the KVO - had a poor idea of the tactical purpose of that that he built!

D. Signal Corps Commanders

Inspection reviews of the troops of the Moscow Military District, ZOVO, KOVO, PribOVO, OdVO, ZakVO, Siberian Military District, ZabvVO and Far Eastern Fleet, conducted in the autumn of 1940, revealed the inability of communications commanders

450

sto take into account the tactical situation in their activities, their insufficient ability to organize radio communications ("especially the radio communications of the interaction of military branches") and the poor ability to fulfill the duties of communications specialists (communications officer, head of the communications center, heads of communications, etc.) in military headquarters!69. And the verification of a number of headquarters and formations of the ZOVO, carried out in late August - early September 1940 by S.K. Timoshenko, revealed that "communication chiefs in divisions and corps do not know how to organize communications and plan the use of communications facilities at all"!70.

We note right away that we were unable to find information about the qualifications of the "pre-repression" communications chiefs of divisions and corps. But the fact that the tactical readiness of the command staff of the signal troops has not yet reached the required level, the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Egorov (whose report on December 8, 1935 at the Military Council was distinguished, as we remember, by softened wording of conclusions!) noted on 35th!7 The inability to link their work with the course of hostilities, with the tactical - signalmen of such a large grouping of the Red Army as OKDVA, even the compilers of the annual report of the signal troops of this latter of October 7, 1935 recognized! As we have shown in chapters 1 and 3, in the largest military districts, the tactical training of command personnel was weak even in the "pre-repression" years of 1936 and the first half of 1937.

The insufficient ability of signalmen commanders to organize radio communications (and especially radio communications for the interaction of military branches) in the Red Army was also evident in the 35th, when, as A.I. Egorov, it was not possible to work out the organization of communication in mobile army groups (unthinkable without the use of radio). The same picture was here in the 36th: as stated by the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22500ss of November 10, 1936, with the beginning of the advance of troops during a battle or operation, "communications are interrupted in most cases"!7?.

The poor preparedness of the communications officers on duty and the heads of the communications centers in the military headquarters was also a reality in the 35th, when it was recognized even by the annual reports of the OKDVA communications troops,

451

advanced (!) CVO of October 7 and! 1, 1935, respectively. It was also characteristic of the Red Army in 1936: from the report of M.N. Tukhachevsky dated October 7, 1936 "On the Combat Training of the Red Army", it is clear that the signalmen of the military headquarters could not independently distinguish important documents from unimportant...

2. TROOPS

A. Foot soldiers

Tactical learning. As V.F. Gerasimenko, the training of a single fighter of the Soviet infantry by the end of 1940 "did not stand at the proper height." Commander of the 6th Army KOVO I.N. Muzychenko was more blunt: "We are getting a poorly trained fighter. [...] The fighter [...] is not trained!"173.

Accordingly, the training of infantry units was also weak then. The autumn tactical exercises of 1940 in the KOVO, ZOVO, other border districts and the Moscow Military District showed that both a single soldier and small subunits are poorly able to conduct close combat, overcome obstacles, block pillboxes and bunkers, and neglect self-digging and camouflage!74 (in particular, the trenches dug during the September exercises by the soldiers of the 6th and 13th rifle divisions of the ZOVO were poorly camouflaged). Apparently, at the exercises in the ZOVO, which was attended by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army K.A. Meretskov, the inability of the fighters to apply to the terrain and move in dashes from cover to cover was also revealed. "A fighter," Meretskov said at a December meeting, "runs not as much as necessary, but until [not. - / A.S.] will feel tired, and he is sometimes forced to stop in open areas under enemy fire! 75.

"Combat formations in an offensive battle," it was noted in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 15119-s of September 27, 1940 on the results of the August-September inspection by the People's Commissar of the ZOVO troops, "have not been worked out at all. There is great crowding and disorder in the movement of the infantry, often the latter advances in a crowd [...]" (the fact that the advancing infantry "is often grouped in a crowd near the tanks",

452

caught the eye of the accompanying S.K. Timoshenko K.A. Meretskov). G.M. Stern!"⁵.

During the autumn tactical exercises in the ZOVO, PriboVO, OdVO, ZakVO, Siberian VO, ZabVO and the Far Eastern Fleet, it was also found that the infantry "poorly carries out reconnaissance and surveillance of the battlefield"¹⁷⁷, and the head of the UBP KA V.N. Kurdyumov pointed out at the December meeting that the troops were not able not only to attack the fortified area, but also to defend it.

The situation did not change even at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. By the end of the winter training period of the 1940/41 academic year, it was stated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense: No. 34678 dated May 17, 1941, "a soldier and a squad [in the winter period, these units were put together. - A.S.] are not taught to act skillfully in the field! ⁷⁸,

However, the training of a single infantryman in the Red Army, as we showed in Chapter 6, was also weak in 1935 (when this soldier "turned out to be incompetent in combat operations"¹⁷⁹), the "poor training of a single soldier" of the Soviet infantry was directly stated and in the 36th (in the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of May 17, 1936), and in the first; "pre-repression" half of 1937 (again, let us quote A.I. Egorov's directive letter dated June 27, 1937: "A single fighter in his training does not have solid skills in dashing, crawling, in choosing a place for shooting, observation, etc. Particularly weak are camouflage and self-entrenchment") ¹⁸⁰.

The fact that, due to the weak individual training of a soldier in the Red Army, "tactically trained poorly" and infantry units - squad, platoon and company - was also stated (pompopolitan of the 3rd rifle corps of the Moscow Military District T.K. Govorukhin) and 1935 -m; the fact that not only "solitary fighters", but also "squads and platoons are undereducated", to the head of the UBL of the Red Army A.I. Sedyakin also caught his eye in 1936 at the famous Belorussian and lesser-known Polesye maneuvers. "Tactical training of troops, especially a soldier, squad, platoon, vehicle, tank platoon, company does not satisfy me," he reported on September 11, 1936 to K.E. Voroshi

453

I catch my impressions of the Belorussian maneuvers...¹⁸¹ By May 1941, the infantry squad was not "learned to act skillfully in the field" - but in the advanced KVO it was the same in the spring of 1936: on May 5 of that year, the political department of the district confessed to Moscow that in the actions of rifle squads in the field exercises "there is not enough camouflage, mobility and dexterity"¹⁸². In the two largest military districts - BVO and OKDVA - this was the case on the eve of the purge of the Red Army. The preparation of the squad and platoon carried out at the beginning of the school year, we read in the annual report of the BVO dated October 15, 1937, "was not completed and has a number of shortcomings," and the chief of staff of the OKDVA commander S.N. Bogomyagkov in May 1937 stated the "insufficient training" of "small units"...¹⁸³

In the autumn of 1940, Soviet infantrymen were bad at close combat, but they were bad at it in 1936 as well. After all, the fact that "the questions of close combat are" with them "Only at the stage of development", that their infantry has only "weak close combat skills", was then forced to admit even the compilers of the annual reports of the two largest districts - KVO, who were trying to rub points in Moscow and OKDVA (October 4 and September 30, 1936, respectively)¹⁸⁴. And in the forward (!) BVO, instead of close combat, the attacking infantry demonstrated "indiscriminate, little realized in its tactical meaning, forward movement" even at the notorious Belarussian maneuvers of 1936 (direct evidence refers only to the 2nd Infantry Division, but the "training of divisions" in the BVO "was distinguished" then by "great uniformity", and in both of its rifle divisions, for which information about the tactical training of fighters for the previous year, 1935 - the 27th and 43rd, - "unbelting" "instead of close combat" existed even then! ⁸⁵). As shown in October 1936 by large tactical exercises near Polotsk, the infantrymen of the BVO were then poorly able to conduct close combat and defense ...

VOKLDVA (information on the KVO and BVO has not been preserved) the "complete lack" of "skills and practical skills in the art of close combat" among the infantrymen was stated even before the very beginning of the mass repressions - in the report of the headquarters of the Special Far East of May 18 1937¹⁸⁶,

454

In the autumn of 1940, Soviet infantry clumsily overcame obstacles, but in the 43rd Infantry Division of the BVO it was the same in October 1936, at a large tactical exercise near Polotsk. And in 1935, OKDVA infantrymen were poorly able to overcome even the obstacles of a field town (not like a real fortified area) ...

In the autumn of 1940, Soviet infantrymen clumsily blocked pillboxes and bunkers, but the soldiers of the 5th and 43rd infantry divisions of the BVO, who stormed the Polotsk fortified area in October 1936 during the exercises, did not know how to block them at all even in the open. broke into embrasures!

In the autumn of 1940, Soviet infantrymen neglected self-digging and camouflage, but A.I. Yegorov reported to the Military Council as early as December 8, 1935¹⁸⁷ (what was behind the word "often" - this is evident from the fact that "a shovel during an offensive" was then neglected even at the "exemplary" Kiev maneuvers - and not where In the spring of 1935, poor camouflage skills were recorded in 4 out of 6 rifle divisions of the UVO/KVO, BVO and OKDVA, the materials of the checks of tactical training of which during this period survived, and in the fall - in 2 of 3 rifle divisions of the BVO checked by the UBP of the Red Army at that time and in both rifle formations of the OKDVA, from which reports for [1935 ...] were preserved.

In the infantry of the advanced (!) KVO, there was no "sufficient camouflage" (see above) in the spring of the "pre-repression" 1936 (at least in the 15th Rifle Corps, which was then withdrawn for the Polesye maneuvers) and at the end of August. In the BVO, then, fighters of 3 out of 5 were poorly camouflaged, and in the OKDVA - 4 out of 7 rifle divisions, the materials of the tactical training checks of which were preserved in 1936 (in all three "Belarusian" they did not even want to dig in ...). Above, we have already quoted from the directive letter of A.I. Yegorov dated June 27, 1937, testifying that "camouflage and self-entrenchment" in the infantry of the Red Army were "particularly weak" and by the beginning of its cleaning.

In the autumn of 1940, the ZOVO infantrymen did not know how to move, applying to the terrain, in dashes, but it was the same

455

in the spring of 1935, when this inability was recorded in both infantry divisions of the BVO (future ZOVO), the materials of inspections of the then tactical training of which were preserved (in the 27th and 37th). In two of the three rifle divisions of the BVO (in the 2nd and 33rd) checked by the UBP of the Red Army at that time, this art was not mastered even by July of the "pre-repression" 1936.

In the autumn of 1940, in the ZOVO and Far Eastern Fleet, the overcrowding of the combat formations of the advancing infantry was noted, but it was noted in the BVO and OKDVA and in 1936 (respectively, in 3 out of 5 and 3 out of 7 of their rifle divisions, for which the materials of tactical training checks were preserved for that year). At the March maneuvers of this year in Primorye, "great crowding of battle formations" was also recorded in units of three other Far Eastern divisions, and at the September Belarusian "crowds from squads" instead of sparse chains, even the "shock" 2nd Infantry Division attacked (apparently, the others attacked in the same way: after all, the training of the divisions of the BVO was distinguished then by "great uniformity")¹⁸⁸. The "insufficient training" of a single fighter and small units in both the BVO and OKDVA was noted, as we have seen, in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937 - which means that the combat formations of the attacking infantry should have been crowded there even before the very the beginning of the purge of the Red Army ...

In the autumn of 1940, Soviet infantrymen (including those in the ZOVO and IVDVF)) were "poorly" able to conduct reconnaissance and observe the battlefield - but in the Primorsky OKDVA group (the future 1st Red Banner Army of the Far Eastern Fleet), as well as, at least, in one of the three rifle divisions of the Amur Group (the future 2nd Red Banner Army of the Far Eastern Fleet), they "weakly" did this in 1935 too! The infantrymen of the OKDVA (as even the annual report of this army of September 30, 1936 was forced to admit) were distinguished by "loose skills in conducting reconnaissance" in 1936¹⁸⁹. Of the eight infantry divisions of the BVO/ZOVO, the tactical training of whose infantrymen is known in 1936, two (the 2nd and 43rd) did not know how to conduct reconnaissance, and fighters (33rd and 37th) - should not have been able to. As is clear from the annual report of this district of October 15, 1937, the infantrymen of the BVO "weakly worked" even before the start of the purge of the Red Army ... 130 Judging by the fact that from observation

456

deniya (see above the same quote from A.I. Yegorov's letter dated June 27, 1937) then it was bad throughout the Red Army, it was "poorly worked out" among the OKDVA infantrymen; in a number of formations of this army in the spring of 1937, they also complained about the inability of the soldiers to conduct reconnaissance ...

The inability of the infantrymen to act in the defense of the fortified area was also manifested not only in the fall of 1940, but also in the fall of 1936, when the infantrymen of the 27th Infantry Division of the BVO, who defended the Polotsk fortified area during large tactical exercises near Polotsk, poorly able to conduct close combat in defense.

Fire training. Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army K.A. Meretskov rated it as "bad" at the December meeting. Only the infantry of the Moscow Military District for shooting from all types of small arms then had "good", but in the Far Eastern Fleet, 47 of the 64 checked units received a "positive assessment" (units and subunits of the 1st Red Banner Army of the Far Eastern Fleet, Meretskov noted, "confidently shoot from rifles and - kovy machine guns"). On the other hand, in the PriVO, out of 15 units tested for fire training, 9 fired back, in the Ural Military District (UrVO) - 15 out of 18, in the LVO - 25 out of 30, in the ZOVO - 51 out of 54!¹⁹¹

Of course, all fire training assessments obtained in 1940 cannot be unconditionally trusted: at least many of the "positive", as before, could only be obtained due to eyewash in the organization of firing and / or falsification of their results - Resovannye authorities. But even if we assume that the good results shown in 1940 by the infantry of the Moscow Military District and the Far Eastern Fleet are overestimated, then deterioration in comparison with the "pre-repression" period will still not work! After all, in 1935, the fire training of the infantry of the Moscow Military District was, according to the 2nd department of the General Staff of the Red Army, not at an excellent and not even at a good, but at an "elementary" level!¹⁹² From a statement made on November 21, 1937 on Military Council of the MVO commanders Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny (about the fact that in most parts of the district, fire training "and continues to remain [highlighted by me. - / A.S.] at a very low level"! ¹⁹³) it is clear that it was exactly the same in

457

1936, and in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937... In the predecessor of the Far East Fleet - OKDVA - the fire skills of an infantryman throughout the entire "pre-repression" period were also unsatisfactory...

In 1940, the fighters of the 1st Red Banner Army of the Far Eastern Fleet "confidently fired from rifles and heavy machine guns", but in the "pre-repression" 1935 (as even the compilers of the OKDVA report for that year admitted) there was real automatism in actions< Far Eastern infantrymen did not achieve it with weapons. That "the bulk of the fighters were completely unsatisfactorily worked out in terms of fire," the OKDVA headquarters had to state even at the end of the "pre-repression" 1936¹⁹⁴. What kind of "confident shooting from heavy machine guns" could we then talk about if in the training (!) Battalions tested in May 1936, representing five of the ten rifle divisions of the OKDVA Primrgroup (the future 1st Army of the Far Eastern Fleet), easel machine gunners were poorly able to

even to prepare the "maxim" for firing (not to mention finding and eliminating delays), if the training battalions of the sixth division did not know how to do this even in October, and in the line battalion of the seventh division checked in August they could not even properly load and aim a machine gun?

And what kind of "confident shooting from rifles and heavy machine guns" could we talk about in the First, "pre-repression" half of 1937, even if the May and June checks showed the OKDVA headquarters that "the main practical is unsteady, superficial"? !95

In the ZOVO in 1940, 94.4% of the inspected rifle units shot "failedly", but the results shown by the infantry of the BVO (future ZOVO) in the "pre-repression" May 1937, when for shooting from a rifle "bad" received 64.2% of the district's rifle regiments, for firing from a light machine gun - 88.1%, for firing from an easel - 92.9%¹⁹⁶ - howling training received unsatisfactory). However, as we showed in Chapter 1, the BVO infantry's fire training was extremely low throughout the entire "pre-repression" period.

458

The fire skill of the infantry of the Red Army as a whole in 1940 was "bad", but wasn't it bad in the "pre-repression" 1935, when in 4 military districts out of 10 for which there is relevant information (Moscow, North Caucasian, Volga and Siberian), it, according to the 2nd department of the Eestab of the Red Army, was "at the elementary level"¹⁹⁷, but in at least three (KVO, BVO and OKDVA) it was, as we showed in chapter 1, either unsatisfactory or close to it? |

Wasn't it bad even in the "pre-repression" 1936, when live firing of units was carried out in an environment that had nothing to do with real combat, and the individual shooting skills of Soviet infantrymen, as shown by the materials of the three largest military districts (KVO, BVO and OKDVA), obviously did not reach the M.N. Tukhachevsky of October 7, 1936 "On the combat training of the Red Army" a satisfactory assessment?

Wasn't it bad even in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937, when in the three largest and in the three following in terms of the number of troops (MVO, LVO and KhVO) military districts it was (as we showed in chapter 1) "at a low" or "very low" level?

B. Tankers

Tactical learning. Autumn exercises, K.A. Meretskov, showed "satisfactory tactical training of tank units"¹⁹⁸. However, in his next phrase, the chief [of the Staff of the Red Army] admitted something that did not fit in with such an assessment (but which, nevertheless, was also stated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. and in a report made at the December meeting by the head of the GABTU KA Ya.N. Fedorenko), that tank units are poorly able to interact with infantry. "The main shortcoming in the actions of tanks," Meretskov pointed out, "is that they unfriendly precede the infantry: some of the tanks lag behind during the attack, while others are far ahead, as a result of which the interaction of tanks with infantry on the battlefield does not work"! ⁹⁹.

459

The second major flaw in the tactical training of tank crew members (noted both in November Order No. 0306 and in Ya.N. Fedorenko's December report) was their inability to navigate the terrain and observe the battlefield—and, consequently, to conduct intelligence. "You let the tank go on reconnaissance," the head of the GABTU KA described, "it will pass around the forest, the swamp, the crew will get out and do not know where the south is, where the north is" ... ²⁰⁰ About the fact that his "tank reconnaissance" is "very weak", reported at the December meeting and the command troops of the Far East Fleet G.M. Stern?

However, the tactical training of tank units in the Red Army was no more than satisfactory even in 1935, when only units operating (for the sake of saving motor resources) "with a designated materiel", i.e., showed good results in exercises. reduced by 3-4 times against the regular strength ("The rise of units as a whole," rightly stated in the annual report of the armored troops of the OKDVA dated October 19, 1935, "will undoubtedly give a slight decrease in the indicators of crowding [...] »202).

The tactical training of Soviet tank units was no more than satisfactory in 1936. After all, in one of the three largest Soviet military districts (OKDVA), it was then satisfactory (the grades received in the fall of the 36th for the tactical training of 80% of the Far Eastern tank units were approximately equally divided between "good", "satisfactory" and "unsatisfactory"203), and in the other two (KVO and BVO) - in which, by the way, more than half of all tanks of the Red Army consisted - unsatisfactory. ("Tactical training [...] of a vehicle, a tank platoon, a company does not satisfy me," said A.I. - ziy BVO - in those four that transferred a company to the 4th mechanized brigade - it was "weak" and, according to the definition of the Belarusian tankmen themselves: 204 on the Polesie and Shepetovsky maneuvers of the KVO, the battle formations of the attacking tanks were upset in the same way, as in the Belarusian ones; units of the mechanized brigades withdrawn to the Shepetovka maneuvers are bad,

460

as commander of the 1st rank I.E. Yakir, knew how to act in close combat; the overall combat training of the 45th Mechanized Corps of the KVO in July 1936 was assessed as unsatisfactory...)

The tactical training of Soviet tank units was no more than satisfactory in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937, when (as stated in A.I. Egorov's directive letter dated June 27, 1937) there were no even platoons have been put together (and in such major military districts as the BVO and OKDVA, even crews!).

The ability of tank units to interact with infantry units was weak not only at the end of 1940, but also in the spring of 1935, when even the units of a separate tank battalion of the "shock" 44th rifle division of the KVO and its tanket battalion [The 32nd Infantry Regiment of this division (designed precisely and only to support the infantry!) was recorded "a complete lack of ideas on issues of combined arms combat...205

The ability of Soviet tank units to interact with infantry units was also weak in 1936, when, even at the famous Belarusian maneuvers, the vehicles of a separate tank battalion of the "shock" 2nd Infantry Division of the BVO (just like in the exercises of 1940) "lagged behind the infantry chronically", and the tank battalions of the 7th, 46th and 60th rifle divisions of the advanced (!) KVO participating in the Polesky maneuvers were not trained at all to interact with the infantry!206

According to the directive letter A.I. Yegorov dated June 27, 1937 (confirmed here, in particular, by the documents of the KVO and OKDVA), the Soviet tank crews did not work out interaction with other branches of the military even by the beginning of the purge of the Red Army.

Observation skills from a tank, as stated on December 8, 1935 at the Military Council by the same A.I. Yegorov (and as confirmed by the annual reports of the KVO and the armored forces of the OKDVA dated October 11 and 19, 1935, respectively), the tankers of the Red Army were also weak in the 35th. "Out of hand bad," as M.N. Tukhachevsky, they were from 36-m207, "The mediators at the tank units complained

461

that the young tank commander observes very poorly from the tank," emphasized I.E. Yakir⁶⁸. And not only young - the chief of staff of the 3rd tank battalion of the 17th mechanized brigade of the "Reds" senior lieutenant Kolomeets led two of his companies 200 meters to the "blue" T-26s and only then noticed these last ones (which in a real battle, more than one of his BT-7s would have been shot long ago - and most of all, the tank of the chief of staff himself, which stood out like an elk antler with a handrail antenna). Another time, the 17th mechanized brigade, having the task of attacking the 15th, attacked from an empty place - the commanders of its BT-7 did not notice the "blue" T-26s. On September 13, 1936, the 2nd tank battalion of the 15th mechanized brigade dealt the same blow into the void: the commanders of its T-26 did not see where the squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry Division of the "Reds" were located. .. Finally, from the directive letter of A.I. Egorov dated June 27, 1937 (confirmed here, in particular, by the documents of the BVO and OKDVA), it is clear that the Soviet tank crews did not work out the observation from the tank even before the start of the purge of the Red Army,

The inability of tankers to navigate the terrain in the BVO - which consisted of about a quarter of all tanks of the Red Army! - was a common occurrence in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937. And in 1936 (at least in 2 of its 7 tank formations - in the 1st heavy tank and 5th mechanized brigades), the tankers of this district could not navigate the rough terrain even on carefully rehearsed Belarusian maneuvers!

The inability of tankers to conduct reconnaissance in the Red Army was manifested both in September 1935 (during maneuvers in the Primorsky OKDVA group), and in September 1936 (during the famous Belarusian maneuvers)... As stated in the directive letter of A.I. . Yegorov dated June 27, 1937 (confirmed here, in particular, by the order of the OKDVA commander on the results of the winter training period of the 1936/37 academic year), the lack of practice in reconnaissance for Soviet tankers was typical even before the start of the purge The Red Army ... (As you can see, the intelligence of the Far Eastern tankers was also "very weak" not only in 1940, when the Far Eastern Fleet complained about this, but even before the mass repressions.)

462

Fire training. The autumn inspections of 1940, carried out by both the district command and Moscow, showed that in most tank formations, tankers shoot "good" and "excellent", but in 20% of formations and units, individual shooting skills turned out to be poor. In addition, in the tank troops of the Red Army, live firing as part of units was not practiced at all? ®.

But even if the results of individual tank firing in the autumn of 1940 are overestimated, they still will not be lower than those shown in the "pre-repression" 1935, when (as the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army himself admitted on December 8, 1935 at the Military Council), Even knowing in advance what and where targets would appear before them, the tankers of the Red Army could not get a rating higher than "quite satisfactory"? 19. The annual reports of the CVO and the Political Directorate of the BVO (dated | and October 21, 1935, respectively) also speak volumes here. In every possible way praising the skills of their tankers, for some reason these reports are silent about their successes in fire training ...

No higher than in 1940, the results of individual tank firing should have been in the "pre-repression" 1936 - when in one of the three largest military districts (KVO) they turned out to be unsatisfactory even according to its own annual report (from a machine gun, its compilers admitted, tankers of the KVO shoot only at "satisfactory", and from a cannon - even "weaker" ... 2!), and in another (OKDVA) tank units received only "satisfactory" in fire training .. .

No higher than in 1940, the results of individual tank firing should have been in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937, when the tankers of the KVO had fire training, according to the order of the commanders of the district No. 0100 dated June 22 1937, "at a low level"?! 2, and in almost all the then tank units of the BVO covered by sources, the firing results were also unsatisfactory.

The tankers of the Red Army also did not work out live firing as part of the units, not only in 1940, but also (as it is clear from A.I. Yegorov's directive letter dated June 27, 1937) before the start of the purge of the Red Army.

463

Technical training. "It is noted," K.A. Meretskov, "quite satisfactory training of drivers for driving in mountainous, wooded and marshy terrain"?13.

If this assessment was not based on the results shown by individual, specially trained crews, then in comparison with the "pre-repression" period, there was generally obvious progress! Indeed, in the summer of 1935, even in the Primorsky group of OKDVA (which was to fight in such an area), they were not able to drive a tank in a mountainous-wooded-swampy area, and in the autumn both in Primgrupp and in the BVO this wooded landscape confidently drive a car through forest could only be an absolute minority of driver-mechanics - those whose vehicles were only taken out at that time for tactical exercises ... In all tank units and formations of the OKDVA, for which the relevant information was preserved (2nd and tank battalions of the 40th, 59th and 66th rifle divisions), most of the "mechanic drivers" did not master driving in mountainous wooded areas even in the "pre-repression" 1936. But at the tactical exercises organized in June 1937 with the new command troops of the KVO I.F. Fedko, it turned out that the "mechanic drivers" of this district, and by the beginning of the purge of the Red Army, were "not trained, not taught to walk in a wooded area", that they generally "walk only on level ground, and if the terrain becomes a little more difficult, they will prevent - Actions are taken with great difficulty. Of course, on August 4, 1937, at a meeting of political workers of the Red Army, Corps Commissar E.A. Shchadenko, "we were shown samples of athletes such [So in the document. - A.S.], who jumped the marsh obstacles well, but when the whole unit was accepted, it turned out that it was not prepared"?14. (Recall that in these three districts - KVO, BVO and OKDVA - there were most of all the tanks of the Red Army.) However, what can we say about the ability to overcome forests and swamps, if, according to the directive letter of A.I. Yegorova dated June 27, 1937, tankers not only in the KVO, but in the entire then Red Army in general, "mastered driving only on flat and slightly rough terrain"?15

464

B. Gunners

In terms of the training of a single gunner fighter in the fall of 1940, only artillery reconnaissance officers (with them, as N.A. objects" and did not have "observation skills"). At least in the Far Eastern Fleet, the ability of personnel to equip firing positions in engineering terms and camouflage them was "especially weak" at that time²¹⁵,

As for the training of artillery units, the autumn inspection of the PribOVO, OdVO, ZakVO, Siberian VO, ZabvVO and Far Eastern Fleet revealed that divisions (as well as regiments) were weakly cohesive in their artillery. But the artillery of the 99th Rifle Division of the KOVO and the 123rd Rifle Division of the LVO demonstrated "highly organized and coordinated" gun crews during the September tactical exercises, which made it possible to develop a good rate of fire¹⁷,

It was not possible to find information about the degree of training of the "pre-repression" artillery scouts, but the artillery observers, as follows from the speech of the chief of artillery of the Red Army commander N.N. Voronov at the Military Council on November 22, 1937, were poorly prepared even before the purge of the Red Army.

According to V.N. Kozlovsky, "a common phenomenon" in 1935;

OKDVA in March 1937, was everywhere weak and in the last before the start of the purge of the Red Army months.

As for the density of divisions and artillery regiments, it is significant that both the "pre-repression" BVO divisions covered by sources from this side (from the 33rd, which in 1940, by the way, turned out to be part of the PribOVO mentioned above, and the 37th artillery regiments) were in 1936 they were not knocked together (for the division of the 37th regiment, this is established by the inability of its headquarters to manage the division in combat

465

situation)... In the OKDVA in the fall of 1936, two-thirds of the divisions—those that were engaged not in combat training, but in construction—"didn't exist at all as trained combat units"219

The 123rd Rifle Division was formed only in 1939, and no information has been preserved about the level of readiness of the "pre-repression" gun crews of the 99th Rifle Division (and any other formations of the Kiev District). <

G. Sappers

An autumn inspection of five districts and the Far East Fleet showed that the training of their engineering units was "mediocre" and that "corps engineer battalions stand out for the better in terms of training"?20. Concretizing this general assessment at the December meeting, the command troops of the Far East Fleet G.M. Stern pointed out that his sappers had achieved "significant success" in the field of engineering support for defense, but "they are not able to perform their most important tasks in offensive combat"22!. A similar situation was apparently also characteristic of the engineering troops of other districts; Thus, in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 151 19-sot on September 27, 1940, it was noted that the sapper units of the ZOVO, which equipped the foreground of the defensive zone for the September exercises, "in all cases deserve a positive assessment", but the pontoon units "They still don't work well. Bridges are built very slowly"?22,

But in OKDVA / DVF (information on other districts could not be found), the training of units of engineering troops was no more than mediocre in the 35th (if only because of the OKDVA from 8 ok - October 1935 "insufficient field training"? 23 and poor mastery of sapper business). And in the "pre-repression" 36th IW OKDVA, and in one of the two engineer battalions of the KVO and BVO, whose skills are estimated by surviving sources (in a separate engineer battalion of the 44th rifle division of the KVO), this skill was assessed not even as mediocre but how unsatisfactory! In the KVO (there is no information on the BVO and OKDVA), it was at best mediocre

466

and by the time the purge of the Red Army began: the section "Tactics of the engineering troops", was stated in the order of the command troops of the KVO No. 0100 dated June 22, 1937, "it was not passed in the engineering troops" ...

In 1940, sappers of the Far East Fleet mastered the engineering equipment of the defense - but in the "pre-repression" 1935, most of them (which was part of the OKDVA Primrgroup) served as barriers, according to the annual report of the OKDVA "inzhtroysk" themselves, worked poorly . And in the "pre-repression" 1936, this low level also decreased: as stated by the "Summary of the results of the combat training of OKDVA troops [...] for 8 1/, months of 1936", compiled at the army headquarters, "general the state of training of engineering troops "-" unsatisfactory "...225

In 1940, sappers of the Far Eastern Fleet were not able to perform "their most important tasks in offensive combat," but with such a task as building bridge crossings, they (as even the compilers of the OKDVA annual report from 11 October 1935) did not cope even in the 35th. And some of them (sappers of the Amur OKDVA group) did not know how to solve another engineering problem.

to ensure the offensive — the laying of columns and roads in mountainous wooded areas... worse!

In the autumn of 1940, the ZOVO sappers coped well with the installation of barriers, but in the only sapper unit of the "pre-repression" BVO / ZOVO, about the training of which at least some information has been preserved - a separate sapper battalion of the 37th rifle division, this is a matter, even according to the annual report of the division itself dated October 1, 1936, they mastered only "satisfactorily" ...

D. Signalmen

From the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0360 dated December 20, 1940, stating that, according to the results of the autumn inspection of military districts, "the training of communications units can only be considered satisfactory

467

in terms of individual training of certain categories of specialists", it can be understood that the training of these parts was then unsatisfactory. However, speaking about the rank and file, the order noted only the "insufficiency" of practical skills of signalmen in working in difficult weather conditions and at night, in determining and repairing damage to telephone and telegraph sets and on lines, poor preparedness of telegraph operators and telephonists, serving certain types of equipment and telephone exchanges and the poor performance of telegraph linemen ("lines are built badly and carelessly")?26. V.A. Anfilov also points out that before the start of the war, "the personnel of the communications units were insufficiently prepared for the operation of radio facilities"?27.

The "pre-repression" state of affairs with most of the aspects of the training of signalmen mentioned in order No. in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 00105 dated November 3, 1936 on the results of the 1935/36 academic year and in the directive letter to A.I. Egorova dated June 27, 1937 on the results of the winter period of study of the 1936/37 academic year - the distortion of transmitted information by signalmen.

In OKDVA (we have practically no information on other districts), telegraph linemen in May of the "pre-repression" 1936 as a whole (as checks in a number of units showed) were prepared "good", but already in the fall of that year their training was no better than in 1940: the wire lines they laid, as a rule, did not provide stable communications. Judging by the documents of the units of the Special Far East, they did not work better in the first, "pre-repression" half of 1937...

At the beginning of 1941, Soviet radio operators were "insufficiently prepared for the operation of radio equipment," but even in 1935, even in the advanced KVO, radio stations were kept in such a way that they were not constantly ready for work, and in the advanced BVO, so that 45% of regimental radios did they require repairs by the end of the year?28. And in the "pre-repression" 1936 in the KVO materiel

468

radio equipment was poorly known even in the elite 44th rifle division and in that only part of the communications of this district (a separate communications battalion of the 15th rifle corps), from which such truthful sources as the protocols of Komsomol meetings were preserved ... In two Of the three signal units of the BVO (separate signal battalions of the 16th Rifle Corps and the 2nd and 81st Rifle Divisions) tested in 1936 by the UBP of the Red Army, the radio operators either did not know the radio station very well, or had a poor command of the transmission technique. And only in the third largest district - OKDVA - the knowledge of the radio station and the skills of working on it were assessed then as a whole as "satisfactory". However, the only test of the training of OKDVA radio operators, the materials of which have been preserved, was carried out in March 1937, in the communications units of the 69th artillery

1st Infantry Division, showed that the battery radio operators not only did not know the material part of the radio station, but were also unable to set it up ... And in the KVO and BVO on the eve of the purge of the Red Army, the ability to operate radio equipment, as noted in the order by the KVO I.E. . Yakira No. 051 dated April 7, 1937, and as is clear from the maintenance of radio equipment by BVO signalmen, as bad as in the KVO, was frankly unsatisfactory (i.e., perhaps even worse than at the beginning of 1941- th).

As you can see, in the last months before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the combat training of the Red Army was no worse than before the repressions of 1937-1938. In some aspects, even better!

NOTES

1 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). M., 1994. S. 224-225.

2 Ibid. S. 194.

3 Ibid. T. 12 (1). M ..., 1993. S. 82, 16. The fact that Meretskov, who actually spoke about the August and September inspection exercises in general, had in mind precisely the exercise in the 6th Infantry Division, is clear from the fact that the case he described took place when overcoming the forefield of the defensive zone, and overcoming the forefield in August-September

469

it was during the exercises of the 6th division (which Meretskov also personally observed).

4 Russian State Military Archive (hereinafter - RGVA). F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 40.

5 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12v.

6 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 61 vol.

7 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 40.

3 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12.

9 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 589. L. 176.

0 7am same. F, 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 11.

1! There. F: 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 117.

2 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 56-55 (sheets of the file are numbered in descending order), 39; F. 37464. op.1. D. 11. L. 63.

13 7am same. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 152.

14 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 575. L. 69.

15 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 166.

16 Ibid. F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 122v., 249v., 61v.

17 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19.L. 116.

18 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 12; F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 52.

19 Ibid. F. 900. Op. 1. D. 269. L. 51.

20 See: Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 12 (1). pp. 31, 58.

21 Ibid. S. 35.

22 Ibid. T. 13 (2-1). S. 194.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid. pp. 224-225.

25 Ibid. T. 12 (1). S. 368.

26 Ibid. S. 41.

27 Ibid. T. 13 (2-1). S. 271.

28 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 325.

29 Ibid. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 32-33.

30 Ibid. D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 rev.).

31 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 41. L. 38.

32 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 18v.

33 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 11.

At 7am. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 1049. L. 105.

36 Ibid. F. 40334. Op. 1. D. 204. L. 58.

37 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36, D. 2611. L. 249 vol. (1 rev.).

38 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 614. L. 89v. (the first of two sheets of this case, which have the number 89).

39 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 60.

4 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 16.

41 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 361.

42 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 11 and rev.

43 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 151-152.

44 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 24v.-25.

45 Ibid. D. 574. L. 103. .

4% Ibid. F. 25880. Op. 4. D. 45. L. 374.

470

47 Ibid. L. 389.

48 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12v.

49 Ibid. D. 213. L. 56, 58.

- 56 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. November 1937 Documents and materials. M., 2006. S. 221; RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2529. L. 151-152; F. 33879. Ol. 1.D. 614. L. 87v. (the second of two sheets of this case, having the number 87).
- 5! Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T, [2` (1). S. 35.
- 52 Ibid. T. 13 (2-1). S. 194.
- 53 Ibid. T. 12 (1). P. 83. In the transcript of Stern's report, the 31st Cavalry Division is erroneously named the 3rd.
- 54 Ibid. T. 13 (2-1). S. 225.
- 55 Ibid. T. 12 (1). S. 49.
- 56 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 361.
- 57 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12v.
- 58 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 36. L. 18.
- 59 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 406, 40, 43; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 574. L. 20, 135, 136.
- 60 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 1460. L. 230v.; D. 583. L. 9; D. 575. L. 128.
- 61 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611. L. 249v. (1 Ob.).
- 62 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 584. L. 26v.
- 63 Ibid. D. 573. L. 11; F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 82-83.
- 64 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 587. L. 21, 50; D. 582. L. 2; D. 575. L. 130; F. 36393. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 249v.
- 65 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 93.
- 66 Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, November 1937, p. 30. _
- 67 RGVA. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 43.
- 68 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19. L. 156, 169.
- 69 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 41. L. 38.
- 70 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 16, D. 19. L. 142; F. 9. Op. 29. D. 268. L. 133.
- P There. F. 9. Op. 29. D. 213. L. 362.
- 72 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1.D. 573. L. 8.
- 73 Ibid., F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 202. L. 12, 11.
- 74 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 67; F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 583. L. 6.
- 75 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203.L. 60.
- 76 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 29. D.213.L. 362, 40.
- 77 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 214. L. 55; F. 37464. Op. 1.D. 12. L. 48, 57. 67.

78 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 2611.L. 250(2).

79 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 12 (1). S. 36.

80 Ibid. T. 13 (2-1). S. 193.

1 Cited. lo: Ayafilov V.A. The road to the tragedy of the forty-first year. M., 1997. S. 87.

82 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). S. 17.

83 Ibid. T. 12 (1). S. 312.

471

84 Ibid. S. 26.

85 Ibid. T. 13 (2-1). S. 193.

86 Ibid. pp. 177, 194; T. 12 (1). pp. 32, 49, 75, 78; Sandalov L.M. We fought to the death // Military Historical Journal. 1988. No. 10. P. 12.

87 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). pp. 225-226.

88 RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 204, 184.

8 Vol. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 30.

% 7am same. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 203. L. 62.

I am there. L. 59.

92 Ibid. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 153.

93 Ibid. L. 204.

34 Ibid. F. 9. op.36. D. 2529. L. 169.

95 Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2-1). S. 177.

%RGVA. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 4227. L. 33.`

97 Ibid. F. 37464. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 100.

98 Ibid. F. 900. Op. 1.D. 269. L. 170.

*RGVA. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 196. L. 204.

100 Ibid. F. 33879. Op. 1. D. 584. L. 28v.-29.

101 7am same. F. 31983. Op. 2. D. 213. L. 47.

102 7am same. F. 4. Op. 16. D. 19.L.7.

103 Ibid. F. 9. Op. 36. D. 1759. L. 88.

194 Ibid. F. 4. Op. 15a. D. 422. L. 34v.

105 Ibid. F. 62. Op. 3. D. 41. L. 39.

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Conclusion

Thus, during the mass repressions of 1937-1939. and after them, the training of the commanders, headquarters and troops of the Red Army did not deteriorate at all, but remained at the same, very low level (in some aspects, it seems, it even improved! Apparently, we can talk about some improvement by the end of 1940 - the beginning of 1941 compared with the "pre-repression" level of technical knowledge of artillery commanders, field training of tank drivers and special training of a sapper fighter and sapper units...). The only deterioration that we discovered—the inability of the new senior command staff to make adequate decisions in 1938 when the situation changed in the course of the operation that had begun—turned out to be a transient phenomenon. By 1941, as is clear from the instruction of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503138/op of January 25, 1941, "On the Results and Tasks of the Operational Training of the High Command Staff of the Red Army," which analyzed in detail the shortcomings of the training of the highest command staff, it was no longer noticeable.

Accordingly, the generally accepted opinion about the deterioration of the combat skills of the Red Army as a result of mass repressions in 1937-1938. is erroneous. We have to admit that it was not only the German military attache in the USSR, E. Köstring, who reported on August 22, 1938, that "due to the liquidation of a large number of senior officers who improved their art by decades of practice and theoretical studies, the Red Army paralyzed in its operational capabilities" and that "the absence of senior and generally experienced commanders will adversely affect the training of troops for a long time"! (His conclusions were purely speculative: after all,

476

"Köstring's judgments about the Red Army were based almost exclusively on his own observations and the results of his study of the Soviet press," and what Soviet high headquarters, what military unit could he observe, if he himself admitted, that "it is more likely that an Arab in burnous will pass unnoticed through Berlin than a foreign agent through Russia"? What could he learn from the censored press of a totalitarian state?) It was not only the Czechoslovak military delegation that was mistaken, which visited the USSR in October 1937 with the aim of "checking the state of preparation of the Red Army" and reporting that "the flow of mass repressions" "causes fear regarding [...] its inability to conduct offensive operations and further due to the lack of tactical and strategic experience [at. - A.S.] new young commanders. (The depth of this delegation's acquaintance with the consequences of the purge of the Red Army is already eloquently evidenced by the fact that, according to it, "young commanders" "became commanders of regiments by the thousands in the rank of lieutenant" ... 3) Such authoritative experts as representatives of the Soviet top command staff of the 1930s and 1940s: General of the Army D.G. Pavlov (who declared on May 13, 1940 at a meeting of the commission of the Main Military Council of the Red Army that, as the war with Finland demonstrated, "the operation of 1937-1938" had "sat up" the army), Major General V.S. Tamruchi and Major General of Artillery A.A. Weiss (who claimed

in 1941 that "the retreat of the Red Army is the result of the 1937-1938 arrests, as a result of which the army [...] was left without experienced command personnel"), General of the Army A.I. Eremenko (who noted between 1945 and 1947 in the manuscript of his memoirs that "the extermination of military personnel before the war" "had an effect on the combat capability of the army")⁴. We have to recognize as false even the extremely clear statement of the Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, who emphasized in 1965 or 1966 that "if we compare the training of our personnel before the events of these years, in 1936, and after these events, in 1939, it must be said that the level of combat training of the troops has fallen very much"

But if the training of the Red Army did not worsen after its purge, one cannot consider the repressions to which he was subjected in 1937—

477

1938 v. command and command staff of the Red Army, one of the reasons (and even more so the main reason) for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941 (2 also unsuccessful actions of the Soviet troops in the battles on Khasan in 1938 and in the war with Finland 1939-1940 1v.).

But why, then, was the combat training of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War (as we could already see in Chapter 7) low? In what year, if not in 1937, should we look for the roots of this state of affairs? We seem to be able to answer this question as well, but more on that in the next book.

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Table of contents

Introduction... eeee nina nnn ah, 5 Chapter 1. AT THE BEGINNING OF MASS REPRESSIONS

(second half of 1937).....eeeeenineinn, 31 Chapter 2. IN THE BATTLE AT LAKE KHASAN

(July-August 1938).....

REPRESSIONS (autumn 1938) ... ninninn, 186 Chapter 4. IN THE BATTLE ON THE RIVER Khalkhin-Gol

(May-September 1939) her reading 244 Chapter 5. IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST POLAND (September-October 1939) ze eneineina 287 Chapter 6

(November 1939 - March 1940) her care 311 Chapter 7. IN THE LAST PRE-WAR MONTHS

(August 1940 - May 1941) en nezyaninnie 406

Conclusion ani ane yen inenteya 476

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